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Preface 
This dissertation partially resulted from my experiences while working for the 
parliamentary committee on Dutch immigrant integration policy. National and 
local civil servants appeared to have similar motives for cooperating with even the 
smallest immigrant organisations, although their practices were at odds with the 
political ideology of that time. In trying to square the circle between these 
bureaucratic motives and the reigning political ideology, I became more generally 
interested in bureaucratic motives for working with interest groups. This ongoing 
challenge to systematically explain variations in bureaucracy-interest group 
relations made me persist until this dissertation was finished.  
Several years lie in between that initial moment of sheer fascination and the 
final proofs of this book. With the advantage of hindsight, I would compare these 
intermediate years to what evolutionary biology calls ‘punctuated equilibrium’. In 
the agenda-setting literature, this concept explains variation in political attention as 
a result of sudden turmoil. Every now and then in a dissertation project, there is 
indeed change and a leap forward. Contrary to what punctuated equilibrium theory 
predicts, however, real change does not occur in the short periods of turmoil. Real 
change in doing a PhD occurs in the periods of stability, because they confront you 
with your intellectual and personal abilities far more than the euphoria a leap 
forward produces.  
The question is thus how to survive these, sometimes uncomfortable, stable 
periods? The answer is simple. I couldn’t have lived through them without the 
support of many people. First of all, I would like to thank the civil servants and the 
representatives of the interest groups who participated in this study. This research 
would not have been possible without them, and I hope I generated some valuable 
insights in return.  
My promotor, David Lowery, has been an invaluable supervisor in many ways. I 
have benefited from his suggestions and ideas during this research project and his 
constructive feedback on earlier versions of the manuscript. More generally, his 
advice showed me how an academic could combine both analytical rigour and 
tolerance for the various traditions in doing scientific research. 
Many other people were willing to help during the various stages of this 
dissertation project. Frits van der Meer and Trui Steen offered useful feedback on 
early drafts of the manuscript. Nanette Kistemaker’s assistance in collecting the 
data for the Dutch interest group survey was particularly helpful, and without 
Martin Gagner, the Swedish case would have been impossible. Marcel 
Hanegraaff’s good sense of humour and enthusiasm stimulated me to pursue a 
more elaborate data-collection strategy and made it much more enjoyable at the 
same time. Constructive feedback from the individual members of the PhD 
committee helped to improve the manuscript in significant ways. And, last but not 
least, I’m very grateful for Anne Messer’s meticulous and stimulating editing of the 
final manuscript.  
 
Preface 
viii 
Several colleagues ensured that I enjoyed a pleasant working environment and 
activities other than only those related to the dissertation. I appreciated the 
teamwork offered by the colleagues of the Agenda Setting Project. Co-teaching with 
Anne-Greet Keizer was a good experience, as well as the many talks we had about 
doing research. The coffee breaks and a fine Budapesti co-chairing experience with 
Joost Berkhout were both pleasant and welcome academic breaks. The meetings 
with my fellow PNN-board members offered a stimulating and enjoyable 
experience outside yet related to academics.  
Roommates are truly important in creating a stimulating working environment, 
and I’ve been very lucky with my roommates at the fifth floor in Leiden, Marleen 
Romeijn and Caspar van den Berg. I enjoyed all those times we laughed together 
about what life sometimes has to offer, and I have benefited from this positive 
atmosphere in several ways. In addition, the joint venture with Caspar, both in 
teaching and conducting surveys, was a stimulating co-workers’ experience amid 
the solo expedition of doing a PhD.  
The final revisions of the manuscript were made after I joined the political 
science department of the University of Antwerp. I appreciate the warm welcome I 
received from my colleagues of the International and European Politics research 
group, in particular Jan Beyers, and I very much look forward to conducting some 
fascinating research together.  
 
Above all, this dissertation would not have been possible without my family and 
friends. Although my friends often wondered whether it was really worth it, they 
nevertheless fully supported me in this endeavour. Ilse and Lennart were exactly 
the down-to-earth and enjoyable persons with whom you want to prepare an 
important day in your life. My family provided me with an encouraging and warm 
environment, even though the last few years were tied to life’s unforeseen 
challenges. Ab showed me the benefits of constructive criticism during the short 
period of time I knew him, while Petra’s and Stoffer’s renewed happiness very 
much helped to put the dissertation in perspective. And so did the compassion of 
my parents for their family, while their own life was not always so easy. Most 
importantly, their unconditional support stimulated me to follow the direction of 
my dreams. Jort, my final thanks are for you. Your wonderful joie de vivre, even in 
times of sorrow, helped me to persist and finally finish the dissertation. And, what 
is more, how could I ever enjoy our lucky number 13 in the middle of the street so 
much without you?  
 
Caelesta Poppelaars 
Den Haag, Januari 2009 
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Building Bridges, Seeking Support,           
or in Need of Expertise? 
The importance of the bureaucracy in the decision-making process of modern societies has become 
almost axiomatic. It is true that ‘the growth of executive power, de facto rule-making power in the 
bureaucracy, growing complexity of rule-making, the emergence of delegated legislation, the 
burgeoning of welfare state activity, the needs of regulatory and developmental bureaucratic agencies 
….all help us to understand why a bureaucracy cannot be adequately understood unless we take careful 
account of the role of interest groups in the bureaucratic process.1 
1.1 Introduction 
In January 2004, a Dutch parliamentary commission published its evaluation of 
Dutch integration policy, titled Building Bridges. This title, unintentionally but 
perfectly, summarised one of the most important reasons why civil servants 
continued to interact with immigrant organisations, even when current-day 
political and public opinion suggested a different approach. At that time, 
multiculturalism had become a politically sensitive issue. Politicians, scholars, and 
publicists alike were involved in public polemics about the negative outcomes of 
multiculturalism. One of the most often heard conclusions those days was that 
immigrant organisations had hindered the participation and integration of their 
members within Dutch society, rather than enhancing it. Meanwhile, however, 
most civil servants steadily continued to subsidise and maintain relationships with 
the very immigrant organisations that had been accused of creating substantial 
obstacles to integration.2 In the public hearings conducted by the parliamentary 
commission, civil servants, ministers, aldermen, and representatives of 
immigrants’ organisations described their relationships with each other. 
Illustrative of many of those conversations is the following quote from a former 
Alderman of Tilburg:3  
We want to arrange a meeting point for Somali people. Some see this as a means 
of segregating activities. We, however, think of this as a kind of stepping stone for 
these people. Also, we want to provide them with a place to meet, because we 
ourselves feel the need to have deliberation partners from the community with 
whom we can do business with and arrange things. 
 
                                                        
1 Suleiman (1974, 232) and Joseph La Palombara (1957, 257), Interest groups in Italian Politics, quoted in 
Suleiman (1974, 232). 
2 Temporary Committee Integration Policy, Building Bridges, TK, 2003-2004, 28689, nr. 7-9. 
3 Temporary Committee Integration Policy, Building Bridges, TK, 2003-2004, 28689, nr. 10, 427. 
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It was exactly this concept of intermediation that explained why civil servants chose 
to keep in touch. The immigrant organisations fulfilled an important function, in 
Dutch neatly termed aanspreekpunt, which is best translated in English as the 
capacity to intermediate. This logic of intermediation proved to be more important 
than enhancing participation or integration of individual immigrants within Dutch 
society, a function these immigrant organisations were assumed to perform. 
The challenges of administering a culturally diverse city call for an instrumental 
approach to such immigrant organisations, rather than the high politics involved in 
articulating policy ideas and policy advice (Poppelaars and Scholten 2008).4 The 
capacity to intermediate seems particularly important during political or societal 
events that may threaten the delicate balance of accommodating more than 150 
nationalities within a single city’s boundaries. For example, the Dutch Minister of 
Housing, Communities and Integration and the Minister of Justice immediately 
convened meetings with several Islamic organisations after the release of Fitna, 
Geert Wilders’ anti-Islam cinematic essay in spring 2008.5 How else to probe the 
atmosphere in the different immigrant communities, in order to prepare an 
appropriate governmental response? 
This link between contingencies and the logic of intermediation appears to 
travel the Atlantic well. In the early 1990s, Mayor Dinkins of New York City (NYC) 
came into office with the help of a broad civic coalition. His administration, 
however, did not maintain ties with this civic coalition while in office, which 
became problematic when attempting to solve major race riots between Caribbean 
and Jewish communities (Thompson 2005). Brooklyn, one of the City’s 
neighbourhoods, had a tense atmosphere, especially within the Heights 
community in central Brooklyn. A rapidly growing Caribbean immigrant 
population and a small low-income Hasidic Jewish community vied for scarce 
housing. One day, a Caribbean boy was killed in a car accident involving a car 
driven by a Hasidic Jewish man. A Jewish student was stabbed in a crowd of young 
Caribbean men only a few hours later. Severe race riots broke out after these 
accidents, which could not be quickly stopped by the NYC administration. This 
inability resulted from a lack of interactions with community organisations that 
had contacts with both populations in Brooklyn Heights. Those two populations 
were, literally and figuratively, out of reach for Dinkin’s administration. In the 
words of a former administration-member (Thompson 2005, 304):  
There were only a few community leaders with connections and respect among 
the alienated youth who might have served as channels for positive discourse. In 
the absence of more such channels, and because there had been little prior effort 
to include unemployed men in civic affairs or to have their voice meaningfully 
considered within a neighbourhood civic structure, there was no way to rapidly 
construct meaningful exchanges between blacks and Jews during the Crown 
Height Crisis, or between blacks and the police department.  
                                                        
4 Formulating policies that do not seem to address existing social structures in society tend to even reinforce 
rather than reduce such an instrumental use of immigrant organisations (de Zwart and Poppelaars 2007). 
5 Geert Wilders is the founder of the PPV, a populist, right-wing party with immigrant integration issues as 
political priority. 
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Apparently, a lack of communication channels, i.e. links to various communities, 
determined whether the New York City administration could solve the problem. 
Either termed aanspreekpunt or ‘a need for communication channels,’ organisations 
or individuals that serve as intermediates were important to both Dutch national 
and local government and the New York City administration.  
Could the logic of intermediation also apply to immigrant issues in other 
countries? Interacting with immigrant communities in France might be difficult, 
as the French system does not consider organisations solely based on an ethnic or 
religious background to be legitimate partners to work with (Koopmans and 
Statham 2000).6 Or, could intermediation be equally important in other policy 
areas? Voluntary organisations, for instance, proved to be highly useful in tracing 
people to properly address the HIV problem in Australia (Brown 1999). And, as 
illustrated by a Dutch respondent in this study, intermediation capacity is useful, 
for instance, in the health care sector as well:7  
In my case it is very easy, this field is characterised by a diverse array of 
professional organisations. The existence of so many highly professionally 
organised interest groups simplifies the job as they are useful in reaching the 
proper people and offering new insights. My colleagues at the inspectorate for 
youth care face an unorganised field, which does not make life easier in 
monitoring and regulation.  
Organisations capable of establishing access to the target population offer a useful 
resource to policy makers. Treasury civil servants involved with the budgetary 
process, however, are not very likely to need such intermediation capacity.8 
Expertise on financial and fiscal issues would be more appropriate for them. 
Intermediation could, however, resume an importance in social security issues if 
governments seek to activate the long-termed unemployed. This group may be as 
unknown to governments as certain communities of immigrants. 
These questions suggest that there are good reasons why civil servants choose to 
work with certain interest groups rather than with others. And although this 
implies limited responsiveness, it also seems that these particular patterns of 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions will vary along important political-
administrative dimensions affecting the policy-making process, such as variation in 
policy sectors or public agencies. This study aims to explain such bureaucracy-
interest group interactions systematically, and its central research question is as 
follows: Why do civil servants interact with certain interest groups, whereas they do not 
or only do so to a lesser extent with other groups? Bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions are thus the main dependent variable of this research.  
                                                        
6 The French citizenship regime is often termed ‘assimiliationist’ or ‘republican’, meaning that France allows 
immigrants easy access to the political community, but denies their cultural or ethnic differences (Koopmans 
and Statham 2000). Solving severe policy problems may nevertheless require relations between such 
organisations and civil servants (see also Favell 2001). 
7 Interview by author. 
8 However, a recent affair in the Netherlands concerning the impossibility of levying taxes on people living in 
caravan parks would suggest otherwise (De Volkskrant, 2003, ‘Wijn pakt illegale afspraken met 
woonwagenkampen aan’, 3 June, online newspaper, www.volkskrant.nl). 
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1.2 Explaining bureaucracy-interest group interactions  
Instances of bureaucratic interactions with interest groups have been termed as 
instances of ‘bureaucratic politics’ or ‘bureaucratic autonomy’ by some scholars; 
others call them ‘iron triangles’ or ‘close-knit policy networks’, and still others 
speak in terms of ‘capture’, or less dramatically, ‘interest group influence’. Each 
approach examines the phenomenon through somewhat different lenses and 
arrives at different conclusions. The policy networks literature explains such 
behaviour by pointing to the mutual benefits for bureaucrats, interest groups, and 
parliamentarians interacting in policy making. Mutual benefits often result in long-
term and close cooperation between a fairly limited number of policy actors 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Milward and Provan 2000; Rhodes 1990). Scholars 
in the field of bureaucratic politics argue that bureaucrats use their contacts with 
interest groups to enhance their autonomy or improve their bargaining power 
against their political superiors or other bureaucratic agencies (Carpenter 2001), or 
to otherwise serve their position or job performance (Peters 2001; Ripley and 
Franklin 1986; Suleiman 1974). The literature on interest group politics, finally, 
suggests that bureaucrats ultimately become dependent on powerful interest 
groups in society, often pointing to regulatory agencies that seem to be puppets in 
the hands of particular groups (Chubb 1983; Posner 1974; Yackee 2005).  
The literatures on policy networks, interest group politics, and bureaucratic 
politics all agree on the existence of patterns of bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions that are not fully responsive to a comprehensive array of groups and 
interests. Yet, at the same time, they offer rather different explanations for these 
patterns. To date, it remains unclear which explanation will apply in which 
circumstances. A major reason for this ambiguity is that the literature lacks a single 
theoretical model capable of systematically comparing both bureaucrats’ and 
interest groups’ motives and how these motives vary across various political-
administrative dimensions. This research is an attempt to formulate such a 
theoretical model. To do so, I adopt a resource dependence approach to explain 
these bureaucracy-interest group interactions.  
1.3 Bureaucracy-interest group interactions unravelled 
The three sets of literature discussed above share an implicit assumption that 
certain goods are exchanged for others. According to the bureaucratic politics 
literature, civil servants trade for political support by deliberately reaching out to 
those interest groups capable of providing them such support. The literature on 
interest group politics suggests that the information or expertise interest groups 
have to offer is so valuable that bureaucrats may to a large extent depend on these 
interest groups. And, finally, the policy network literature suggests that mutually 
beneficial exchanges result in long-term interactions. By employing this idea of 
‘exchange of goods’, it is possible to integrate these different explanations into a 
single theoretical model of bureaucracy-interest group interactions.  
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Resource exchange is the key explanatory variable used in resource dependence 
theory to explain interorganisational behaviour. Its main hypothesis is that 
organisations are not fully self-supportive. They need to interact with other 
organisations to obtain the resources they need for their survival (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 2003[1978]). Such resource exchanges create interdependencies among 
organisations, which are a function of both the importance of a resource and its 
concentration in the environment. By measuring each of these two elements, the 
degree of dependence between organisations can be determined.  
Based on classic resource dependence theory, bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions can be conceptualised as resource exchanges. By examining the 
importance of these resources and the availability of the resources in the 
environment, it should be possible to determine the degree of dependence that 
characterises bureaucracy-interest group interactions. Relevant contextual factors 
are included in the model to serve systematic comparisons of these resource 
exchanges. National interest representation regimes; political-administrative 
relations; agencies’ tasks and culture; the influence of ideas; Europeanisation; and 
the salience, complexity, and political sensitivity of policy issues are all 
hypothesised to influence resource concentration, resource importance, or both. 
These contextual variables are derived from the literatures on interest group 
politics, bureaucratic politics, and network studies in which they have been shown 
to influence either bureaucrats’ or interest groups’ behaviour. Systematic variation 
of contextual variables thus makes it possible to determine the exact nature of 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions under different circumstances.  
A model based on resource dependence theory incorporates the assumption that 
an organisation will try to minimise its dependence, and therefore the theory 
implicitly assumes that organisations can end their interactions when they think 
that this is beneficial for them. Indeed, why continue to interact when an 
organisation can no longer provide the resources you need? Factors such as 
trustworthiness, uncertainty reduction, routine behaviour or anticipating future 
consequences, however, will also determine resource exchange. In other words, 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions may not only be determined by strategic 
rationality that is implicit in a resource dependence approach but also by 
anticipatory and habitual rationality, which are revealed through a long-term 
perspective on these interactions over time.9  
I constructed a dataset of bureaucracy-interest group interactions to assess the 
explanatory potential of the model. A survey of senior civil servants and interest 
groups in the Netherlands and the UK10 together with semi-structured elite 
interviewing were the methods used to collect data. To ensure equivalent data, I 
                                                        
9 While this all seems beneficial to the study of bureaucracy-interest group interactions, it is important to 
note that when applying resource exchange to these interactions, I implicitly assume that bureaucracies have 
certain administrative leeway to act within a set framework of rules and arrangements. Moreover, full 
autonomy is not attainable in the case of public bureaucracies, as they have to be loyal to their political 
superiors and responsive to the public. So, autonomy refers to the possibility to influence politicians and 
interest groups and thus does not have the same implications as autonomy in the original resource 
dependence approach (see chapter 3). 
10 Data was also collected for senior civil servants and interest groups in Sweden and the US. However, 
because of a low response rate, these data will not be included in the analyses.  
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developed and implemented a strategy to construct a dataset of interest groups in 
the Netherlands. The survey data allowed for a cross-sectional analysis of 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions to test the model and explore additional 
contextual variables related to the interest group environment. The different types 
of rationality that may underlie the resource exchanges between bureaucrats and 
interest groups could be examined via additional interview data.  
1.3.1 Why study bureaucracy-interest group interactions? 
The explicit focus on bureaucracy-interest group interactions in this study is driven 
by a two-fold aim. First, this study aims to offer a theoretical contribution to the 
study of both bureaucratic and interest group behaviour. It does so by developing a 
theoretical model which should enable the systematic comparison of bureaucracy-
interest group interactions over time and across cases. Although the literature is 
rich with findings of bureaucracy-interest group interactions, it is very difficult to 
determine which explanation holds under which circumstances. When will the 
bureaucrat be able to engage in entrepreneurial behaviour, or when is he/she likely 
to be vulnerable for capture? The resource dependence model developed in this 
study is an attempt to integrate the fundamental behavioural logics the various 
existing explanations point to. My main contribution is thus to push forward the 
conceptual discussion about bureaucracy-interest group interactions and to offer an 
analytical tool for systematic comparative research. 
This research is not only driven by a strong theoretical and analytical interest. It 
is also driven by sheer curiosity and an irrepressible interest in what exactly is 
going on when either bureaucrats or interest groups decide to interact. It thus also 
aims to provide empirical insights into this phenomenon. Turning to the case of 
immigrant integration policy in the Netherlands clarifies this second goal. When 
public opinion forced politicians to argue strongly against subsidising immigrant 
organisations, politicians overlooked an important aspect of administering society. 
In reality, immigrant organisations offered a meeting point for people in a foreign 
society. Few acknowledged the usefulness of those organisations for civil servants 
to probe the atmosphere and to get in touch with different communities. Put 
differently, these organisations served as a valuable instrument for civil servants to 
steer and monitor a culturally diverse society. If this had been more explicit, 
regulation concerning immigrant organisations could have been better geared to 
the actual situation. In general, insights on bureaucracy-interest group interactions 
could indicate when the administrative part of the policy-making process inevitably 
diverges from politicians’ plans, or to what extent bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions contribute to (un)intended consequences of policy making.  
In sum, this study is predominantly aimed at contributing to a better analytical 
and conceptual assessment of bureaucracy-interest group interactions. At the same 
time, it also aims to make a significant empirical contribution, both in testing the 
proposed analytical model and by providing insights into what exactly happens 
when civil servants and interest groups decide to interact.  
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1.3.2 What follows 
To answer the research question of why civil servants interact with some interest 
groups, but not (or only to a lesser extent) with others, I proceed as follows. Chapter 
2 will review and discuss the most important literatures addressing bureaucracy-
interest group interactions. I argue that the problem in explaining bureaucracy-
interest group interactions is not so much a shortage of theories. It is much more a 
problem of offering different, even rival, theories that make it impossible to 
determine under which circumstances which set of explanations holds. Therefore, 
I develop a model to systematically compare bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions in chapter 3. I use the classic resource dependence theory of Pfeffer 
and Salancik (2003[1978]) to construct a model that not only enables a cross-
sectional analysis, but also incorporates a longitudinal perspective on these 
interactions. Subsequently, I discuss the comparative design I employ in this study 
in chapter 4 as well as the characteristics of the datasets which have been developed 
to allow empirical analyses. Chapters 5-7 provide empirical insights on these 
interactions by testing the model empirically. The findings of chapter 5 imply that 
the resource dependence model has explanatory potential. It generates a satisfying 
explanation of bureaucracy-interest group interactions, and contextual factors are 
shown to have a small yet significant influence on the degree of dependence 
characterising bureaucracy-interest group interactions. Chapter 6 shows that 
interest group population dynamics influence the degree of dependence between 
interest groups and bureaucrats. Modest patterns of cooperation and competition 
in addition to highly valued access to the bureaucracy suggest that the degree of 
dependence for bureaucrats is mitigated. Chapter 7 explores the various types of 
choices that may potentially determine bureaucracy-interest group interactions, 
examining the (joint) contribution of strategic, anticipatory, and habitual rationality 
to explain their resource exchanges. Each of these chapters (chapters 5-7) 
incorporates a final paragraph summarising the main findings and reflecting on 
the implications of these findings. The final chapter, chapter 8, summarises the 
theoretical model, and the main empirical findings, and serves as a critical 
reflection of the explanatory value of the model and its implications for existing 
theories and future research. 
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The Captive, the Entrepreneur, and the 
Routine-Driven Man 
2.1 Introduction 
The question of why bureaucrats interact with certain interest groups but not with 
others, and to what extent their interaction vary, seems straightforward and even 
elegant, but proves to be misleadingly simple. The examples of the New York 
administrators and Dutch civil servants attempting to reach out to immigrant 
organisations reveal a similar – and well-founded – basis for interaction: namely, a 
need for intermediation. On either side of the Atlantic, the question of why civil 
servants interacted with these specific organisations seems easy to answer.  
The theoretical and conceptual accounts of bureaucracy-interest group relations, 
however, offer diverse and contrasting explanations. The literature on interest 
group politics suggests that interest groups may be quite decisive in bureaucracy-
interest group interactions. The literature on bureaucratic politics, on the other 
hand, suggests an image of the entrepreneurial bureaucrat capable of steering his 
interactions with interest groups. Finally, policy network studies suggest that 
mutually beneficial relationships between bureaucrats and interest groups are very 
durable. This chapter discusses each of these strands of literature in detail to show 
that, despite a considerable body of knowledge on bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions, the ability to distinguish under which conditions which explanation 
applies is missing. In short, we cannot properly determine when the bureaucrat 
will be an entrepreneur, a captive or a routine-driven man. 
2.2 The captive bureaucrat 
The notion that interest groups exert a significant influence on public decision 
making stems from the literature on interest group politics. More generally, this 
literature is concerned with questions of when do interest groups emerge, how do 
they maintain themselves, and why do they get access to governmental institutions 
to exert influence? Pluralism and corporatism are two broad research paradigms 
within which theories have been developed on interest group behaviour. To start 
with the former, pluralism has often been critiqued for constituting a normative 
view on interest groups within a democracy. Traditionally (and ideally), it refers to a 
democratic system characterised by the existence of many, often adversarial, 
interest groups involved in an equal competition to advance their interests. Every 
interest in society, or issue salient to it, eventually gets represented via a process of 
counter-mobilisation. When a particular interest mobilises, it follows naturally that 
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people who are harmed by this mobilisation process will automatically mobilise to 
counterbalance the initial mobilisation of an interest group (Truman 1951). 
Alternatively, pluralism holds that those in office or with other political power have 
such power only as long as they represent the latent political potential of a much 
larger group of citizen constituents (Dahl 2005[1961]). Traditional pluralism has 
been heavily critiqued for being almost naïve in its assumptions. Some pointed to a 
mobilisation bias in the interest population in favour of the upper-class and well-
organised few (Schattschneider 1970[1960]), while others pointed out that such a 
bias was a consequence of the inherent nature of public goods, resulting in free-
riding (Olson 1965). Traditional pluralism and its critics focused on the societal 
origins of interest groups, and thus adopted a group approach towards politics.  
Things diverge when one sets foot on European shores, where corporatism has 
been the dominant paradigm for explaining interest group involvement in public 
decision making, rather than interest group behaviour as such. However, the 
conceptual fuzziness in the literature on corporatism (see Molina and Rhodes 
2002) does not seem to help in drawing conclusions about the specific nature of 
interest representation in corporatist regimes. An important obstacle in defining 
corporatism is that most studies implicitly distinguish between a particular type of 
policy making and a particular type of interest representation. Schmitter (1989) 
proposed a reconceptualisation that explicitly disentangled both meanings: 
corporatism I and corporatism II. Corporatism I, he argued, refers to the 
organisation of societal interest representation and should accordingly be termed 
corporatism, as opposed to pluralism as another type of interest representation. 
Corporatism II entails decision making and implementation as a joint venture 
between the state and interest organisations, and should, therefore, be termed 
concertation, as opposed to pressure politics. In theory, corporatism and 
concertation do not necessarily co-exist (Schmitter 1989). Yet, in practice, they 
largely do, as policy making and implementation by concertation have implications 
for the way interest organisations are organised. Policy making and 
implementation by concertation necessarily limit the number of organisations to be 
invited to the negotiation table. When access is limited, and this is one of the core 
characteristics of concertation according to Schmitter (1985), the development and 
existence of hierarchically organised umbrella organisations is more likely (Lowery 
and Gray 2004; Lowery, Poppelaars, and Berkhout 2008). So, a concerted method 
of policy making and implementation (Schmitter’s corporatism II) goes hand-in-
hand with a hierarchically organised field of interest organisations (a pyramid 
structure). A simple rule seems to apply: when all interests do not have an equal 
chance of access, because access is regulated by the government, the best option is 
to organise in a hierarchical fashion.  
Without explicit reference to it, studies of concertation have prevailed within the 
field of corporatism. They have predominantly focused on the systemic effects of 
institutional deliberation on economic and social-economic policies (Molina and 
Rhodes 2002). In addition, both concertation and corporatism have been heavily 
dominated by studies of business interests (Schmitter 1989), a trend still apparent 
in recent attempts to operationalise and measure corporatism (Siaroff 1999), or in 
studies examining derivatives of corporatism (Becker 2005). Such a political-
economy perspective has dominated studies of corporatism (Visser 2005; Visser 
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and Hemerijck 1997; Wilts 2001). And this emphasis has resulted almost in a 
neglect of the representation of other interests in corporatist regimes (but see 
Blom-Hansen 2001; Huitema, 2005; Trappenburg 2005).  
Although the two paradigms differ markedly, they nowadays seem closer to 
each other than they have ever been. Most importantly, the emphasis on context 
has become apparent on both sides of the Atlantic, and, in addition, scholars in 
Europe now seem to pay more attention to interest population studies than 
previously. Dependencies on their immediate environment have been used to 
explain, for instance, whether or not interest groups are able to get access in 
Brussels (Beyers and Kerremans 2007). More generally, context seems to have 
become an important explanatory variable in explaining interest groups’ behaviour 
(Lowery and Gray 2004). Baumgartner (1996), for instance, has shown that 
different conceptions of government and constitutional structures in France versus 
the US result in different resources, maintenance strategies, and relations between 
government agencies and interest groups. State structures and constitutional 
design are additional variables to consider along with historical tradition, social 
cleavages and other mass-based factors to explain interest groups’ access.  
Variables such as formal political institutions, informal arrangements between 
elites, social cleavages and more informal institutional characteristics determine 
how and why social movements come to life and maintain themselves (Koopmans 
and Statham 2000; McAdam 1996). Originally designed to explain social 
movement behaviour, these political opportunity structure arguments have more 
recently been applied to explain the origins and maintenance of immigrant 
organisations in Western Europe as well (Koopmans and Statham 2000; Soysal 
1994). Another approach that heavily emphasises context is Gray and Lowery’s 
population ecology approach explaining the density of interest group communities 
at the US state level. They applied a population ecology model used by island 
biogeographers hypothesising that the size of the island (area), the energy available 
for species (energy) and the stability of the system (stability) are crucial in 
explaining how certain species of interest groups thrive (Gray and Lowery 1996a). 
They found that the size of potential constituents (area) and the likelihood of 
government actions (energy) of concern to interest groups have a profound 
influence on a state’s interest community density. 
An important question for this study is thus whether and how government 
action, and context in general, affects interest group behaviour. As Lowery and 
Gray (2004, 170) note: “Neo-pluralist research is strongly grounded in the notion 
that policy outcomes influence mobilisation rates, the structure of interest 
populations, and levels and types of influence activities employed.” Illustrative is a 
study on the relationships between the US Presidency and federal membership 
organisations, which shows that the US presidency deliberately tried and succeeded 
to influence interest group behaviour. More generally, Leech et al. (2005) identify a 
recurrent pattern of interaction between government actions and interest group 
activity. US interest groups become active when there is a certain level of 
government activity in the issue areas of concern to interest groups. A similar 
process takes place in Brussels concerning EU interest groups (Mahoney 2004). 
And Dutch interest groups also seem to benefit from the distinct opportunities the 
Dutch political system offered: the maintenance of Dutch interest groups is often 
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ascribed to the willingness of the government to provide subsidies, even to 
perceived adversaries (Duyvendak et al. 1992; Koopmans 2002). And as a 
respondent in the current study observes: “Now that the government emphasises 
the importance of exercising for personal health, the fitness and sports industry has 
become really active in this field.”1 In other words, government activity is like the 
legendary flute of the Pied Piper of Hamelin (De rattenvanger van Hamelen).2 Just 
like the tune of the Pied Piper’s flute, governments’ activities seem to cast a spell 
on interest groups’ behaviour, drawing them to their realm. Whenever a 
government proposes solutions to societal problems or initiates projects, interest 
groups become active, almost in a mechanical fashion. Vice versa, when 
government withdraws from initiating policy actions, interest groups lose interest.  
Some question, however, whether the Pied Piper’s flute is really in the 
government’s hand. Those who have studied the behaviour of interest groups with 
respect to regulatory agencies are likely to argue that it is interest groups that play 
the flute. The following example illustrates this point:  
Interest groups playing high 
We [one of the regulatory agencies in the NLD, CP] formulate every year a formal 
list of priorities we will address in the year to come. It includes, for instance, 
which industries we are going to monitor closely, or what kind of sector-specific 
research we are planning to conduct. We consult the major stakeholders to 
approve this list. One of the priorities included in this year’s list was to establish a 
research project in a particular sector where we knew that individual corporations 
were violating the law. Their representative organisation was one of the 
stakeholders invited to discuss our priorities for this year. They obviously did not 
agree with this particular priority and threatened not to endorse the list. They even 
threatened to no longer cooperate, and they refused to attend the stakeholders 
meeting. A few days later they invited themselves to our office and, tried to 
‘convince’ us to refrain from investigating their sector. ... This was indeed 
difficult, but we need to find a way to deal with this situation. Obviously, we 
caught a big fish….3 
Interest group influence on agency behaviour is often referred as ‘capture,’ and this 
concept most commonly features in studies about economic regulation. In short, 
capture means that regulatory agencies become largely dependent on the industries 
they were designed to regulate. Regulations such agencies produce often favour 
certain industries (Chubb 1983; Posner 1974). More generally, authors have studied 
interactions between bureaucracies and interest groups in terms of bureaucratic 
responsiveness, or how external actors determine a bureaucracy’s or agency’s 
behaviour (Moe 1985; Scholz and Wei 1986). Recent studies indeed show that 
business interests have a significantly larger influence on government rulemaking 
than other interest groups (Yackee and Yackee 2006), and that, in general, interest 
groups have significant influence on the content of government regulation (Yackee 
                                                        
1 Interview by author. 
2 This is the legendary tale of a man who lured all rats of Hamelen out of the city with the bewitching tunes of 
his flute in 13th century Germany. When he did not get properly paid for his helpful deed to dispose Hamelen 
of the rats, he repeated the same trick with the city’s children, and led them out of the city and they never 
returned. 
3 Interview by author. 
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2005). By studying databases of proposed rules by government agencies, the 
comments various types of interest groups submitted on the proposals, and, finally, 
the extent to which the rules were changed according to the interest groups’ 
comments, the authors assessed the influence of various categories of interest 
groups. Business interests indeed seemed to have a dominant influence.  
Measuring business influence by content analysis certainly points to the 
direction of influence, but not necessarily to the causal mechanisms underlying 
these interactions. The advantage accorded to certain businesses may be related to 
capture, but may also be related to familiarity with a particular firm or early entrant 
benefits. Some capture-related mechanisms thus may overlap with non-capture-
related mechanisms (Carpenter 2004). Indeed, it is a difficult methodological 
challenge to establish whether behaviour that benefits a certain industry results 
from capture or is simply a routine (Yackee and Yackee 2006; see also Wilson 
2000[1989]). Perhaps civil servants, in coping with their workload, simply adapt 
the rules accordingly to make life a bit easier, a routine which unintentionally 
results in benefiting a certain industry. Questions of whether and how bureaucratic 
agencies respond to their environment, in particular to interest groups - so, who 
eventually plays the Pied Piper’s flute – brings me to the second strand of literature 
related to bureaucracy-interest group interactions, namely, bureaucratic politics.  
2.3 The entrepreneurial bureaucrat 
From the literature on bureaucratic politics we can infer that bureaucrats rather 
than interest groups dominate these interactions. Bureaucratic politics commonly 
refers to conflict among several bureaucratic agencies within government, or to the 
strategic behaviour of civil servants in regard to their political superiors. Engaging 
in contacts with interest groups could enhance the bargaining power of agencies as 
opposed to their political superiors or other competing agencies. Those 
interactions, however, could also serve the execution of policies designed by civil 
servants. To establish and maintain relations with interest groups could, thus, be 
administratively instrumental or political in nature. But there is only a fine line 
between these two incentives, if there is any at all. To address this delicate line, 
bureaucratic politics is here defined to include several individual yet interrelated 
components: political-administrative relations, interagency competition, and 
interactions with interest groups.  
2.3.1 Political-administrative relations  
Bureaucratic politics raises the idea that government bureaucracies constitute a 
‘fourth power’ in addition to Montesquieu’s Trias Politica (Crince le Roy 1979). 
This in turn invokes a discussion of the grand dichotomy between politics and 
administration. In its most rigorous, but nowadays unattainable, form it declares 
administration to be both totally separate from and yet loyal to its political masters. 
This neutral yet loyal conception of bureaucracy parallels the Weberian ideal type of 
a rational bureaucracy. Weber acknowledged the potential capacity of a bureaucracy 
to gain power and engage in policy making based on its specialised knowledge. 
Weber, however, was very much concerned with restricting such bureaucratic 
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power because he considered it most undesirable (Albrow 1970; Weber 
2006[1922]). What seems common sense today is that bureaucrats enjoy 
administrative leeway and that their activities are becoming increasingly political in 
nature (Peters and Pierre 2004; Svara 2001). 
Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman (1981) were among the first to offer a 
comprehensive empirical picture of the overlap between bureaucratic and political 
functions. They distinguished four images of the relation between politicians and 
bureaucrats. Image 1, ‘Policy-Administration’, refers to a true politics-
administration dichotomy. Image II, ‘Facts-Interests’, assumes that both politicians 
and civil servants engage in policy making. Their functions are intertwined, but 
they bring distinct contributions to the policy process. Politicians bring interests 
and values; civil servants bring facts and knowledge. Image III, ‘Energy-
Equilibrium’, states that civil servants and politicians engage both in policy making 
and politics. Yet a distinction remains, with politicians articulating the broad 
interest of unorganised individuals and civil servants introducing the narrowly 
focused interests of organised clientele. Their fourth and final image, the ‘Pure 
Hybrid’, indicates a full blurring of the roles of bureaucrats and politicians. 
Following a comprehensive empirical analysis, part of their conclusion is as follows 
(Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981, 239-241):  
It could be a committee room in the modernistic Bundestag, or the prime 
minister’s functional central Stockholm office, or a Renaissance chamber in a 
Roman ministry. Around the table are gathered a few members of parliament and 
several senior civil servants, discussing what to do about petroleum supplies, or 
housing subsidies, or university reform. In the shorthand of political science: they 
are ‘making policy.’ (…) All these men (and they are almost surely all men) are 
here as policy makers, and all accept that civil servants are legitimate participants 
in the policy process.  
Such an overlap between roles and tasks, or put differently, the politicisation of the 
bureaucracy (Peters and Pierre 2004; Page and Wright 2001), triggers intense 
debate about the perceived power of the bureaucracy. Such debates involve 
concerns about the primacy of politics, the span of control of the political 
executives, and the perceived power of senior civil servants. The case below, ‘Stuck 
in a revolving door’ (Klem in de draaideur), illustrates this nicely. It is the case of a 
notorious clash of influential top civil servants and the Dutch minister of Justice, 
which harmed her reputation and finally resulted in the dismissal of the chair of 
the Board of Procurators General (Van Thijn 1998): 
Stuck in a revolving door4 
 ‘Stuck in a revolving door’ is situated in the late 1990s and tells the story of 
Arthur Docters van Leeuwen, the then chair of the Board of Procurators General, 
in defending a colleague who eventually got fired by the then Ministry of Justice, 
Mrs. Sorgdrager. His colleague, Procurator General Steenhuisen, had been 
accused of favouring a particular consultancy bureau, which employed him, to 
conduct the investigation of a judicial case. The case was formally investigated. 
Just before the findings of the investigation were to be sent to the parliament, 
                                                        
4 The title ‘Stuck in a revolving door’ refers to the story that Docters van Leeuwen had once been literally 
stuck in the main entrance of the Ministry of Justice, which is a revolving door.  
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Docters van Leeuwen, during a short conversation with Mrs. Sorgdrager on that 
day, defended the position of his colleague. The fact that Steenhuisen wanted to 
go to court to contest the evaluation even before it had been sent to the 
parliament, was leaked to the media. The eight o’clock news announced that the 
entire Board of Procurators General was about to go court. Soon, the political 
establishment of The Hague portrayed the entire Board of Procurators General as 
senior civil servants in rebellion against Mrs. Sorgdrager. ‘Mutiny’ among 
Sorgdrager’s senior civil servants, whether a true reflection of reality or not, was 
undoubtedly severely harmful for her authority and her political position. The 
image of an entire a Board of Procurators General on a collision course with the 
Minister could not be remedied, and Docters van Leeuwen lost his job. Such a 
display of power was unacceptable. As chair of the Board of Procurators General, 
he was held responsible for allowing the senior civil servants to adopt too powerful 
a position and for being too supportive of his colleague.  
2.3.2 Agency strife 
Not only do such power relations between top civil servants and political executives 
add to the idea of bureaucratic politics, but inter-agency competition does so as 
well. Inter-agency competition stems from the underlying idea that civil servants 
pursue their agency’s interests rather than the public interest in general. Early 
public choice scholars developed a rather bleak picture of civil servants submerged 
in their own or their agency’s interests. Whereas Tullock (1965), for instance, 
argued that bureaucrats seek to maximise their agency’s size, Niskanen (1971) 
argued that, as there is no profit to maximise, bureaucrats will try to maximise the 
budgets they receive to do their work. Their individual interests, such as salary, 
public reputation, power, or output of the bureau are all positively related to the 
bureau’s overall budget. Maximising budgets are in two ways important for an 
agency’s survival. First, agencies receive their budget from ‘sponsors’, i.e. political 
superiors who expect to receive requests for an increase in the agency’s budget. It is 
their natural tendency to expect demands for higher budgets from civil servants 
(see Dunleavy 1991; Wildavsky 1964). If there is no demand for an increase, 
political superiors will get confused and stop their cooperative behaviour. Secondly, 
senior civil servants seek to maximise budgets, because a larger budget makes it 
easier to manage the bureau. Removing people to other positions, for instance, 
becomes easier with a larger budget. These accounts of bureaucratic behaviour 
portray civil servants’ motives as purely based upon maximising their own 
interests, either by maximising the budget or maximising agency size.  
The public choice literature developed a picture of what bureaucracies do and 
why they do it based on the idea of ‘economic man’, projecting ‘market failure’ in 
terms of the inefficient monopolies granted to government agencies. Downs’ 
(1967) account of bureaucratic behaviour is bit more nuanced. Instead of the 
existence of the bureaucracy’s interest, Downs argues that bureaucrats’ preferences 
depend on the role and function they have.5 He developed two laws of bureaucratic 
behaviour, namely the ‘law of conservatism’ and the ‘law of increasing 
                                                        
5 He distinguishes several bureaucratic personalities, of which two act upon pure self-interests, the ‘climbers’ 
and ‘conservers’. The other personalities, ‘zealots’, ‘advocates’ and ‘statesmen’, mix self-interest with broader 
altruistic motivations (Downs 1967, 88). 
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conserverism.’ The first law points to a life cycle of bureaucracies, arguing that 
every agency ends up becoming dominated by conservers who are resistant to 
change. Second, the ‘law of increasing conserverism’ indicates that every individual 
bureaucrat will become a conserver who wants to retain the status quo. Upward-
moving bureaucrats quickly exhaust the promotion options available to themselves 
and lower-ranking officials and become conservers of their function. Lower-ranking 
officials, in turn, also become conservers as they realise that their behaviour has no 
significant influence on the agency’s policy. Another account, also inspired by 
public choice principles, is that the bureaucrat, rather than maximising agency size 
and budgets per se, engages in bureau-shaping behaviour (Dunleavy 1991). Public 
employment systems make it likely that the welfare of higher-ranking bureaucrats 
will be closely linked to intrinsic characteristics of their work. This means that 
rational officials want to work in small, elite, collegial bureaus close to the centre of 
political power. Bureaucrats will maximise their bureaus’ conformity to these goals. 
Although the latter is somewhat more nuanced, what these accounts of 
bureaucratic behaviour have in common is that they only pay attention to one 
particular set of incentives bearing upon a bureaucrat’s behaviour, namely self-
interest. As Wilson (2000[1989], 88) argues: “When bureaucrats are free to choose 
a course of action, their choices will reflect the full array of incentives operating on 
them: some will reflect the need to manage workload; others will reflect the 
expectations of workplace peers and professional colleagues elsewhere; still others 
may reflect their own convictions.” Not all of these early public choice scholars are 
entirely oblivious to the public interests civil servants might want to serve. Yet, they 
argue that civil servants will be unable to do so, because they lack full information 
to properly attend to that interest (Niskanen 1971). Critics of these approaches have 
shown that economic models of bureaucratic behaviour do not always effectively 
explain bureaucratic behaviour (Frederickson and Smith 2003, 190-193), or that 
public-choice-inspired solutions for inefficiency should not be taken as axiomatic in 
designing reforms, despite their attractive analytical rigour (cf. Lowery 1998).  
Interagency competition between the armed services that together make up a 
country’s Ministry of Defence is a well-known phenomenon (Huntington 1961). 
Equally notorious in the Netherlands was competition over het banenplan van den 
Uyl, an attempt of the 1981 Minister of Employment and Social Affairs (Joop den 
Uyl) to design a comprehensive approach to unemployment. The Ministry of Social 
Affairs brought its political reasoning to the negotiation table, while the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and the Treasury brought a divergent view, which resulted in 
serious antagonism during the bargaining process (Hupe 2000). More recently, 
the competitive or, rather, non-cooperative behaviour between the Ministry of 
Education and Ministry of Economics to address what is commonly called the 
‘knowledge economy’ may be also termed a case of bureaucratic politics. 
Bureaucratic politics, some argue, may result in neutralising the power of the 
entire bureaucracy because of the competition that results from individual agencies 
pursuing their own interests (Rosenthal 1988), a possibility that the early public 
choice scholars ignored (but see Niskanen’s (1971) last chapter). Or, it might result 
in a virtual bureaucratic gridlock (in Dutch: bureaupolitisme). Such a gridlock, or 
bureaupolitisme occurs when competition and rivalry among bureaucratic agencies 
ends up in a strong defence of self-interests, resulting in non-decisions, 
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inefficiency, and avoidance (Rosenthal 1988; Rosenthal, Geveke, and ‘t Hart 1994). 
More generally, bureaucratic politics seems to be characterised by the interplay of 
many actors with divergent interests, where no single actor has dominant 
influence, and by compromises and a gap between decision making and 
implementation (Rosenthal 1988). The divergent interests that characterise 
interagency competition not only seem to result from civil servants pursuing their 
own interests, as public choice scholars have argued. They may also stem from 
divergent societal interests that civil servants want to represent or defend.  
2.3.3 A search for interest groups 
The politicisation of the bureaucracy and interagency competition all contribute to 
inherently political behaviour by and within the bureaucracy. An important aspect 
of this political behaviour concerns the external relations of civil servants. As 
Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman (1981, 241) observed:  
The civil servants, it is true, are especially concerned with technical matters (…). 
But they are also concerned about mediating among those organised interests that 
have expressed concern about the problem at hand. The politicians, by contrast, 
emphasise their own roles as partisans and advocates for broader causes and for 
less organised or more individual interests. (…) brokerage among interests is less 
central to the role conception of politicians than of bureaucrats.  
Thus, the tasks of politicians and bureaucrats seem intertwined, and advocating 
interests has become a significant task of civil servants nowadays. ‘Brokerage 
among interests’ is exactly what bureaucratic politics often seems to be all about. 
Civil servants may use such external relations to enhance their agency’s position or 
their own position in relation to the political executive. As a respondent notes:  
Within the ministry, we have divergent opinions on how to properly design a 
public health care system. We have recently written a letter for the minister to 
send to parliament discussing our idea for such a design. Well, they [civil servants 
from another division, CP] made sure that this letter did not reach the minister. 
So, we tried another way, by involving certain interest groups, in order to convince 
him of the advantages of our approach.6 
Although the external component of bureaucratic politics is not demarcated as a 
theoretical topic as such in the literature, several authors have discussed such 
dynamics. A very early example of bureaucracy-interest group interactions is 
provided by the Ottoman bureaucracy. As early as the seventeenth century, such 
interactions between the state administration and interest groups are reported to 
have existed within the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman state officials engaged in 
purposive bargaining with organised groups of bandits roaming the empire to 
incorporate them into the state bureaucracy. The Ottoman state absorbed these 
bandits temporarily into the state organisation either by hiring their services or 
attracting their leaders to powerful positions within the state bureaucracy. The 
main goal was to keep them under control and establish state rule in the remote 
regions of the vast Ottoman Empire (Barkey 1994). In fact, the Ottoman 
bureaucracy shows a very early attempt of what Selznick (1953) termed cooptation.  
                                                        
6 Interview by author. 
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More recent, but still early, accounts of bureaucrats interacting with interest 
groups can be found in the works of La Palombara (1964) and Suleiman (1974). 
Suleiman, for instance, shows that French bureaucrats in the 1970s interacted with 
a few selected interest groups, despite the general belief that intermediary 
organisations would threaten the general public interest. Although the ministries 
were open to virtually any organised interest, in practice, the Directors of the 
ministries made a careful distinction between what they perceived as legitimate 
and illegitimate groups. For those civil servants, the term groupe d’intérêt or groupe 
de pression entailed a negative connotation. Interest groups were thought to only 
represent private interests and not to represent a larger part of the population. They 
rather favoured working with professional organisations that represented an ‘entire 
profession’ (Suleiman 1974). Perhaps more important than this perceived 
representation was the fact that these professional organisations were well-
equipped, well-organised, and had information to offer that was useful and often 
indispensable to the Directions or agencies of a ministry. Moreover, close relations 
between such professional organisations and the corpes des mines of respective 
industries meant that agencies could mobilise an industry’s power to exert pressure 
on their own minister (Suleiman 1974, 343-344). 
At a more general level, Peters (2001) describes several types of relations 
between bureaucrats and interest groups: ‘legitimate’, ‘clientele’, ‘parentela’ and 
‘illegitimate’ interactions. These relations differ in the scope of the interests that 
are included and how close the relationships are between bureaucrats and interest 
groups. Such classifications or general theoretical statements about bureaucracy-
interest group interactions can be summarised by the fact that interactions often 
involve a resource exchange: support and information for access to and influence 
over the political process (Peters 2001, 186; Van Schendelen 1992). Carpenter 
(2001, 94-144) provides a detailed account of how political support is exchanged 
when it is beneficial to, what he terms, the ‘forging of bureaucratic autonomy:’  
Forging bureaucratic autonomy with the help of various interests 
In the late 19th and early 20th century, the establishment of a Rural Free Delivery 
system (RFD) in the US became feasible due to the American Post Office’s sound 
reputation together with its multiple ties to a diverse network of political actors, 
including many interest groups. The then postmaster-general, Wanamaker, 
turned out to be a skilful entrepreneur in establishing a diverse network of 
support and a sound reputation for his agency. RFD would entail a revision of the 
national delivery system and included delivering mail at the doorstep of each rural 
citizen instead of delivering mail for a small town to a small post office located in 
a general or common store. Whereas Wanamaker thought his proposal for RFD 
would strengthen support from rural constituencies, it divided farm communities. 
The fourth-class postmasters, the ones who ran the small post offices in common 
stores, were heavily opposed to RFD and lobbied extensively against it. As they 
were central figures in the Republican Party, many representatives were left 
between choosing between the new system or sticking to the old one. Wanamaker 
knew he had to establish sound support from the farmers. To get support for his 
agency and RFD, he not only communicated with agrarian leaders, he also 
tightened relations with business and civic associations, which were supportive of 
free rural delivery. In sum, coalition building in the case of the post office 
included assembling diverse organised interests in a broad network, including 
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moralist progressives, media organisations, agrarians and corporate business, all 
with a stake in mail delivery reforms. Without securing vast support from such a 
diverse coalition, the development of a strong autonomous bureaucratic agency 
would not have been possible, or would at least have been more difficult.  
According to Carpenter (2001), bureaucratic agencies tend to rely on a network of 
diverse organised interests for support to prevent capture and enhance their 
position toward their political executives. In the RFD case mentioned above, 
Wanamaker proved to be a skilful bureaucratic entrepreneur capable of arranging 
such a network. When policy innovations are supported by a wide variety of 
organised interests, it becomes more difficult for politicians to resist or stall 
proposals for reform. In Carpenter’s words (2001, 363): “Multiple networks did not 
refract power. They rather reduced the dependence of agencies on any one group, 
putting the agency in the role of broker among numerous interests seeking access 
to the state.” Late 19th and early 20th century civil servants thus proactively 
reached out to interest groups in society and diversified the portfolio of interest 
groups they interacted with to build agency autonomy.  
Scattered throughout the literature, one can find other studies of bureaucrats 
deliberately choosing to interact with particular interest groups. A well-known 
example of a government agency deliberately working together with interest groups 
is what Selznick (1953) called ‘the cooptative mechanism’. Cooptation refers to the 
“the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining 
structure of an organisation as a means of averting threats to its stability or 
existence” (Selznick 1953, 262-263). The strong constituent relationship that 
evolved between the agricultural relations department of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA) and the land-grant college system in the valley can be said to 
particularly reflect such a cooptation mechanism. Strong influence centres in the 
valley were covertly absorbed into the policy-determining structure of the TVA. 
More generally concerning bureaucracy-interest group interactions, Lindblom and 
Woodhouse (1993,77), for instance, state that: “Interest group interactions with the 
bureaucracy make an important contribution to social problem solving by helping 
to cope with the great complexity of the governmental agenda.”  
Ripley and Franklin (1986, 28) offer an even more intriguing argument on 
interactions between bureaucracies and organised interests: “What is less-evident 
[in the study of interest groups’ role in policy, CP] is that bureaucracies charged 
with implementing programs will, in fact, sometimes take the initiative in creating 
and funding the existence and activities of interest groups that will then 
subsequently lobby for decisions favourable to their interests.” This is basically 
what the EU is aiming at by encouraging a flourishing civil society to address the 
democratic gap in European decision-making. A respondent observes: “National 
implementation of policy programs as part of the European Social Funds, requires 
us to involve interest groups. Interest groups and an active civil society are really 
important in Brussels. Actually, Brussels is organising its own system of interest 
representation, just as we in the Netherlands have done before, to proactively 
arrange organisational structures with which to deliberate and which could serve as 
intermediates.”7 A clear example of deliberately including interest groups during 
                                                        
7 Interview by author. 
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local level implementation is the practice of community policing in which police 
officers choose community groups to interact with to enhance public safety. 
Community policing and the search for intermediates 
In trying to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Houston Police 
Department, its then new leader Lee P. Brown chose to bring the police closer to 
the community. In this way, the police would respond more to problems of 
citizens’ concerns rather than to those the police department considered 
important. To bring the police closer to the people, Brown set up the Directed 
Area Response Teams (DART). Each team was assigned a specific district in 
Houston and was responsible for public order and safety in that area. The police 
officers had to establish contacts in the community and had to consult with local 
citizen groups representing the citizens living in that area. Subsequently, they had 
to solve the problems the citizens brought up (Moore 1990). This idea of 
‘community policing’ and proactively reaching out to citizen groups has also been 
applied in the Netherlands. In Rotterdam, for instance, police offers responsible 
for particular neighbourhoods (wijkagenten) try to build and maintain 
relationships with various organisations, such as community organisations, 
governmental agencies, and mosques, so that they can be informed by and 
provide information to those organisations. According to a police officer in 
Rotterdam: “The police are by now utterly convinced of the necessity and 
usefulness of cooperating and communicating with other actors. When the 
relationships are good, you can get a lot of information, even from mosques, 
which naturally have a rather suspicious attitude towards us.”8 
Both cases show that including interest groups during implementation is often an 
important step in successfully completing the policy process, or generally in 
administering society, and thus serves the civil servants’ interests. So, the external 
component of bureaucratic politics entails consciously chosen interactions with 
interest groups by civil servants, as illustrated by these diverse case studies. For 
instance, those interactions serve to generate support, as was the case for the 
American Post Office. For the Houston police and the Rotterdam police, 
deliberately establishing and maintaining relations contributed to more successful 
policy implementation and administration of the society. These interactions 
somehow served the interests of civil servants, in functional or in strategic terms.  
The literature on bureaucratic politics does not systematically study how 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions may contribute to an agency’s or civil 
servants’ interests. Instead, it offers anecdotal evidence of such interactions. The 
literature contains either typologies of such interactions, or case studies that show 
more descriptively how such interactions take place. What we can distill from these 
insights is that bureaucratic politics assumes that civil servants may benefit from 
interactions with interest groups both strategically and instrumentally. They thus 
deliberately engage in interactions, carefully picking and choosing those that serve 
their interests. In other words, bureaucratic politics assumes that bureaucrats are 
in control of their interactions with interest groups in order to serve their own or 
their agency’s interests. 
                                                        
8 The case description is partly based on interviews by author; see also Poppelaars (2007). 
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2.4 The routine-driven bureaucrat 
A final, often implicit, explanation in the policy network literature of bureaucracy-
interest group interactions is that they are mutually beneficial and are therefore 
stable over time. The core idea of this network-based perspective is that policy 
making and policy implementation are inevitably based on interactions between 
many actors, who all have different interests yet need each other to achieve their 
goals. (Provan et al. 2005; Provan and Milward 2001; Toke and Marsh 2003; van 
Bueren, Klijn and Koppenjan 2003).  
The basic idea behind these policy networks, namely interactions between 
government and other actors, is certainly not new. Policy community or policy 
subsystem studies were already concerned with relations between government and 
society. Initially, terms like ‘iron triangle’ and ‘sub government’ referred to rather 
closed systems of relationships between elected politicians, government officials, 
and interest groups. These systems were characterised by consensus among 
participants and were effectively closed to new interests (Salisbury et al. 1992). 
Gradually these terms were replaced by concepts such as ‘advocacy coalitions’ and 
‘issue networks,’ referring to systems of relationships that were more open and 
flexible and often characterised by conflict (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 
Baumgartner and Leech 1998). Although over time closed networks seemed to 
open up, given the growth of interest communities, subsystems often appeared to 
be remarkably stable. This was the case, for instance, in US energy policy even after 
the 1970s oil crisis (Chubb 1983). Dutch policy making was also shown to take 
place in rather closed policy communities, in which policy advisors form ‘an iron 
ring’ around policy makers (Oldersma, Portegijs, and Janzen-Marquard 1999). 
Pressman and Wildavsky (1984[1973]) coined the idea of ‘complexity of joint 
action’ to indicate the involvement of third actors and its consequences in policy 
implementation. Simply put, complexity of joint action means that the more actors 
are included during policy implementation, the more decision junctures along the 
process will occur. This growing number of decision junctures will increase the 
likelihood of conflicts and therefore delay or, even worse, distort output. Over the 
years, this complexity of joint action has become recognised as an important 
feature of policy implementation (Börzel 1998; Goggin et al. 1990; O'Toole Jr., 
Hanf and Hupe 1997). Interestingly, scholars examining policy implementation in 
developing countries had earlier indicated that implementation was exactly the 
stage of the policy process when interest groups were most influential. According 
to this literature, it becomes increasingly apparent during implementation how the 
groups’ interests would be harmed and/or could be enhanced. Some of these 
scholars point to the difference between a weak and a strong state as a reason for 
such severe interest group involvement in policy implementation in developing 
countries (Grindle 1980; Migdal 1988; Smith 1973). Yet, in democratic states, the 
involvement of interest groups during implementation has been occasionally 
shown to alter or slow down implementation processes. The example of US 
residential home programs for the mentally ill in the late 1980s is such a case. 
Local decision makers had to take into account the conflicting interests of 
constituents’ groups, which were split between pro-community and pro-institution 
groups, in establishing proper housing for the mentally ill. These two groups were 
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divided on whether to provide the mentally ill with a normal life in the community, 
or to put them away in concealed homes outside society (Miller and Iscoe 1990, 
115-118). Obtaining legitimacy for the community option required taking the 
concerns of the pro-institution group seriously, which slowed down the 
establishment of proper housing. In the Dutch immigrant integration case, an 
instrumental approach toward immigrant organisations in order to accomplish 
swift and proper implementation, rather than high politics on normative 
immigrant issues, revealed a fundamental difference between policy making and 
policy implementation (Poppelaars and Scholten 2008). Getting the job done 
requires a different approach towards societal actors than articulating political ideas 
and designing policy advice.  
Interacting with interest groups is an important part of policy network studies. 
What remains often implicit, however, is the assumption of stability most policy 
networks share (but see Baumgartner and Jones 1993). As Fritz Scharpf (1999, 19) 
argued: “The ‘network’ metaphor is justified by the fact that the set of participants 
specialising in certain policy domains is likely to remain relatively stable, and that 
semi-permanent patterns of mutual support or opposition are likely to emerge over 
time.” This underlying assumption of stability depends on the existence of mutual 
benefits exchanged by the actors within a given network, but this is often not made 
explicit by the proponents of network theories. 
So, when governance and policy network approaches are employed to examine 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions, these studies are usually aimed at 
explaining how many and which actors are involved in policy making and how 
long-term interaction patterns, resulting from a perceived mutual benefit, 
influence eventual policy outcomes. Another consequence of such stable 
relationships, namely routine behaviour, is often not explicitly mentioned in policy 
network studies. What we can infer from this literature is that bureaucracy-interest 
group interactions serve a mutual benefit, tend to be durable, and could turn into 
routine behaviour over time.  
2.5 The missing link 
As diverse as the scholarly contributions on bureaucracy-interest group interactions 
are, they have one commonality. They all seek to explain particular, not fully 
responsive, patterns of bureaucracy-interest group interactions. A true null 
hypothesis underlying this common objective would account for interactions 
between bureaucracies and interest groups that include all relevant interests and do 
not discriminate among interest groups representing these interests. Such a null-
hypothesis reflects the more normative statements and theories about the role of a 
bureaucracy and interests groups in a democracy. A central concern about the role 
of the bureaucracy in a democracy is how to reconcile the efficiency, stability, and 
order a bureaucratic organisation seeks to achieve with the need to be accountable 
and politically responsive in a democratic society (Burke 1986; Gormley and Balla 
2004; Meier 1997). With regard to the role of interest groups in a democracy, this 
normative aspect is reflected in the concern that bias in the interest population may 
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afford the well-organised and powerful members too much influence in the policy 
process (Schattschneider 1970[1960]; Olson 1965). 
From a democratic point of view, interactions between bureaucracies and 
interest groups should then indeed be more evenly distributed among interest 
groups representing each group of citizens or organisations targeted by a particular 
policy issue. In other words, bureaucratic agencies should be fully responsive to the 
entire general public (or at least those with salient interests in a policy area) and not 
only to a few carefully selected organisations. Full responsiveness, however, is often 
like a fata morgana; it simply does not exist in reality. Many authors thus turn to 
questions of who is more influential or powerful, the bureaucracy or interest 
groups (Hill 1991). The theoretical challenge then is to provide a systematic 
explanation of why bureaucrats reach out to a particular subset of existing interest 
groups, for what reasons, and how their reasons may vary under different 
circumstances. The bottom line is that we need to fully understand the 
circumstances which enable either bureaucracies or interest groups to dominate 
the start and maintenance of their interactions.  
As has been discussed in the previous sections, three broad perspectives on 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions feature in the literature: bureaucratic 
politics, interest group studies and policy network studies. Each suggests that 
interaction patterns are not evenly distributed among various interests, albeit for 
different reasons. The bureaucratic politics perspective suggests that bureaucrats 
behave opportunistically to improve career options, to ensure their agency’s 
survival, or to improve policy implementation. The interest group literature 
addresses the strategies of interest groups in approaching bureaucratic agencies, 
trying to explain interest groups’ influence and success. Policy network 
perspectives suggest that there will be close ties between bureaucratic agencies, 
interest groups and elected politicians, influencing eventual policy outcomes. 
These ties not only appear to be close, but they also turn out to be rather stable over 
time, as they serve a mutual benefit.  
So, the question of why bureaucrats cooperate with some interest groups rather 
than others can be answered by three general sets of propositions that follow from 
these three perspectives (see figure 2.1). First, interaction between bureaucracies 
and interest groups occurs because bureaucrats consciously and strategically pick 
and choose who to talk to serve their own interests. Or, secondly, interest groups 
can choose to interact with certain bureaucrats because they are influential enough 
to do so. Finally, other mechanisms, such as mutual benefit, allow such 
interactions to thrive.  
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interest group interactions
Interest groups
politics
Interest groups
dominate
interactions
Bureaucratic
politics
Bureaucracies
dominate
interactions
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Interactions are 
mutually beneficial
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Figure 2.1 Three sets of explanations for bureaucracy-interest group interactions. 
Each of these strands of literature illuminates a certain aspect of bureaucracy-
interest group interactions, and each is rich with theories and illustrations. Thus, 
the basic problem is not that there is not enough information about bureaucracy-
interest group interactions, but that we simply do not know under which 
circumstances which of these explanations will hold. Each of these strands of 
literature explains bureaucracy-interest group interactions from a different 
perspective or as part of a broader framework. We thus need a model that is able to 
differentiate between situations when either bureaucrats or interest groups are 
decisive in establishing and maintaining relationships and that can simultaneously 
distinguish between short-term and long-term interactions. Chapter 3 will discuss 
such a model 
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 Why bureaucrats interact with     
interest groups 
3.1 Introduction  
Dutch civil servants did have strong incentives to interact with immigrant 
organisations. They needed those organisations to mediate their relationships with 
diverse immigrant communities. Similarly, New York’s City administration needed 
such organisations to create ‘communication channels’ (Thompson 2005) to more 
quickly solve intercultural tensions in New York City’s neighbourhoods. There 
seems to be something unique to the issues facing minorities, so that civil servants 
need such organisations, especially those that can constitute a link between 
governments and individual communities. The question is whether we can explain 
such bureaucracy-interest group interactions more generally. For instance, could 
this particular capacity to intermediate be similarly valuable in other policy areas? 
Or, under which circumstances could other driving forces of bureaucracy-interest 
group interactions be more important? To more fully examine such public 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions, we need a theoretical framework with 
which to systematically compare these interactions. Consider the following quotes,  
We need each other; there is no question about it.1  
What does it take to be a successful lobbyist? Offering trustworthy information is 
the essential trick.”2 
This is how I perceived these women’s organisations, as an entrance to the target 
group, they knew these kids.3 
The insurance companies and their associations? They are powerful players in the 
field, because we need them for financing the system.4  
These quotes are either from civil servants or interest groups, from different policy 
fields and different levels of government. Yet they share the same understanding, 
that some goods are traded for others. What the different theoretical explanations, 
which I discussed in the previous chapter, have in common is that they implicitly 
entail such exchanges as well. For instance, interest groups trade information and 
expertise for access; bureaucrats need public support; or, such exchanges are 
assumed to serve a mutual benefit so that they last over time. The key difference is 
                                                        
1 Interview by author. 
2 Idem. 
3 Poppelaars 2007, 17. 
4 Interview by author. 
Chapter 3 
26 
that these different accounts vary in their assessment of which of the two sets of 
actors is more ‘powerful:’ the bureaucrats or the interest groups. So, amid the 
conceptual variety in the three strands of literature examined in chapter 2, a 
common element recurs: some goods are traded for others. 
Such common ground is exactly what is needed to engage in comparative 
research. It provides an appropriate abstraction of bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions that moves beyond the idiosyncrasies of each individual explanation by 
capturing the idea of ‘exchanging goods.’ Such an exchange of resources is the 
main explanatory variable of interorganisational behaviour in the classic resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003[1978]) and will be used to explain 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions. In sum, the argument developed in this 
chapter is that by reconceptualising bureaucracy-interest group interactions as 
resource exchanges, it is possible to systematically compare those interactions 
across cases and over time. And, in doing so, this reconceptualisation allows us to 
distinguish between the explanations offered by the literatures on bureaucratic 
politics, interest group politics, and policy networks.  
I proceed in several steps to develop the explanatory model of bureaucracy-
interest group interactions. First, I briefly summarise the original resource 
dependence theory developed by Pfeffer and Salancik (2003[1978]). Second, I 
reconceptualise bureaucracy-interest group interactions based on resource 
dependence theory and I subsequently add a comparative and longitudinal 
perspective to this reconceptualisation. Finally, I develop a concrete explanatory 
model of bureaucracy-interest group interactions across cases and over time, based 
on the resource dependence reconceptualisation.  
3.2 Reconceptualising bureaucracy-interest group interactions  
Resource dependence theory has been developed as an instrument to understand 
organisational behaviour by examining the social context of organisations. 
According to resource dependence scholars, organisations are embedded in a 
network of interdependencies and social relationships (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976; 
Pfeffer and Salancik 2003[1978]). They argue that organisations interact with each 
other to obtain resources they do not control themselves. Such dependencies may 
serve a mutual benefit, but can also be highly asymmetrical when one organisation 
controls the most important resources needed by another. 
Resource dependence theory, when applied to interest group politics, is often 
used to explain variance in access of interest groups to public policy making, based 
on the resources they control that are useful for policy makers. Illustrative is the 
use of resource exchange to explain the access of interest groups to the different 
institutions of the European Union. The institutions’ varying needs for expertise or 
information explained the variance in access that certain interest groups were 
granted (Beyers and Kerremans 2004; Bouwen 2002; 2004).  
Resources may come in many guises, but can generally be defined as the 
utilities an organisation needs to function effectively or even to survive. In their 
classic work, Pfeffer and Salancik (2003 [1978], xii) defined resources to include 
financial and physical means, as well as information. Benson (1975) argued that 
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not only financial means but also grants of authority are essential resources an 
organisation should posses.5 Unlike neo-institutionalist theory, intangible assets 
such as legitimacy or political support can also be defined as resources in resource 
dependence theory (Scott 2001). For example, civil servants have been shown to 
establish relations with networks of interest groups to strengthen their position 
towards their political superiors (Carpenter 2001), or to enable smooth 
implementation, a strategy also known as cooptation (Selznick 1953). A final 
resource that is important throughout the implementation of public policy is the 
organisational capacity to actually deliver (urban) services, a key variable in policy 
network analyses of service delivery (O'Toole Jr., Hanf, and Hupe 1997; Kjaer 
2004). The resources included in exchange relationships may thus be very 
different in nature and can range from financial means to political support and 
from authority to implementation capacity.  
3.2.1 Assumptions of resource dependence theory 
Having something important to offer is one thing that explains interactions. Yet, 
resource dependence theory rests on several additional assumptions to explain 
interorganisational behaviour. First, it is not a purely deterministic explanation of 
interorganisational behaviour. Resource dependence theory recognises that 
organisations may behave strategically to steer or manipulate interactions with 
other organisations as they wish to acquire the resources they need. This entails 
strategic decision making about how to minimise interdependence with some 
other organisations, while maintaining beneficial relations. Some argue that the 
core function of organisations is such resource acquisition and that decision 
makers are fully oriented towards resource acquisition and securing a supply of 
adequate resources (Benson 1975).6 The organisations or actors in question 
deliberately choose to interact with each other and to maintain their relationships. 
In other words: “The organisations involved in the exchange [of resources, CP] 
make an implicit or explicit cost-benefit analysis on the basis of which they decide 
with whom to interact” (Bouwen 2002, 368). Thus, an organisation has to make up 
its mind about who to interact with, which necessarily entails some room to 
manoeuvre or to make strategic choices.7  
Second, the role of subjectivity is important in selecting resources and the 
organisations from which to obtain these resources. Based on Weick’s (1967) 
concept of the ‘enacted environment,’ Pfeffer and Salancik (2003[1978]) argue that 
                                                        
5 Benson (1975, 232) defines authority as follows: “the legitimation of activities, the right and responsibility to 
carry out programs of a certain kind, dealing with a broad problem area or focus.”  
6 This differs from other contextual theories, such as population ecology and (neo-) institutionalism. Each of 
these perspectives focuses on the environment to explain an organisation’s success or survival. Population 
ecology theory links natural selection processes to survival (Hannan and Freeman 1997; van Witteloostuijn 
2000), whereas neo-institutional theory focuses on norms, values, and social expectations as key 
environmental factors influencing organisations (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003 [1978]; Scott 2001). Both strands 
of literature implicitly treat the natural selection or norms and values, respectively, in terms of ‘an unseen 
hand explanation’ similar to the logic of supply and demand equilibria in micro-economics. Natural selection, 
in the case of population ecology, and norms, values and social expectations, in the case of neo-
institutionalism, are treated as simply ‘out there,’ determining an organisation’s options for survival.  
7 This responsiveness is necessarily limited, in the sense that conflicting demands or goals may arise and 
organisations can rarely respond to all conflicting demands (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003[1978]). 
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organisations give meaning to their environment, implying that the environment is 
subjective. “Organisational environments are not given realities; they are created 
through a process of attention and interpretation,” according to Pfeffer and 
Salancik (2003[1978], 13). In other words, organisations not only objectively select 
the resources they need; they also select those resources based on what they perceive 
to be important. A good example is political attention to what in the Netherlands is 
called ‘radicalisation.’ Radicalisation refers to the development of religious 
fundamentalism or fundamentalism in a general sense. Although Islamic 
radicalism, right-wing radicalism, and environmental radicalism might entail an 
equal threat to state security, Islamic radicalism receives far more attention than 
the other two types of fundamentalism.8 Islamic fundamentalism is thus perceived 
to be a top priority in ensuring public safety. Many actions of the Dutch 
government can be explained by this perception, as well as the resources they 
accordingly need. Inside information, for instance, is important in addressing 
radicalisation, which renders immigrant organisations very useful partners for the 
Dutch government (Poppelaars 2007). In sum, resource dependence theory 
assumes that organisations subjectively decide what is important, which resources 
they need, and from whom it is best to obtain them.  
Although resource dependence creates interdependence, such interdependence 
is not necessarily asymmetrical. This is another assumption underlying Pfeffer’s 
and Salancik’s resource dependence theory (2003[1978]). Interdependencies can 
also be symmetric, symbiotic or even asymmetric and symbiotic at the same time. 
Consider, for instance, a hypothetical interest group ‘Defending the Blind’ that 
receives subsidies from the government to organise get-a-job trajectories for the 
blind. Representing the blind is clearly the raison d’être of the organisation. Yet, it 
exists by the virtue of those governmental funds to organise the get-a-job 
trajectories. In this sense, the relation is clearly asymmetric. But it is symbiotic at 
the same time. ‘Defending the Blind’ receives government funds, and as result of 
this funding, it can continue its representative tasks. Vice versa, it contributes to an 
important target of the government: decreasing unemployment. Both parties gain 
in this asymmetric relationship. Interdependencies between organisations thus 
assume a certain power division.9 From a resource perspective, one organisation is 
more powerful than another because it is less dependent on other resources, has 
direct access to resources, or is the only provider of an important resource.  
Resource dependence theory further assumes that organisations try to 
manipulate their environments. Organisations seek to obtain adequate resources. 
To do so, they are dependent on their position in the market and their power to 
affect the flow of resources. They not only adapt to the environment, but they seek 
to create the most favourable environment for obtaining resources by, for instance, 
influencing regulation via financial contributions to political parties or via 
providing support to governing coalitions in order to get access (Benson 1975; 
                                                        
8 Nota Radicalisme en Radicalisering (Policy Memorandum Radicalism and Radicalisation; Parliamentary 
Papers, 2005-2006, 29754, nr. 26, 3). 
9 ‘Power’ is usually defined as the ability of actor A to make actor B do what A wants him to do or severely 
affect actor B’s life (cf. McClelland 1996, 650). Power is extremely difficult to define (see Dahl 2005[1961]), 
and even more difficult to measure. Because of this, I refer to power in a general sense rather than a specific 
political concept throughout this study.  
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Pfeffer and Salancik 2003[1978] 188-222). As Pfeffer and Salancik (2003[1978], 
190) note: “Organisational attempts to alter or adapt the external political or 
economic environment are almost limitless.” Economic regulation is a well-known 
example in which organisations not only adapt to but try to create the environment 
as well. Regulation policies are shown to often benefit the regulated industry, as a 
result of influential stakeholders (Posner 1974; Stigler 1971; Yackee 2005). In the 
language of the resource dependence theory, this is a result of individual firms 
manipulating the environment to minimise dependence. 
Resource dependence theory assumes, in summary, that organisations interact 
with each other because they need resources that other organisations control. Such 
resources are very different in nature and include, for instance, financial means, 
political support, or a capacity to intermediate. Organisations subjectively decide 
what important resources are. Based on such a perception, they decide with whom 
they need to interact to obtain those resources. This necessarily entails strategic 
decision making. In addition, resource dependence theory assumes that 
organisations try to manipulate their interactions and their environment so as to 
minimise their dependence to finally achieve full autonomy.  
3.2.2 Resource dependence between bureaucrats and interest groups 
The idea of exchanging goods is a core element of resource dependence theory. As 
we have seen, the literatures on bureaucratic politics, interest group politics and 
policy networks share an implicit assumption of trading or exchanging goods. We 
can thus use this element of resource exchange to systematically compare 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions at a more abstract level.  
Applying resource dependence theory to bureaucracy-interest group interactions 
assumes that variation in the types of resources controlled by interest groups 
results in variation in the interactions between them and bureaucracies. If interest 
groups do not control resources that are useful to policy makers, it will be hard for 
them to get access. Vice versa, if bureaucrats do not control or get access to 
appropriate resources, they will be less able to establish autonomy for their agency, 
to support their political superior, or to properly implement policy plans. In the 
approach taken here, each interaction between bureaucrats and interest groups will 
be defined as a resource exchange determined by two aspects: the characteristics of 
the resources in question, and contextual factors in the political-administrative 
environment.10 The first element allows a classification of these relations, while the 
second allows a systematic comparison. Concerning the characteristics of the 
resources in question, the following elements are important (Pfeffer and Salancik 
2003[1978]): 1) the importance of a resource to the organisation(s) in question, 2) 
the discretion of an organisation to use that particular resource, and 3) the extent of 
an organisation’s control over a resource. By examining each of these 
characteristics, and how they vary under different circumstances, we should be able 
to fully specify a given situation of resource exchanges between bureaucrats and 
interest groups. Below, I first discuss the resource characteristics. 
                                                        
10 Implicitly, this assumes that every type of interactions can be characterised by a resource exchange. 
Indeed, even short informal talks often serve the exchange of some sort of information, yet contact for just 
making appointments would obviously not be characterised as a resource exchange.  
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The importance of resources 
Resources vary in their importance. And, as a consequence, a given dependency 
relation will be more severe when a particular resource is extremely important to a 
certain organisation than when it is not. A resource’s importance is determined by 
two factors: its relative magnitude within the total exchange, and its criticality to the 
organisation. The first component refers to the proportion that a resource 
constitutes of the total input or output of resources. One could easily imagine, for 
instance, that academic staff is an important resource of the total set of resources 
universities need to obtain to survive. They, however, do not necessarily make up 
the largest proportion of these resources. Students constitute a larger part of the 
resources a university needs to survive. The question is which of these two 
resources is more important for its survival? 
This brings me to the second component of resource importance, its criticality 
to the organisation. By criticality, we mean the ability of the organisation to 
function effectively without that particular resource (Pfeffer and Salancik 
2003[1978], 46). A ‘critical’ resource does not necessarily constitute the largest 
proportion of the organisation’s total input or output of resources. Consider the 
following example. A shipyard receives an order to build naval vessels to be used in 
UN peace-keeping operations. To build these vessels, the shipyard has to obtain 
several resources, such as material to construct the hull, and skilled engineers to 
prevent instability and other hydro-mechanical inconveniences. These resources, 
among others, allow these vessels to cruise the oceans. Yet, one important resource 
for them to become useful in UN peace-keeping operations is missing. Without 
any weaponry, these vessels will be unable to execute their main task of 
establishing, enforcing or maintaining peace. So, weaponry could be seen as the 
most important resource for this shipyard to obtain, despite its small proportion of 
the total amount of resources. This implies that the second dimension, criticality, is 
more important in determining the importance of a resource than its proportion to 
the total set of resources required by an organisation.  
Based on this idea of criticality, we can rank resources based on their 
importance in enabling an organisation to determine what others have called the 
‘most problematic dependency’ (Jacobs 1974). The most problematic dependency is 
the resource the organisation needs most to ensure its survival or to perform its 
tasks. Recall the example of racial violence in the city of New York, discussed in the 
introduction to this study. With knowledge of and contacts with key figures from 
the individual social groups, New York City might have been able to better probe 
the atmosphere in these communities. Communication channels could be termed 
a critical resource with which this crisis could have been prevented or more quickly 
solved, without having to resort to a massive use of police force. In this study, the 
importance of a resource will be defined in terms of being most problematic or 
critical to an organisation’s survival.  
Discretion over and control of resources 
It is not only the importance of a resource that determines a resource exchange 
relationship. Discretion over resources refers to the ability to decide upon the 
allocation or use of resources. This may include the actual possession of a resource, 
access to it, or the ability to administer its use (for instance, via regulation). The 
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extent of control over resources refers to the degree of concentration of a resource 
within a given number of organisations. In other words, how many organisations 
control a given resource? When the resource you desperately need is in the control 
of a single organisation, you fully rely on that organisation to obtain it. This 
explains why immigrant organisations, albeit relatively weak in terms of financial 
and human capital, have an important function for the Dutch government. They 
are the only ones who can provide proper access to certain groups within society 
(Poppelaars 2007). In analytical terms, these second and third dimensions, i.e., the 
discretion over and the control of a given resource, can be combined. If you have 
discretion to decide upon a resource, you will also be able to control it. Or, vice 
versa, control over a resource implies a possibility to decide upon its use and its 
allocation, which implies discretion at the same time. So, these two dimensions can 
be combined into a single dimension of ‘concentration of control over a resource’ 
(hereafter ‘concentration of resources,’ for convenience). In sum, two elements 
define a given resource exchange situation: the importance of resources, defined by 
its criticality to the organisation, and their concentration in the environment, 
defined by the number of organisations capable of controlling such a resource. 
3.3 Resource dependence across cases 
Bureaucrats and interest groups do not interact in a complete vacuum. Their 
interactions will vary across different political-administrative dimensions. 
Systematic variation of these dimensions thus should enable systematic 
comparison of bureaucracy-interest group interactions. In order to systematically 
compare, we need to distil the systemic effects of the political-administrative 
environment (see chapter 4). I will use the position of bureaucrats as the point of 
the departure in defining such systemic effects, thereby distinguishing between 
institutional and policy-related contextual variables.11 The systemic effects of the 
political-administrative environment that most significantly influence bureaucracy-
interest group interactions are national interest representation regimes, the nature 
of political-administrative relations, the organisational culture, and the formal tasks 
of public agencies. Interest representation regime is often used as an important 
variable in explaining interest group behaviour and access, whereas political-
administrative relations, organisational culture, and formal agency tasks relate to 
the immediate environment of bureaucrats, which is important in the bureaucratic 
politics literature. A second set of contextual variables refers to policy 
characteristics. Not just policy content, but also policy saliency, complexity and 
political sensitivity are likely to influence interactions between interest groups and 
bureaucrats. How policy is framed will also affect bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions. And finally, Europeanisation is an important factor to include. These 
variables relate to the literature on policy networks and interest group politics as 
                                                        
11 In this study, as said, the bureaucrat will be the point of departure. To fully model bureaucracy-interest 
group interactions, one would need to include contextual dimensions important in explaining interest group 
behaviour as well. Yet given practical constraints, I opted for a focus on bureaucrats, implying that several 
contextual factors more important to interest groups are lacking in the model (but see chapter 6 for an 
empirical assessment of potentially relevant contextual factors in explaining interest group behaviour). 
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they are shown to be important in explaining interest group behaviour and 
interactions between interest groups and the government in general. Below, I will 
discuss each of these contextual variables more elaborately and hypothesise their 
effect on either resource concentration, resource importance or both.  
3.3.1 National interest representation regimes 
National systems of interest representation will significantly influence bureaucracy-
interest group interactions, as they entail different ways of organising access for 
interest groups to government. The main difference of importance here lies in the 
extent to which access is institutionalised and hierarchically organised.12 
Traditionally, pluralism refers to a political system with an emphasis on the 
primacy of groups, in which any interest can and will be represented, at least in 
principle (Dahl 2005[1961]; Truman 1951). Corporatism is an equally broad 
perspective and refers to a more restricted pattern of interest group involvement in 
policy making (Molina and Rhodes 2002; Schmitter 1985; 1989). Here, the 
institutions and arrangements for participation and interaction are established by 
the government and are highly institutionalised. In a pluralist system, however, 
participation and interactions are much less institutionalised. And whereas 
corporatism implies a dominant state, pluralism does so to a far lesser extent. 
Interest groups’ behaviour is inevitably affected by these organising principles, as 
are the choices of public bureaucracies to interact with them.  
When we relate these organising principles to a resource dependence approach, 
bureaucrats in less-institutionalised systems have more options to choose among 
interest groups as partners to interact with, because access is less restricted than in 
highly institutionalised systems. The difference thus results in varying degrees of 
resource concentration. Due to the relatively highly institutionalised nature of 
interest representation in the Netherlands, for instance, civil servants may be less 
able to interact with interest groups that are not included in the institutionalised 
patterns or platforms of consultation. This means that the number of interest 
groups that have access to civil servants may be lower, which, in turn, results in 
higher resource concentration. So, we hypothesise that:  
 
When national interest representation systems are highly institutionalised, the 
concentration of resources in the environment will be high. [H I]  
3.3.2 The bureaucratic environment  
Variation across national interest representation regimes is not the only important 
factor determining the political environment of bureaucrats. The organisational 
environment of bureaucrats is another important factor to take into account. In this 
study, the following variables will represent this organisational environment of 
bureaucrats: political-administrative relations, organisational culture, and a 
functional distinction between public agencies.  
                                                        
12 I thus proceed from the organisational structure of interest representation. This reflects the key difference 
between what Schmitter (1989) terms concertation and corporatism (see chapter 2).  
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Political-administrative relations  
How the political executive and (senior) civil servants relate to each other is an 
important factor to take into account as well. We thus need to examine how the 
political environment of bureaucrats touches upon their daily activities. For 
example, the composition of the government and constitutional characteristics are 
assumed to affect a civil servant’s relationship with the political executive.13 As a 
representative of an interest group observes:  
Civil servants are usually loyal to their political executives. Yet if there is a weak 
minister or secretary of state, civil servants will just say to us: “Let’s see what we 
can do for each other.” If the political executive shows strong leadership, however, 
the political beacons will be clearly set with less room to manoeuvre. Indeed, we 
see the games they play change when new political executives are in office.14 
Political-administrative relations are likely to change when the government in 
office changes. One way to include such a ‘political spill-over effect’ on 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions is by examining political-administrative 
relationships. Political-administrative relations often refer to the extent of political 
control of the bureaucracy and the role in policy making bureaucracies normatively 
should, and empirically do have (see chapter 2). I refer to politicisation of the 
bureaucracy to capture such ‘political spill-over effects’. Politicisation in this case 
does not refer to the number of political appointees within a bureaucracy, but is 
defined as the nature of the tasks of a bureaucracy (Peters and Pierre 2004). From 
this definition, we can assume that the more the tasks of a bureaucracy become 
politicised, the more room to manoeuvre civil servants will have in interacting with 
interest groups. Such a politicisation will imply a need for different resources. 
Senior civil servants engaged in political-strategic decision making on 
infrastructural projects, for instance, will prefer political support rather than 
consultation on the nitty-gritty of technical aspects. So, when civil servants are 
engaged in political-strategic decision making, they will most likely need another 
mixture of resources than those who are not, or are to a lesser extent, engaged in 
political-strategic decision making. At first sight, a larger role of political-strategic 
insights in a bureaucrat’s job will result in a need for both different resources and a 
higher concentration of resources, since not all interest groups will be able to offer 
what the bureaucrat needs. For instance, a top civil servant at the department of 
macro-economics needs highly sophisticated models to anticipate future economic 
                                                        
13 This thus implies that I exclude institutional characteristics of constitutional design, the nature of the 
executive government and its political party system (cf. Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Lijphart 1999) as such 
from the analysis. For a model that focuses on interest groups as a point of departure, these factors may be 
more relevant as they directly influence the strategic decision making of interest groups as to where to seek 
access. Another feature of civil service systems that could be important is the distinct administrative culture 
apparent in different civil service systems. Two models are often invoked to explain administrative culture, 
‘Rechtsstaat’ and ‘Public Interest’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; see also Rutgers 2001), which represent 
variation in state dominancy in organising public interests. This idea of administrative culture only seems to 
indicate some general variations. In addition, the difference in dominant or non-dominant states is reflected 
by the variable of interest representation regimes. Therefore, I excluded it from the model. 
14 Interview by author. 
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trends. Not every organisation would be able to offer the necessary information or 
contribute to meeting this need. So, we can hypothesise that,  
 
When civil service positions require high levels of political-strategic insight, the 
importance and concentration of resources will be high. [H2] 15 
Organisational culture  
Organisational cultures consist of a set of norms and values determining how 
individual employees interpret the task of the organisation, their role within the 
organisation, and how he or she perceives the environment. As such, 
organisational culture will influence how bureaucrats interact with interest groups. 
Organisational culture may be an important aspect determining bureaucracy-
interest group interactions, but a complicating factor is that it is notoriously 
difficult to examine systematically. Culture may apply to an entire national civil 
service system, or culture may differ from agency to agency within a nation’s civil 
service system (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, 54-63; Scott 2001). Also, while scholars 
see organisational culture as an important explanatory factor determining an 
organisation’s success or failure, it is one that is hard to cast in prescriptive 
typologies or hypotheses (Carpenter 2001; Wilson 2000[1989]).16 Inter-
organisational classifications that now exist typically distinguish only between 
public and private organisations (Hofstede 1998) and not between various types of 
public agencies. The main challenge, then, is that we cannot ascertain what aspects 
of organisational culture will matter for any given organisation, or how to 
systematically compare such aspects across different organisations.17 In sum, there 
is considerable scholarly agreement about the importance of organisational culture 
as an explanatory factor for organisational success, but there are few, if any, agreed-
upon theories that specifically relate aspects of organisational culture to how 
different types of organisations survive.  
Wilson’s definition is an appropriate starting point to theorise about the effects 
of organisational culture on resource exchanges, given his external perspective on 
organisational culture. In his view, organisational culture is “a persistent way of 
thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an 
organisation.” And, “organisational culture consists of those patterned and 
                                                        
15 I note that this relationship may be mitigated by the very same strategic position these civil servants 
occupy. As a result of their greater discretion, they will enjoy more leeway, allowing them to diversify the set 
of interest groups and perhaps even to dismiss those they do not approve of. This administrative leeway could 
thus mitigate a potentially high degree of dependence. For now, I exclude such potential mitigation effects 
from the hypothesis, as this effect is more uncertain than the main effect noted therein.  
16 Carpenter differs from scholars such as Wilson in his view that bureaucracies do not necessarily require a 
culture (Carpenter 2001, 24, note 24). He defines bureaucratic culture as a prevailing metaphor of the 
organisation; therefore, the absence of a culture in his opinion exists if “employees and clients do not feel 
inclined to ‘consume’ any of the available metaphors, or when there are so many contending metaphors that 
none of them take hold.” His conception of bureaucratic culture as ‘buying into’ a prevailing and powerful 
metaphor precludes the possibility of employees adhering to existing practices that could well be part of a 
organisation’s culture, without consciously ‘buying into it’ and ignores the fact that refraining from 
adherence to a certain organisational metaphor can be defined a  (sub)culture as well. 
17 Such a lack of systematic research is attributed by some to the abundance of case studies characterising 
this field and the fact that nation states often remain the only available researchable unit of analysis (Hofstede 
1998; cf. Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, 54-63). 
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enduring differences among systems of coordinated action that lead those systems 
to respond in different ways to the same stimuli” (Wilson 2000[1989], 91, 93). In 
other words, behavioural norms within organisations allow similar organisations to 
respond differently to similar environments. This idea, among others, united the 
German army, a Texas prison and Carver High School. They all created a common 
understanding among their employees about the critical task of their organisation 
so that everyone complied with it. It distinguished their performance and success 
from fellow army organisations, prisons and high schools in similar circumstances.  
The notion of a strong common understanding among the individual members 
of an organisation can explain variance in bureaucracy-interest group interactions. 
First, we might assume that an important factor in determining the perception of 
an interest group is the extent to which a public agency considers it a legitimate 
partner to work with. Such an idea of legitimacy directly relates to the question of 
whether interest groups represent broad or narrow interests within society. When 
they are perceived to represent broad interests and, in doing so, to contribute to 
democratic decision making, bureaucrats will be more responsive. On the other 
hand, if interest groups are assumed to only represent narrow interests, resulting 
in non-democratic decision making, bureaucrats will be less likely to be responsive. 
Put differently, if there is a strong common understanding within the agency that 
interest groups are legitimate partners, civil servants will be more inclined to 
interact with them than when they are perceived as illegitimate partners.  
A next step is to relate the existence or non-existence of such a common 
understanding to resource exchanges. When there is a strongly shared bias against 
interest groups, bureaucrats are inclined to diversify the total set of organisations, 
including both interest groups and other types of organisations, and minimise 
contacts with interest groups. Illustrative is the case of a major fraud scandal in the 
Dutch construction sector (Bouwfraude). Its main interest groups had hardly any 
access to the ministry, because they were perceived to be untrustworthy (see also 
chapter 7). When there is a strongly shared bias toward interest groups, 
bureaucrats may be inclined to proactively reach out to various interest groups, in 
turn enlarging the set of interest groups they rely on. Both cases decrease the 
concentration of resources in the environment.18 In other words, organisational 
culture mitigates the effects of a dependence on interest groups, because it results 
in lower resource concentration. We can thus hypothesise that,  
 
When there is a strong common sense within a public agency against or in favour 
of interest groups, the concentration of resources will be low. [H3] 
Functional differences between public agencies 
The functional distinction between different public agencies is also assumed to 
cause variation in bureaucracy-interest group interactions. An agency responsible 
for allocating agricultural subsidies, for instance, is likely to engage in interactions 
with different interest groups than those with which a policy advisory unit involved 
                                                        
18 In theory, there are four different options: strong common sense against interest groups, strong common 
sense in favour of interest groups, weak common sense against interest groups, and weak common sense in 
favour of interest groups. I focus on the first two options, as a strong common sense entails an organisational 
culture that influences individual behaviour more than a weak common sense would do.  
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in strategic decision making on future agricultural policy will interact. Or, the 
nature of the interactions with interest groups is likely to vary between different 
agencies. To theorise about how functional differences result in variance of 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions, I use Dunleavy’s (1991) typology of 
functional differences as a point of departure.19 His typology is explicitly based on 
functional differences between government agencies. He distinguishes between 
several types of agencies, among them regulatory agencies, delivery agencies, 
taxing agencies, and control agencies (see Dunleavy 1991, 183-187).20  
We can derive a threefold functional distinction from Dunleavy’s typology that 
is particularly relevant to bureaucracy-interest group interactions, namely: policy 
advice, regulatory and service delivery agencies. This three-fold typology of 
government agencies is important for explaining variation in bureaucracy-interest 
group interactions. Policy advisory agencies are important, as the literatures on 
both bureaucratic politics and policy networks focus on policy making and decision 
making. Examples are the organisational subunits located in the ministerial 
departments responsible for policy development. Policy delivery agencies are also 
useful to include, as a supplement to the dominant focus on policy formulation in 
the policy network literature. In the Netherlands, the immigration agency (De 
Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst) is a good example of such service delivery 
agencies. Finally, much of the interest group literature concerned with 
bureaucracy-interest group relations seems to concern regulation. To incorporate 
both regulation and control and supervision, the category of monitoring agency is 
added to the classification used in this study. Examples are the Dutch authority for 
the financial markets (Autoriteit Financiële Markten) or the Dutch health care 
inspectorate (Inspectie Gezondheidszorg).  
These functional differences can be related to bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions, as they demarcate tasks of civil servants and thus identify the 
resources civil servants need to accomplish their tasks. That is, agency tasks mostly 
relate to the importance of resources, as variation in agency types will relate to the 
different nature of resources needed. Advisory agencies may require expertise more 
often than their colleagues at service delivery agencies, or may need a different type 
of expertise. Service delivery agencies may consider implementation capacity more 
important than expertise. And, in the case of monitoring or regulatory agencies, 
both expertise and implementation capacity may be important. So, we can 
hypothesise that,  
 
The importance of resources will vary across different types of agencies. [H4] 
                                                        
19 See also Wilson (2000[1989], 159-171) for a functional typology of government agencies. According to 
Wilson’s classification, which he insists we must use with caution (Wilson, 1989, 159), other types of 
organisations are: procedural agencies (only outputs can be observed, e.g. mental hospital), craft organisation 
(only outcomes can be observed, e.g. army during wartime), and a coping organisation (neither outputs nor 
outcomes can be observed, e.g. schools). Interestingly, on the basis of the costs and benefits a certain policy 
issue generates, and thus different collective action patterns an agency faces, he constructs another agency-
typology (client agencies, majoritarian agencies, entrepreneurial and interest-group agencies). It remains 
unclear, however, how these two typologies relate to each other, and, if so, whether and when they overlap. 
20 This typology was developed in part to contrast with classic budget-maximisation models of bureaucratic 
behaviour (Dunleavy 1991, 174-209). Taken in isolation, it nevertheless serves as a useful starting point to 
theorise about how agency differences would influence bureaucracy-interest group interactions. 
Why Bureaucrats Interact with Interest Groups 
37 
3.3.3 Policy characteristics 
In the literatures on interest group politics and policy networks, variation in policy 
issues and policy sectors is important in explaining interest group behaviour or 
interest groups’ access to public decision making (see Baumgartner and Leech 
1998). Several well-known policy typologies link content-related factors to variation 
in collective action patterns (Lowi 1964, 1972; Stone 1997; Wilson 2000[1989]). 
Yet, it remains difficult to deductively generate meaningful hypotheses on the 
relation between policy content and different types of collective action. The most 
pressing problem seems to be that these policy typologies assume that policy 
content results in different patterns of collective action. That is, they do not exclude 
the possibility that collective action patterns came first, and out of those patterns, 
certain public measures evolved (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Stone 1997). Also, 
these typologies have mostly been constructed and subsequently applied in cross-
sectional research. Over time, however, costs might turn into benefits for the very 
same constituents, and conflict might shift to consensus. Differently put, issue 
perception may change over time (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 41-43). Recollect 
the immigrant integration issue discussed in chapter 1. It has been shown that 
issue perception, or framing, of immigrant integration policies in the Netherlands 
has changed over time. Whereas in the 1990s social and economic issues were 
important in framing immigrant integration, over recent years, issues of culture 
and religion within a diverse society have become increasingly important 
(Poppelaars and Scholten 2008). This shift in issue perception may have 
consequences for getting access. Furthermore, several policy areas could contain 
regulative and redistributive elements. Agriculture, for instance, generally 
classified as a regulative policy area (Ripley and Franklin 1986; Blom-Hansen 
2001), contains redistributive elements as well, such as subsidies to farmers in 
Europe and the tariff barriers they entail. And one could argue that every policy 
issue is in essence redistributive in nature, as redistribution or dispersal of negative 
consequences of citizen behaviour usually is the main goal.  
In sum, these typologies help to signal different collective action patterns that 
are potentially related to issue content. However, they do not provide a firm basis 
from which to estimate the precise direction of the relationships between specific 
policy issues and certain types of collective action patterns (or vice versa). When 
theorising about variation in bureaucracy-interest group interactions across policy 
issues, we thus need to distil other characteristics of policy content likely to 
influence those interactions. Below, I discuss how issue salience, policy complexity, 
and political sensitivity relate to resource exchanges.  
The salience of an issue 
Let me first consider issue salience. Kollman (1998), for instance, combines issue 
salience, i.e. whether the public is inattentive or attentive, with issue popularity to 
explain interest group strategies to gain access and exert influence. However, 
whether or not issues are salient, interest groups will seek to exert influence 
whenever their private interests are negatively addressed by policy proposals. In 
other words, it is not a matter of if, but a matter of how they will do so. Indeed, 
interest groups adapt their strategies when issues become more or less salient (see 
for a discussion of the literature: Lowery and Brasher 2004, 175-177). Over recent 
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decades, immigrant integration has become a very salient issue in the Netherlands, 
thereby enlarging its scope of activity. It has developed from an issue of guest 
workers to an all-encompassing issue that is perceived to influence many aspects of 
society, including education, public safety and the labour market. Accordingly, the 
number and type of organisations and interest groups involved in the issue have 
been expanding. We now find not just traditional immigrant organisations, but 
also professional organisations, educational organisations, housing cooperations 
and so on. The number of organisations the government has to deal with to 
address this issue has increased over time.21 Issue salience thus matters for 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions as well. Once an issue becomes salient, 
resource concentration will decrease, as it moves from a ‘hidden’ issue to a ‘more 
visible’ issue about which other interest groups in society might have something to 
add. So, it seems that bureaucrats should benefit when issues become salient and 
we can thus hypothesise that,  
 
When issues are salient, the concentration of resources in the environment will be 
low. [H5] 
The complexity of an issue 
The complexity of certain policy issues is also likely to result in different patterns of 
collective action. Complexity, or technical complexity, refers to the extent to which 
understanding of a specialist or expert is required. Or, according to Gormley (1983, 
89-90), the problem requires in principle a professional appraisal rather than a 
normative account. Financial instruments and regulations to monitor financial 
markets are technically complex and usually require a high standard of professional 
expertise.22 Constructing innovative dams, bridges, and other devices to prevent the 
Netherlands from flooding needs highly technical expertise, which only a few 
organisations can offer. Complexity, in Gormley’s definition, thus certainly would 
matter for bureaucracy-interest group interactions. High complexity means that 
resources will be highly concentrated and civil servants have little leeway to make 
strategic choices about with whom to interact. Thus, we can hypothesise that, 
 
When issues are technically complex, the concentration of resources will be high. 
[H6] 
The political sensitivity of an issue 
Gormley (1983) combines technical complexity with what he terms ‘consumer 
conflict’ to explain the effectiveness of advocacy. Consumer conflict refers to the 
impact that policies might have and is high when a policy proposal is expected to 
benefit some people at the expense of many others. The rise of oil prices, for 
instance, is likely to become an issue with potentially high consumer conflict. 
Higher oil prices perhaps benefit the oil companies and petrol stations, but they are 
a strong disadvantage for transport companies and individual citizens when 
                                                        
21 Parliamentary Papers, 2003-2004, 28689, nrs. 8-9. 
22 This may change, however, when the negative consequences of such technical financial instruments touch 
upon the daily lives of citizens, such as in the 2008 sub-prime mortgage and credit crises. Even highly 
technical issues may thus ‘tip over’ to issues involving highly normative accounts.  
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refuelling their cars. Both dimensions, technical complexity and consumer conflict, 
generate different options for either grass-roots advocacy (citizen groups) or proxy 
advocacy (government organisations representing residents from a certain 
jurisdiction in another government organisation’s proceedings).23 The 2007-2008 
sub-prime mortgage crisis, for instance, has moved from a highly technical issue 
with low consumer conflict to an issue characterised by high complexity and high 
consumer conflict. Relatively few people benefit, whereas many suffer. 
We may redefine Gormley’s notion of consumer conflict in somewhat different 
terms to come to a sense of what is called political sensitivity. Politically sensitive 
issues not only potentially generate high consumer conflict, but, as a consequence, 
they will also give rise to conflict in parliament and thereby threaten the position of 
a political executive. Politically sensitive issues require civil servants to find an 
appropriate mix of interest groups with which they can interact to perform their 
job. The extent to which civil servants can diversify the resources they rely on to 
ground their advice and policy plans will matter considerably in politically sensitive 
issues. So, this tendency to diversify resources (Beyers 2004; Beyers and 
Kerremans 2004) will be even more important for politically sensitive issues than 
is normally the case. Politically sensitive issues may not only require a large 
amount of expertise to design a solid policy proposal. Obtaining legitimacy may be 
even more important. The recent public health reforms in the Netherlands not only 
required expertise on how to design a system in which insurance companies could 
properly cope with the insurance risks, how to implement market principles, and 
how to improve actual health care. These reforms also required, apart from the 
technical details, the approval of those involved in public health care. Obtaining 
expertise was one important element in this case; legitimacy and the need to 
ensure the appropriate amount of implementation capacity were perhaps even 
more important. The importance of various resources increased dramatically in 
this case.24 So, in terms of resource exchange, the importance of resources 
becomes more relevant in politically-sensitive issues. We can thus hypothesise that:  
 
When issues are politically sensitive, the relative importance of resources will be 
high. [H7] 
3.3.4 Two additional contextual factors 
Apart from factors specifically related to policy characteristics, two more abstract 
factors can be identified that are important in the interest group and policy network 
literature to explain group behaviour: the influence of ideas, or, ‘framing.’ And, 
secondly, Europeanisation in the context of EU member states. I discuss their 
effect on bureaucracy-interest group interactions more generally below. 
                                                        
23 When complexity and consumer conflict are high, neither grass-roots nor proxy advocacy is effective 
(Gormley 1983). In these circumstances, we usually see a policy problem that lacks a solution or for which the 
outcomes cannot be easily perceived and there is a (fundamental) lack of agreement among the important 
actors about the nature of appropriate solutions. When issues are highly complex and there is low conflict, 
issues remain far from the public agenda (cf. Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 41). 
24 Discussion based on interviews by author. 
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The influence of ideas  
Ideas matter in public policy making. They help certain issues to hit the political 
agenda when they fit the current dominant perception of what is important and 
what is not (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 2005). They also help us to evaluate 
policy, learn from past experiences, adapt policy programs where necessary (Hall 
1993), and to explain how policy develops and improves. Ideas may have different 
names, such as policy frames, policy paradigms, dominant world views, and policy 
discourse (Howlett and Ramesh 2003). What these different concepts essentially 
entail is a shared perspective on how the world works. In that sense, Weick’s 
(1969) idea of enactment of the environment, important in Pfeffer’s and Salancik’s 
(2003[1978]) resource dependence theory, is nothing more than a set of ideas that 
determines how organisations and their members interpret their environment. 
Indeed, why do we perceive Islamic fundamentalism to be much more dangerous 
than Christian or Jewish fundamentalism, since all three are capable of resulting in 
a similar intolerance (Stern 2003)? Or, why did the Dutch environmental planning 
agency (NPM) struggle until 2006 to get its climate message heard, while in 2008 
it is successful in doing so?25 Major shifts in ideas by powerful agenda setters help 
to bring about a different perception of what is important or what is in desperate 
need for governmental action. Interest groups may be part of the policy 
communities either defending the status quo or trying to change it (Baumgartner 
and Jones 1993). Ideas thus will matter for bureaucracy-interest group interactions.  
Ideas will determine who gets access or not, which resources are important, and 
to what extent such resources are concentrated within a given environment. When 
climate change, for instance, is predominantly framed as an economic issue (for 
instance, in terms of sustainable development and corporate responsibility), the set 
of organisations from which to obtain resources is much larger than when it is 
framed as environmental protection or wildlife preservation.26 The type of 
resources will be different as well. Political support is perhaps much more 
important when national governments and the EU want to adopt stringent 
regulations to stimulate corporate responsibility among larger companies than 
when they want to add the house sparrow to the list of protected species. Such 
ideas may not only affect a single policy area, they may well have broader 
implications. Our current perception of Islamic fundamentalism in the 
Netherlands has a spill-over effect to, among other issues, public safety (how do we 
avoid terrorist attacks?), education (how do we prevent immigrant youth from 
dropping out and radicalising?), emancipation (how can we make sure that women 
from Islamic communities enjoy freedom of choice?), and even civil rights (what is 
more important to us, freedom of speech or freedom of religion?). Ideas, or 
framing, thus can be seen as a contextual variable that may operate at different 
levels of analysis. Returning to bureaucracy-interest group resource exchanges, we 
may assume that the current set of ideas on a particular policy or societal 
phenomena will influence both the importance of individual resources as well as 
their concentration in the environment.  
                                                        
25 Private communication with members of the Dutch agenda setting project. 
26 cf. Parliamentary Papers, 2007-2007, 31209, nr. 1. 
Why Bureaucrats Interact with Interest Groups 
41 
Enlargement of the environment 
A final contextual factor to take into account, for European Union member states in 
particular, is that the institutional environment is not a given and fixed entity. 
European member states are increasingly confronted with a supranational 
governmental body that influences their internal and external affairs. As ‘project 
Europe’ steadily progresses, interactions between bureaucrats and interest groups 
are likely to be affected by what is often termed ‘Europeanisation.’ Europeanisation 
is a many-sided phenomenon (Olsen 2002), but a basic definition would at 
minimum entail the influence of Europe’s supranational arrangements and laws 
on national institutions (Kohler-Koch 1997; Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996).27 
With respect to interest groups, Europeanisation is usually seen as influencing 
interest group strategies, as they endeavour to represent their interests when an 
additional level of government has emerged. The evidence of which governance 
level is more important to interest groups remains somewhat mixed. It seems, 
however, that despite ongoing Europeanisation, the national level remains the 
main target for national interest groups, although they engage in additional 
strategies to lobby Brussels (Beyers 2002; Visser and Wilts 2006; Wilts 2001).  
In applying the argument to public bureaucracies and interest group 
interactions, a similar process is assumed to occur. Thus, while the environment 
and the number and type of actors within it in principle steadily expand, the main 
interactions will occur between national bureaucrats and national interest groups. 
Yet, similar to the studies on interest groups, both actors are assumed to employ 
additional strategies and engage in supranational or international interactions as 
well. As has become clear from the existing literature, Europeanisation is an 
ongoing process, the impact of which will vary from issue area to issue area and 
country to country. Additionally, it will depend on the degree of required 
compliance (regulation, directives, or the Open Method of Coordination) and the 
date of joining the EU. In the case of the Open Method of Coordination, for 
instance, Europeanisation will proceed slower given its noncommittal nature.  
Given these multiple influences and the ongoing debate whether Europe 
influences member states or vice versa, it is difficult to pinpoint the precise 
direction of influence Europeanisation will have on bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions. On the one hand, we may assume that Europeanisation enlarges the 
environment. This renders the degree of dependence for bureaucrats less severe, 
since more organisations will be available to obtain resources from. In this case, 
Europeanisation results in lower resource concentration. Yet, on the other hand, 
EU policy making will demand a different type of resources, which may not be 
readily available within the current environment, thus resulting in higher resource 
concentration. Another effect could be that interest groups consider EU access to 
be more important than national access, rendering national civil servants more 
dependent on national interest groups. Furthermore, the ‘EU factor’ matters in 
different ways across different policy areas.  
                                                        
27 Any definition of Europeanisation is not complete without taking into account its reciprocal nature. 
Differently put, studies of Europeanisation always suffer from the chicken-and-the-egg problem of what 
comes first, as national member states provide input for European decision making and European 
regulations affect national regulations in turn.  
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Given its many-sidedness, it would go beyond the purpose of this study to 
include it as a full explanatory variable in the model. Nonetheless, it remains a 
factor too significant to fully ignore and, therefore, it will be taken into account in 
the analysis in a more inductively-oriented fashion. A general impact of 
Europeanisation will be assessed, but concrete effects will not be hypothesised. It is 
left to the empirical analyses to reveal if and to what extent Europeanisation has an 
effect on the degree of dependence characterising national bureaucracy-interest 
group interactions.  
3.3.5 A multidimensional view on resource dependence 
As discussed above, bureaucrats and interest groups do not interact in a complete 
vacuum. The resource dependence assumed to characterise the relationships 
between these two sets of actors is thus undeniably affected by the political-
administrative environment in which these interactions occur. I hypothesised that 
several contextual factors affect resource dependence between bureaucrats and 
interest groups, by stating their effect on either resource importance or resource 
concentration.  These effects are listed in table 3.1 
Table 3.1 The effect of contextual factors on the resource elements 
Effect on resource elementsContextual factors
? When there is a strong common sense within a public agency against or in favour of interest 
groups, the concentration of resources will be low.
Organisational
culture
? Europeanisation will affect both resource concentration and resource importance.EU 
? Dominant ideas will affect both resource concentration and resource importance.Ideas
Policy area
Agency type
Political-administrative 
relations
Interest representation 
regime
? When issues are salient, the concentration of resources will be low.
? When issues are technically complex, the concentration of resources will be high.
? When issues are politically sensitive, the relative importance of resources will be high.
? The importance of resources will vary across different types of agencies.
? When civil service positions require a high level of political-strategic insight, the importance and 
concentration of resources will be high. 
? When national interest representation regimes are highly institutionalised, the concentration of 
resources will be high.
 
3.4 Resource dependence over time  
Using the reconceptualisation developed in the previous section, we can compare 
whether, when, and to what extent bureaucrats are dependent on interest groups or 
vice versa. In other words, we can distinguish a bureaucratic entrepreneur from an 
interest group entrepreneur under different circumstances. An assumption 
underlying this model is that their behaviour is grounded in strategic rationality, an 
important yet implicit point of departure from the original resource dependence 
theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003[1978], 188-222). Put differently, resource 
dependence theory assumes that it is possible to end a relationship when it no 
longer suits your interests.28 Indeed, why continue interacting when an 
                                                        
28 The term strategic choice, and accordingly the terms strategic, anticipatory, and habitual rationality 
indicate how choices of either bureaucrats or interest group to obtain resources may be restricted or favoured 
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organisation cannot deliver the resource you need? Contemplating a long-term 
perspective immediately draws attention to potential limits to strategic rationality. 
It may well not be possible for the actors involved in the exchange relationship to 
end these interactions. In this case, other types of rationality will determine the 
interactions. But what types of rationality could be involved other than strategic 
rationality? Two theories may offer useful insights on the nature of such choices, 
namely long-term perspectives on decision making in the rational choice literature 
and historical institutionalism.  
Let me first consider the long-term perspectives on decision making in the 
rational choice literature. Strategies of rational actors differ between single and 
repeated interactions, which are an important implication of adding a time 
dimension in decision making. Unlike single interactions, actors in a relationship 
that is assumed to take place repeatedly will take as an initial step a cooperative 
rather than non-cooperative position (Ostrom 1998; Ostrom and Walker 2003). 
This means that when interactions are assumed to take place repeatedly with the 
same actor, the actors in question are not likely to choose an initial action that fully 
maximises their own interests and entails negative consequences for the other 
actor. Reciprocity then becomes an important norm for repeated interactions. If 
you choose to cooperate initially, you want the other actor to cooperate afterward. 
One of the most well-known reciprocity strategies is tit-for-tat: First cooperate and 
then do whatever the other actor has done during the prior interaction (Axelrod 
1984; Ostrom, 1998, 10).29  
Even in highly unlikely situations, cooperation on the basis of reciprocity might 
arise. For example, soldiers of hostile armies involved in the WW I trench war 
displayed often implicit but effective ways of cooperating with the enemy based on 
the logic of reciprocity. It is fairly easy to shell hostile food-supplying troops on the 
road to the trenches. However, you obviously can expect an equally heavy attack the 
next day when food suppliers bring your daily meal. Instead, trench soldiers on 
both the French and the German sides refrained from such attacks. Both sides 
developed a shooting scheme such that the other side knew when it was safe to 
crawl out of their trenches to have dinner. Their behaviour was based on tacit but 
essential reciprocity (Axelrod 1984). During interactions that take place repeatedly 
over time between the same actors, it has been shown that trust is positively related 
to successful interactions (Hardin 2002; but see Axelrod 1984, 174).  
The longer interactions take place, the less likely it is that actors will behave 
opportunistically (Judge and Dooley 2006). If the actors can foresee that 
interactions will take place repeatedly and over a considerable period of time, they 
are likely to reciprocate. Diamond dealers, for instance, are famous for exchanging 
millions of dollars with a simple hand shake and a verbal agreement (Axelrod 1984, 
177-178). They know that they will deal with each other in the near future, so it is no 
use cheating or pursuing other non-cooperative strategies.  
                                                                                                                                             
by the context in which they take place, by anticipating (un)intended consequences in the near future, or by 
choices made in the past. In this sense, their use resembles yet is somewhat different from how these 
concepts are used in rational choice theory.  
29 Tit-for-tat, however, may also end up in a non-cooperative trap when one of the actors chooses a non-
cooperative strategy as his/her first action.  
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Returning to resource exchange, we see something of the logic behind 
reciprocity strategies. Scharpf (1999, 19) argues that: “The ‘network’ metaphor is 
justified by the fact that the set of participants specialising in certain policy 
domains is likely to remain relatively stable, and that semi-permanent patterns of 
mutual support or opposition are likely to emerge over time.” Pfeffer and Salancik 
(2003[1979], 27) also note that interactions or dependencies are likely to persist 
over time, because they reduce uncertainty for participants. If interactions to obtain 
resources are successful, there will be incentives to retain these relationships. In 
other words, the desires to reduce uncertainty and increase trustworthiness become 
more important incentives to maintain relationships.  
The bottom line is that when taking into account time, strategic choices still 
seem to underlie long-term interactions. Yet, such strategic choices are particularly 
constrained by the consequences participants envision to happen in the near 
future. For example, you might trust the person or organisation in question too 
much to end your relationship, the interaction might be too important in reducing 
uncertainties, or perhaps you know that you will need the other organisation or 
person in question in the foreseeable future. In other words, when the anticipated 
costs of terminating the interactions are too high, one will or cannot end the 
interaction. When applied to bureaucracy-interest group interactions, bureaucrats 
may maintain interactions precisely because of these reasons. So, rather than being 
the result of strategic rationality, bureaucracy-interest group interactions may well 
be the result of anticipatory rationality. Both are strategic in nature, yet anticipatory 
rationality emphasises consequences in the near future of today’s interactions.  
Bringing in a long-term perspective, however, also raises the possibility of the 
absence of conscious or strategic choice. As Axelrod (1984, 173) notes: “The 
evolutionary process allows the successful strategies to thrive, even if the players do 
not know why or how.” Pfeffer and Salancik (2003[1978], 82) also state that 
interactions may result from commitments from the past. Not only a shadow of the 
future, but also a legacy of the past points to mechanisms that allow bureaucracy-
interest group interactions to thrive. Put differently, relations between bureaucrats 
and interest groups may become ‘sticky,’ not only because actors intend these 
interactions to last, but also because those interactions could become a repetitive 
pattern over time without the actors consciously choosing that they become so. As a 
respondent reflects on the annual spring and fall meetings of the Dutch 
government with employers and labour unions: “We merely perform a ritual 
dance. Every year, we strongly oppose each other, for instance in terms of wage 
claims, just for the sake of it.”30 Organisational behaviour may be quite resilient 
even when it does not result in efficient or effective outcomes.  
The key question for this study is whether or not such interactions serve a 
rationally-chosen purpose even when they do not seem to be effective or efficient. 
An answer to this question may lie in the literature on path dependence. Could 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness in long-term interactions also be the result of a 
rational or strategic choice? The quest for efficiency can be considered an axiom in 
economics. Actors are assumed to pursue strategies that eventually result in the 
most efficient outcome. Outcomes will always end up in equilibria of maximum 
                                                        
30 Interview by author. 
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efficiency because of decreasing returns. This means that each move away from an 
efficient equilibrium will be opposed by a countermove back towards that same 
equilibrium. If oil prices rise (move away from equilibrium), conservation will 
increase and new energy sources will be explored and exploited. As a consequence, 
oil prices will drop (move toward original equilibrium) (Pierson 2004). Decreasing 
returns, or in political science language, negative feedback, are processes that 
promote stability. Perturbations away from the equilibrium are particularly 
difficult, as the system forces a return to the equilibrium of optimal efficiency. In 
politics, such negative feedback is often constituted by counter mobilisation, 
resulting in a stable political status quo characterised by incremental changes 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Becker 1985).  
The problem with this reasoning is that not all equilibria are efficient or the 
optimal solution to a problem. To explain such suboptimal outcomes, economists 
developed the idea of increasing returns as opposed to decreasing returns. Moves 
away from equilibrium benefit particular actors, who then have strong incentives to 
pursue a particular course of action (Pierson 2004). Put differently, in the case of 
increasing returns, the marginal benefits of moves away from equilibrium become 
larger rather than smaller as is the case with decreasing returns.  
The concept of increasing returns is explicitly tied to economic theory, as it is 
used to explain inefficient outcomes. General terms that indicate similar 
mechanisms without an exclusive focus on efficiency, such as positive feedback or 
self-reinforcing mechanisms, are often used in political science to explain 
suboptimal outcomes (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Pierson 2004). In politics, 
reinforcing mechanisms are said to occur when, under initial conditions, several 
outcomes are possible so that multiple equilibria can evolve. When multiple 
equilibria are possible, other factors such as contingencies, small events, and 
timing seem crucial in determining which particular equilibrium will be realised. 
Once steps are taken along a certain path, negative feedback mechanisms similar to 
the case of optimal equilibria will ensure that this path will be pursued for at least a 
while (Pierson 2004, 44). In general, reinforcing mechanisms “induce further 
movement in the same direction such that over time it becomes difficult or 
impossible to reverse direction” (Mahoney 2000, 512).  
Put differently, reinforcing mechanisms result in the institutional reproduction 
of a suboptimal or optimal outcome. When, at a certain time, multiple equilibria 
are possible, small events, contingencies and timing may explain the emergence of 
a suboptimal situation. In the case of optimal equilibria, the resulting outcomes are 
the most efficient or optimal solutions for a wide range of stakeholders. Moves 
away from an efficient equilibrium in the market affect both consumers and 
producers, for instance. In the case of suboptimal equilibria, initial circumstances 
allowed actors to pursue a path resulting in a suboptimal solution. The most 
important and influential stakeholders decide upon a course of action that suits 
their interests. Once the suboptimal equilibrium is established, it will be resistant 
to change as well, but a smaller set of stakeholders profits from the equilibrium. In 
the case of a suboptimal demand-supply equilibrium, for instance, consumers 
often pay the price, literally.  
So, the stickiness of relationships may also result from strategic choices by 
actors willing to retain relations as the situation suits their interests. Several 
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mechanisms of behavioural persistence result in strategic choices to follow a 
certain path (Simon 1997[1947]). In Simon’s view, certain behaviours persist 
because of three mechanisms. A first mechanism concerns what he terms sunk-
costs: the costs of pursuing certain behaviour, albeit inefficient, are less than those 
involved in changing paths. In other words, the investments already made prohibit 
a change of direction. Secondly, the activity itself may generate stimuli that ensure 
completion. A page-turner exactly does the trick: you do not want to stop reading 
before you have reached the final page of the book. Finally, what Simon terms make 
ready costs allow behaviour to persist. Once a routine has been developed, it is easier 
to continue in that direction because of the time such a routine saves, in contrast to 
the time-consuming business of exploring new behaviours (Simon 1997[1945], 105-
106). The costs of changing paths (sunk costs and make ready costs) as well as the 
benefits arising from the activity or institution itself cause the path to be continued. 
These mechanisms apply to both intra- and inter-organisational behaviour. In 
politics, these mechanisms are also visible, but they are differently guised. Counter-
mobilisation could result from high costs involved in changing paths or from the 
stimuli an institution generates for a group of stakeholders.  
Literature on path dependence is often concerned with explaining suboptimal 
outcomes by processes of negative feedback. Yet, behaviour persistence, or 
routines, may be a long-term reflection of an initial rational choice that still meets 
the purpose for which it was originally designed. In Simon’s words (1997[1947], 
89): “Even if an actor has developed a procedure quite deliberately and consciously, 
it may in time become wholly habitual, but still retain the same utility and 
purpose.” A fundamental difference between the shadow of the future and the 
legacy of the past thus seems to be the difference between anticipatory and habitual 
rationality. A shadow of the future constrains the set of choices that can be made by 
incorporating considerations on potential consequences in the near future. For 
instance, when it has become more important to reduce uncertainty than 
maintaining the interactions per se. Yet, such choices still seem to be made 
deliberately and consciously. That is, one is trying to make the best of a given 
situation, but is constrained in his or her options to do so by future consequences. 
The legacy of the past might have started with a rational and conscious choice, 
but gradually it has become a habit or routine. Sunk costs, make ready costs, or 
stimuli generated by the activity itself result in reproduction of an activity. This is 
what Simon calls habitual rationality. When habits take over, however, and are no 
longer the best answer to the problem posed by the environment, we may define it 
as institutional reproduction of a suboptimal solution, which is often denoted as 
path dependence in the literature. Both the shadow of the future and the legacy of 
the past thus induce different types of choices that are grounded in different 
behavioural logics. The shadow of the future points to anticipatory rationality, 
whereas the legacy of the past points to habitual rationality which may or may not 
reflect an optimal situation. Accordingly, we can hypothesise that,  
 
When interactions between bureaucrats and interest groups cannot be ended, 
resource dependence between bureaucrats and interest groups will not only be 
based on strategic rationality, but also on anticipatory or habitual rationality. [H8] 
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3.5 Modelling bureaucracy-interest group interactions 
In the previous sections, I have discussed a reconceptualisation of bureaucracy-
interest group interactions to allow systematic comparisons of bureaucracy-interest 
group interactions, both across cases and over time. The underlying assumption of 
this reconceptualisation is that bureaucracy-interest group interactions can be 
conceptualised as resource exchanges. Based on resource dependence theory 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 2003[1978]), the argument is that bureaucrats and interest 
groups interact because they need resources from each other in order to perform 
their tasks. Those resource exchanges are determined by both the importance of 
the individual resources and the extent to which these resources are concentrated 
in the environment. Thus, by measuring both resource importance and resource 
concentration, we should be able to establish a degree of dependence that, in turn, 
characterises the relationship between civil servants and interest groups. This 
degree of dependence can then be used to distinguish among the explanations of 
bureaucratic politics, interest group politics and network studies. To systematically 
compare the nature of these interactions, institutional and policy-related contextual 
variables have been included. A long term perspective, finally, draws attention to 
two rival explanations. That is, rather than a result of strategic rationality, resource 
dependence between bureaucrats and interest groups may also be the result of 
anticipatory and habitual rationality.  
Thus, a reconceptualisation of bureaucracy-interest group interactions enables 
systematic comparison of these interactions over time and across cases. A final 
step, then, is to translate such a reconceptualisation into a concrete explanatory 
model of bureaucracy-interest group interactions. Applying resource dependence to 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions, however, requires some assumptions, in 
particular about bureaucratic behaviour. I discuss these assumptions first, before 
developing the model itself.  
3.5.1 Assumptions of a resource dependence model 
A first important assumption underlying a resource dependence model is that 
resources are scarce. Indeed, if resources are widely available to the organisation in 
question, i.e. the organisation is able to control or possesses a certain resource 
itself, there will be no reason for it to interact with other organisations to obtain 
that resource (Levine and White 1961). What is more, classic resource dependence 
theory, due to its strategic rather than deterministic point of departure, assumes 
that organisations in the end seek to obtain full autonomy or at least try to 
minimise their dependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003[1978]). Applying resource 
dependence theory to model bureaucracy-interest group interactions thus assumes 
that, first, bureaucrats are to some extent responsive to their environment and 
second, that bureaucrats enjoy some degree of autonomy.  
The fact that governments purport to act out of a general public interest as well 
as from democratic accountability distinguishes a public organisation from a 
private one.31 Public organisations have to be democratically accountable to the 
                                                        
31 Many scholars have tried to demarcate what is public and what is not (see Pesch 2005; Rutgers 2004). But 
to date, there is considerable debate over whether there is a clear-cut public-private dichotomy or rather a 
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public. And, to preserve their legitimacy, states must to some extent be responsive 
to the demands of their citizens and their organised entities, and so must their 
public bureaucracies. These two key characteristics justify the use a resource 
dependence approach to model bureaucracy-interest group interactions. 
Public bureaucracies in democracies, however, cannot achieve full autonomy. 
Their formal function within a state, their relation to their political superiors, and 
their relations with citizens, whether collectively organised or not, do not permit 
full autonomy in the sense that private organisations might enjoy. Resource 
dependence theory explains how organisations respond to their environment and 
how they try to improve their relative position towards other actors in the 
environment in a search for autonomy. As has become clear from my discussion of 
political-administrative relations as a contextual factor, I assume that bureaucrats 
enjoy some degree of administrative leeway and thus a sense of at least some 
political or contingent autonomy. Bureaucratic autonomy is, however, not 
equivalent to full administrative freedom (cf. Carpenter 2001). Rather, it entails the 
ability, at maximum, to influence the preferences and choices of politicians or the 
public within an existing framework of general (legal and formal) constraints.  
So, this research proceeds from the assumption that public bureaucracies 
behave in a democratically accountable way and are thereby responsive to citizens’ 
demands. Second, it acknowledges both a certain degree of politicisation of 
bureaucracies and a certain amount of administrative leeway, which both entail 
some room for strategic choices to be made. 
Now that the underlying assumptions are made explicit, the actual model can be 
discussed. This discussion will proceed in several stages. First, a core model of 
resource dependence between bureaucrats and interest groups will be developed. 
The second stage adds the comparative element to the model by including the 
contextual factors. And, finally, I include the rival rationalities that may underlie 
resource dependence between bureaucrats and interest groups.  
3.5.2 Explaining bureaucracy-interest group interactions  
In principle, Pfeffer and Salancik (2003[1978]) offer an elegant and parsimonious 
explanation for interorganisational behaviour that we can apply to bureaucracy-
interest group interactions. When we are able to measure both the importance of 
resources and the concentration of resources, we will be able to characterise a given 
situation of resource exchange. That is, both elements define the degree of 
dependence between two sets of actors. By interpreting the value of the degree of 
dependence, we can characterise the relationship between bureaucrats and interest 
                                                                                                                                             
continuum on which the degree of publicness diminishes the further one moves along the continuum. In 
other words, public versus private is not an issue of black and white, but it is rather an issue of greyscales 
(Rutgers, 2004). Given public management reforms and the flourishing of public-private partnerships (Hood 
1995; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000; Rhodes 2005), many scholars would indeed opt for the greyscales. To turn 
the usually normative black-white question into meaningful greyscales, several scholars have proposed to 
disentangle the grand dichotomy and employ several dimensions on which the public-private distinctions can 
be traced, such as legal, economic and organisational dimensions (Dijkstra and van der Meer 2003). Despite 
this conceptual variety, most scholars take for granted governments’ most essential and formal differences 
from private organisations, namely its ultimate authority to use coercion and its monopoly on violence. They 
rather seem to focus on relations with the environment to distinguish between publicness and privateness.  
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groups. I include two additional elements to properly apply resource dependence 
theory to bureaucracy-interest group interactions. The first is the relationship 
between resource importance and resource concentration. Second, we must isolate 
resource concentration within the interest group environment from resource 
concentration in a broader environment.  
Let me start with the first element. When more than one resource is involved in 
the exchange relationship, we need to know the relative ranking of the resource in 
terms of its importance and its availability in the environment. For instance, 
suppose that an interest group offers both expertise and intermediary capacity in an 
exchange with a bureaucrat. Both resources may not be equally available in the 
environment. This particular interest group could, for instance, be the only one 
that has such an intermediary capacity to offer, yet is among ten others to offer the 
expertise the civil servant in question needs. In addition, we need to know what is 
more important to the civil servant in question, expertise or intermediation 
capacity. For simplicity, I assume that every resource is characterised by a certain 
importance and that the end result of a dependence relation is the sum of both the 
importance and concentration of resources for each individual resource that is 
exchanged in a given bureaucracy-interest group interaction.  
Second, in Pfeffer’s and Salancik’s (2003[1978]) definition, concentration of 
resources is an aggregate measure. It measures the concentration of resources 
within a broad environment of organisations. Had a general examination of 
resource concentration in the bureaucracy’s environment been the subject of study, 
an aggregate measure would have been sufficient. As the focus of this study is 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions, however, an estimate that distinguishes 
between the concentration in the interest group environment and the remainder of 
the environment is necessary. When we want to know the extent to which 
resources are concentrated in the interest group environment, we need to isolate 
this particular environment from a broader environment of organisations. Indeed, 
interest groups are not the only organisations that have resources to offer 
bureaucrats. And, vice versa, bureaucrats may prefer to obtain certain resources 
from other types of organisations, such as highly qualified research institutes, 
rather than from interest groups.  
So, resource concentration needs to be subdivided into what I term here ‘inside 
resource concentration’ and ‘outside resource concentration.’ Inside resource 
concentration refers to the types of resources that are available within an interest 
group community or population. Outside resource concentration refers to the 
availability of resources within a broader environment of organisations, being a 
diverse array of organisations that includes not just interest groups, but also 
advisory councils, research institutes, or consultancy firms. By distinguishing these 
two types of resource concentration, we are able to isolate resource concentration 
within the interest group environment from a broader organisational environment 
in general. By summarising these arguments, we find the following model: 
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where,  
D = degree of dependence of a given bureaucracy-interest group resource exchange relation 
I = the importance of a particular resource (the value attributed to a particular resource) 
Ci = inside concentration of a particular resource (the number of interest groups that control 
a particular resource) 
Co = outside concentration of a particular resource (the number of other organisations that 
control a particular resource) 
 
The model outlined here provides a first indication of how resource concentration 
and resource importance can be related to each other and how they may determine 
the degree of dependence characterising the relationship between bureaucrats and 
interest groups. It is not my aim to develop a full formal model in this study. Yet, 
the advantage of a rudimentary formal model is that it emphasises those elements 
we can estimate and separates them from those we cannot, thus attributing to 
transparency in building the model and pointing to gaps in the theory (see also 
chapter 8). With this model, we are able to measure the degree of dependence in 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions based on the importance of resources and 
their concentration in the environment. It further reflects a degree of dependence 
when all contextual factors are held constant. Put differently, when various 
political-administrative contextual variables are included, the impact of resource 
importance and resource concentration on the final degree of dependence are likely 
to vary. This comparative aspect of the model will be discussed below.  
3.5.3 Explaining bureaucracy-interest group interactions across cases 
Including contextual factors, such as those discussed in section 3.3, adds a 
comparative aspect to the resource dependence model developed above. Each of 
these contextual factors will influence either resource concentration or resource 
importance or both. Some will interfere with resource concentration more than 
with resource importance and vice versa. By including these contextual factors, the 
model accounts for the degree of dependence, and thereby the nature of 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions, under different circumstances. By 
systematically varying these contextual factors, we will be able to assess their 
impact on both elements of the resource exchange relationship between 
bureaucrats and interest groups and thus be able to examine which of the two sets 
of actors will be more dependent under a given set of circumstances. Figure 3.1 
depicts the model graphically. It shows the different levels of analysis at which the 
independent variables can be measured and which element of the degree of 
dependence they are hypothesised to influence. 
A first thing to observe is that the contextual variables operate at different levels 
of analysis. Interest representation regimes operate at a macro-level. 
Europeanisation and ideas operate at the macro, meso- or even at micro-level. 
Ideas, for instance, can apply to entire national political systems, but can also be 
tied to specific policy areas or agencies as well as the individuals working for those 
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agencies. Political-administrative relations, organisational culture and formal tasks, 
as well as policy salience, complexity and political sensitivity, operate at meso-level.  
Another important aspect to observe is that no micro-level variables are included 
in the model. This is a deliberate choice. The focus of this study is on how context 
determines the choices of bureaucrats to interact, or how context determines the 
strategic room civil servants have to manoeuvre. Undeniably, micro-level variables, 
for instance, leadership style or other personal dispositions, will influence 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions. Yet, the focus in this study is on context 
and, therefore, they were excluded from the model.  
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Figure 3.1 A comparative explanatory model of bureaucracy-interest group interactions 
All in all, this model allows us to systematically compare bureaucracy-interest 
group interactions on the basis of their reconceptualisation in terms of resource 
exchange. Each contextual variable will influence resource concentration, resource 
importance, or both and will thus alter the degree of dependence. What this model 
cannot do, as yet, is study bureaucracy-interest group interactions over time. A final 
element to complete the model is thus incorporating a long-term perspective. Such 
a long-term perspective highlights forces other than strategic rationality in 
determining the resource dependence between bureaucrats and interest groups.  
3.5.4 Explaining bureaucracy-interest group interactions over time  
The discussion in section 3.4 revealed two additional types of rationality in which 
resource dependence between bureaucrats and interest groups may be grounded. 
Not only may a strategic choice based on a cost-benefit analysis determine such 
resource dependence (strategic rationality). Habitual rationality and anticipatory 
rationality could be at stake as well. Habitual rationality and anticipatory rationality 
reveal themselves when we add a time perspective to the core resource dependence 
model. To explain this further, figure 3.2 illustrates several hypothetical directions 
in which a given degree of dependence could evolve. A given relationship between 
bureaucrats and interest groups may be determined by a degree of dependence D. 
At t = (1 + x), we observe several possibilities. In the case of D1, the degree of 
dependence has become less severe over time, indicating, at face value, the 
presence of strategic rationality. And so does D2. A degree of dependence that has 
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become less severe suggests the opportunity to strategically pick and choose. Yet, 
had the path of D2 been measured at t = 2, we would have characterised this 
relationship as grounded in anticipatory rationality rather than strategic rationality. 
The situation characterised by D3 could indicate habitual rationality, when actors 
unconsciously interact with each other. Yet, D3 could also indicate strategic 
rationality, when the interaction still meets the same strategic purpose of the past. 
Situation D4 would, at face value, be characterised by anticipatory rationality, given 
a higher degree of dependence. It may, however, also reflect a situation of habitual 
rationality, where routine behaviour has taken over in a situation in which civil 
servants are relatively dependent on certain interest groups.  
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Figure 3.2 The evolution of degree of dependence 
So, fluctuation of or a decrease in the degree of dependence indicates strategic 
rationality, whereas stability could point to habitual rationality. Rising degrees of 
dependence would indicate anticipatory rationality but may be habitual in nature as 
well. Whereas fluctuation would be a face value indicator of conscious decision 
making, stability or rising degrees of dependence might conceal different types of 
decision making. Unpacking these degrees of dependences into resource 
importance and resource concentration could reveal which type of rationality 
underlies the resource exchange. For instance, when the importance of a resource 
remains similar but concentration increases, the interaction could be characterised 
as grounded in anticipatory rationality. Or, when both importance and 
concentration decrease, the interaction could be grounded in habitual rationality 
where routine has taken over.  
By examining how the individual resource elements evolve over time, under 
different circumstances, we can determine the types of rationality underlying a 
given resource exchange between bureaucrats and interest groups. In sum, this 
resource dependence model enables a systematic explanation of bureaucracy-
interest group interactions across cases and over time. Chapter 4 outlines a 
research strategy to empirically assess the explanatory potential of the model.
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4  
Bureaucracy-Interest Group Interactions 
in Comparative Perspective 
4.1 Introduction  
We compare daily. We pick the best apples in the supermarket by comparing them 
to the rest; we compare restaurants by the quality of their food. Or, we compare 
different options to commute by evaluating their comfort, speed and anticipated 
delays. Either consciously or unconsciously, human judgment seems to be 
fundamentally grounded on comparisons. The same is true for the scientific 
endeavours we undertake. One of the most powerful empirical strategies, the 
experiment, is based on a cautious and rigorous controlled comparison of the 
presence or absence of independent variables and their impact on the dependent 
variable, i.e. the phenomenon to be explained. The importance of comparison is 
not only visible in the natural sciences. Social sciences also rely on comparison to a 
very large extent. Even in philosophy or theoretical politics, comparison is, albeit 
indirectly, important for conceptual development. Concepts and ideas in theoretical 
politics are often judged by comparing and contrasting them to the existing body of 
literature and evaluating how they contribute to contemporary thinking. 
Comparing thus seems to be a fundamental research strategy.  
This study is explicitly designed to be comparative in nature. It is an attempt to 
develop a theoretical model to systematically compare bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions and thereby to contribute both conceptually and empirically to the 
literature on interest group politics and bureaucratic politics.1 In what follows, I 
discuss the comparative design I employed in this research, the methods of data 
collection, and the dataset on bureaucracy-interest group interactions constructed 
to test the theoretical model developed in chapter 3.  
                                                        
1 I interpret comparative research more as a general strategy of scientific inquiry. In public administration as 
well as in political science, however, comparative research is also often used to denote a particular type of 
research, rather than a general research strategy (Lijphart 1971). Interpreted as such, comparative politics or 
comparative public administration constitutes a sub-discipline of the political science or public 
administration disciplines, attracting specialised journals and a body of literature tailored to that end.   
Chapter 4 
54 
4.2 The challenges of the comparative method 
In scientific research, we compare theoretical propositions with empirical reality or 
existing theories to rule out rival explanations, thereby lending confirmatory 
support to the formulated hypotheses. The field of comparative politics2 relies 
heavily on Mill’s methods of experimental inquiry, in particular his method of 
agreement and method of difference (Mill 1970[1843]). When two situations share 
a similar feature among many different ones, and when they share a similar 
outcome, according to Mill’s method of agreement, this similar feature is said to 
result in the outcome that both situations share. Mills method of difference 
explains the contrary situation. According to method of difference, the absence or 
presence of the outcome in a given situation is the result of a deviant feature in two 
otherwise similar cases.  
Mill’s methods of agreement and difference were originally designed for 
experimental research. And they encourage careful and controlled variation of 
independent and dependent variables in (quasi-)experimental research (see also 
Cook and Campbell 1979; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). As said, the discipline 
of comparative politics heavily draws upon Mill’s methods (see Lijphart 1971; 
George and Bennet 2005). Given the non-experimental or quasi-experimental 
nature of comparative politics, however, studies inspired by Mill’s methods of 
agreement and difference need to address some of the difficulties that arise when 
one applies an experimental method in a non-experimental environment. Two of 
the major difficulties, the complexity in establishing causality and the pitfalls of 
poor equivalence, are addressed below.  
4.2.1 Establishing causality  
Mill explicitly noted that the methods of agreement and difference were designed 
for the experimental settings: “It is very seldom that nature affords two instances, 
of which we can be assured that they stand in this precise relation to one another 
(…) [so] a spontaneous experiment of the kind required by the method of 
difference, is commonly not to be found” (Mill 1970[1843], 256-157). In particular, 
these two methods are difficult to apply to a setting with what he calls ‘permanent 
causes,’ that is, causes that cannot be fully excluded or isolated from the 
environment. The influence the moon exerts on the surface of the earth is a good 
example. For such situations, he proposed a method of concomitant variation. This 
method states that when a particular variation of a phenomenon is related to a 
particular variation of another phenomenon, “[this particular phenomenon] is 
either a cause or effect of that phenomenon, or is connected through some fact of 
causation” (Mill 1970[1843], 263). To return to the example of the moon, we can 
observe that variations in the position of the moon are followed by variations in the 
time and place of high water. Mill explicitly warned us, however, that there is no 
way of knowing which of these phenomena are the effect or cause, until we are able 
                                                        
2 For reasons of convenience, I will use ‘comparative politics’ to denote the distinct comparative research 
tradition in political science and public administration mentioned in footnote 1.  
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to ascertain that the variation of a (particular) set of phenomena produces the 
particular variation in the dependent variable (Mill 1970[1843], 263).3 
It is a not a big step to conclude that, although highly preferred, the methods of 
agreement and difference will be difficult to apply to the quasi-experimental 
settings we often encounter in political and public administrative research. Indeed, 
how can we remove from the scene the Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende and 
Minister Rouvoet, both Christian-Democrats, when we want to establish a causal 
relation between the regime of such Christian-Democrats and an increasing 
scepticism about current practices of abortion and euthanasia in the Netherlands? 
We can only establish, if at all, a relation between a particular variation in political 
persuasion and a particular variation in the tone of current public and political 
debates on such ethical issues. This very point, the fact that isolating or controlling 
independent and dependent variables is hard in real-life politics and public 
administration, is used by many authors to conclude that, although comparative 
research is necessary for establishing empirical relations and hypotheses, it should 
be applied in an extremely careful manner (cf. Brady and Collier 2004; King, 
Keohane, and Verba 1994; Lijphart 1971; Prezworski and Teune 1970; Ragin 1987; 
2000). The competitive advantage of experimental research is thus clearly the 
ability to isolate or control the (in)dependent variables in order to establish 
causality. This, alas, is not fully allowed by the quasi-experimental environment 
that political science and public administration usually have to offer. One of the 
most complex issues scholars thus have to deal with is how to infer causality.  
An important impediment to establishing causality in comparative politics is the 
multi-level and multi-context nature of political and administrative phenomena. 
According to Prezworski and Teune (1970) in their classic work The Logic of 
Comparative Social Inquiry, for instance, the aim of comparative research, and at the 
same time its biggest challenge, should be to express characteristics of different 
social or political systems in general variables and in measurements designed to 
account for such systemic influences. Individual or meso-level relations may differ 
between political or social systems at a more aggregate level, such as nation states. 
What is it that makes interest groups behave differently in the Netherlands 
compared to the United States, for instance? A fundamental challenge facing 
comparativists is thus to incorporate systemic effects into their theories on meso- 
or micro-level social behaviour. One way to do this is to identify the different types 
of characteristics of such social and political systems, according to Prezworski and 
Teune (1970). Yet, this is precisely why comparative public administration is 
                                                        
3 Although these are the methods most often invoked to legitimate the method of comparison that is applied, 
they are not the only methods Mill developed. What he calls the ‘indirect method of difference,’ or the ‘joint 
method of agreement,’ applies when it is not possible to generate situations in which two instances agree in 
every antecedent but one, and differ in the outcome. What we can do in such cases is first examine instances 
that agree in the outcome a and factor A, and then search for situations that agree in not having outcome a 
and factor A. This joint method of agreement thus constitutes a double application of the method of 
agreement, where each application or proof is independent and confirms the other. Another method Mill 
suggested is the ‘method of residues.’ According to this method, when we subtract the antecedents from a 
phenomenon, which are previously proved to be the cause, the residue of the phenomenon is the result of the 
non-examined antecedents. Suppose we have factors A, B, and C followed by a, b, c, and suppose we 
established a causal relation between A and a and B and b, then by subtracting a and b from the total outcome 
we know that c is the effect of C (Mill, 1970[1843], 258-260).  
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difficult. As Peters (1990, 10-11) observes: “What we are less certain about, 
however, is how differences in structures translate directly into differences in the 
behaviour of members of the organisation, or in the outputs of the organisation.” 
In order to engage in comparative studies on administrative phenomena, 
theorising their multi-level nature is, however, prerequisite.4  
So, multi-level and multi-context characteristics of administrative phenomena 
threaten causal inferences. Additionally, the cumulative nature of political 
processes poses additional problems to causal inferences and comparative research. 
Concerning interest representation, for instance, community characteristics may 
influence to some extent an interest group’s success in gaining access to public 
decision makers. In such processes, the dependent variable in one part of the 
process, limited access for interest groups, may be an independent variable in 
another process; for instance, mobilisation (Lowery and Gray 2004). In such cases, 
isolating variables is even more difficult. The solution may lie in segmentation of 
the process, such as the ‘influence production process’, and then comparing these 
segments across different political systems (Lowery, Poppelaars and Berkhout 
2008; Pelassy and Dogan 1990). Such a segmentation strategy does not entirely 
circumvent the problem, as one still has to theorise the fine lines between two 
segmented parts of the entire process. Yet, by segmenting, we can control for the 
independent variables that are associated more directly with individual segments.  
The very nature of political and administrative processes, i.e. their multi-level, 
multi-context and cumulative nature, renders it difficult to isolate or control 
independent variables in such a way that they allow firm inferences about causal 
relations. A more modest but still challenging aim is thus to establish relations 
between variations in (sets of) independent variables and the dependent variables, 
while at the same time incorporating their multi-level or cumulative nature into the 
theories characterising the relationships that one is to examine. In other words, the 
challenge is to embed Mill’s method of concomitant variation in a multi-level, 
multi-context, and cumulative environment of political-administrative reality.  
4.2.2 Establishing equivalence 
Inferring causality is not the only threat to solid comparative politics. 
Unconsciously comparing things that are not similar may also be a problem. This 
phenomenon is known as the travelling problem, which indicates that concepts or 
measures based on experiences in one society are not necessarily meaningful when 
applied to other societies. Raising a hand may in one society indicate a way of 
                                                        
4 Another, related problem in comparative research is the total number of cases that can be handled and data 
collection strategies that are pursued in relation to causal statements. Comparative politics as a distinct sub-
discipline usually involves a small or intermediate number of cases and has often been applied at the nation-
state level (see Lijphart, 1971; for concrete examples and a theoretical discussion, see also Rueschemeyer and 
Mahoney 2003). Again, many authors have considered the advantages and disadvantages of using case 
studies in this respect, paying specific attention to causal relations and what kind of strategy to use (see 
Lijphart1971; George and Bonnet 2005; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Gerring 2006). An important 
trait that those studies have in common is a focus on paired comparison or structured, focused comparisons, 
reminiscent of and inspired by Mill’s methods of difference and agreement. A particular difficulty concerning 
case study designs in establishing causal relations, is the small N these studies usually entail and thus a lack 
of necessary variation in (in)dependent variables (King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Ragin 1978; 2000).  
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saying goodbye, while in other countries it may be an offensive gesture. 
Cooperation may in a democratic society mean working together on an equal basis, 
whereas in authoritarian societies it could mean a more asymmetrical relationship. 
In that sense, the travelling problem seems to operate at two levels (Peters 1998, 
86-92). Concepts may not only have different connotations or meanings, but 
measurement and operationalisation may also apply only to specific cases.  
Researchers often engage in so-called concept-stretching to remedy the 
travelling problem. That is, they tend to broaden the concept so that it becomes 
more inclusive, without considering the range of characteristics that objects must 
possess to belong to that broadened concept (Sartori 1970). Concepts have often 
fallen prey to unconscious stretching attempts, resulting in vague concepts that can 
no longer be falsified. Ideology is a good example of a concept that has been 
stretched so much that it “never ceases to apply (it has no opposite)” (Sartori 1991, 
249). Thus, hypotheses using the concept of ideology are very hard to falsify. When 
does a particular idea or set of ideas stop being an ideology or begin to constitute an 
ideology? Seen from this perspective, defining individual or organisational 
preferences as ideologies (see Tsebelis 2002) does not contribute to sound 
comparative research and solid falsification. When does someone’s preference stop 
being a preference when we cannot decide upon the demarcation of an ideology?  
Connotation
Denotation
 
Figure 4.1 Sartori’s ladder of abstraction 
A careful and systematic way of defining and organising concepts is needed to 
address the travelling problem properly. Sartori (1970) developed a specific 
instrument to do so, a so-called ladder of abstraction. Its basic rule is that the 
connotation of a word (the collection of properties determining the things to which 
the word applies) and its denotation (the class of things the word applies to) are 
inversely related. So, to increase comparability, one should reduce its 
characteristics, and thus at the same time enlarge the class of things the concept 
applies to. Conversely, to make a concept more concrete and thus less comparable, 
one adds properties or characteristics (Sartori 1970; 1991). When one moves 
consciously up and down this ladder of abstraction, concepts and terms remain 
related to one another. These different levels of abstraction should be clearly related 
to each other, resulting in two pyramidal shapes that are inversely related (see 
figure 4.1). The further one climbs the connotation pyramid, the further one 
descends on the denotation pyramid.  
Essentially, Sartori’s strategy is about determining the absolutely vital elements 
of concepts and distinguishing them from those that are secondary or peripheral. 
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As he (Sartori 1984, 32) puts it, we must focus on “defining as opposed to 
accompanying properties.”5 Put differently, the challenge in comparative politics is 
thus to find the appropriate intersection of the connotation and denotation 
pyramid. In an early, previously unpublished, manuscript, part of which is now 
published in West European Politics (Mair 2005), Sartori offered an example of how 
this ladder of abstraction works. In the process of building a classification of 
political parties, he first identified a core analytical concept of political parties, i.e. 
organisational networks, and defined three functions central to such organisational 
networks: participation, electioneering, and expression. While political parties 
exhibit many other functions, these three are irreplaceable and apply to political 
parties throughout the Western world (Sartori 2005[1967]). But only the 
combination of the three denotes political parties. When we remove electioneering, 
the two remaining characteristics could denote any type of civil society 
organisation, NGO or ad-hoc protest organisation. And, when leaving out both 
participation and expression, it could denote such people as Barack Obama, John 
McCain, Jan-Peter Balkenende, or Wouter Bos running for president or prime 
minister. This example shows that political parties are somewhere in between the 
connation and denotation pyramid shown above, and that it is often the exact 
combination of characteristics that defines a concept that may travel well.  
An important principle underlying Sartori’s strategy to systematically unravel 
concepts is the idea that categories are hierarchically related. This means that some 
concepts are subordinated to others. This taxonomy, or hierarchical classification, 
can mathematically be represented as a tree diagram. Ultimately, all concepts, 
except for the ones down at the bottom of the classification, have at least one 
element or one category in common. An often-used example of such a taxonomic 
hierarchy is the scientific classification of organisms. On top of the tree diagram 
stands one particular category of organisms, for instance, mammals. A subcategory 
of mammals is big cats, a subcategory of big cats is tigers, and finally a Siberian 
tiger is a specific sub-species differing in its colour and striped pattern.  
Moving up and down the connation ladder (the collection of characteristics of 
organism) and denotation ladder (the class an organism belongs to) is relatively 
easy for such hierarchically organised concepts. Social categories are, however, not 
so neatly organised. Corporatism, for instance, is often defined by listing a set of 
commonalities, but not every commonality is apparent in countries classified as 
being corporatist (Collier and Mahon 1993, 846-849).6 Gerring and Barresi’s 
                                                        
5 Several scholars have built on Sartori’s strategy to define appropriate strategies to engage in comparative 
research. Pelassy and Dogan's (1990) ‘functional equivalence’, for instance, is but one example. Functional 
equivalence refers to the idea that political systems necessarily fulfil certain fundamental tasks; yet these 
functions may appear in different guises in different nations. The task then is to define and compare those 
functions instead of their appearance. Functional equivalence thus refers to those elements of concepts that 
are, in Satori’s words ‘irreplaceable.’ 
6 Corporatism, in Collier and Mahon’s (1993) words, is a type of family resemblance. Family resemblance 
occurs when cases each exhibit different combinations of commonalities without sharing one common 
feature. Another option discussed by these two authors is the idea of radial categories. In this case, secondary 
categories split up the original category rather than together constituting the overall concept. The authors give 
the example of democracy; many types have been constructed: liberal democracy, participatory democracy 
and popular democracy, for instance. They distinguish different types of democracy instead of a sub-type of 
an overall category of democracy 
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(2003) min-max strategy presents an alternative way to systematically organise the 
concepts of the phenomenon in question without necessarily relying on the 
hierarchical assumption that is so apparent in Sartori’s organising structure. Their 
min-max strategy is a conjoined use of minimal and ideal-type definitions of the 
concept. Minimal definitions, they argue, contain the ‘bare essentials’ of a concept, 
are minimal in their attributes and maximal in their phenomenal range. Ideal types 
include all attributes that together define the concept, and are thus minimal in 
their phenomenal range (Gerring and Barresi 2003, 201). Both theorising about 
and systematically organising concepts are thus a matter of distinguishing what is 
really important about an entity (Goertz 2006). From a comparative perspective, it 
is not only a matter of what are the important and defining characteristics of a 
concept, but also of finding the appropriate level of abstraction that both allows 
falsification and travelling to other political-administrative systems.  
Comparative research is important. Poor conceptualisation and overestimating 
the possibility of establishing causal relations, - so, not paying full attention to the 
complex multi-level and multi-contextual nature of political phenomena - seriously 
threaten sound comparative research in political science and public administration.  
4.2.3 Why the resource dependence model does the comparative job 
A reconceptualisation of bureaucracy-interest group interactions in terms of 
resource exchange has a strong potential to meet the demands of comparative 
research. First, it addresses the conceptualisation issue by defining the 
characterising elements of bureaucracy-interest group interactions: an exchange of 
resources under the assumption that bureaucrats are not able to achieve full 
independence because of the responsive and democratic nature of public 
administration.7 This conceptualisation enables us to move beyond different 
connotations of cooperation or asymmetrical contacts such as capture. Moreover, 
such resource exchanges can still be falsified. If no resource exchange takes place 
and there are still interactions, the model will be falsified. 
Second, a reconceptualisation in terms of resource exchange addresses the 
multi-level and multi-contextual nature of bureaucracy-interest group interactions, 
given a careful consideration of each contextual factor that may affect the individual 
elements constituting the degree of dependence that characterises those 
interactions. The dependence model thus tries to incorporate systemic 
characteristics of the administrative-political environment in which these 
interactions take place. In doing so, this model attempts to contribute to 
comparative research on bureaucracy-interest group interactions by explicitly 
addressing the conceptual difficulties the travelling problem poses by a conscious 
reconceptualisation. In addition, it incorporates the multi-level and multi-
contextual nature of the political-administrative context in which bureaucracy-
interest group interactions occur. And, by systematically varying contextual factors, 
it aims to establish relationships between variations in a set of independent 
variables and variation in the dependent variable. It is thus an attempt to embed the 
method of concomitant variation in a multi-level and multi-contextual system.  
                                                        
7 These defining characteristics only hold for interactions in democratic societies, and would need refinement 
if applied to non-democratic countries.  
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4.3 A dataset of bureaucracy-interest group interactions 
The proof of the pudding is in the eating, and this also applies to the resource 
dependence model of bureaucracy-interest group interactions. One cannot properly 
judge a theoretical model without testing it. And most models will need at least 
some refining based on the findings such analyses generate. Interestingly, both 
testing and a dialogue back and forth between theory and the data (or, more 
generally, empirics) are often considered part of two distinct research traditions. 
The chasm between quantitative and qualitative researchers in public 
administration and political science reflects a longstanding fundamental debate 
between positivists and hermeneutics. Put differently, scholarly debates about the 
question whether we should deduce relationships from theories or construct 
relationships more inductively often end in stalemate. The argument is essentially 
about weighing the potential of explanation and understanding in social sciences. 
In other words, is it better to deduce hypotheses and try to explain (and perhaps 
even predict) reality based on general patterns of behaviour? Or, is it better to 
understand the idiosyncrasies of reality by interpreting them based on theories, and 
then derive patterns of behaviour from the very same idiosyncrasies? And, as in any 
debate, there are believers and non-believers. Deductive versus inductive 
approaches in social sciences are even today often juxtaposed as two equally valid 
yet unbridgeable approaches to knowing.8 
This research explicitly proceeds from the proposition that these two traditions 
should not be juxtaposed, but should supplement each other to genuinely 
contribute to scientific research. That is, posing and answering research questions 
rather than methodology as such should lie at the heart of social sciences. This 
study relies on testing theories and thus proceeds from a positivist perspective. In 
this way, we can evaluate the theoretical model that has been developed. Yet, it also 
relies on more interpretative ways of conducting research, both in developing the 
theoretical model and in suggesting avenues for future research. In general, this 
study is firmly based on the assumption that answering research questions 
requires a conscious consideration of, and preferably a combination of, several 
methods, but at a minimum an objective attitude must be brought to the entire 
array of existing methods. All in all, this study is grounded in a pluralist philosophy 
of science that will be reflected in a strategy of mixed methods. 
4.3.1 Data collection strategy: online survey 
A theoretical model that is specifically designed to engage in comparative research 
requires a data-collection strategy that meets such demands at an operational level. 
To collect data on the different elements constituting the degree of dependence 
between bureaucrats and interest groups, I opted for a cross-sectional online survey 
instrument. Other instruments or strategies to collect data were less suitable for 
this particular topic. Information on interactions between bureaucrats and interest 
groups are not readily observable, so relying on existing databases is not useful 
here. And if there are such data available, they only contain part of what this model 
                                                        
8 The relatively recent trend to mixed methods (Bennet and Braumoeller 2005) is a fruitful attempt to bridge 
the gap. 
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tries to explain (Carpenter 2004; Yackee and Yackee 2006). Obtaining the data 
directly from bureaucrats and interest groups, the subjects under study, seemed 
therefore the most appropriate choice. In addition, as the aim was to test the 
theory, I needed a large N to perform the analyses in order to provide statistical 
leverage, as most of the variables cited in the model are included in the analysis.  
Although best fitted for the purpose of this study, cross-sectional (online) 
surveys have some drawbacks that need to be taken into account before they can 
result in a solid database. Apart from the general cautionary tales regarding the 
reliability and validity of employing a survey instrument, which is often associated 
with a low response rate (Fowler 2002; Groves et al. 2004; Litwin 1995), adding 
online and cross-sectional elements requires perhaps even more caution. Survey 
research in comparative politics has a long tradition and has contributed to the 
development of standardised data sets and replicable procedures to test hypotheses 
on political behaviour (Rokkan 1969). Currently, almost a quarter of all articles and 
half of the quantitative articles use sample surveys (King et al. 2001).9  
True development in theory building in comparative political and administrative 
behaviour, however, lies in a contextual approach to comparative surveys. 
Traditional survey research has focused on the individual, assuming that a person’s 
behaviour stems from his or her preferences and experiences. But a contextual 
approach seems necessary to develop theories on political behaviour, as such 
behaviour will undeniably be influenced by the institutional setting in which it 
occurs (Verba 1969). Such an assumption was also reflected in the multi-level 
approach of Prezworski and Teune (1971) to comparative research in general. 
Comparative surveys are, however, notorious for biased results (King et al 2004) 
resulting from two main thresholds: conceptualisation and measurement 
techniques (King et al. 2004; Verba 1969). Bias, as a result of conceptualisation, 
stems from unconscious concept formation, which I discussed in section 4.2. Bias 
as a result of measurement techniques refers to the equivalence of individual 
questionnaire items and whether respondents interpret questions similarly. Such 
measurement problems thus relate to equivalence issues, which conceptualisation 
problems refer to on a theoretical level.  
Although the interactive character and options to control question ordering are 
obvious advantages of online surveys as opposed to mail surveys, two drawbacks 
are worth mentioning here. Coverage error and the assumption of internet 
familiarity could result in significant bias (Orr 2005; Winne de, Plevoets, and Sels 
2003). If only a certain proportion of the population has access to the internet, 
together with the fact that only people who are more familiar with the internet will 
be likely to fill out such a questionnaire, an online survey significantly bias the 
results. In addition, the possibility of multiple responses, when an individual 
respondent fills out the questionnaire twice or more, may cause the results to be 
unreliable. Although the latter issue can be relatively easily addressed, the former 
two are serious drawbacks that should be taken into account when online surveys 
are selected as a data collection method.  
                                                        
9 These results come from a content analysis conducted by the authors of five years (1993-1997) of the 
American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, and the British Journal of Political 
Science (see footnote 1 in King et al. 2001). 
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In sum, there are several major challenges in using cross-sectional online 
surveys. Similar interpretation of questionnaire items and equivalence of concepts 
are challenges to cross-sectional surveys in general. In addition, online surveys add 
to this a potential sampling bias as a result of overrepresentation of those 
respondents who are more familiar with or have access to the internet. And, in 
general, surveys often result in high non-response or high non-item response. In 
what follows, I outline how I take these issues into account in developing 
comparative surveys for bureaucrats and interest groups so as to use them as solid 
data collection instruments. 
4.3.2 Surveying bureaucrats 
Who is a bureaucrat is often crystal clear to those outside the public bureaucracy. 
‘They have a 9-5 job and drink a lot of coffee,’ seems an appropriate summary of a 
popular interpretation of ‘the bureaucrat.’ Those working inside public agencies or 
studying them, however, often point to considerable differences within 
bureaucracies, not to mention the differences between bureaucracies in different 
countries. Yet, for comparative research to produce solid findings, we have to 
establish at least some commonalities or equivalences between what we popularly 
call the bureaucracy. This section explains the rationale behind the definition of 
bureaucrats used in this study, and discusses the strategy employed to establish a 
population and to apply an appropriate sampling method. 
Defining bureaucrats 
There seems to be a scholarly consensus that public agencies and civil service 
systems are more alike across different environments than any other part of the 
political-administrative system. If we proceed from the Weberian ideal type of 
bureaucracy, there would indeed be very few differences. As Peters (1990, 9) 
suggests: “When one knocks on the door of bureaucratic offices, one is likely to 
find more similarities, than when knocking on the doors of legislators or even chief 
executives.” Recent reform trends also point to similarities or even convergence of 
national civil service systems (OECD 2003). However, those adhering to the 
parable of six blind men touching a giant African elephant are perhaps more likely 
to emphasise the vast differences among state agencies (Lowery and Brasher 2004, 
197). Every blind person would indicate that they are touching a different animal, 
as they cannot imagine its overall shape when touching only its trunk or one of its 
legs. Comparative studies of national civil service systems indeed suggest that there 
are significant differences among them (Bekke, Perry, and Toonen 1996). Bringing 
in meso-level considerations further threatens any comparable endeavour, as the 
number of such differences may exponentially grow. 
To steer a middle course between full variation in all public agencies and 
imposing overly exact similarities by too narrow sampling, I selected only a 
particular division within national bureaucracies to include in this research: senior 
civil services. Many countries have formally organised civil services, including an 
upper echelon, which I define as the senior civil service. The senior civil service 
includes the civil servants with highest rankings both in terms of salary and 
function. As such, these senior civil servants perform equivalent functions in terms 
of management and often have similar strategic positions within their 
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organisations (OECD 2003). The comparison in this research thus concerns 
national senior civil services rather than entire national civil service systems.10 
Selecting senior civil services addresses the equivalence issue, as they are 
comparable across different national civil service systems.  
A drawback of such a selection is, however, that it could result in a bias towards 
strategic interactions while ignoring other types of exchanges taking place. 
Strategic interactions are more likely to occur between senior civil servants and 
interest groups, as the first usually have important strategic positions in terms of 
policy advice. Moreover, they often have influential positions within the civil service 
system. Middle or lower-ranking civil servants are assumed to have interactions 
with interest organisations as well, but are more likely to exchange other types of 
resources. Their interactions are more likely to concern the substance of particular 
bills rather than the political strategy behind a set of similar issues or bills. As a 
lobbyist of a Dutch interest group puts it: “Civil servants that are truly important 
for us are involved with multiple issues at the same time.”11 Or, as there may be a 
lower threshold for accessing middle and lower-level civil servants, this selection 
could also result in an under-representation of bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions. I addressed this issue by including the answer option of “junior 
employees (in Dutch, beleidsambtenaren) usually interact with interest 
organisations” in the questionnaire (item 4, see appendix I). This option was 
seldom chosen. Only 8.4 per cent of all respondents indicated that they did not 
interact with interest groups. Five of them replied that junior employees usually 
interacted with interest groups. All in all, comparing senior civil services meets the 
demands of equivalence. Yet, it may result in bias in the type and number of 
interactions that take place with civil servants.  
Establishing a population of senior civil servants  
The appropriate population of civil servants consists of those officials belonging to 
a country’s senior civil service. Comparing senior civil services thus automatically 
results in a demarcation of the population. I used existing institutional 
configurations of senior civil services in each country to define the population. For 
the Netherlands, the population consisted of civil servants belonging to the Dutch 
senior civil service (Algemene Bestuursdienst (ABD)). The UK population consists of 
civil servants belonging to the Senior Civil Service (SCS).12 
                                                        
10 The selection of senior civil servants also controls for different levels of government. Namely, by selecting 
the senior civil services, I opt for a comparison at a national government level. Some indeed argue that 
differences exist in types of interactions between different levels of government. Local governments, for 
instance, would entail much smaller bureaucracies and, therefore, be more responsive to their environment 
or have a greater flexibility in their response (Scholz and Wei 1986). However, analysing such interactions in 
the case of immigrant integration policy in the Netherlands also reveals similarities across different levels of 
government, because the need for certain resources appears to be the same (Poppelaars 2007). If different 
levels of government were treated as a full explanatory variable, this variable would become intertwined with 
one of the explanatory variables in the model, namely the character of national interest group systems. In 
some cases, interest group representation and involvement could be different at local and regional levels. 
When including other levels of government, it will become hard to keep other variables constant while 
examining the level of government. Therefore, the analysis will be limited to the national level of government.  
11 Interview by author. 
12 To ensure a proper mix between advisory agencies and executive agencies (see chapter 5), I also included 
the Dutch civil-service candidates who have been selected as persons who could (potentially) fulfil a senior 
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Drawing a random sample from these two populations was hindered by one the 
drawbacks of sample surveys: a notoriously low response rate. The initial strategy 
was to randomly sample both populations.13 In order to ensure a sufficiently high 
response rate, given a high non-response, I opted for the following strategy. I sent 
questionnaires to the total population of Dutch senior civil servants (N = 996). In 
the case of the UK, I first randomly sampled 1,147 from a total of 3,306 senior civil 
servants at the time of conducting the initial surveys (based on Dod’s Civil Service 
Companion 2007).14 As the initial response rate was very low, I decided to submit 
questionnaires to the remainder of the SCS population listed in Dod’s Civil Service 
Companion as well.15 Given the low response rates, both anticipated and actually 
experienced, this was at that time the best strategy available. On the other hand, 
studying the entire population is a strength as well. Nevertheless, I will take this 
issue into account in the interpretation and conclusions of this study.  
4.3.3 Surveying interest groups 
Compared to the complexity of equivalence in comparative interest group research, 
the issues encountered in comparative research on civil service systems seem 
relatively easy. Quite ironically perhaps, for a study emphasising equivalence, a 
major and crucial difference among countries traditionally denoted as pluralist and 
corporatist, is the availability of data on interest group populations. In countries 
usually identified as neo-corporatist, there are no databases available containing 
information on individual interest groups, whereas in neo-pluralist systems such 
databases commonly exist. This difference posed a major challenge in sampling 
respondents for the interest group survey. Furthermore, there is a general 
agreement within the interest group scholarly literature that a common definition 
of interest groups does not exist. In this section, I will address both issues to justify 
the sampling techniques used for conducting the interest group surveys. 
                                                                                                                                             
civil service position relatively soon (www.algemenebestuursdienst.nl). For the UK, level 6/7 civil servants 
were also included in the survey. For the US, civil servants from the Senior Executive Service (SES) were 
included. More specifically, the population of senior civil servants in the US was defined as those belonging 
to the SES, who are career employees and whose position is a competitive one, other than the non-career SES 
members who receive non-competitive positions. This selection was supposed to provide a better equivalence 
between the nature of the Dutch and US senior civil services (Federal Yellow Book 2007, fall and personal 
communication with dr. F. M. van der Meer, Leiden University, Department of Public Administration). For 
the Swedish case, I used the civil servants denoted as senior civil servants in the Swedish State Calendar. 
Although there is not a formal institutionalisation of a senior civil service, based on existing classifications 
(Page and Wright 2001) and the listing in the Swedish State Calendar, I could define a population of senior 
civil servants as equivalent as possible to those of the UK, the US and the Netherlands.  
13 When the senior civil servant’s survey in the UK and the Netherlands is discussed, ‘I’ should be interpreted 
as ‘we’ as I conducted these surveys together with Caspar van den Berg, a then colleague at the Department of 
Public Administration, Leiden University. As two populations in our individual research projects overlapped, 
we jointly conducted the survey.  
14 Dod (2007), Dod’s Civil Service Companion, London. 
15 For the US and the Swedish cases, the sampling methods were as follows. From the Swedish State 
Calendar, I selected from each national agency the two most senior civil servants, from whom I tried to 
obtain contact details. I submitted a survey to those from whom I had been able to obtain the email 
addresses. For the US, I took a random sample of SES members to establish a sample for the survey.  
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A strategy to define an indefinable population 
Despite the need for comparative research to truly assess the nature of individual 
interest representation systems, there is considerable disagreement and doubt 
about the feasibility of comparative research in this field. Quite fundamentally, 
there is no real consensus about what interest groups, the subject in question, 
exactly are. Part of the fuzziness seems related to the very concepts employed to 
designate the subjects under scrutiny. “Counting is not the issue”, according to 
Jordan (2006, 2), “it is categorisation that is the problem.” A listing of existing 
definitions by Baumgartner and Leech (1998, 29) aptly illustrates Jordan’s 
conclusion. According to the literature, interest groups are:  
Social or demographic categories of the population; membership organisations; 
any set of individuals with similar beliefs, identifications, or interests; social 
movements; lobbyists registered in legislatures; political action committees, 
participants in rule-making or legislative hearings; institutions, including 
corporations and government agencies; coalitions of organisations and 
institutions; prominent individuals acting as political entrepreneurs or lobbyists. 
This is a colourful collection of definitions containing a wide variety of potential 
interest groups. What are we to make of such a collection, if one is to engage in 
comparative research? Most of these concepts refer to specific organisational 
configurations. What all these loosely (or very formally) organised entities have in 
common is that they intersect with government actions when they pursue their 
private interests. When governments adopt certain measures or rules affecting 
private interests, interest groups will try to influence these measures or regulations 
through elected and/or appointed government officials (Baumgartner and Leech 
1998; Lowery and Brasher 2004; Salisbury 1984). So, what these entities have in 
common are two fundamental aspects, irrespective of whether they are an ad hoc 
protest group, a full-fledged peak labour organisation or something else in 
between. First, they pursue their private interests. And second, in doing so, they 
intersect with public policy or regulations. Theoretical issues determine which of 
these two aspects will dominate in a given research project. The aspect of pursuing 
private interests will merit more attention in studies of mobilisation, maintenance 
and population studies of interest groups, while the intersection with public policy 
may be more pronounced in studies of interest groups’ influence, and strategies. 
A definition of interest groups in functional terms meets the conceptual 
demands necessary for comparative research. In Sartori’s (1970) words, we “move 
up the ladder of abstraction.” A definition in functional terms also eliminates the 
idiosyncrasies associated with various individual types of interest groups that 
prohibit any meaningful comparison. When this strategy is consistently applied, 
groups of any type of organisational configuration that intersect with public policy 
should be referred to as ‘interest-pursuing entities.’ For reasons of convenience, I 
will continue to use the term ‘interest groups,’ while keeping in mind that it is not 
the specific organisational configuration that is of importance, but it is rather the 
activity of pursuing one’s interests.16  
                                                        
16 A complicating factor in this definition may be that the extent to which such ‘interest-pursuing entities’ are 
successful in pursuing private interests relates to the organisational characteristics of these entities. In other 
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How to sample from an unknown population? 
Not only do differences in definitions seem to exist, but available data on interest 
groups differs markedly between the two broad sets of interest representation 
regimes. In the UK and US, databases of interest group populations are available. 
In contrast, in the Netherlands and Sweden, such comprehensive databases do not 
exist. Two fundamental questions arise in this case. What should we sample from 
and what should we compare? For the Dutch case, I developed a strategy to deal 
with the non-existing database problem.17  
There is no census of the existing interest groups in the Netherlands from 
which to draw a random sample. The important or ‘big players’ among the interest 
groups are often well-known to policy makers in the Netherlands. Beyond this 
familiar collection of interest groups, however, it is hard to get an overview of other 
relevant interest groups. Recent studies of membership organisations in the 
Netherlands also restrict themselves to the largest ones (de Hart 2005), concern 
sector specific studies (Akkerman 2005; Huitema 2005), or study a particular type 
of organisations, such as professional associations (Visser and Wilts 2006). Such 
studies do not accumulate and thus fail to provide a full overview of the interest 
group population. As a civil servant noted: “When there are problems with certain 
health and safety rules in a particular profession, we often meet interest groups 
that were completely unfamiliar to us before.”18 In general, there is no 
representative indication of the existing interest groups, outside those that regularly 
knock on policy makers’ doors. The scholarly literature on interest representation 
in the Netherlands very much reflects this political-administrative practice. Put 
differently, the literature does not provide a full overview of the existing interest 
groups in the Netherlands either.  
By studying only those organisations that already have access, we cannot draw 
conclusions about the nature of interest representation. We do not know how many 
others there are, so we do not know (for instance) how severely access is limited. 
Conceptual models that explicitly draw attention to this issue thus cannot be fully 
applied. The question, then, is how to measure resource concentration when the 
boundaries of the interest population are unknown. When applying a resource 
dependence model, we need to include population dynamics, which require us to 
be aware of the total interest population (see chapter 6). Moreover, comparative 
research is further complicated by the fact that we cannot compare different 
systems when there are no comparably representative estimates of the interest 
populations available from which we can sample in an equivalent manner.  
                                                                                                                                             
words, their organisational configuration may be a vehicle to a successful intersection with public policy and 
thus access. So, by excluding this, we might omit an important intervening variable. Still, such organisational 
characteristics are not an essential or fundamental characteristic of interest groups. Pursuing private interests 
and seeking access when interests intersect with public policy are, similar to Sartori’s definition of political 
parties, the bare essentials of this concept. In explaining differences in success, we should move down the 
ladder of abstraction and find parameters covering, for instance, organisational characteristics.  
17 For Sweden, a similar full-blown strategy would have been appropriate, but given a lack of time and 
resources I opted for a satisfying rather than optimising strategy: selecting the organisations reported in the 
Swedish State Calendar and via an additional, snowball sampling web search adding other major interest 
organisations to establish a dataset of at least the major Swedish interest groups. 
18 Interview by author. 
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Indeed, there are no legal requirements for interest groups to register in the 
Netherlands when they want to consult or contact political parties in parliament, 
ministers or civil servants. Such requirements to register not only contribute to 
more transparency in public decision making, but also provide scholars, for 
instance in the US, with a fairly satisfactory start for collecting data on interest 
groups (Baumgartner and Leech 1998). And whereas the multiple databases 
available on EU interest groups generate their own methodological and substantive 
problems, at least there is some census of the EU interest system (Berkhout and 
Lowery 2008). These databases allow researchers to define in a relatively 
satisfactory way a population from which to sample and eventually infer some 
general conclusions about interest populations at large. A lack of such a database 
thus results in a fundamental sampling issue when studying interest 
representation in the Netherlands. Indeed, how are we to generalise findings and 
results on the national interest population, if we are not familiar with the 
characteristics and size of this population?  
Two databases have been constructed to provide a representative dataset for the 
Dutch national interest group population. One includes interest groups that are not 
necessarily known to policy makers and the other one includes those that are 
presumably familiar to policy makers. The two together provide an estimate of the 
entire national interest population.  
Let me discuss the database with interest groups not necessarily known to the 
government first. To establish such a database, I used the association and 
foundation database generated by the National Chamber of Commerce in the 
Netherlands (NCC). The NCC is an autonomous public agency (in Dutch: 
zelfstandig bestuursorgaan (zbo)) under the auspices of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs. The NCC not only administers the trade register, but also administers an 
association and foundation register (Register Act 1997). Essentially, every citizen in 
the Netherlands either planning to establish his or her own company or start any 
type of foundation or association needs to register with the NCC. These trade, 
association and foundation registers are available online and accessible via a NCC 
coding system, which provides codes for every type of firm or association. As all 
interest groups are formally registered as either a foundation or association, this 
database provides a good starting point to establish an estimate of the national 
interest population. To select candidate organisations, I searched the NCC database 
via their coding system. Based on classifications used by other scholars (Beyers and 
Kerremans 2004; Mahoney 2004), I categorised different types of interest groups 
to guide the selection of appropriate NCC codes (see appendix II).  
Searching the NCC register on the basis of these codes resulted in an initial 
database of 58,220 organisations. However, two caveats needed to be addressed 
before finalising the dataset. First, as the NCC coding system is not mutually 
exclusive, duplicate organisations needed to be eliminated. Second, the NCC 
coding system only registers the location, name and type of organisations rather 
than its scope of activity. It was therefore necessary to distinguish between national 
and local organisations, as I was only interested in interest groups operating at the 
national level. In order to make this distinction, I manually searched the initial 
database of 58,220 organisations by organisations’ names to distinguish the 
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national from local ones.19 Finally, as even this coding system turned out to be 
incomplete, I checked the database against an overview of the largest interest 
groups (de Hart 2005), and, whenever necessary, I added missing organisations to 
the database. This strategy eventually resulted in a database of 7,565 
organisations.20 From these 7,565 organisations, I took a random sample of 1000 
organisations and gathered contact details for each via an internet search and by 
phone. This information was also used to ensure that organisations had a national 
scope of activities and to check whether they still existed. 
Second, to account for interest groups that were already familiar to policy 
makers, I examined websites from each central government department and from 
the organisations that are members of the Social and Economic Council. This did 
not, of course, provide a full overview of the collection of interest groups with 
which the government is familiar. Policy makers are not truly familiar with all of 
the groups, and some with which policy makers are familiar are still excluded. 
Assuming that familiar and non-familiar organisations are missing at random, this 
website database provides a fairly good estimate of the characteristics of the interest 
population known to the government rather than an estimate of the total number of 
organisations with which the government is familiar.  
The two diagrams in figure 4.2 depict the results of the database searches. They 
show the different characteristics of each population based on random samples 
from both datasets. That is, they show the proportion of each type of interest group 
in the random samples drawn from the two datasets: the one containing 
organisations known by the government (A), and one not necessarily known by the 
government (B). I checked both samples to assess whether the organisations 
indeed had a national scope, still existed, or were international organisations. The 
NCC sample contained 507 national organisations and the website-based sample 
contained 336 national organisations. The results in figures 4.2 are based upon the 
number of national organisations, rather than the full sample.  
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19 In Dutch, I coded organisations with the following words in its title as possibly national interest 
organisations: Nederlandse, nationale, landelijke, vereniging van/verenigde, koepel, platform.  
20 This database excludes individual corporations as well as advisory councils. 
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Figures 4.2 The population of interest groups in the Netherlands 
Two important aspects of these datasets need attention. First, the sample based on 
the Chamber of Commerce database contained 317 organisations that were 
untraceable. They either ceased to exist or could simply not be found via the 
internet, a phone book, or the yellow pages. The NCC database provided indeed a 
comprehensive start for establishing a database of national interest organisations, 
as it registers every type of organisational activity. Yet, it does not provide a 
complete and up-to-date registration, indicating that the database is not entirely 
reliable. Second, the website database most probably overestimates the number of 
NGOs, in particular development and environmental NGOs. For this dataset, I 
used snowball sampling. Via the websites of the central government departments 
and peak organisations, I collected organisations and member organisations 
respectively. The association of development organisations provided a separate, 
comprehensive website of its member organisations. The listing of the member 
organisations of the two professional organisations was not complete, however. 
This strategy may have resulted in an overrepresentation of development NGOs. 
Yet, these two datasets together provide a comprehensive view on the Dutch 
interest group population. As such, they offer a fairly equivalent database to those 
in pluralist systems. In addition, these datasets can provide more information on 
interest representation in the Netherlands than the case studies and the studies of 
particular types of interest groups have together offered until now.  
I used these databases to take random samples, which are illustrated in figure 
4.3 above. For the UK, I used the Directory of British Associations, Edition 6 (CBD 
Research 2006).21 This directory contains a database of British and Irish 
associations, including 7,368 British associations and their contact details. Some, 
however, question its completeness and representativeness.22 Yet, for the purpose 
of this research, it was the best available option to conduct a comparative survey. 
                                                        
21  CBD 2006, Directory of British Associations and associations in Ireland, CD-ROM version, CBD research, 
Beckenham, Kent. I thank Prof. dr. W. Maloney for his suggestion and reference to this database.  
22 Research project of Prof. dr. G. Jordan and Prof. W. Maloney; presented at the ESRC Conference on the 
Politics of Interest Representation: Counting interest groups, Aberdeen University, 02-07-2007. 
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From those 7,368 organisations, I randomly sampled 977 organisations.23 For 
organisations without current email addresses, I called to ask the email address of 
the director, chief executive, or general secretary. After the database search and the 
telephone calls, I was able to collect contact details for 879 organisations, which 
included either personal or personal assistant’s email addresses.24  
4.4 Assessing the quality of the survey dataset 
Based on the surveys submitted to the random samples of bureaucrats and interest 
groups, I established a dataset of bureaucracy-interest group interactions. To 
measure each of the theoretical concepts of resource importance and resource 
concentration, questionnaire items were designed. In the following chapters, I will 
discuss the operationalisation and measurement of each of the theoretical concepts 
in more detail, including the individual questionnaire items.25 I sent the 
questionnaires to the respondents via an online web tool, which allowed me to fully 
administer the surveys myself.26 The questionnaires were sent via an email 
containing a unique link to the questionnaire.27 The surveys were conducted 
between January 2007 and March 2008.  
These surveys resulted in a database of bureaucracy–interest group interactions 
mainly from the UK and the Netherlands. Surveys were also sent to Sweden and 
the US. This particular set of countries was selected as they provided for variation 
in interest representation regimes (for a detailed discussion, see chapter 5). Table 
4.1 shows the responses in total N.  
Table 4.1 Total N dataset bureaucracy-interest group interactions 
Nations Bureaucrats Interest groups
The Netherlands 418 222
UK 406 133
US 82 38
Sweden 119 49
Total N database
 
                                                        
23 This was done in two ‘rounds.’ I first randomly sampled 609 organisations, but as the response rate turned 
out to be very low, I additionally sampled 368 organisations to increase the response rate, as several 
reminders had not helped to increase the response rate of the first round.  
24 For the US, I used the database of interest groups based on the Lobbying Disclosure Act (see Baumgartner 
and Leech 1998) and selected a list of interest groups and lobbyist via the fields: issue codes; government 
entity contacted and year filed. For each issue, I selected the first 100 organisations that were listed after the 
query based on three fields: policy area (issue), Congress (government entity contacted) and 2007 (year filed). 
For the Sweden case, I listed the organisations included in the Swedish State Calendar and conducted 
snowball sampling via a website search. 
25 See chapters 5-7 for further discussion and appendix I for a full list of questions. 
26 See: www.zipsurvey.com; I thank Dr. T. Capelos for this very useful suggestion.  
27 I used a general email address (for the ABD survey: topambtenaren@fsw.leidenuniv.nl; for the UK, US and 
Sweden SCS surveys and the NLD, UK, US and Sweden interest group surveys I used: 
governance@fsw.leidenuniv.nl) to which respondents could respond and provide us comments on the 
questionnaire. Such a reply option allowed me to detect possible technical malfunctions or other questions 
regarding the survey, and prevented multiple responses from a single respondent. As a result, these options 
effectively addressed some of the drawbacks of online survey 
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Whereas in absolute numbers the bureacrats’ datasets of the UK and the 
Netherlands are comparable, the interest group dataset of the Netherlands is larger 
than that of the UK. And the total N generated by the Sweden and US surveys, both 
for the bureaucrats and the interest groups, is much smaller than the total N 
generated by the UK and Dutch surveys. Therefore, the Sweden and the US 
datasets are not used in this study. The UK and the Dutch datasets are, however, 
sufficient to assess the model’s explanatory value. I can only use these datasets to 
measure the degree of dependence characterising bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions, however, when they meet the demands of reliability and validity. 
Below, I discuss these issues in turn.  
4.4.1 Assessing the reliability of the questionnaires 
One of the measures of the robustness of a dataset is reliability. Reliability in 
survey research often hinges on how consistently respondents have answered the 
questions, how well they have interpreted the questions, whether they have 
interpreted the questions in a similar way, and, finally, whether or not there is a 
bias resulting from a high non(-item) response. Testing the reliability of a 
questionnaire can be done in several ways. An obvious method is the test-retest 
method, since providing the same item twice to the same respondent with some 
period of time in-between is an obvious measure of consistency. In the case of 
multi-item measurements, checking the internal consistency of the respective 
items is an additional way to measure the reliability of a questionnaire (Fowler 
2002; Groves et al. 2004). The questionnaires contained both single item and 
multiple item measurements. So, the obvious way to test reliability was the test-
retest method, but that was not possible given practical limitations. Although the 
questionnaires did not contain true parallel form or multi-item measures, several 
items related to similar topics were included. Therefore, to gauge the reliability of 
the questionnaires, inter-item correlations (de Vaus 2002) were examined.  
For the bureaucrats’ dataset, I chose two items that were designed to measure 
interactions with interest groups and two items on the influence of the EU on 
interactions with national interest groups.28 The internal consistency of the interest 
group dataset was also measured for items related to the importance of the EU and 
importance of civil servants for getting access to the policy making process. The 
inter-item correlations vary from 0.38 to 0.82, indicating a satisfactory internal 
consistency. Table 4.2 shows the inter-item correlations compared between the UK 
and the Netherlands for both the interest group and bureaucrats’ datasets.  
                                                        
28 The number of questions in a questionnaire is limited, as a questionnaire should not take too long to 
complete. This helps to increase both the response-rate and reliability (the longer it takes, the less people will 
be concentrating at the end of the questionnaire). For this particular research project, the questionnaire 
contained items measuring various aspects of interactions with interest organisations as well items 
measuring (the Europeanisation of) various competencies and activities of senior civil servants. These items 
were part of the empirical research of C. van den Berg (see footnote 13). As a consequence, the number of 
questions for our individual research projects was restricted.  
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Table 4.2 Inter-item correlations questionnaire-items 
Datasets UK NLD
Bureaucracy
Interactions interest groups 0.83 0.82
Influence EU on interactions 0.69 0.53
Interest Groups
Importance civil servants 0.44 0.50
Importance EU 0.38 0.51
Inter-item correlations
 
The inter-item correlations for the bureaucrats’ datasets are generally higher than 
for the interest group datasets. Whereas the values for the bureaucrats’ dataset vary 
from 0.53-0.83, the values of the interest group dataset vary from 0.38-0.50.29 
Possibly, this difference is due to variance in uniformity. A dataset of senior civil 
servants may be less heterogeneous than a dataset of representatives of interest 
groups. Accordingly, this heterogeneity may be reflected in a lower internal 
consistency of the interest group dataset. For both questionnaires, the inter-item 
correlations for the EU are less high than those related to the importance of 
interest groups or civil servants respectively. This is most likely a result of 
sequencing. The EU questions followed those on the importance of civil servants 
and interactions with interest groups, respectively, and were asked almost at the 
end of the questionnaires. This could reflect lack of concentration, which often 
occurs at the end of questionnaires (Fowler 2002; Groves et al. 2004). Also, 
interviews revealed that the EU may be a complex topic, which could also entail 
lower consistency. Still, the inter-item correlations suggest a satisfactory internal 
consistency of the questionnaires. And as the interview data are generally in line 
with the survey results, we can infer that this survey dataset is fairly reliable.  
4.4.2 Assessing the validity of the questionnaires 
Validity, one could argue, is always in the eye of the beholder. The theoretical 
framework that is adopted very much determines whether questionnaire items are 
valid measurements or not. So, in the end, validity remains much more a matter of 
theoretical judgment rather than a rigorously tested characteristic of the dataset. 
Given the nature of the subject under study, I was able to address its face and 
content validity by conducting pilot tests.30 Pilot testing included a group of peers 
in the field of public administration and political science who critically assessed 
whether the questionnaire items measured what they were supposed to measure. 
This phase included both native Dutch and native English speakers to ensure that 
                                                        
29 According to several authors (de Vaus 2002, Field 2005), inter-item consistency, or internal consistency, 
can be measured by inter-item correlations and Cronbach’s alpha. Cronbach’s alpha is a measure of the 
reliability of a scale and it measures how well the different items or components reflect a similar concept. 
According to a similar logic, that different items are designed to measure the same thing, we can use 
Cronbach alpha to check the reliability of multi-item measurement. The values of Cronbach's alpha vary from 
0.68 to 0.91 for the civil service dataset and from 0.54 to 0.66 for the interest groups dataset. These values 
indicate a good to satisfying internal consistency.  
30 More sophisticated analyses of validity, such as criterion and construct validity, could not be used given the 
nature of the topic at hand (see Litwin 1995). 
Bureaucracy-Interest Group Interactions in Comparative Perspective 
73 
interpretation of the questions was as similar as possible. I refined the question-
naires based on their comments. I also pre-tested the senior civil servants’ 
questionnaire with a small group of civil servants to check whether the items were 
meaningful and whether the questionnaire was not too long. Again, their 
comments resulted in improvement of the questionnaires. In addition, several 
experts in survey methods provided feedback on the wording and order of the 
questionnaire items.31 I did not assess the internal validity of the survey dataset as 
such, yet further analyses (see chapters 5-7) did not point to major internal 
contradictions that would indicate poor internal validity. I addressed the internal 
validity of the entire database, however, by including both surveys and elite 
interviewing as corroborative methods of data collection.  
4.4.3 Assessing the response of the SCS survey 
Assessing external validity in the case of survey research is usually based on the 
quality of the sampling method and an assessment of the relative response rate. 
The Dutch senior civil service, including the members of the candidate-
programme, consisted of 996 members at the time the survey was conducted. I 
sent questionnaires to the total population and received 416 questionnaires (a 
response rate of 41.4 percent). Such a response rate allows generalisation of the 
results to the entire population of senior civil servants in the Netherlands. 
To further assess the external validity of the Dutch dataset, I examined the 
differences between the dataset and the population in terms of gender, age, 
minority and grades. Figures 4.3 show the results of this analysis for the Dutch 
senior civil service. The proportion male/female is roughly similar, as are the 
figures representing age. Until the age of 55, the percentages are more or less 
similar. Above the age of 55, the survey dataset shows smaller percentages of these 
age categories. In terms of grades, the results show some minor differences. The 
survey dataset contains less people with a grade under 15, somewhat more people 
with grades 15 and 16, and less people with grades 17, 18 and 19 than the entire 
population. The results are quite satisfactory for the Dutch senior civil service 
dataset and they confirm the possibility to generalise the results to the entire 
population of senior civil servants in the Netherlands.  
                                                        
31 I thank both Prof. dr. P.L.H. Scheepers (Nijmegen University) and Dr. T. Capelos (at that time Leiden 
University, currently University of Leeds) for very useful feedback on the structuring and wording of the 
items.  
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With regard to the UK SCS, I received 406 completed questionnaires from a total 
of 3,306 senior civil servants listed in Dod’s Civil Service Companion (2007). This 
would have resulted in a response rate of 9.1 per cent, which is too low to justify 
generalisations for the entire senior civil service. 
A further assessment of the external validity of the UK dataset, similar to the 
Dutch dataset, included figures of gender, age, minority and grades. Generalisation 
appeared to be somewhat difficult for this dataset given an almost completely 
inversed picture in terms of grade. The population of senior civil servants (SCS and 
level 6/7) contains 1.7 percent SCS civil servants, whereas the survey dataset 
includes 69.3 percent SCS civil servants. Clearly, something unexpected had 
happened during the process of collecting data for the UK civil servants. I had used 
Dod’s Civil Service Companion (2007) to establish the population of senior civil 
servants in the UK, assuming that those listed in the database actually were senior 
civil servants. A further examination of the differences in grades between the 
survey database and figures of the entire UK SCS (National Statistics 2006; ORC 
International 2006) suggested something else. Dod’s database encompassed some 
of the level 6/7 civil servants as well, rendering the response rate even lower.32  
To deal with this inconvenient situation, I decided to examine how 
representative the SCS respondents in the survey dataset were compared to the true 
population of SCS members in the UK. The respondents had indicated grades 
corresponding to their jobs in the questionnaire. Dod’s Civil Service Companion, 
appeared to explicitly denote civil servants who were members of the SCS but not 
those belonging to level 6/7 and included about 600 SCS members. From other 
sources (National Statistics 2006; ORC International 2006), I was able to infer that 
the UK has a total population of about 4,455 senior civil servants. Comparing the 
number of SCS civil servants in the survey dataset (124) to the full population of 
senior civil servants, the response rate is only 2.7 per cent.33 This is, of course, far 
too low for any legitimate and meaningful generalisation. Based on demographic 
figures, however, the set of SCS respondents appeared to be quite representative. 
Figures 4.4 show the results of the analysis. 
                                                        
32Apparently, the organisation did not offer a systematic database of SCS-members based on specific criteria. 
The organisation works with the database of the previous year, updates it and sends it to the department 
directors for approval. Some civil servants will add information or request to be omitted from the database. 
Very likely, civil servants who have an external profile or have a very responsive disposition will be 
overrepresented in the database. Instead of a systematic and representative database of the UK SCS, it turned 
out to be a rather unsystematic database that contained both SCS members and level 6/7 civil servants 
(telephone call tot Dod’s, 12-01-2008 after observing differences in grades).  
33 Inferred from ORC International, SCS survey 2006. The response rate of the latter was 67% of the entire 
SCS, including a total N of 2,985, which results in a full population of about 4,455. Since Dod’s database 
includes about 600 SCS, this represents 13.2 percent of the full SCS population. Then, I figured out the 
percentage of true SCS members in the survey. The demographic and ranking questions were posed at the 
end of the questionnaire. As a result of non-item response throughout the questionnaire, I had to apply the 
ratio of level 6/7 and SCS-level answers to the initial set of respondents. About 30.5 percent of the 
respondents had answered that they were SCS members. Applying this percentage to the initial number of 
respondents, I estimated the number of senior civil servants in our dataset at about 124. The ratio of level 6/7 
and SCS-level in the UK dataset rendered it less comparable to the Dutch SCS dataset, in which the 
percentage of true SCS-level civil servants is higher. This may affect the analyses. Yet, answers to the 
questions of whether civil servants interacted with interest groups and if not for what reasons, did not reveal 
significant differences between the two samples concerning interactions with interest groups.  
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As can be observed from the figures, the numbers in terms of gender and minority 
are roughly similar between the population and the survey dataset. In terms of age, 
the figures are also rather similar, yet the survey produced a somewhat different 
proportion of younger and older people than the proportion apparent in the 
population. This may be a result of the online survey, as younger people may 
perhaps be more inclined to fill out an online based survey.34 Based on the 
demographic statistics, we may, very cautiously, generalise the results to the UK 
SCS, while keeping the low response rate in mind. For the entire dataset, the 
results only apply to the civil servants that participated in the survey, as I was 
unable to determine the representativeness of the level 6/7 civil servants. However 
inconvenient Dod’s Civil Service Companion database may be, it was the only 
database of UK (senior) civil servants available at the time of collecting data. So, 
acknowledging the low response rate and its consequences for generalisations is 
generally the best option for this study. But, given the fact that in demographic 
terms our SCS dataset is rather similar to the full population of SCS members, we 
may, if cautiously, generalise the results to the entire SCS population.  
4.4.4 Assessing the response of the interest groups survey 
Response rates for the UK and Dutch interest group datasets were also quite low, 
as is common in interest group research (Gray and Lowery 1996a). I received 133 
questionnaires from a sample of 879 organisations from a total population of 7,368 
interest groups in the UK. The eventual response rate was 1.8 percent. For the 
Netherlands, however, it is difficult to formulate an exact response rate. Both 
samples consisted of national and non-national organisations. After establishing 
the number of national organisations and extrapolating the ratio to the population 
databases, I found a response rate of about 3 percent of the (estimate of) the total 
population of interest groups in the Netherlands.35 Both datasets are thus not really 
satisfactory in terms of response rates and representativeness. 
                                                        
34 It can also be the result of a difference in grades, as the SCS is more likely to consist of older people. Yet, 
the relatively large number of SCS in our survey suggests otherwise.  
35 The NCC sample contained 507 (51.0 percent) national organisations, and the website sample contained 
336 (84.0 percent) national organisations. Extrapolating this to the entire database, this means that the full 
NCC database contains about 5,718 national organisations and the website database contains about 1,737 
national organisations. Adding these two numbers and comparing it with the total number of respondents 
would result in an initial estimate of the response rate. Yet, we still have to take into account that both 
datasets may overlap. Comparing the two samples (only national organisations), 2 percent of the 
organisations in the website database overlapped with the NCC database. This means that we have to subtract 
about 35 organisations from the total website database before adding the total number of organisations to the 
NCC database. Based on these results, we can infer that there are roughly 7,420 national interest groups in 
the Netherlands. 
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Another estimate of the representativeness of the dataset was to compare the 
survey dataset and the population datasets in terms of characteristics of the interest 
group population. In other words, we could compare the datasets in terms of the 
relative contribution of each type of interest group to the entire dataset. When we 
compare the Dutch survey dataset with the two databases, we see that the 
distribution of different types of interest groups in the survey dataset falls between 
the NCC database and the website database. Some proportions of the types of 
interest groups are more similar to the NCC database and others are more similar 
to the website database. Estimating the representativeness of the UK interest group 
dataset was also difficult, as the CBD research database does not contain a mutually 
exclusive classification system. Some organisations are classified more than once, 
but it is impossible to discover which ones. If we compare the relative contributions 
of the types of interest groups between the survey dataset and the full CBD 
research database, the different categories are relatively similar. However, a major 
difference is that there is no category for NGOs in the CBD research database. So 
for those organisations, it is hard to determine the representativeness of the survey 
dataset. Figures 4.5 show the relative contributions of each type of interest group to 
the survey datasets and the other databases.  
We observe a larger number of employers’ organisations and NGOs in the UK 
interest group database than in the CBD database. The CBD dataset contains more 
organisations in the fields of science and culture/sports/recreation. In the case of 
the Netherlands, the survey dataset contains a similar percentage of consumer, 
employers, and minorities’ organisations as the NCC database. The percentage of 
development NGOs and labour organisations is similar to those of the website 
database. In the case of idealistic, environmental and culture/sports/recreation 
organisations, the survey dataset is comparable to both the website and the NCC 
databases. The survey dataset contains fewer ‘other’ organisations and more 
voluntary organisations than the two population datasets. Easy generalisation of the 
results is not possible, because the survey dataset of Dutch interest groups, in 
terms of relative proportion of types of interest groups, falls between the two 
databases. With regard to the UK dataset, the relative contribution of each type of 
interest group renders the survey dataset to be roughly similar to the CBD research 
database. But as the response rate is also low, we need to be cautious with 
generalisations. When we compare the UK and NLD samples, there are some 
differences. In general, however, the ratio between professional organisations and 
NGO’s is roughly similar. In the NLD dataset the percentage of NGOs is somewhat 
higher, whereas in the UK dataset the percentage of professional associations is 
somewhat higher.  
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In sum, generalisation of the results seems possible for the Dutch senior civil 
service, given the relatively high response rate and similar demographic figures of 
both the survey dataset and the entire population. In case of the UK SCS, 
generalisation is somewhat more complex, given the low response rate, yet similar 
demographic figures in the case of the senior civil servants seem to justify cautious 
generalisations. In the case of the interest groups surveys, the response is low, but 
this is common in interest group research. What is different in this study, at least 
for the dataset of Dutch interest groups, is that an attempt has been made to get a 
detailed picture of the broader population. This dataset allows for a comparison in 
the distribution of types of interest groups and permits a better judgement of the 
possibility to generalise findings. More broadly, despite a relatively low response 
rate, the resulting datasets allow a more systematic analysis of bureaucracy-interest 
group interactions than case studies would have allowed.  
4.4.5 The quality of the dataset 
So, what can we conclude about the quality of the datasets? In terms of validity, I 
relied on pilot testing, including peers from within the scholarly field as well as 
several civil servants and experts on survey methodology. Their comments and 
feedbacks substantively improved the questionnaires. Satisfactory inter-item 
correlations suggest a reliable database. The low response rate seems worrisome 
for generalisations. Generalising the results for the NLD senior civil servants 
dataset is possible given the relatively high response rate and representativeness in 
terms of demographic characteristics. Yet, we can only make cautious 
generalisations about the representativeness of the UK SCS survey in terms of the 
demographic characteristics, and in comparing the proportion of different types of 
interest groups between the populations and the datasets. All in all, this dataset can 
be used to test hypotheses on bureaucracy-interest group interactions and to make 
cautious inferences to the entire populations of civil servants and interest groups. 
The discussion of the findings of each of the analyses will refer to ‘civil servants’ 
and ‘interest groups’ more generally for convenience. Despite the usage of these 
general terms, the limits of easy generalisation are acknowledged.  
Missing data  
There is one important issue concerning survey research in comparative politics 
and administration that I have not dealt with so far. Surveys are notorious for their 
relatively high non-response or non-item response rate, resulting in incomplete 
datasets, which in turn complicate the robustness of statistical analyses. A recent 
survey of the literature shows that almost 94 percent of scholars use listwise 
deletion to remove entire observations from the analysis to address non-item 
response, resulting in missing data (King et al 2001). Generally speaking, we can 
observe three mechanisms of missing data. First, data can be missing completely at 
random (MCAR), which means that a missing response occurs only by chance. A 
second mechanism of missing data entails the option of missing at random (MAR). 
Responses are still missing at random, but may depend on other observed 
characteristics. Finally, data can be missing not at random (MNAR), meaning that 
missing responses are related to a value that could have been observed. For 
instance, people with a high income are more likely not to report their income 
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(Sinharray, Stern, and Russel 2001). Listwise deletion is only appropriate if the 
proportion of missing data is relatively small and if the assumption of MCAR 
holds; a situation that rarely occurs. Otherwise, using listwise deletion could result 
in biased results and inefficient data analysis (King et al 2001). In addition, listwise 
deletion means that potentially valuable data cannot be used for analyses.  
The databases in this study are also characterised by a relatively large non-item 
response (see also chapter 5 and 6). To avoid biased results, I will use multiple 
imputation to generate complete datasets to test the hypotheses. Various methods 
exist to handle missing data, and multiple imputation is but one. Although 
contested, there seems to be a consensus that multiple imputation is generally the 
best solution (Sinharray, Stern and Russell 2001; Tabachnik and Fidell 2007).36 
Due to the contested nature of multiple imputation (Gelman, King, and Chuanhai 
1998), I will compare results based on both datasets: the original incomplete 
dataset and the complete datasets after multiple imputation. Further details and the 
diagnostics of the multiple imputation process will be discussed in the context of 
the civil service (chapter 5) and interest groups analyses (chapter 6) respectively. 
4.5 Approximating a longitudinal perspective 
The dataset generated by the cross-national survey enables us to analyse current 
interactions between a bureaucracy and interest groups. The impact of time, 
however, can only be traced to a limited extent. Recall that the model developed in 
chapter 3 revealed the existence of alternative types of rationality that can only be 
unravelled by a long-term perspective. That is, habitual and anticipatory rationality 
may also determine resource exchanges between interest groups and bureaucrats, 
in addition to the strategic rationality implicit in resource dependence theory. A full 
appreciation of a time dimension in bureaucracy-interest group interactions, and 
thus the ability to examine the complete set of different types of rationality 
underlying those interactions, requires longitudinal data. Longitudinal data, 
preferably panel data, would enable us to comprehensively measure the nature of 
the degree of dependence characterising bureaucracy-interest group interactions 
over time. That is, measurement over time would make it possible to examine 
whether the resource exchanges are based on strategic, anticipatory, or habitual 
rationality or a combination of these types of choices. Unfortunately, establishing a 
longitudinal database was not possible in this study. Nevertheless, to address such 
a time perspective, I supplemented the dataset described above by semi-structured 
interviews with both civil servants and representatives of interest groups. I added 
this method of elite interviewing to the survey instrument to collect data, thereby 
employing a mixed-method strategy in the data analysis.  
The underlying assumption of the mixed-method strategy in this research is 
twofold.37 First, I used a combination of survey research and semi-structured elite 
                                                        
36 A full examination of all mathematical assumptions underlying these different methods goes beyond the 
scope of this research. Instead, I rely on discussions and suggestions of scholars who are experts in these 
methodologies and their mathematics.  
37 In the literature on research methods, such combinations of research methods are often discussed in terms 
of ‘mixed methods’ (Bennet and Braumoeller 2005; Lieberman 2005) or, more generally, ‘triangulation’ 
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interviewing because this was the best mix of data collection methods available to 
generate the data necessary for testing the hypotheses within the boundaries of a 
relatively small-scale research project. I was able to use the resulting dataset with a 
number of analysis techniques to test the hypotheses discussed in the previous 
chapter. Combining statistical analyses with a version of fuzzy-set analysis, an in-
depth content analysis and counterfactual analysis allowed me to measure the 
different types of rationality underlying bureaucracy-interest group interactions.  
Second, and equally important, combining various data collection and analysis 
methods helps to strengthen the internal validity of the research by establishing 
true triangulation. The semi-structured interviews with bureaucrats and interest 
group representatives provided an additional check on the survey data. More 
importantly, these interviews enabled me to allow respondents to reflect on their 
interactions with bureaucrats or interest groups, respectively, when explicitly 
considering them over time. Relying on several methods of data collection also 
allowed me to construct a dataset that would serve the application of multiple 
analysis methods necessary for testing the different types of rationality underlying 
the resource exchanges between bureaucrats and interest groups.  
I restricted the interviews to the Netherlands.38 Yet, to bring in the comparative 
element so important to this study, I chose two policy areas, macro-economics and 
public health, from which to select respondents. The choice of these two policy 
areas was based on an initial analysis of the survey results, which showed that these 
two policy areas involved civil servants interacting with a relatively large number of 
interest groups. I further opted for these specific policy areas for the following 
reasons. First, macro-economics, and social-economics, is the subject of most 
studies of corporatism and international political economy (Molina and Rhodes 
2002). Explicitly addressing the two rival explanations, habitual and anticipatory 
rationality, for bureaucracy-interest group interactions regarding this policy area 
could result in an interesting contribution to this strand of literature. Second, 
public health in the Netherlands is a policy field that is not only characterised by a 
high number of interest groups, but also by a diverse array of interests. Many 
patient or consumer organisations are active in this field, as well as the very 
influential private firms, such as insurance companies and pharmaceutical firms, 
and associations representing them. The existence of many diverse organisations 
provides an interesting case to study how organisational characteristics may 
influence differences in access and the degree of dependence. Both policy areas 
thus allowed for an interesting additional perspective on bureaucracy-interest 
group interactions to that already offered by the survey dataset.39 In total, I 
                                                                                                                                             
(Peters 1998; term coined by Webb et al. 1967). What is often missing in existing mixed-method work is 
attention to the testing of rival explanations by using several research strategies. And this is exactly the point 
where the implicit logic behind mixed methods - using a supplementary research method to strengthen 
causal inferences regarding one theoretical model or set of hypotheses - no longer seems to apply. Put 
differently, various methods are often combined to test the same hypotheses, but various methods are seldom 
combined to test different hypotheses related to a single phenomenon. 
38 Interviews were held with SCS-level civil servants in the UK via telephone (N = 8). The quality of the data 
resulting from these interviews was not similar to the quality of the Dutch interview data. Therefore, I 
decided to limit the interviews to civil servants and interest groups in the Netherlands.  
39 The aim of these semi-structured interviews was to collect data on the impact of time on bureaucracy-
interest group interactions. I therefore did not select on the basis of the dependent variable, for instance 
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conducted 39 interviews with civil servants and 18 interviews with representatives 
of interest groups. This resulted in a dataset of bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions that included information on these interactions over time. As I opted 
for an individual-level analysis (see chapter 7), the dataset includes information on 
57 different instances of bureaucracy-interest group interactions varying across 
policy areas, agency types, and types of interest groups, with a set of indicators for 
different types of choices (see appendix II and chapter 7 for further details).  
4.5.1 Reliability and validity in elite interviewing 
Interviewing, in particular elite interviewing, poses challenges to the reliability and 
validity of the data collected by these interviews. To address these issues, I opted for 
the following two strategies: semi-structured interviews and a combination of 
interviewing civil servants and interest groups active in a similar policy area to 
collect multiple interpretations concerning a single topic. Using multiple sources is 
an obvious yet fundamental strategy to estimate whether the things respondents 
telling you are close to the truth (Berry 2002). I also used the results of the survey 
analysis to check whether answers to interview questions corresponded to the 
survey results, and vice versa. The semi-structured nature of the interviews enabled 
me to construct a dataset of comparable data so as to allow sound analyses. The 
additional room for manoeuvre such interviews offer allowed me to probe further 
when it was necessary and to dig deeper into issues that from the outset seemed 
interesting, yet were not at the core of the research project. Additionally, semi-
structured questions and open-ended questions allow respondents to organise their 
answers within their own frame, which seems essential in the case of elite 
interviewing. Elite interviewees apparently do not like “to be put in a straightjacket 
of closed-ended questions” (Aberbach and Rockman 2002).40 Semi-structured 
interviews are thus very suitable for elite interviewing when used for exploring 
alternative explanations of a particular phenomenon, as they both allow a 
researcher to establish a sound database and at the same time provide enough 
flexibility to engage in what should be interpreted as a good conversation by the 
respondents (Aberbach and Rockman 2002; Odendahl and Shaw 2002 ).  
To address the political sensitivity of the topic, I promised confidentiality and 
anonymity and took into account the ordering of the questions (Leech 2002). That 
is, I started with general questions and gradually asked those that could reveal the 
                                                                                                                                             
choosing one area with no or relatively few interactions and a policy area with many interactions. Such a 
selection would not serve the aim of the data analysis eventually to be conducted: examining the existence of 
different types of rationality revealed by long-term interactions. In addition, the comparison of two policy 
areas does not involve a detailed, structured, focused comparison (George and Bennet 2005). Rather, the 
selection serves to add an initial comparison of policy areas, types of interest organisations, and agency types 
to the in-depth analysis of the interview data so as to probe whether a mixture of different types of rationality 
would vary along these dimensions.  
40 The authors argue as follows: in the case of elite interviewing, or interviewing other highly educated 
people, respondents often comment on the rationale behind the answer options and try to suggest other ways 
of measuring what you want to measure (Aberbach and Rockman 2002, 674). Tellingly, the option of 
replying to our general email address in the survey research, as well as the option provided to the respondents 
to comment on the survey in a final open question, provoked exactly such commentary.  
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true nature of their interactions with bureaucrats or interest groups, respectively.41 
I taped each interview and transcribed them so as to generate an accurate database 
for coding. A small-scale research project does not allow for multiple coders, so to 
deal with the intercoder-reliability issue, I coded half of the interviews twice to 
check the consistency of my coding (see also Chapter 7). 
4.6 A summary of the research design  
This study is truly comparative in nature, although I consider comparative research 
a general research strategy rather than constituting a distinct sub-discipline within 
public administration and political science. Establishing causal relations and sound 
equivalence both at a conceptual and measurement level require special attention 
in comparative research. I designed the research in such a way as to carefully 
consider both demands and to offer the best available options possible within the 
scope of this research project to address these issues properly.  
First, in order to draw conclusions on bureaucracy-interest group interactions, I 
will rely on Mill’s method of concomitant variation to examine whether a particular 
pattern of variation among a set of independent variables coincides with a 
particular pattern of variation in the dependent variable. As such, we can draw 
conclusions about how contextual factors relate to resource importance and 
resource concentration and how a degree of dependence may vary under different 
circumstances. Given the nature of this research project, it will be difficult to 
clearly establish causal relations, i.e. to infer which contextual factor results in 
which particular degree of dependence. Conclusions will thus be put in 
probabilistic rather than causal terms. 
I address equivalence, a second important threat to comparative research, both 
at a conceptual and measurement level. In terms of conceptual equivalence, I use a 
reconceptualisation of resource exchange to measure bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions. To compare, we need to define a fundamental set of characteristics of 
a concept. The fundamental characteristic of bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions is the exchange of resources, be they tangible or intangible. Such a 
resource exchange renders it possible to distinguish between the different natures 
of such interactions as hypothesised by the literature on bureaucratic politics, on 
interest group politics, and on policy networks. Moreover, as the two elements 
determining such a resource exchange, resource concentration and resource 
importance, can be measured under different circumstances, we can also compare 
the nature of such interactions under such different circumstances. That is, we can 
compare the impact of contextual factors on the degree of dependence 
characterising bureaucracy-interest group interactions. In addition, the definitions 
of senior civil servants (civil servants belonging to a nation’s senior civil service), 
                                                        
41 When respondents indicate that they want to tell you something ‘off the record’, you know that they are 
quite frank in general and in such cases are willing to give away some sensitive details. This happened in 
several interviews, which can be interpreted as a sign of relatively sound reliability. Yet, it is always important 
to keep in mind, as is well known, that each individual’s answer offers a particular perspective to a given 
situation.  
Bureaucracy-Interest Group Interactions in Comparative Perspective 
85 
and interest groups (private interesting-pursuing entities that intersect with public 
policy) also take into account equivalence issues.  
In terms of data collection and measurement, I opted for comparative online 
surveys, an instrument that perfectly fits the subject under study, yet has some 
drawbacks in terms of equivalence and reliability. Careful operationalisation, pre-
testing, the usage of an online survey instrument and multiple imputation have 
been applied to address these issues. To generate equivalent populations of 
bureaucrats, this study has been restricted to the senior civil services. A lack of 
comparable databases of interest groups populations posed, however, a serious 
challenge to this comparative endeavour. Databases of interest groups were 
available for the UK (and the US), but the Netherlands (and Sweden) lack such 
databases. Therefore, I developed a strategy to establish a dataset of interest groups 
in the Netherlands to overcome this particular comparative problem. By examining 
the foundation and association database of the Netherlands Chamber of Commerce 
(NCC) and an additional website search, I constructed a comprehensive dataset of a 
national Dutch interest group population. This dataset was rather equivalent to the 
existing datasets in pluralist systems. It thus allowed for both comparative research 
and for random sampling, a difficulty in comparative interest group research in 
general and, in particular, in corporatist regimes.  
The surveys resulted in a reliable dataset of bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions, reflected in satisfying inter-item correlations. In terms of 
representativeness, the Dutch senior civil service dataset offers a sound dataset as 
well. The UK SCS dataset is a bit more complicated, as are both interest group 
datasets. For these three datasets, the response rates are very low. By examining 
demographic figures in the case of the UK SCS survey and comparing the types of 
organisations included in the survey and the population datasets for interest 
groups, I provided an additional check on external validity. Such constraints in 
terms of validity will be taken into account in the final interpretations and 
conclusions. Yet, as this study set out to generate a theoretical model to better 
compare bureaucracy-interest group interactions, an internally valid and reliable 
dataset is most important, and the survey dataset meets these demands.  
To examine bureaucracy-interest group interactions over time and to provide a 
measure for the internal validity of this study’s dataset, the survey dataset has been 
supplemented with 57 interviews of Dutch senior civil servants and representatives 
of interest groups in the areas of macro-economics and public health. A format of 
semi-structured interviews and partial recoding of the interview transcripts were 
used to address the issues of validity and reliability in elite interviewing.  
All in all, by systematically addressing the methodological issues generated by 
comparative research, I have been able to construct a useful dataset of bureaucracy-
interest group interactions containing both survey and interview data. As such, the 
data collection strategy has been a combination of different methods, just as the 
analysis strategy will also combine different analysis techniques. Chapters 5-7 
measure the degree of dependence from a bureaucratic perspective, examine 
resource concentration within the interest group environment via population 
dynamics, and examine the set of multiple rationalities underlying bureaucracy-
interest group interactions. 
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5  
Measuring Degree of Dependence:        
A Tale of the Bureaucracy 
5.1 Introduction  
“We simply need each other,” said a civil servant about his relationships with 
various interest groups, a reflection that is illustrative for most civil servants 
participating in this study. But is this a true symbiotic relationship where ‘give and 
take’ is perfectly balanced? Or, does this statement reflect an underlying 
asymmetric dependence, where each side’s needs are not equally balanced? Civil 
servants participating in this study mostly regarded national interest groups as 
actors becoming increasingly important for them to execute their jobs (61 percent). 
When asked, however, about the nature of their relationships with the interest 
groups they interact with, 50 percent of the civil servants reported that their 
relationship is ‘somewhat constructive.’ Only 7 percent judge their relationship 
‘very constructive,’ whereas almost 17 percent consider them to be ‘somewhat 
conflictual.’1 A majority of civil servants consider national interest groups to be an 
important player, but their interactions are not entirely unambiguous. “We need 
each other” apparently has multiple meanings and could point to both symmetric 
and asymmetric degrees of dependence underlying those relationships.  
The resource dependence model developed in this study should help determine 
the nature of interactions between bureaucrats and interest groups. This chapter 
assesses the explanatory value of the model. An essential first step is to test the 
impact of resource concentration and resource importance on the degree of 
dependence, a test of the core model explaining bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions. To address the comparative component of the model, the analysis 
includes several successive steps. Initially, I will test the independent effect of the 
contextual variables on the degree of dependence. After that, the impact of the 
contextual variables on each of the resource elements will be assessed. And, finally, 
I will test whether interaction effects exist between the contextual variables and the 
resource elements used to explain the degree of dependence.  
Figure 5.1 provides a schematic overview of these individual steps, each of which 
includes several empirical analyses. In section 5.3, the empirical analyses of the 
core resource dependence model will be discussed (step 1). In section 5.4, the 
comparative empirical analyses will be discussed, as well as the full explanatory 
potential of the model (steps 2-5).  
                                                        
1 Source: dataset of bureaucracy-interest group interactions compiled in this research project; see chapter 4. 
Results are based on the original dataset.  
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Figure 5.1 An assessment of the explanatory potential of the resource dependence model 
5.2 Measuring degree of dependence 
The core argument of the resource dependence model is that conceptualising 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions in terms of a degree of dependence 
facilitates better comparative research and thus may provide a better explanation of 
these interactions. This degree of dependence is determined by resource 
concentration and resource importance, both of which will vary along different 
political-administrative dimensions. Thus, by measuring the resource 
concentration and resource importance and by assessing the impact of contextual 
variables on each of these elements, we can estimate the degree of dependence for 
bureaucrats under different circumstances. Before turning to the actual analyses 
that probe the model empirically, this section discusses which indicators have been 
used to measure the contextual variables and the resource elements.2 
Questionnaires can be found in appendix I.3  
                                                        
2 For practical reasons, not all of the contextual variables included in the explanatory model in chapter 3 will 
be included in the empirical analysis. To be precise, policy complexity, policy saliency, a policy’s political 
sensitivity and the influence of ideas will not be included.  
3 The UK SCS and interest group survey can be found in appendix I. Other questionnaires are available from 
the author, including the short version of the Dutch SCS questionnaire as well as the Dutch interest group 
questionnaire. The item numbers used in the text refer to the UK SCS survey, unless otherwise mentioned. 
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5.2.1 Concentration and importance of resources 
A first set of variables that need to be addressed are the core explanatory variables 
for resource dependence: resource concentration and resource importance. First, 
resource concentration refers to the number of organisations in the environment 
that possess or are in control of resources that another organisation needs. This 
study distinguishes between two types of resource concentration, so that resource 
concentration in the interest group environment (inside resource concentration) 
can be isolated from resource concentration in a wider environment (outside 
resource concentration), as discussed in chapter 3.  
Inside resource concentration refers to the number of other interest groups 
apparent in the environment. I measured this number by asking respondents how 
many interest groups in their area they were familiar with, but with which they did 
not interact (see item 10, appendix I). This number provides an idea of the set of 
interest groups known to a bureaucrat and thus the resource concentration within 
the interest group environment.4  
Outside resource concentration refers to the number of other types of 
organisations in the environment. By other types of organisations, I mean 
organisations such as advisory councils, consultancy firms, research institutes, and 
so on. These organisations are assumed to interact with the bureaucracy as part of 
the set of organisations with which bureaucrats interact regularly to formulate and 
implement policy. To measure this type of resource concentration, I included an 
item in the questionnaire asking respondents to indicate with how many of such 
organisations they interact (item 12, see appendix I).  
The importance of resources refers to the value civil servants attach to particular 
resources. Resources, as has been discussed earlier, have been operationalised in 
the literature as both tangible and intangible resources such as expertise, financial 
means or political support (see chapter 3). Yet, when using a survey instrument to 
collect data, asking respondents about ‘resources’ applies an abstract concept to 
their every-day reality. Therefore, to better understand how the respondents 
themselves understand resources, item 5 was included in the questionnaire (see 
appendix I). It required respondents to list the most important ‘reasons’ for them 
to interact with interest groups. Asking for reasons is an indirect way to measure 
the resources civil servants may exchange with interest groups, but listing reasons 
for interactions is easier to comprehend than the ‘resources they exchange.’  
Four concrete reasons attributed to the resource dependence model are the need 
for expertise, the need for implementation capacity, the need for intermediation 
capacity and the need for legitimacy (political support). These resources are derived 
                                                        
4 In the original coding and order of the answer categories, ‘I don’t know/ hier heb ik geen zicht op’ followed 
the final substantive option ‘more than 15 organisations.’ Interpretation of this option can be as follows: 
“there are so many other organisations, I cannot tell.” Yet, this option is open to multiple interpretations, as it 
could also mean: “I really don’t know how many other organisations there are.” This may seem an 
unimportant difference, yet in terms of resource concentration, the first option indicates a small degree of 
concentration (as there are so many organisations, you can’t tell, but you know of them) and the latter option 
indicates a high concentration of resources (since you really don’t know of any other organisations). To 
address such a difference, the analyses were run both with the original coding and a recoding reflecting the 
second option. Generally, there were no differences between the analyses, other than a negative sign attached 
to the values of the coefficients as a result of the reverse order of coding. 
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from the literature on bureaucracy-interest group interactions. Expertise is usually 
mentioned as one of the most important resources interest groups have to offer 
and with which they try to obtain access (Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Bouwen 
2002). In addition, political support is often mentioned, not only in the interest 
group literature but also as a reason why civil servants working at regulatory 
agencies may be vulnerable to capture (Wilson 2000[1989]). Implementation 
capacity has been derived from policy network studies in the field of policy 
implementation. It reflects the governance notion that the current role of the 
government is to deliver services and implement policy in co-production (O'Toole 
Jr. 2000; O'Toole Jr., Hanf, and Hupe 1997). Finally, intermediation capacity is 
derived from the initial case study and the literature mentioning the need for such 
intermediates (Beyers and Kerremans 2004; Brown 1999; Poppelaars 2007; 
Thompson 2005). The degree of dependence, finally, is measured by the number of 
interest groups with which civil servants interact (see item 3, appendix I).  
5.2.2 Contextual factors 
An important element of the explanatory model outlined in chapter 3 is the 
comparative aspect in explaining bureaucracy-interest group interactions. Each of 
the resource elements is assumed to vary along different political-administrative 
dimensions. Below, I discuss how these contextual variables will operationalised. 
Interest representation regime  
National interest representation systems refer to existing practices of interest group 
involvement in political and policy processes. I hypothesised that variation in 
institutionalisation of interest representation regimes will influence bureaucracy-
interest group interactions (H1). In this sense, and at a minimum, the analytical 
distinction between pluralism and corporatism indicates the degree to which 
venues and patterns of interest representation are formally arranged and 
institutionalised. For example, the Social and Economic Council in the Netherlands 
(Sociaal-Economische Raad, SER), is a venue where collective bargaining about 
social-economic issues is formally arranged and, as such, reflects a high degree of 
institutionalisation. Ideally, developing indicators based on this definition would 
include, for instance, an inventory of such formal institutional arrangements 
and/or consultation practices. Such an elaborate operationalisation, however, goes 
beyond the scope of this study. Instead, I rely on existing classifications of the 
pluralist-corporatist continuum as an indicator of the degree of institutionalisation 
of interest representation. Various rankings and classifications are available. 
Lijphart and Crepaz (1991), for instance, offered such a ranking on the basis of 
existing scholarly scales and rankings. More recently, the OECD (1997) and Siaroff 
(1999) offered rankings based on prior scholarly contributions, including the 
Lijphart and Crepaz ranking. The Siaroff ranking is very similar to the Lijphart and 
Crepaz ranking and represents the consensus among scholars on a country’s 
position on the pluralist-corporatist scale. I therefore opted for this classification as 
an indicator of the degree of institutionalisation of interest representation systems, 
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under the assumption that such systems have fairly consistent patterns of interest 
intermediation across policy areas.5  
Table 5.1 shows the Siaroff ranking. The table indicates where countries are 
positioned along a pluralist-corporatist continuum; their standard deviation from 
the Siaroff ranking; the number of contributions classifying the respective 
countries; and finally, the Lijphart and Crepaz ranking.  
Table 5.1 Ranking of countries on a pluralist-corporatist continuum 
Standard
DeviationII
Austria 5.000 0.000 23 1.600
Norway 4.864 0.351 22 1.531
Sweden 4.674 0.556 23 1.396
Netherlands 4.000 0.989 23 1.006
Denmark 3.545 0.999 22 0.518
Germany (West) 3.543 0.940 23 0.480
Finland 3.295 1.043 22 0.427
Belgium 2.841 0.793 22 0.258
Ireland 2.000 1.015 18 - 0.528
New Zealand 1.955 0.907 11 - 1.106
Australia 1.688 0.873 16 - 1.025
UK 1.652 0.818 23 - 0.862
Italy 1.477 0.748 22 - 0.851
Canada 1.150 0.489 20 - 1.335
USA 1.150 0.489 20 - 1.341
Nations considered to be not at all corporatist, but rather pluralist
Nations considered to be strongly corporatist
Nations considered to be moderately to strongly corporatist
Nations considered to be moderately corporatist
Nations considered to be weakly or only somewhat corporatist
MeanI (N)III Lijphart/Crepaz 
ScoreIV
 
Source: Siaroff 1999, 184 
Note: I = Siaroff’s scale, based on scholars' assessments; 5 = country classified as strongly corporatist; 1 
= classified as pluralist. II = standard deviation: variation in scholarly consensus. III = number of 
scholarly contributions the scale in column (I) is based on. IV = Lijphart & Crepaz ranking: 2 = 
strongly corporatist; -1.5 = pluralist (Lijphart and Crepaz 1991, 239-240). 
Although different in scale, both the Siaroff and Lijphart and Crepaz rankings are 
relatively consistent in their assessment of the level of corporatism, as we can see 
in the table above. The countries classified in the Siaroff ranking as only weakly or 
somewhat corporatist (Australia, the UK, and Italy, for instance) are in the Lijphart 
and Crepaz ranking designated as relatively pluralist (compare the second column 
to the left and the final column). Interestingly, the Lijphart and Crepaz ranking 
assumes a midpoint on a continuum of corporatism-pluralism, implying that there 
could be countries that can be classified as neither corporatist nor pluralist. 
Countries that have a moderate position on the corporatist scale (Siaroff’s ranking) 
                                                        
5Most of the scholarly contributions on which Siaroff grounds his ranking concern macro-economic and/or 
social economic policy and deliberation between the state, labour unions and business associations. My 
research is, however, not exclusively aimed at labour-business-state relations. Notwithstanding the bias 
toward social-economic issues in the corporatist literature, using this ranking more generally assumes a 
similar degree of institutionalisation across the different policy areas. 
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seem to have a relatively high standard deviation. Consensus among scholars is 
thus more obvious on the countries positioned at the far ends of the continuum.  
To use this ranking as a proper indicator, I assume that each country represents 
a certain degree of institutionalisation of interest representation regimes. Evidence 
remains inconclusive, however, about whether the nature of interest representation 
regimes is subject to change.6 It is therefore best to select values of this indicator 
that represent diverging degrees of institutionalisation to capture variation of the 
countries along the continuum. For this research, the US, UK, the Netherlands and 
Sweden have been selected so as to represent such different degrees of 
institutionalisation. That is, the US represents a pluralist system (a 1.150 score on 
Siaroff’s ranking), the UK a mostly pluralist system (a score of 1.652), the 
Netherlands a mostly corporatist system (a score of 4.000) and Sweden a fully 
corporatist system (a score of 4.674). These 4 countries represent different degrees 
of institutionalisation of interest representation regimes and two of them (UK and 
NLD) will be included as such in the empirical analyses.  
Political-administrative relations 
The concept of political-administrative relations is operationalised in this study as 
the work division between bureaucrats and interest groups. Work division refers to 
the extent to which the activities of civil servants and elected officials are 
intertwined or are purely separate. This is reflected in varying degrees of political-
strategic insight (see hypothesis 2). There are very few solid typologies 
unequivocally classifying these interactions (Pollit and Bouckaert 2004). Many 
authors also indicate that most state bureaucracies are to some extent politicised 
and engage in political-strategic advice (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981; 
Bekke and Meer van der 2000, 281-282; Peters and Pierre 2004). The lack of clear 
typologies renders it difficult to infer solid classifications and systematic 
differences based on the literature. In addition, a phenomenon that seems to be 
characteristic of civil service systems in many countries is that the top echelons of 
the civil service are relatively politicised. I therefore rely on a direct measurement 
of the degree of political-strategic insight involved in a senior civil servant’s job (see 
item 17, appendix I). The coding of the answers provided by the respondents is 
used to measure the degree of political-strategic insight in the analyses. This is, in 
turn, is used as indicator for the degree of politicisation of a bureaucrat’s job.7 
                                                        
6 Despite the consensus about the positioning of individual countries on the continuum, the scholarly 
literature about the changing nature of formerly corporatist states remains inconclusive. General conclusions 
about the current state of interest representation in the Netherlands, for instance, fail to pinpoint the nature 
of changes to the overall pattern of interest representation (Akkerman 2005; Huitema 2005). There is some 
evidence for a trend towards lobbyism (Torenvlied 2005), but this is atypical for the Netherlands, which is 
usually depicted as extremely to fairly corporatist (Siaroff 1999). Such developments have been observed for 
Scandinavian countries as well (Blom-Hansen 2001; Lindvall and Sebring 2005; Rommetvedt 2005). When 
applying the analysis of corporatism to the meso-level, conclusions about a decline or continuation of 
corporatism remain inconclusive and controversial (Blom-Hansen 2001). It could well be, for instance, that 
“the decline of corporatism usually means that the efficacy and frequency of the use of corporatist structures 
have decreased not that these structures themselves have disappeared or are being dismantled” (Lijphart 
1999, 173). And, contrary to those who signal a decline of corporatism, still others argue that corporatist 
tendencies in small European states are reinforced by the process of Europeanisation (Katzenstein 2003). 
7 Questions 23 and 24 of the unabbreviated Dutch questionnaire explicitly asked respondents to indicate how 
important different tasks were for their job by requiring them to indicate percentages of their working time 
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Functional differences between public agencies 
Government agencies are characterised by vast differences in function, formal 
organisational structures and cultural aspects. A broad classification will certainly 
do no justice to this complexity. Yet, a general distinction between policy advice and 
policy implementation, including regulation and monitoring, is relevant for this 
study, as this distinction appears in the three sets of theoretical explanations of 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions. And these three strands of literature 
implicitly focus on one or two of these functional types of agencies. The literature 
on bureaucratic politics, for instance, is often focused on advisory agencies, while 
the literature on capture is often concerned with monitoring and regulation. So, 
instead of relying on a detailed analysis of agency differences, I use Dunleavy’s 
(1991) classification to construct a typology of agencies that are relevant to the 
distinction of policy advice and policy implementation (see also chapter 3). The 
selection of agency types is listed in table 5.2.  
Table 5.2 Classification of functional tasks of public agencies 
Type of agency General task description 
Advisory agency Agencies that provide policy advice to their ministers and are involved in decision-
making. They are usually located in central departments.
Monitoring agency Agencies concerned with regulating, supervising and controlling constituents, can be 
located at central departments, but also outside central departments.
Service delivery agency Agencies concerned with translating policy plans into specific projects and actions, 
and/or providing services to clients; are usually located outside central departments.  
The table lists the definitions of three types of agencies that have been defined 
using Dunleavy’s classification. They reflect the broad distinction between policy 
advice, monitoring and regulation, and service delivery. Examples of these three 
types of agencies include the Dutch centres for work and income (Centra voor Werk 
en Inkomen) in the case of service delivery, and the Dutch food and consumer 
product safety authority (de Voedsel en Warenautoriteit) in the case of monitoring 
agencies. As for the policy advice agencies, they are usually located in an agency’s 
central department and reflect those parts within central departments that are 
involved in policy development. This three-fold classification will thus be used as 
an indicator for the functional distinction between public agencies, which is 
hypothesised to influence the importance of resources (H4). Item 1 of the 
questionnaire (see appendix I) served as a measurement for these differences by 
asking respondents to classify the agency they work for.  
Policy area 
Policy-related variables have been hypothesised to influence bureaucracy-interest 
group interactions, albeit at a more abstract level (complexity (H5), salience (H6), 
and political sensitivity (H7)). Measures of issue complexity, salience and political 
sensitivity have not been included in the analyses for practical reasons. Yet, to 
                                                                                                                                             
spent at specific tasks. These items offered a more detailed measurement of political-administrative relations. 
Unfortunately, they were only included in the first round of the survey for the Dutch civil service. Due to a 
very low initial response rate, I decided to shorten the questionnaire to obtain a higher response rate, and I 
removed these items. For this reason, I used one element, ‘political-strategic insight’ from question 17 of the 
UK SCS and its equivalent in the abridged Dutch civil service questionnaires, asking respondents to value the 
importance of each of the listed tasks on a 5-point Likert scale. 
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gauge an initial sense of the relevance of policy-related factors in bureaucracy-
interest group interactions, I used an issue-topic coding scheme. Although issue 
coding only provides a distinction between substantive differences, it could indicate 
whether substantive differences matter for resource exchanges between 
bureaucrats and interest groups. To measure these substantive differences, the 
questionnaire contained an item asking respondents to choose a policy area with 
which they were mostly involved (see appendix II).  
Europeanisation 
Although measuring the impact of Europeanisation on national bureaucracy-
interest group interactions was not the central aim of this study, a proper model of 
such interactions in EU member states cannot exclude it. Therefore, I chose to 
include a general indicator of the influence of Europeanisation; that is, the time 
bureaucrats spent in EU-related activities. Such a composite measurement 
obviously fails to do justice to a multidimensional variable such as 
Europeanisation. Yet, it provides a first indication of its influence on national 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions. Item 21 of the questionnaire has been 
used to measure the time bureaucrats spend in EU-related activities. This item 
required respondents to note, in percentages, the time they spend at specific EU-
related activities per week. These activities were listed in the previous question 
(item 20) and included, for instance, preparation of national input for EU-level 
meetings; participation in meetings organised by the European commission; 
transposition of EU directives; and involving national interest groups in EU-related 
decision making and policy making (see items 20 and 21, appendix I). So, while a 
percentage of working time is a relatively crude indicator to measure EU 
involvement, it does refer to some specific EU-related activities. The indicator of 
time per week (in percentages) has been included as an independent variable in the 
analyses to measure the impact of Europeanisation on the degree of dependence. 
Section 6.5 will discuss various aspects of Europeanisation related to bureaucracy-
interest group interactions in greater detail. Table 5.3 summarises the contextual 
variables, resource concentration, and resource importance discussed above. 
The left column of table 5.3 lists the contextual variables as well as the resource 
concentration and resource importance variables. In the column entitled ‘Coding,’ 
the different answer categories are listed, except for the variables interest 
representation regime, political-strategic insight and outside resource 
concentration. In the case of interest representation regime, the categories 
represent the countries in which the survey was conducted. As was discussed in 
chapter 4, the Sweden and US surveys are excluded from the analysis mainly due 
to the large differences in response rate.  
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Table 5.3 Operationalisation of (in)dependent variables 
Variable Coding Mean SD Min Max Missing
NLD (1)
UK (0)
Ministry (1)
Executive agency (2)
Other (3)I
Very relevant (3)
Somewhat relevant (2)
Not relevant (1)II
Degree of dependence None (0)
1-5 org (1)
6-10 org (2)
11-15 org (3)
More than 15 org (4)
Influence EU Self-coding open question III 9.46 14.84 0 100 354
Inside resource concentration None (0/1) 1.84/2.35 1.49/1.86 0 5 218
1-5 org (1/2)
6-10 org (2/3)
11-15 org (3/4)
More than 15 org (4/5)
I don’t know (5/0)IV
Outside resource concentration
Number of other types of 
organisations with which civil 
servants interact (item 12)
0 = not important Expertise: 0.66 0.47
1 = important Implementation: 0.67 0.47
Legitimacy: 0.48 0.50
Intermediation: 0.41 0.49
Number of interest groups with 
which civil servants interact 
(item 3)
Importance of resources 0 1
Familiarity with other interest 
groups than those civil 
servants already interacted 
with (item 5)
159
Recoding, based on midpoint 
ordinal response categories
20.22 14.49 0 106 256
3 320
552.58 1.40 0 4
Political-strategic insight 2.65 0.56 1
0.57 1
0.50 0Interest representation regime 0.51
Agency type 1.83
1 0
3 7
 
Note: I = Inspectorates and project organisations are both coded as executive agencies; II = The initial 
categories are recoded to the 3 categories reported in the table; III = Time in percentages per week; IV 
= Two different codings, based on varying interpretation of ‘hier heb ik geen zicht op’ and ‘I don’t 
know’ (see footnote 4). Political-strategic insight has been included as a continuous variable rather than 
ordinal, which is often done in statistical analyses (de Vaus 2002, Tabachnik and Fidell 2007). 
The response categories of political-strategic insight were recoded because the 
original distribution of answers resulted in a non-discriminating variable (de Vaus 
2002, 52-53). Finally, outside resource concentration was recoded so as to represent 
a total number of other types of organisations. A midpoint was set for each of the 
original ordinal answer categories. By adding up these midpoints, a total number of 
organisations with which civil servants interact could be derived. Intuitively, 106 
organisations is a large number of organisations to interact with. Yet, civil servants 
directly involved in, for instance, granting subsidies or organising consultation 
meetings, may interact with a relatively large number of organisations. So, these 
results reflect an indication of the number of other types of organisations with 
which civil servants interact rather than an absolute number of organisations (see 
also section 5.4.3). The final column lists the number of missing observations and 
reveals an increasing non-item response throughout the questionnaire.  
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5.2.3 Missing data 
As the relatively large numbers of missing data in the column entitled ‘Missing’ in 
table 5.3 already indicate, not every item on the questionnaire resulted in an 
absolute N of 821. Indeed, non-item response gradually increased from the first set 
of questions to the last set of questions. For each analysis, a total N of between 420 
and 520 (roughly) could be used after listwise deletion of all cases missing a value 
for one of the variables. Running a missing-value analysis showed that Little’s 
MCAR test was significant, indicating a non-random pattern of missing data 
(Nurosis 2007; Tabachnik and Fidell 2007). The EU variable appeared to be 
problematic, and I initially opted to run the analyses both with and without the EU 
variable to get an indication of its effects. Listwise deletion, however, may result in 
biased effects of the model (King et al. 2001). So, I used the program Amelia (see 
Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2007)8 to impute the missing data. The program 
Amelia deploys multiple imputation to fill in missing data, generates by default five 
different imputed datasets, and offers several diagnostics to check the fit of the 
imputation model and the imputed data. These diagnostics indicate whether the 
imputed data is not too distant from the originally observed values, the extent to 
which the program is able to predict the true value of the data, and whether the 
imputations are consistent and are not dependent on the value from which the 
process started (Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2007, 16; see appendix II).  
Overall, the imputation model generates a good fit. Interpretation of the final 
results will be based on analyses that are conducted with the original and imputed 
(complete) datasets. The results for the complete dataset are actually the average 
coefficients and average standard errors based on 3 out of 5 imputed datasets.9 The 
average standard errors do not yet reflect the variance across the standard errors 
based on the three datasets, nor do they reflect the total variance of the average 
regression coefficients.10 Nonetheless, these average standard errors serve as a 
sufficient though somewhat crude indication for comparison among the models 
based on the original and imputed datasets. Finally, the significance of the 
coefficients varied slightly across the different imputed datasets. The p-levels 
reported for the analyses based on the complete dataset reflect the lowest 
significance level found. For instance, when there are two results significant at p ≤ 
0.01 and one that is significant at p ≤ 0.05, the latter value is chosen as a 
representative of the significance levels across the imputed datasets. Comparing 
results from the original and complete datasets will provide an estimate of the 
potential bias in the original data and allow for a better examination of the model. 
If the results of the two datasets vary to a great extent, at a minimum there will be 
                                                        
8 The program was developed at Harvard University ( see: http://gking.harvard.edu/amelia/) 
9 The SPSS package used in this study does not include a feature to analyse multiple imputed datasets as if 
they were one dataset. Therefore, each analysis had to be rerun for each imputed dataset, after which the 
average regression coefficients had to be computed. Using three rather than five datasets saved some time, 
but should give a fair estimate of the average based on five imputed datasets. 
10 To measure an appropriate standard error for the average regression coefficients, the variance between the 
coefficients of the individual datasets should be computed in addition to the average regression coefficient 
and the average standard error. The average standard error and the variance across the individual coefficients 
could then be used to measure an overall standard error (See for a computation of these values: Sinharray, 
Stern and Russell 2001, 324).  
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reason for concern about potential bias affecting the results and thus the 
interpretation of the explanatory value of the model. Roughly similar results from 
both datasets would imply, however, that the results are not severely biased, and 
allow for a useful interpretation of the results to assess the model. Multiple 
imputation is thus used as a check of the analyses based on the original dataset and 
serves to assess the potential bias of the results.  
5.3 Examining degree of dependence  
The quote, “we need each other,” with which I introduced this chapter, reflects a 
certain resource exchange that may be either asymmetric or symmetric in nature. 
Recall the resource dependence model outlined in chapter 3. By measuring the 
degree of dependence between bureaucrats and interest groups, we should be able 
to explain why these two sets of actors interact and to determine the asymmetry of 
their relationships. A first step in measuring the explanatory potential of the 
resource dependence model is thus to test the impact of the individual resource 
elements on the degree of dependence. Inside and outside resource concentration, 
as well as resource importance, were hypothesised to explain the degree of 
dependence characterising bureaucracy-interest group interactions. Inside resource 
concentration is measured by the number of interest groups with which a civil 
servant is familiar in his/her area, but does not interact with. Outside resource 
concentration refers to the total number of organisations with which a civil servant 
may interact in his/her area. Resource importance, finally, is measured by the value 
that civil servants attribute to particular reasons for interacting with interest 
groups. In this case, a reason is coded as either important or unimportant. 
To assess the model’s explanatory value, I tested whether the individual 
elements result in a degree of dependence. I assumed that the number of interest 
groups with which civil servants interact reflects the degree of dependence. When 
civil servants interact with a large number of interest groups, the degree of 
dependence is likely to be less severe. Vice versa, the degree of dependence is likely 
to be higher when they interact with only a small number of interest groups.11 
I conducted an ordered logistic regression analysis to test the model, including 
the number of interest groups with which civil servants interact as the dependent 
variable and the individual resource elements as independent variables. Ordered 
logistic regression was chosen to take into account the ordinal level of analysis of 
the dependent variable.12 Two different models have been tested for two datasets: 
                                                        
11 Obviously, this is a relatively crude measure as many organisations can offer different resources, rendering 
the dependency on a single organisation very severe. For the purpose of these analyses, which is to indicate 
the explanatory value of the model, such a measurement is sufficient.  
12 Logistic regression is generally used for analysing categorical dependent variables, be they either binominal 
or multinominal. Ordered logistic regression is used in case of ordinal dependent variables and is a way of 
expressing a nonlinear relationship in a linear way (Agresti 2007; Long 1997). The main reasons for 
conducting ordered logistic regression are to retain the information of the ordered nature of the response 
categories, as well as addressing the violation of several assumptions of (multiple) regression, namely 
normality and linearity. Despite the advantage of its straightforward interpretation and its robustness to 
violation of normality (de Vaus 2002, Field 2005), and the relaxed attitude that is often adopted to treat 
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the original dataset and the dataset generated by the process of multiple imputation 
(the complete dataset). The models tested with the complete dataset are 
represented by an additional ‘MI’ (thus, model 1 and model 1 MI). Table 5.4 reports 
the results of the analyses.  
Table 5.4 Ordered logistic regression analysis of the effect of resource elements on the degree of 
dependence (number of interest groups with which civil servants interact) 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 1 MI
-0.14 -0.22
(0.28) (0.23)
-0.69** -0.70***
(0.29) (0.23)
-0.58** -0.61***
(0.26) (0.22)
-0.41 -0.68**
(0.34) (0.26)
-0.68 -0.69**
(0.48) (0.32)
0.09*** 0.08***
(0.01) (0.01)
0.74*** 0.55**
(0.20) (0.14)
0.71*** 0.78***
(0.20) (0.15)
-0.23 0.09
(0.19) (0.14)
0.59*** 0.66***
(0.20) (0.16)
Cut-points 0.79; 2.06; 2.78 -0.76; 0.73;          1.47; 1.93
Pseudo R2 (Nagelkerke) 0.36 0.36
χ2 model 208.12 (10)*** 343.20(10)***
N 517 821
Inside resource concentration IV (11-15 org)
Inside resource concentration V (> 15 org)
Outside resource concentration 
Dependent Variable: Degree of dependence
Inside resource concentration I (none)
Inside resource concentration II (1-5 org)
Inside resource concentration III (6-10 org)
Expertise
Implementation capacity
Legitimacy
Intermediation capacity
 
*** p ≤ 0.01; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; all two-tailed tests. 
Note: For inside resource concentration, the reference category is ‘I don’t know’; in Dutch: ‘hier heb ik 
geen zicht op’. In the case of model 1 MI, four cut-points were generated, whereas model 1 only 
generates 3 cut-points. The difference is a result of the 'routing'-scheme in the questionnaire on which 
the original dataset is based. Routing was applied in the survey with the answer-category 'none,' so that 
respondents automatically skipped questions related to interactions with interest groups. As a result of 
listwise deletion, answers for that category are omitted from the analysis. Model 1 MI is based on the 
datasets generated with multiple imputation, and does not incorporate missing values due to routing 
logic and non-item response. 
A first observation is that both models result in satisfactory values of the pseudo R2 
(0.36 for both models), meaning that the overall explanatory potential of the model 
is reasonably good.13 What about the individual variables? Consider the variables 
                                                                                                                                             
ordinal variables or Likert scales as if they were continuous (de Vaus 2002), I did not opt for multiple 
regression, but rather for ordered logistic regression to match the original data better. 
13 The goodness-of-fit statistics in the case of the complete datasets show significant results, indicating that 
the expected values of the model significantly differ from the observed value. The test of parallel lines in case 
of model 1 MI is significant at p = 0.1. Model I meets the assumptions of the goodness-of-fit and parallel lines 
tests: both have insignificant results. It is important to note that when various categorical variables are 
included in the model, and when there are several cells with low expected values, the goodness-of-fit statistics 
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related to resource concentration. Inside resource concentration - the number of 
interest groups with which a civil servant is familiar but does not interact - 
produces significant coefficients for some of the dummy variables. Inside resource 
concentration II (-0.69; p ≤ 0.05 in model 1, or -0.70; p ≤ 0.01 in model 1 MI) and 
inside resource concentration III (-0.58; p ≤ 0.05 in model 1, or -0.61; p ≤ 0.01 in 
model 1 MI) relate to the number of interest groups with which civil servants 
interact. That is, a relatively small number (1-5 organisations) or intermediate 
number (6-10 organisations) is likely to indicate that civil servants interact with a 
smaller number of interest groups. In the case of model 1 MI, all inside resource 
concentration variables, except inside resource concentration I, produce significant 
coefficients. Their levels of significance vary, but at a minimum they are significant 
at the p ≤ 0.05 level. So, familiarity with a smaller number of organisations than 
the reference category of ‘so many, I cannot tell’ is likely to be associated with a 
smaller number of interest groups with which civil servants interact. 
Outside resource concentration - the total number of organisations with which a 
civil servant interacts - is also related to the number of interest groups with which a 
civil servants interacts, yet to a relatively small extent (0.09, model I, or 0.08 in 
model 1 MI, p ≤ 0.01 level). An increase in the number of other types of 
organisations with which civil servants interact is likely to result in an increase in 
the number of interest groups with which civil servants interact.  
Consider the other determining element of the degree of dependence, the 
importance of resources. In this case, we see that the importance of expertise (0.74 or 
0.55 respectively), implementation capacity (0.71 or 0.78 respectively) and an 
intermediation capacity (0.59 or 0.66 respectively) are related to the number of 
interest groups with which civil servants interact (all p ≤ 0.01; but p ≤ 0.05 for 
expertise in model 1 MI). When the importance of these resource increases, the 
number of organisations with which civil servants interact is likely to increase as 
well. Apparently, civil servants engage more organisations in obtaining expertise, 
and in finding partners that can help to implement public policies and serve as 
spokespersons. Legitimacy is not related to the number of interest groups with 
which civil servants interact. Apparently, the importance of the other types of 
resources is more decisive in explaining the number of interest groups with which 
a civil servant interacts. 
What do these results suggest for the resource dependence model? The 
dependent variable of the model was the number of interest groups with which 
civil servants interact. In contrast to multiple regression, however, we cannot 
straightforwardly derive precise conclusions about the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables. In logistic regression, the coefficients say 
something about how much the log of the odds that an event occurs (the value of 
the dependent variable) will change (Nurosis 2007, 70). Interpreting coefficients is 
thus somewhat more complex than in the case of multiple regression.  
What we can cautiously derive from the model is, first, that if a civil servant is 
familiar with fewer other interest groups than the reference category ‘there are so 
many I cannot tell,’ he/she is likely to interact with fewer interest groups. 
                                                                                                                                             
for ordered logistic regression are not entirely reliable as a measure of the overall fit of the model (see 
Nurosis 2007).   
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Remember that the number of interest groups with which a civil servant interacts 
is inversely related to the degree of dependence. In terms of the resource 
dependence model, this means that a higher inside resource concentration is likely 
to contribute to a higher degree of dependence. When a civil servant interacts with 
more other types of organisations, the number of interest groups with he/she 
interacts is likely to increase. This means that a lower outside resource 
concentration results in a less severe degree of dependence. The effect of outside 
resource concentration, however, seems to be very small. In the case of the 
importance of resources, we may conclude that when a civil servant considers 
resources such as expertise, implementation capacity and intermediation capacity 
to be important, he/she is likely to interact with a larger number of interest groups. 
The importance of resources thus contributes to a degree of dependence that is less 
severe. This is perhaps a less than straightforward result. We would expect that, 
when resources are more important, such an importance would render the degree 
of dependence more severe. This result could imply that when these resources are 
important, a civil servant tends to enlarge the group of interest groups with which 
he/she interacts, thus making him/her becoming less dependent on an individual 
interest group. In sum, a higher degree of inside resource concentration results in 
a more severe degree of dependence. A lower outside resource concentration and 
increasing importance of resources result in a smaller degree of dependence. 
Interestingly, the model shows that resource importance is not the only variable 
contributing to bureaucracy-interest group interactions. The concentration of 
resources is shown to be relevant as well. This is a part of Pfeffer and Salancik’s 
theory (2003[1978]) that is not often included in recent applications of resource 
exchange theory (see, for instance, Bouwen 2002; 2004, but see Beyers and 
Kerremans 2007). They tend to focus on the relative importance of resources in 
explaining variation in access and rarely include the extent to which resources are 
available in the environment. Also, the model suggests that it is not only expertise 
that is an important trading good. A capacity to intermediate and a capacity to 
implement are also important. The latter is in line with network theories in 
implementation studies (Kjaer 2004). The first confirms earlier analysis of the 
importance of such a capacity to intermediate in immigrant integration policy 
(Poppelaars 2007), or the importance of political support more generally (Beyers 
2004). This finding indeed suggests a broader area of application. And exactly this 
broader application brings me to the next step in the analysis: assessing the 
comparative potential of the resource dependence model (step 2 in figure 5.1). 
5.4 Resource dependence in comparative perspective 
Could such a degree of dependence be less severe in the UK compared to the 
Netherlands? Or, could civil servants working for advisory agencies be more or less 
dependent on interest groups than those working for executive agencies? Each of 
the individual elements constituting the degree of dependence may independently 
vary across different circumstances. Measuring the degree of dependence in 
comparative perspective thus requires a strategy of successive analyses. I first 
examine to what extent the contextual variables explain the number of interest 
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groups with which civil servants interact. Second, I examine to what extent the 
contextual variables and resource elements jointly explain the degree of 
dependence. These analyses (steps 2 and 3, figure 5.1) will generate a first 
assessment of the impact of context. Two other steps are necessary, however, to 
precisely assess the comparative potential of the model. First, the extent to which 
the contextual variables influence each of the individual resource elements needs to 
be assessed (step 4, figure 5.1). And second, we need to know how the impact of the 
resource elements on the degree of dependence varies across different contextual 
dimensions (step 5, figure 5.1). This set of analyses should provide an overall 
assessment of the comparative potential of the resource dependence model.  
5.4.1 Does context matter?  
A first step is thus to measure whether the contextual variables by themselves 
explain the number of interest groups with which civil servants interact. 
Comparing the results of this analysis with those of the previous analysis of the 
resource dependence model will show the differences in their explanatory 
potential. An ordered logistic regression has been conducted to measure the impact 
of the contextual variables, since the dependent variable is similar to the previous 
analysis. The independent variables in the model are the type of interest 
representation regime, the difference between functional agencies, the type of 
political-administrative relations, the type(s) of policy area, and, finally, EU 
involvement.14 Recall that interest representation is measured by a coding scheme 
based on the Siaroff ranking of the degree of corporatism; political-administrative 
relations are measured by the degree of political-strategic insight; the functional 
difference between agencies is measured by coding according to a functional 
classification of agencies; policy area is measured by issue coding used by agenda-
setting scholars; and, finally, EU involvement is measured by the percentage of 
working time spent in EU-related activities (see also table 5.1). Similar to the 
previous analysis, the models have been tested with the original dataset (model 1) 
and with the complete or imputed datasets (model 1 MI). Table 5.5 shows the 
results of these analyses.  
Compared to the resource dependence model, these models all have much 
lower pseudo R2 (0.16 and 0.12 respectively), implying that the overall explanatory 
value of the contextual model on its own is smaller than that of the degree of 
dependence model. Nevertheless, most of the contextual variables seem to be 
statistically significant and are associated with the number of interest groups with 
which civil servants interact.  
                                                        
14 A drawback of including all contextual factors simultaneously is that potential interaction effects between 
the contextual factors remain obscure. These analyses do not measure how and to what extent a particular 
contextual variable may have an impact on another contextual factor’s impact on the dependent variable. To 
examine such effects we have to both theorise and measure such interaction effects. This goes beyond the 
purpose of this study as the main aim of the statistical analyses is to examine whether context matters for the 
degree of dependence that characterises bureaucracy-interest group interactions. Exploring and measuring 
how contextual factors relate to each other thus remains a subject for future studies.  
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Table 5.5 Ordered logistic regression analysis of the effect of contextual variables on the degree of 
dependence (number of interest groups with which civil servants interact) 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 1 MI
-1.11*** -1.01***
(0.19) (0.24)
0.64*** 0.55***
(0.16) (0.28)
0.01** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01)
1.01** 0.34
(0.43) (0.31)
0.72 0.29
(0.44) (0.33)
-1.08*** -0.84***
(0.41) (0.05)
-0.82** -0.54**
(0.36) (0.001)
0.15 -0.23
(0.48) (0.32)
-0.56 -0.37
(0.42) (0.14)
-0.45 -0.22
(0.57) (0.26)
-0.94** -0.66**
(0.37) (0.04)
-0.16 0.06
(0.42) (0.25)
-0.69* -0.49
(0.41) (0.07)
-0.38 -0.07
(0.37) (0.16)
-0.18 -0.21
(0.60) (0.24)
Cut-points -1.37; 0.36;          1.31; 1.81
-1.01; 0.11;          
0.95; 1.44
Pseudo R2 (Nagelkerke) 0.16 0.12
χ2 model 75.22 (15)*** 99.39 (15)***
N 458 821
Public health policy
Education, science, culture policy
Transport and water management policy
Public housing policy
Employment, social affairs
Internal affairs
Immigration, integration policy
Public safety policy
Advisory agency
Executive agency
International affairs
Macro economic affairs
Dependent Variable: Degree of dependence
Interest representation regime
Political-strategic insight
EU Involvement
 
*** p ≤ 0.01; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; all two-tailed tests 
First, interest representation regime is in both models a highly significant variable (-
1.11 or -1.01 respectively; p ≤ 0.01). When the interest representation regime 
becomes more corporatist, civil servants are likely to interact with fewer interest 
groups. This finding is in line with the traditional literature on corporatism and 
pluralism. That is, in (neo-)corporatist countries, the number of organisations that 
interact with decision makers is likely to be smaller due to the hierarchical 
organisation of such interest representation regimes (Schmitter 1985; 1989). Peak 
organisations represent many member organisations in their interactions with the 
government. So, the number of organisations that interact with the government is 
smaller than the actual number of interest groups in the environment as a result of 
the organising principles of corporatist systems.  
What about political-administrative relations and the differences in agency type? 
An increase of political-strategic insight is likely to be associated with an increase in 
the number of interest groups (0.64 and 0.55 respectively; p ≤ 0.01). Apparently, 
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civil servants involved in considerable political-strategic decision making tend to 
interact with somewhat more organisations than those civil servants who are to a 
less extent involved in such political-strategic decision making. The difference in 
type of agency is a significant variable only in the original dataset (model 1). Advisory 
agency is related to the number of interest groups (1.01, p ≤ 0.05). According to 
model 1, civil servants in advisory agencies are likely to interact with more interest 
groups compared to the reference category of other types of organisations.  
EU involvement also has a significant impact on the number of interest groups 
with which civil servants interact, although a very small one. Its coefficient is barely 
discernible from zero (0.01; p ≤ 0.05 and 0.02; p ≤ 0.01 respectively). An increase 
in EU-involvement is likely to relate to an increase in the number of interest groups 
with which civil servants interact. Yet, the impact of EU involvement is almost zero. 
Finally, consider policy area. We cannot draw any conclusions about a direction 
of influence, as the coding only reflects a substantive difference. Yet, such 
substantive differences in policy area apparently matter. The areas of international 
affairs (-1.08 or -0.84 respectively; p ≤ 0.01), macro-economics (-0.82 or -0.54 
respectively; p ≤ 0.05), and public safety (-0.94 or -0.66 respectively; p ≤ 0.05), and, 
for model 1, education policy (-0.69, p ≤ 0.1) are associated with a smaller number 
of interest groups with which civil servants interact, as opposed to environmental 
policy (the reference category). The macro-economics field is among those policy 
areas that result in a smaller number of interest groups with which civil servants 
interact. What is interesting is that such variation across policy areas may explain 
why authors provide different analyses of, for instance, the nature of Dutch interest 
representation (Akkerman 2005; Huitema 2005; Torenvlied 2005). Their 
conclusions about the level of corporatism characterising the Dutch interest 
representation system varies across the different areas they studied (see also Blom-
Hansen 2001 for similar variation in Denmark). The sheer numbers of interest 
groups with which civil servants interact, shown to be different across various 
policy areas in the analysis above, could also indicate varying levels of corporatism.  
So, what can we derive in general terms from this comparative model? As 
discussed earlier, we cannot derive conclusions about the effect of independent 
variables on the dependent variables as straightforwardly as would be possible with 
multiple regression analysis. With some care, however, we can derive some likely 
conclusions. If you are a civil servant in the UK, for instance, you are likely to 
interact with more interest groups than your colleague in the Netherlands. Or, if 
you are working for a policy advisory agency, you are likely to interact with more 
interest groups than your colleagues at executive and other agencies. And, if you 
are involved in international affairs, public safety or macro-economics, it is likely 
that you interact with fewer interest groups than your colleagues involved in 
environmental policy.  
All in all, the model shows that the contextual variables have a small yet 
significant effect on the number of interest groups with which civil servants 
interact. In the case of the complete, imputed dataset (model 1 MI), not all 
assumptions of ordered logistic regression are met. That is, the goodness-of-fit 
statistics produce significant results. This could be the result of including a 
relatively large number of categorical variables. This can result in many cells 
having small expected values, rendering the statistics unreliable. Goodness-of-fit 
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statistics should only be used to assess the fit of a model that has reasonably large 
expected values in each cell (see Nurosis 2007, 77-78). As for the test of parallel 
lines, both models result in a significant test of parallel lines, depending on the 
significance level (p = 0.04 or p = 0.03 respectively). Yet, when the policy variable is 
excluded from the analysis, both models meet the assumptions.15 We might thus 
assume that the contextual variables have a small yet significant effect on the 
number of interest groups with which civil servants tend to interact.16  
In terms of the degree of dependence, we can infer that it is higher in 
corporatist regimes, is smaller when the importance of political-strategic insight 
decreases, and, according to model 1, is smaller for advisory agencies. The degree 
of dependence is smaller for civil servants involved in international affairs, macro-
economics, public safety, and according to model 1, education, than for those 
involved in environmental policy.  
5.4.2 Does context explain more? 
Context by itself does matter to a certain degree. The question is whether adding 
context to the resource elements may explain more of the variance in the number 
of interest groups with which civil servants interact than either the contextual 
model (table 5.5) or the core dependence model (table 5.4) can on its own. A logistic 
ordered regression was conducted to measure this effect. The number of interest 
groups with which civil servants interact was included as the dependent variable, 
and both the resource and context variables were included as the independent 
variables. Table 5.6 reports the results of two models based on the original dataset 
(model 1) and the complete dataset (model 1 MI).  
When we combine resource and context variables, they offer a satisfying 
explanation for the variance in the number of interest groups with which civil 
servants interact (a pseudo R2 of 0.44 and 0.42 respectively). This basically implies 
that, when put together, these models do not explain much more than the resource 
dependence model does on its own. In the case of the resource variables, the same 
variables as in the core resource dependence model significantly contribute to the 
dependent variable. So, outside resource concentration (the number of other types 
of organisations a civil servant interacts with) again significantly contributes to the 
model. Inside resource concentration (the number of other interest groups civil 
servants are familiar with) produces for some of its dummy variables significant 
results similar to those in the model reported in table 5.4. In model 1, only inside 
resource concentration II and III significantly contribute to the model, while in 
model 1 MI, inside resource concentration II, III, IV and V significantly contribute 
to the model. Expertise, implementation capacity, and intermediation capacity 
produce significant coefficients in both models. Again, legitimacy is not related to 
the number of interest groups with which civil servants interact.  
                                                        
15 Based on the original dataset, the pseudo R2 is 0.13 when policy area is excluded, and interest 
representation regime (-0.95; p ≤ 0.01); political-strategic insight (0.60, p ≤ 0.01), advisory agency (0.86, p ≤ 
0.05) and EU involvement (0.01, p ≤ 0.1) are all related to the number of interest groups. This is roughly 
similar to model 1 in table 5.6. Goodness-of-fit statistics and test of parallel lines are now both insignificant.  
16 Since the assumptions for ordered logistic regression were barely met, I conducted a multinominal logistic 
regression analysis. This produced relatively similar coefficients and the same problems with the goodness-
of-fit statistics. Yet, for ease of interpretation, I report the results of the ordered logistic regression analysis.  
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Table 5.6 Ordered logistic regression analysis of the effect of context and resources on the degree of 
dependence (number of interest groups with which civil servants interact) 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 1 MI
0.11*** 0.08***
(0.01) (0.01)
-0.42 -0.29
(0.33) (0.24)
-0.66* -0.74***
(0.34) (0.29)
-0.59** -0.69***
(0.30) (0.22)
-0.54 -0.76**
(0.40) (0.29)
-0.79 -0.77**
(0.54) (0.33)
0.46** 0.40**
(0.23) (0.15)
0.71*** 0.70***
(0.23) (0.15)
0.06 0.25
(0.24) (0.16)
0.47** 0.56***
(0.23) (0.17)
-1.07*** -1.00***
(0.25) (0.15)
0.34* 0.32**
(0.20) (0.13)
0.01 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01)
1.53*** 0.56
(0.56) (0.34)
1.43** 0.58
(0.58) (0.35)
-0.13 0.02
(0.48) (0.32)
-0.21 0.01
(0.42) (0.29)
0.73 0.31
(0.56) (0.38)
-0.32 0.06
(0.51) (0.34)
-0.73 -0.06
(0.65) (0.44)
-0.23 0.02
(0.43) (0.29)
-0.46 0.11
(0.48) (0.33)
-0.85* -0.36
(0.48) (0.33)
-0.43 0.03
(0.43) (0.30)
-0.34 -0.41
(0.70) (0.46)
Cut-points 2.28; 3.73; 4.47 0.19; 1.56;           2.35; 3.80
Pseudo R2 (Nagelkerke) 0.44 0.42
χ2 model 219(25)*** 413.60(25)***
N 421 821
Transport and water management policy
Public housing policy
Immigration, integration policy
Public safety policy
Public health policy
Education, science, culture policy
International affairs
Macro economic affairs
Employment, social affairs
Internal affairs
Political-strategic insight
EU Involvement
Advisory agency
Executive agency
Implementation capacity
Legitimacy
Intermediation capacity
Interest representation regime
Inside resource concentration III (6-10 org)
Inside resource concentration IV (11-15 org)
Inside resource concentration V (> 15 org)
Expertise
Dependent Variable: Degree of dependence
Outside resource concentration
Inside resource concentration I (none)
Inside resource concentration II (1-5 org)
 
*** p ≤ 0.01; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; Note: For inside resource concentration, the reference category is 
‘I don’t know;’ (‘hier heb ik geen zicht op’); for policy area, the reference category is environmental 
policy, and for agency type, the reference category is other types of agencies; all two-tailed tests. 
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As for the contextual variables, interest representation regime produces significant 
coefficients (-1.07 and -1.00; p ≤ 0.01 respectively). Political-strategic insight 
produces significant variables as well, although the significance levels vary across 
the models (0.34; p ≤ 0.1, and 0.32; p ≤ 0.05 respectively). In model 1 MI, EU 
involvement significantly contributes to the number of interest groups civil 
servants interact with, although its effect is almost zero. In model I, both advisory 
(1.53, p ≤ 0.01) and executive agencies (1.43, p ≤ 0.05) are associated with the 
number of interest groups with which civil servants interact. In model I, the issue 
area of education (-0.85, p ≤ 0.1) also significantly contributes to the number of 
interest groups with which civil servants interact. 
The analysis including both context and resource elements produces similar 
results to the core resource dependence model. That is, the same independent 
variables are related to the dependent variable as in the model solely examining the 
resource elements. As for the contextual variables, the effects are also largely 
similar to the analysis that solely examines context.17 In both models, interest 
representation regime and political-strategic insights are associated with the 
number of interest groups, but there are a few differences regarding policy area, 
agency type and EU involvement. All in all, these two models confirm that not only 
the individual resource elements but also the contextual variables influence the 
number of interest groups with which civil servants interact. They also show that 
the additional explanatory value of the contextual variables is relatively small, 
although significant. A next step, then, is to examine whether the individual 
resource elements significantly vary under different political-administrative 
circumstances to better assess the models’ comparative explanatory potential.  
5.4.3 What is the impact of context on the resource elements? 
Is expertise more important for civil servants working at advisory agencies or for 
those working at executive agencies? And, could resource concentration be more 
severe for civil servants in the Netherlands compared to those in the UK? The 
answers to these questions are important, because knowing if and to what extent 
the contextual variables influence each individual element of the degree of 
dependence will reveal how the resource dependence model needs to be adapted in 
order to become truly comparative in nature. This section will measure each of the 
individual resource elements by conducting several regression analyses in which 
each resource element is included as the dependent variable.  
Outside resource concentration 
To measure outside resource concentration, item 12 asked the respondents to 
indicate how many of the different types of organisations they interact with. They 
were asked, for instance, to choose the number of advisory councils or research 
institutes (from set answer categories) with which they usually interact. This 
procedure resulted in several dependent variables. That is, for each type of 
                                                        
17 However, the model has difficulties in meeting the assumptions of the test of parallel lines, which is 
significant, as well as the goodness-of-fit statistics. These difficulties could be caused by including a relatively 
high number of categorical variables. Multinominal logistic regression analysis resulted in similar results, yet 
for ease of interpretation the results of the ordered logistic regression analysis have been reported.  
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organisation, a certain distribution of ordinal answer categories was available. For 
ease of interpretation, I decided to collapse these response categories into one 
overall measure of outside resource concentration. The resulting variable would 
thus represent the total number of other types of organisations with which civil 
servants interact. To obtain this variable, a midpoint was chosen for each answer 
category; for instance, 3 for the category 1-5, 8 for the category 6-10, and so on. The 
total sum of these midpoints resulted in an overall number of other organisations 
with which respondents interacted. This method has two obvious drawbacks. First, 
by adding up midpoints for each category of organisations, important information 
regarding the various individual types of organisations is lost. Second, the overall 
absolute number resulting from the recoding should be interpreted with care. As 
the overall number is the result of adding up midpoints, it does not indicate the 
absolute number of organisations the respondent in question interacted with. 
Further, adding up these numbers in some cases resulted in an unlikely high 
number of organisations with which civil servants interact. To illustrate, figures 5.2 
show the distribution of this recoded variable.  
The distribution of various types of organisations with which civil servants 
interact (in absolute numbers; UK + NLD)
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Figure 5.2 The distribution of other types of organisations with which civil servants interact 
The distribution shows that, generally, most civil servants interact with 20 or fewer 
other types of organisations. Given the relatively large numbers of organisations 
with which civil servants seem to interact, this recoded variable should not be 
interpreted as a measure of the absolute number of organisations with which civil 
servants interact. Rather, it is a general indicator of the number of organisations 
with which respondents are likely to interact. So, conclusions about outside 
resource concentration can only be made in relative terms.  
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What these distributions also show is that the observations do not follow a 
normal distribution. The deviation from a normal distribution was significant 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were significant, even after several transformations of 
the data). So, I initially opted for ordered logistic regression, since the distribution 
of outside resource concentration was not normal. For that, I had to divide the 
overall number into ordinal categories again. Tests of parallel lines turned out to be 
significant. But given the many recodings and transformations of the original data, 
this seemed a logical outcome. Therefore, I opted for a linear multiple regression. 
In doing so, I accepted the violation of the normality assumptions and the need to 
take this into account in interpreting the results.  
Table 5.7 reports the results of this analysis. The number of other types of 
organisations with which civil servants interacted is included as the dependent 
variable. Interest representation regime, political-strategic insight, functional 
agency differences, differences between policy areas and EU involvement are 
included as independent variables. Model 1 is based on the original dataset, 
whereas model 1 MI is based on multiple imputation of the data.  
A first important conclusion is that the combined impact of the set of contextual 
variables is very small, given the small values of the adjusted R2 (0.06 and 0.08 
respectively). Checking the assumptions of the regression model for both the 
original dataset and imputed datasets indicates a fairly good fit. Checking the VIF 
and tolerance value did not indicate a concern for multicollinearity. Case-wise 
diagnostics showed that 4-5 percent of the cases had standardised residuals equal to 
or above 2, and 1.46-1.8 percent of the cases had standardised residuals above 3, 
indicating a fairly accurate model. So, apart from the violation of the normality 
assumption, which is relaxed by some authors (de Vaus 2002), the model seems to 
fit well. This implies that the effect of contextual variables on the number of other 
types of organisations with which civil servants interact is very small.  
Agency type, political-strategic insight, and EU involvement apparently do not 
matter for the total number of other organisations with which civil servants 
interact. In the case of interest representation regime, model 1 MI produces a 
significant coefficient (-1.59, p ≤ 0.1). This implies that civil servants in corporatist 
regimes are likely to interact with fewer other types of organisations. In the case of 
policy area, we observe a few interesting and significant differences. The reference 
category is the policy area of macro-economics. In the case of international affairs, 
both models indicate a smaller number of organisations. For public safety, only 
model I indicates a smaller number of other types of organisations. Educational 
policy, health care, public housing and environmental policies are related to a 
higher number of other types of organisations in both models. Model 1 MI 
generated a positive coefficient for employment and transport issues as well. 
Apparently, other types of organisations are less important in macro-economics 
than in other policy areas.  
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Table 5.7 Multiple regression analysis of the effect of contextual variables on outside resource 
concentration (the number of other types of organisations civil servants are familiar with) 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 1 MI
-0.90 -1.59*
(1.36) (1.01)
1.92 2.25
(1.19) (0.90)
0.04 0.05
(0.05) (0.04)
-2.03 -2.77
(3.04) (2.35)
-3.60 -1.99
(3.19) (2.33)
-5.51** -4.59*
(2.79) (2.03)
1.46 5.66*
(3.04) (3.09)
4.10 2.32
(2.88) (2.17)
0.97 3.61
(4.07) (2.90)
-4.12* -2.66
(2.43) (1.82)
4.91* 5.86**
2.74) (2.11)
6.08** 6.30***
(2.70) (2.02)
3.29 5.63**
(2.42) (2.20)
10.04** 10.14***
(4.08) (3.00)
4.72* 7.10***
(2.60) (2.03)
16.29*** 13.76***
(4.66) (3.55)
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.08
N 460 821
Constant
Education policy
Transport policy
Public housing policy
Environmental policy
Internal affairs
Immigration, integration policy
Public safety policy
Public health policy
Advisory agency
Executive agency
International affairs
Employment, social affairs
Dependent Variable: Outside resource concentration 
Interest representation regime
Political-strategic insight
EU involvement
 
*** p ≤ 0.01; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10 The reference code for agency type is ‘other types of agencies,’ and 
for policy area the reference category is ‘macro-economics’. Interest representation regime and 
political-strategic insight: one-tailed test; all other independent variables: two-tailed tests. 
So, outside resource concentration is to a very small extent influenced by contextual 
factors. In corporatist regimes, outside resource concentration is higher and it 
varies across different policy areas. The number of other organisations with which 
civil servants tend to interact is usually larger in other policy areas than in macro-
economics. This implies that the outside resource concentration for civil servants 
working in those other areas is less severe than for those working in macro-
economics. This may be an interesting result for studies on corporatism. They 
usually focus on bargaining mechanisms and include labour unions and business 
organisations (Visser and Hemerijck 1997; Visser and Wilts; Becker 2001; 2005), 
but often ignore the relevance of other types of organisations. The dependence of 
civil servants on social partners in macro-economic and social economic issues is 
likely to be more severe than for civil servants in other areas. This, in turn, could 
explain variation in the levels of corporatism scholars use to characterise the Dutch 
interest representation system.  
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Inside resource concentration  
We have seen that outside resource concentration varies to a small extent across 
different political-administrative dimensions. The question is whether this is also 
true for inside resource concentration. Item 10 of the questionnaire (see appendix 
I) is used to measure this type of resource concentration. Logistic regression rather 
than multiple regression is applied to examine the effect of contextual variables on 
inside resource concentration.18 The number of interest groups with which civil 
servants are familiar is included as the dependent variable. Interest representation 
regime, political-strategic insight, functional differences between agencies, 
differences between policy areas and EU involvement are included as independent 
variables. Table 5.8 reports the results of this analysis. Model 1 is based on the 
original dataset; model 1 MI is based on the complete dataset.  
The overall explanatory value of the model for inside resource concentration is 
even smaller than that of the model explaining outside resource concentration 
(presenting pseudo R2 values of 0.06 and 0.03 respectively). In fact, the overall 
result is hardly discernible from zero. Both models do not meet the assumption of 
parallel lines. Strictly speaking, another model should have been applied to better 
fit the data; for instance, multinominal regression analysis that does not require the 
assumption of parallel effects. But for ease of interpretation, especially with several 
categorical independent variables, I opted for ordered logistic regression.  
So, what can we conclude from these analyses? Interest representation regime and 
several of the policy variables produce significant coefficients. In more corporatist 
interest representation regimes, the number of interest groups with which civil 
servants are familiar is somewhat higher. The policy areas of internal affairs, public 
safety and transport and water management produce significant different 
coefficients compared to the reference category of environmental policy in both 
models. Model 1 produces a significant coefficient for immigration and integration 
policy as well. The other contextual variables do not seem to be related to the 
number of interest groups with which civil servants are familiar. That is, political-
strategic insight, EU involvement and functional differences in agency types are not 
related to the number of interest groups with which civil servants are familiar.  
What can we conclude from these coefficients in terms of degree of 
dependence? Civil servants in corporatist regimes are likely to be familiar with 
somewhat more interest groups, rendering the degree of dependence smaller. Civil 
servants responsible for internal affairs, public safety and transport and water 
management, and, according to model 1, immigration policy as well, are less likely 
to be familiar with a higher number of interest groups as opposed to civil servants 
working in the environmental policy area. These results suggest that inside 
resource concentration is somewhat higher in these policy areas, in contrast to the 
reference category of environmental policy. Overall, the contextual variables seem 
to have only a small effect, if at all, on inside resource concentration. 
 
                                                        
18 In the previous analysis, multiple dependent variables had to be recoded into one overall measurement. 
The resulting dependent variable was best analysed by multiple regression. In this case, the dependent 
variable concerns only one variable, which is measured at the ordinal level. To better reflect the nature of the 
data, logistic regression analysis was chosen as method of analysis.  
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Table 5.8 Ordered logistic regression analysis of the effect of contextual variables on inside resource 
concentration (the number of interest groups with which civil servants are familiar) 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 1 MI
0.31* 0.24*
(0.19) (0.13)
-0.15 -0.004
(0.16) (0.11)
0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.004)
0.27 -0.09
(0.44) (0.30)
0.13 -0.16
(0.46) (0.31)
-0.06 -0.46
(0.40) (0.29)
-0.34 -0.31
(0.35) (0.26)
-0.49 -0.31
(0.44) (0.32)
-1.00** -0.79**
(0.42) (0.31)
-1.01* -0.55
(0.55) (0.39)
-0.87** -0.75***
(0.36) (0.27)
0.04 -0.11
(0.40) (0.29)
-0.58 -0.44
(0.39) (0.29)
-0.87** -0.55**
(0.35) (0.27)
-0.79 -0.45
(0.57) (0.41)
Pseudo R2 (Nagelkerke) 0.06 0.03
χ2 model 25.78(25)** 26.45(15)**
N 426 821
-1.86; -1.03;         
0.01; 0.46; 0.66
-1.65; -0.59;         
0.11; 0.51; 0.17Cut-points
Public health policy
Education, science, culture policy
Transport and water management policy
Public housing policy
Employment, social affairs
Internal affairs
Immigration, integration policy
Public safety policy
Advisory agency
Executive agency
International affairs
Macro economic affairs
Dependent Variable: Inside resource concentration
Interest representation regime
Political-strategic insight
EU involvement
 
*** p ≤ 0.01; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; The reference code for agency type is ‘other types of agencies,’ 
and for policy area the reference category is ‘macro-economics.’ Interest representation regime and 
political-strategic insight: one-tailed test; all other independent variables: two-tailed tests.  
Both models on resource concentration illustrate that differences in policy area are 
important, yet to a small extent. Meso-level analyses thus may be justified and even 
prerequisite to meaningful conclusions about a nation’s interest representation 
regime, as the levels of corporatism may vary from one policy area to another. This 
finding is line with Blom-Hansen’s research (2001) on Denmark, where he 
concluded that differences are to be observed between various policy areas. These 
corporatist variations across policy areas are also in line with recent studies on the 
changing nature of the Dutch interest representation regime (Torenvlied 2005). 
The differences found in the models are relatively small, however. So, for this 
study, we may proceed with the assumption that the degree of institutionalisation 
of interest regimes is similar across the various policy areas. Yet, for future 
research, such differences need to be taken into account. A general conclusion of 
the previous analyses is that resource concentration varies only to a small extent 
along the political-administrative dimensions included in the models.  
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The importance of resources 
Now that the impact of context on resource concentration has been examined, we 
need to assess the extent to which the importance of resources varies across similar 
political-administrative dimensions. To measure this effect, several binary logistic 
regression analyses were conducted for each individual resource. In the 
questionnaire, these resources were phrased as reasons for which respondents 
could choose to cooperate with interest groups (item 5, see appendix I). Each 
resource was recoded as being either important or unimportant for the civil servant 
in question. The recoding allowed for binary logistic regression analyses.19 Models 1 
and 1 MI result in insignificant goodness-of-fit tests except in the case of the 
capacity to intermediate. The models include each individual resource - expertise, 
implementation capacity, legitimacy, and intermediation capacity - as dependent 
variables. The independent variables are similar across all four models and include 
the interest representation regime, political-strategic insight, functional differences 
between agency types, differences between policy area and EU involvement. Table 
5.9 reports the results of these analyses. In the left column of the table, the 
independent variables are listed. The results for each resource are listed in two 
columns, representing the results for both the original dataset and the dataset 
generated by multiple imputation of the data (the column ‘expertise 1’ reports the 
results based on the original dataset, and the column ‘expertise MI’ reports the 
results based on the complete dataset).  
A first observation is that the importance of several resources is rather context-
driven, given the pseudo R2 values (ranging from 0.08-0.20). Before discussing the 
results, one particular aspect of logistic regression needs to be addressed in order to 
interpret the results correctly. Binary logistic regression models predict the odds of 
a certain outcome occurring. In the case of binary logistic regression, this 
prediction rests on the initial distribution of the answer options. That is, binary 
logistic regression models predict the odds of the answer option that occurs most 
often in the dataset. Given the variation in the frequency of the importance of the 
individual resources, the individual binary logistic regression analyses explain 
different outcomes. In the case of expertise and implementation capacity, they 
explain the odds that these resources will be considered important. In the case of  
                                                        
19 To examine the influence of the institutional and policy-related variables, I used binary logistic regression 
for each of the resources. Techniques that analyse the relationship between multiple dependent variables and 
a set of independent variables are available, yet require both continuous dependent variables and continuous 
independent variables (or both categorical and continuous ones) (see Tabachnik and Fidell 2007). This is not 
the case here. Therefore I opted for separate binary logistic regression analyses. To measure the importance 
of resources, I asked respondents what the most important reasons were for them to interact with interest 
groups (see also section 5.1). Since I phrased the question in this way, I could not obtain a concrete ranking of 
importance. Yet, we can examine which resources are considered important and which are not at a more 
aggregate level. As respondents could check all of the reasons (resources) which they considered most 
important, this item resulted in multiple answers per respondent. I recoded the responses according to a so-
called multiple-dichotomy method (de Vaus 2002, 12). This method interprets every resource as a single 
variable. This requires recoding: a ‘yes’ code, in this case ‘1’, to the options chosen by the respondent, and a 
‘no-code’, in this case ‘0’, to the options not chosen by a particular respondent. At the individual level, the 
recoding system loses the ranking information inherent in choosing several options. At an aggregate level, we 
can count how many times each option is chosen to derive a general indication of which reasons are 
important or unimportant.  
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intermediation capacity, the model explains the odds that this will be considered 
unimportant. Legitimacy is a complex case. Model 1 explains the odds of legitimacy 
being considered important, whereas model 1 MI predicts the odds of it being 
considered unimportant.20 It is possible to explain variation in the case of 
legitimacy, but not in which direction the variation occurs, given these differences.  
So, under what circumstances are these particular resources considered to be 
more important? Interest representation regime produces significant coefficients for 
each resource; political-strategic insight does so in the case of expertise and 
intermediation capacity, and in model 1 MI for legitimacy and implementation 
capacity as well. Advisory agency produces significant coefficients in the case of 
legitimacy, in model 1 MI for intermediation capacity, and in model 1 for expertise. 
Executive agency produces significant coefficients for legitimacy and 
implementation capacity in both models, but it produces coefficients that are not 
discernibly different from zero. EU involvement produces significant coefficients for 
both intermediation capacity (in model 1 MI) and legitimacy. Differences in policy 
area generate some significant coefficients as well. International, macro-economic, 
and immigration policy are related to implementation capacity in model 1 MI, and 
public safety is related to legitimacy in both models. 
Interpretation of the significant coefficients results in the following.21 Civil 
servants in the UK tend to find expertise, implementation, and intermediation 
capacity to be more important than their colleagues in the Netherlands. Civil 
servants in the UK have different opinions to those in the Netherlands about the 
importance of legitimacy. Civil servants working at executive agencies and advisory 
agencies also attach a different value to legitimacy. Civil servants at advisory 
agencies find expertise less important than their colleagues at executive and other 
types of agencies. Intermediation capacity is considered to be less important by civil 
servants working at advisory agencies, as opposed to their colleagues at executive 
and other types of agencies. Civil servants involved in macro-economics and 
immigration issues are likely to consider implementation capacity less important 
than their colleagues involved in environmental issues. Yet, civil servants involved 
in international affairs consider implementation capacity to be more important 
than their colleagues involved in environmental policy.  
What we can generally conclude from these models is that the importance of 
resources seems to be more context-driven than the concentration of resources. 
And, regarding this, interest representation regime, political-administrative 
relations and agency type seem to be the most important explanatory factors. This 
is an interesting finding, as the variation in the importance of resources interest 
groups have to offer is only rarely systematically addressed in the literature on 
interest representation (but see Bouwen 2002; 2004 for variation in critical 
dependence across different EU institutions). Apparently, civil servants differ in 
what they want from interest groups. Such a variation in preference is important to 
include in studies that explain interest groups’ access and tactics.  
                                                        
20 In the original dataset, the majority of the respondents indicated it to be important, whereas in the 
complete dataset generated by multiple imputation, for the majority of the respondents this resource turned 
out to be unimportant.  
21 Given the differences between model 1 and model 1 MI, I will discuss the results for model 1 for legitimacy. 
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5.4.4 How context influences individual resource elements 
The main conclusions from the preceding analyses are that the effect of the 
contextual variables on each of the individual resource elements is small yet 
significant, and that both macro and meso-level contextual variables matter in 
explaining variance in the resource elements. Table 5.10 shows the main results of 
the analyses. It contains a short summary of the significant effects of the contextual 
variables on resource concentration and resource importance. 
In general, interest representation regime often explains variance of the 
individual resource elements. The importance of political-strategic insight seems to 
be related to the importance of resources and functional differences between 
agency types. Differences in policy area seem to matter for both the importance 
and concentration of resources. EU involvement is the least important contextual 
variable in explaining resource importance and resource concentration. In general, 
resource concentration is less context-driven than is the importance of resources. 
The hypotheses formulated in chapter 3 to capture the comparative element of 
the resource dependence model point to an impact of contextual variables on either 
resource importance or resource concentration or both. The findings of the 
empirical analyses are interesting regarding these hypotheses. In the case of interest 
representation regime, it appears that the number of other types of organisations 
with which civil servants interact (outside resource concentration) is somewhat 
smaller in the Netherlands than the UK. In corporatist interest representation 
regimes is the number of interest groups with which civil servants are familiar 
somewhat higher than in a more pluralist interest representation regime. Although 
a higher degree of institutionalisation of interest representation regimes seems to 
reduce the total number of other organisations with which a civil servant 
cooperates, it seems to increase the number of interest groups with which a civil 
servant is familiar. Yet, the overall explanatory value of both models is very small. 
In that sense, it is somewhat difficult to accept or reject hypothesis 1, although the 
effects that have been measured point to rejection of the hypothesis. Given the 
small overall explanatory values of the models, either rejecting or accepting the 
hypothesis seems not legitimate.  
An additional effect, which was not hypothesised, is the relation between 
interest representation regimes and the importance of resources. Expertise, 
implementation and intermediation capacity seem to be more important in 
pluralist regimes than in corporatist regimes. The importance of legitimacy differs 
between interest representation regimes, but the direction cannot be derived from 
the analyses. So, whereas interest representation regimes seem to have only a small 
impact (or none at all) on resource concentration, they have a more explicit impact 
on the importance of resources. These findings are relevant for studies on interest 
groups’ strategies to obtain access. First, the importance of what interest groups 
have to offer is valued differently by civil servants in different interest 
representation regimes. And whereas expertise is generally seen as the most 
important resource interest groups have to offer in exchange for access (see 
Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 126), from a comparative perspective it may not be 
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the only resource that matters. Apparently, a civil servant needs more than just 
expertise, but these needs vary along different dimensions of the political-
administrative system. This, in turn, may have consequences for obtaining and 
maintaining access. Second, interest representation regimes seem to have a small 
effect on the number of interest groups with which civil servants are familiar and 
the broad array of organisations with which they interact. Resource concentration 
may be determined to a greater extent by other contextual variables, and not just by 
the differences between interest representation regimes. 
The hypothesis on political-administrative relations states that a higher degree of 
political-strategic insight results in a difference in resource importance and 
increased resource concentration. The empirical analyses did not find a relation 
between political-strategic insight and concentration of resources, but political-
strategic insight does seem to result in variation in the importance of resources. So, 
the analyses do confirm the difference between the relative importance of resources 
along different levels of political-strategic insights. They do not, however, confirm 
the hypothesised effect on resource concentration. An increase in the importance 
of resources may suggest an increase in resource concentration, but we cannot 
infer this effect from the analyses.  
What about the hypothesis on agency type? This hypothesis states that the 
importance of individual resources is likely to vary across different types of agency. 
The analyses seem to confirm this hypothesis. The importance of the resources 
included in the model indeed seems to vary across different types of agencies and 
across different rankings within the civil service system. That is, those who are to a 
larger extent involved in political-strategic decision making tend to value resources 
differently from those who are to a lesser extent involved in such decision making. 
And, there are differences to be observed between advisory and executive agencies’ 
perceptions of what are and are not important resources. How variations in agency 
type and political-administrative relations precisely relate to each other could not be 
assessed in this study. Yet, in general, such variations are in line with findings in 
the literature on bureaucratic politics on individual motives and agencies (Downs 
1967; Dunleavy 1991). Yet, these findings introduce an external perspective to 
bureaucratic politics more prominently than previous studies of individual motives 
of bureaucrats or differences in agency types have done. They also suggest the need 
for more systematic analyses of bureaucrats’ motives to explain the phenomenon of 
bureaucratic politics. Civil servants’ motives may be more context-driven than the 
current literature on bureaucratic politics suggests.  
The effect of policy areas was hypothesised to be important in terms of 
complexity, salience and political sensitivity, rather than in terms of substantive 
variation as such. Including such substantive differences in the various models, 
however, could provide an initial assessment of a potential effect of policy area on 
both resource concentration and resource importance. The empirical analyses 
indeed showed that both the total number of other organisations and the number 
of familiar interest groups varies across different policy areas. In addition, the 
results show that both implementation capacity and legitimacy significantly differ 
between policy areas. Differences in policy areas are apparently important, and 
further analysis in terms of complexity, salience and political sensitivity may be 
useful. These analyses seem to point to differences in bureaucracy-interest group 
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interactions across different policy areas and introduce questions about the nature 
of different policy areas and interest group activity. Existing typologies (Lowi 1972; 
Stone 1997; Wilson 2000[1989]) have difficulties in unequivocally explaining such 
patterns. Bringing in policy variables to explain interest group activity more 
explicitly and systematically may reveal such general patterns more clearly.  
Finally, EU involvement. EU involvement was included in the analyses, yet was 
not explicitly hypothesised to affect the resource elements. The analyses suggest 
that EU involvement only relates to the legitimacy and intermediation resources. 
Even in the case of legitimacy, a direction of influence could not be established, 
given the differences in predicting importance and unimportance of legitimacy 
across the two models. In addition, both coefficients are barely discernible from 
zero, indicating a very small effect. From these analyses, we can infer that EU 
involvement is not related to the individual resource elements (but for a more 
elaborate discussion of the impact of EU involvement, refer to section 6.5).  
All in all, the contextual variables included in the model have a small yet 
significant influence on the individual resource elements. Some of these effects are 
in line with the hypotheses that have been formulated to capture the comparative 
elements of the model, and some are not. In any case, the results suggest that the 
impact of contextual variables is important in explaining variance in both resource 
concentration and resource importance.  
5.4.5 Does dependence vary under different circumstances? 
A final step, after examining the impact of contextual variables on the individual 
resource elements, is to examine the extent to which the contextual variables 
interact with the resource elements, to determine the number of interest groups 
with which civil servants interact. Put differently, to what extent does the variation 
in the impact of the resource elements on the degree of dependence coincide with 
variation in the contextual factors? Such a test allows for a true assessment of the 
comparative potential of the model. The interaction effects between each resource 
element and each of the contextual variables should be examined to capture how 
the impact of the resource elements on the degree of dependence is influenced by 
the contextual variables. Interactions between variables occur when the regression 
coefficient of an independent variable varies as a result of another independent 
variable (Kahane 2001; Kennedy 2003). For instance, in the current study, resource 
concentration may be higher in highly institutionalised interest representation 
regimes than in those that are less institutionalised. Including interaction effects is 
thus a way to assess the impact of the contextual variables on each of the resource 
elements so as to eventually explain the degree of dependence.  
To account for such relationships, interaction effects between each resource 
element and each of the contextual variables should all be included in the model. 
Naturally, a model with more than 40 variables is somewhat problematic for 
interpretation. A first, obvious concern is multicollinearity. A check of the 
correlation matrix shows that some of the interaction variables of political-
administrative relations and the resource elements highly correlate, at around 0.8., 
although other correlations are relatively low. Still, there is no real reason for 
concern given the large number of observations. Ordered logistic regression is used 
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to examine the effects of the resource elements to match the previous analyses, in 
which the number of interest groups was included as a dependent variable as well.  
Table 5.11 reports the results of the analysis, including the coefficients of the 
individual resource elements, the contextual variables, and the interaction effects of 
each of the contextual variables on the resource elements. An interaction effect is 
depicted by multiplication, for instance: ‘interest representation regime * inside 
resource concentration’ reflects the extent to which inside resource concentrations 
varies along different types of interest representation regimes. Inside resource 
concentration is included as a continuous variable, as are agency type and policy 
area.22 The column entitled ‘model 1’ refers to the analysis based on the original 
dataset, and the column ‘model 1 MI’ reports the results of the analysis based on 
the complete, multiple dataset.  
What we observe is that for both datasets, the explanatory value of the models is 
higher than the models that only include the resource elements (0.48 and 0.43, 
respectively versus 0.36 and 0.36, respectively). The values of pseudo R2 for the 
interaction models are roughly similar to those for the models that separate the 
resource elements and contextual variables (0.48 and 0.43, respectively versus 0.44 
and 0.42, respectively). The interaction models, however, have difficulties in 
meeting the assumptions. In both cases, the goodness-of-fit tests show a significant 
result, indicating that the predicted values significantly differ from the observed 
values. In the case of model I, the model meets the assumptions of the test of 
parallel lines, whereas model 1 MI does not. Although the collinearity correlations 
do not give serious reasons for concern, the sheer number of categorical variables 
included in the model could easily result in a violation of the assumptions.  
Despite the drawbacks of a model that includes so many variables and has 
difficulties in meeting the appropriate assumptions, we can still use it to gauge 
how the independent variables interact with each other. Remember that the 
individual interaction effects are depicted by multiplication. When we examine the 
table, we observe that in the case of model 1, outside resource concentration 
produces a significant coefficient (0.19; p ≤ 0.01), as well as implementation 
capacity (-2.44, p ≤ 0.1), interest representation regime (-2.03, p ≤ 0.01) and EU 
involvement (0.05, p ≤ 0.05). In addition, 6 interaction terms produce significant 
coefficients, namely, expertise * interest representation regime (1.00, p ≤ 0.1), 
implementation capacity * interest representation regime (-1.20, p ≤ 0.05), 
intermediation capacity * interest representation regime (0.97, p ≤ 0.05), 
implementation capacity * political strategic insight (1.23, p ≤ 0.05), outside 
resource concentration * policy area (-0.001, p ≤ 0.1), and intermediation capacity * 
EU involvement (0.04, p ≤ 0.05). 
                                                        
22 The analyses of the core resource dependence model, and the analyses which separated the core resource 
dependence model and context, included inside resource concentration as an ordinal variable. Accordingly, 
inside resource concentration was dummy-coded in those analyses. When inside resource concentration was 
included as a continuous variable in both analyses, it did not produce significant results. So, significant 
coefficients of the individual inside resource concentration dummy variables remain unknown based on the 
analysis reported in the table above. The same applies to agency type and policy area. The reason for 
including inside resource concentration, agency type and policy area as interval variables was to reduce the 
number of variables. The following significance levels apply: *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; All two-
tailed tests. 
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Table 5.11 Ordered logistic regression analysis of the effect of resource elements and context including 
interaction effects on the degree of dependence  
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 1 MI
-0.07 0.03
(0.39) (0.27)
0.19*** 0.11**
(0.07) (0.04)
-0.59 0.05
(1.42) (0.66)
-2.44* -0.29
(1.46) (0.67)
0.06 1.32
(1.33) (0.93)
1.56 1.78**
(1.46) (1.05)
-2.03*** -1.37***
(0.68) (0.35)
-0.66 0.15
(0.56) (0.31)
-0.19 0.06
(0.60) (0.31)
0.09 0.05
(0.01) (0.06)
0.05** 0.03
(0.03) (0.01)
0.05 0.06
(0.12) (0.09)
0.01 -0.002
(0.03) (0.01)
1.00* -0.01
(0.53) (0.31)
-1.20** -0.20
(0.53) (0.31)
0.70 0.75**
(0.48) (0.31)
0.97** 0.31
(0.50) (0.34)
0.08 -0.01
(0.01) (0.08)
-0.003 -0.004
(0.02) (0.01)
0.19 0.15
(0.40) (0.26)
1.23*** 0.44*
(0.43) (0.27)
0.05 -0.07
(0.40) (0.27)
-0.40 -0.49
(0.45) (0.32)
-0.18 -0.03
(0.12) (0.08)
-0.01 0.02*
(0.02) (0.01)
0.27 0.02
(0.41) (0.26)
0.32 -0.12
(0.42) (0.26)
-0.26 -0.88***
(0.41) (0.27)
0.23 -0.32
(0.40) (0.26)
0.03 0.008
(0.02) (0.01)
-0.001* -0.005**
(0.001) 0.002)
-0.08 -0.004
(0.07) (0.05)
0.02 0.03
(0.07) (0.05)
-0.001 -0.01
(0.07) (0.04)
-0.01 -0.02
(0.07) (0.05)
-0.001 -0.003
(0.001) (0.003)
-0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
-0.001 -0.001
(0.01) (0.01)
0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.01)
-0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.01)
0.04** -0.02*
(0.02) (0.01)
Cut-points -0.61; 0.90; 1.67 -0.07; 1.82; 2.16; 3.56            
Χ2 model 241.04(41)*** 429.08(41)***
Pseudo R square (Nagelkerke) 0.48 0.43
N 421 821
Dependent Variable: Degree of dependence
Inside resource concentration
Outside resource concentration
Expertise
Implementation capacity
Legitimacy
Intermediation capacity
Inside resource concentration * regime
Outside resource concentration * regime
Expertise * regime
Implementation capacity * regime
Legitimacy * regime
Intermediation capacity * regime
Inside resource concentration * political-strategic insight
Outside resource concentration * political-strategic insight
Expertise * political-strategic insight
Implementation capacity * political-strategic insight
Legitimacy * political-strategic insight
Intermediation capacity * political stragic insight
Inside resource concentration * agency type
Outside resource concentration * agency type
Expertise * agency type
Implementation capacity * agency type
Legitimacy * agency type
Intermediation capacity * agency type
Inside resource concentration * policy area
Outside resource concentration * policy area
Implementation capacity * EU involvement
Expertise * policy area
Implementation capacity * policy area
Legitimacy * policy area
Intermediation capacity * policy area
Legitimacy * EU involvement
Intermediation capacity * EU involvement
Interest representation regime
political-strategic insight
agency type
policy area
EU involvement
Inside resource concentration * EU involvement
Outside resource concentration * EU involvement
Expertise * EU involvement
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In model 1 MI, outside resource concentration (0.11; p ≤ 0.05), intermediation 
capacity (1.78; p ≤ 0.05), and interest representation regime (-1.37, p ≤ 0.01) 
produce significant coefficients. Model 1 MI also includes 6 interaction terms that 
produce significant coefficients; legitimacy * interest representation regime (0.75, p 
≤ 0.05), implementation * political strategic insight (0.44, p ≤ 0.1), outside resource 
concentration * agency type (0.02, p ≤ 0.1), legitimacy * agency type (-0.88, p ≤ 
0.01), outside resource concentration * policy area (-0.005, p ≤ 0.05), and 
intermediation capacity * EU involvement (-0.02, p ≤ 0.1).  
When we compare these interaction models with the core resource dependence 
model (table 5.4), we observe that by including interaction terms, fewer of the 
individual resource elements produce significant coefficients. This could mean that 
although the interaction is not indicated by the model, several elements in the 
model do affect each other. We also observe that the interaction terms that relate to 
the degree of dependence concern both the importance and concentration of 
resources. Yet, the majority of the interaction terms include resource importance 
rather than resource concentration. And those that include resource concentration 
generally produce very small effects. This result is in line with the previous 
analyses that incorporated the individual resource elements as dependent variables. 
The overall result of those analyses was that resource importance seemed to be 
more context-driven than resource concentration. Also, most interaction terms 
(except outside resource concentration * agency type and intermediation capacity * 
EU involvement) overlap with the results of the analyses that include the individual 
resource elements as dependent variables. Put differently, the interaction terms 
suggest similar contextual effects to the individual analysis of the impact of the 
contextual variables on the resource elements. 
It is difficult, however, to estimate under which exact circumstances the impact 
of each of the resource elements on the degree of dependence is either reinforced 
or mitigated. This is so for two main reasons. First, the inclusion of several 
categorical variables as continuous variables obscures their impact and how they 
are to be influenced by the contextual variables (see also footnote 22). Second, the 
constitutive elements of the interaction model cannot be interpreted as we would 
do in normal linear regression models (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2005). For 
instance, we observe in model 1 MI that intermediation capacity contributes to the 
odds that civil servants interact with a higher number of interest groups (and thus 
to the odds of a smaller degree of dependence). In addition, the interaction term 
‘intermediation capacity * political-strategic insight’ also significantly contributes to 
the number of interest groups with which civil servants are likely to interact. Its 
negative value suggests that the effect of intermediation capacity is reduced as the 
degree of political-strategic insights increases. In other words, when political-
strategic insight becomes a more important part of a senior civil servant’s job, a 
mitigating effect of intermediation capacity on the degree of dependence is 
reduced. The point is that from these results we do not know until what point (in 
this case the exact level of political strategic insight) this effect holds. To precisely 
measure this, we should provide results for meaningful values of political-strategic 
insight to determine how its effect influences the impact of intermediation capacity 
on degree of dependence (see Brambor, Clark and Golder 2005, 76). Since this 
interaction model includes relatively many categorical variables and has difficulties 
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in meeting the statistical assumptions, I will not proceed with estimating the 
precise effect of the contextual variables on the resource elements. Instead, I will 
use this model and its results for a general interpretation of the comparative 
potential of a resource dependence model in explaining why bureaucrats interact 
with interest groups.  
Generally, the interaction model confirms that context does matter and should 
be taken into account when modelling bureaucracy-interest group interactions as 
resource dependence relationships. Despite its flaws, this interaction model is 
important in the assessment of the explanatory potential of the core resource 
dependence model. The interaction effect of inside resource concentration, as said, 
(the number of familiar interest groups) is somewhat concealed in the interaction 
model, however, as a result of including it as a continuous variable. But what the 
interaction model suggests is that concentration of resources is indeed to a lesser 
extent affected by context than is the relative importance of resources. It also shows 
that the importance of resources is important to explain the degree of dependence, 
but that its effect varies along different political-administrative dimensions. Given 
the explanatory value of the resource dependence model (R2 = 0.36 and 0.36 
respectively) and the interaction models (R2 = 0.48 and 0.43 respectively), we could 
conclude that these tests offer a promising start for the resource dependence 
model. In this respect, the empirical analyses reflect the method of concomitant 
variation (Mill 1970[1843]) on which this study rests. That is, the empirical analyses 
showed that a particular variation of the resource elements along different political-
administrative dimensions is related to a particular variation in the degree of 
dependence. Although in need of refinement, for instance, exactly measuring the 
values of the contextual variables that influence the core resource elements, the 
resource dependence model offers a promising tool to systematically explain 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions. 
5.5 The explanatory value of the resource dependence model 
The aim of this chapter was to empirically examine the resource dependence model 
to test its potential for explaining bureaucracy-interest group interactions. First, I 
tested a model that only included resource importance and resource concentration. 
It thus included the core elements hypothesised to explain bureaucracy-interest 
group interactions. This model offered a satisfactory explanation for the number of 
interest groups with which civil servants interact, which served as a measure of the 
degree of dependence. The next step of the analysis examined if and to what extent 
the contextual factors influenced the degree of dependence. When the contextual 
variables were added to the model, the explanatory value of the model increased 
slightly. This implied that contextual variables can improve its explanatory value. 
When their impact was tested on each of the resource elements separately, small 
yet significant effects confirmed the impact of context. Such effects of contextual 
variables have been hypothesised as part of the theoretical model, although some of 
those effects contradicted or were different from the effects that were hypothesised. 
Table 5.12 summarises the effects of the contextual variables stated by the 
hypotheses and indicate whether the results confirm (indicated by +), deny 
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(indicated by -), or offer partial confirmation (indicated by ±). The grey coloured 
rows report the effects that were explicitly hypothesised as part of the explanatory 
model. The striped area reports the effects that were not explicitly hypothesised, but 
were included in the empirical analyses on a more exploratory basis.  
Table 5.12 Status of the hypotheses after the empirical analysis 
? Europeanisation will affect both resource concentration and resource 
importance.EU 
Policy area
Agency type
Political-
administrative 
relations
Interest 
representation 
regime
? When issues are salient, the concentration of resources will be low.
? When issues are technically complex, the concentration of resources 
will be high.
? When issues are politically sensitive, the relative importance of 
resources will be high.
? The importance of resources will vary across different types of 
agencies.
? When civil service positions require a high level of political-strategic 
insight, the importance and concentration of resources will be high.
? When national interest representation regimes are highly 
institutionalised, the concentration of resources will be high.
Status 
hypotheses after 
analysesHypotheses
+
-
±
±
±
 
For interest representation regime, we can infer that the effect is too weak to confirm 
the hypothesis. Although the result points in the same direction as that 
hypothesised, a more solid finding is necessary to confidently confirm this 
hypothesis. Second, for the political-administrative hypothesis, no concentration 
effects were found, but there seems to be variation in the importance of resources. 
The results for agency type confirm the hypothesis that the importance of resources 
varies across agency type due to the different nature and tasks of these agencies. 
The results for policy area are interesting, but cannot confirm or reject the 
hypotheses. The results here concern substantive differences, whereas the 
hypotheses concern more abstract characteristics of policy areas. Yet, they point in 
the direction of variation across policy areas. Finally, EU involvement was not 
included in the model, but was included in the empirical analyses. It does not seem 
to be related to either resource concentration or resource importance, except in the 
case of legitimacy. Although the effect of EU involvement was not formally 
included in the model, the analyses suggest that EU involvement influences 
national bureaucracy-interest group interactions only to a very small extent. We will 
see more on the EU factor in the next chapter.  
A final step in the assessment of the explanatory potential of the resource 
dependence model was to examine the extent to which the effect of the resource 
elements would vary along different political-administrative dimensions. This is a 
test to truly assess the model’s comparative qualities. To measure these effects, an 
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interaction model was examined, incorporating each individual resource element 
and contextual variables together with interaction terms for the contextual variables 
and each of the resource elements. This model showed that context indeed matters 
to a small extent, and that the impact of the resource elements varies to a certain 
degree along the political-administrative dimensions included in the model. 
Concentration of resources appears to be influenced to a smaller extent by context 
than the relative importance of resources is. Taken together, the analyses provide a 
thorough examination of the explanatory potential of the resource dependence 
model. The results suggest that it is a promising tool to systematically explain 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions from a comparative perspective. 
The explanatory value of resource concentration and resource importance are 
interesting for the literature on interest group politics and bureaucratic politics, as 
well as for classic resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003[1978]) in 
which the explanatory model of this study is grounded. Let me discuss the 
implications of these analyses for the classic resource dependence theory first. The 
analyses reveal two additional important aspects of resource exchange relationships 
that deserve attention. First, the importance of resources varies across different 
political-administrative dimensions. Usually, such a comparative aspect is ignored. 
The importance of expertise has been shown to vary across different EU 
institutions (Bouwen 2002; 2004). Yet, an explicit preference of civil servants or, 
more generally, of governments has not yet been studied, and neither has the effect 
of other types of variables such as political-administrative relations, differences in 
public agencies, and variation across policy areas. Expertise is clearly not the only 
important resource to be exchanged between interest groups and the government; 
other resources matter as well. The importance of resources is thus rather context-
driven. And, in order to properly apply the idea of classic resource dependence to 
government and interest group interactions, it is necessary to include such 
contextual variables more explicitly.  
Second, the model and the analyses suggest that not only resource importance 
should be included in the model, but that resource concentration is an important 
determinant of resource exchange as well. Availability of resources can have 
important consequences for a preference for certain types of resources. And, 
perhaps more importantly, concentration of resources seems to be important in 
distinguishing the various types of rationalities that underlie resource exchanges 
between bureaucrats and interest groups. To illustrate, if only a single organisation 
controls a particular resource, there will not be much room left to strategically 
choose with whom to interact to obtain this resource (see also chapter 7). So, it is 
important that the interaction between these two elements is incorporated in 
explanations of resource exchange. The effect of the contextual variables on 
resource concentration offers interesting results as well. Interest representation 
regimes, for instance, seem to influence resource concentration to a small extent.23 
These regimes have usually been studied to explain differences in the degree of 
                                                        
23 The effect might be more explicit when more extreme values on the corporatism-pluralism indicator are 
included. That is, including the US and Sweden as indicators in the analysis may reveal a stronger effect of 
interest representation regime. For practical reasons, this was not possible in this study, but it is an 
interesting matter for further studies.  
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institutionalisation and access of interest groups to decision making (and more 
dominantly, the coordination system to facilitate such decision making: see Molina 
and Rhodes 2002). Perhaps interest representation regimes are converging in so 
far as their effects on access go. This is a trend that raises fascinating research 
questions, part of which have been addressed by studies reporting that the degree 
of corporatism in so-called corporatist countries is declining (see for instance 
Rommetvedt 2005). In addition, access may be determined to a larger extent by 
other contextual variables (see also chapter 6) than simply by variation across 
different interest representation regimes. The results for agency type, policy area 
and political-administrative variables suggest that systematic comparative analysis 
of bureaucracy-interest group interaction should not only focus on national 
comparisons, but should focus on the sub-national level as well. This finding is in 
line with recent studies that point to different levels of corporatism across different 
policy areas (Blom-Hansen 2001; Torenvlied 2005), as discussed earlier. 
The effect of political-strategic insight on bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions is also interesting for the literature on bureaucratic politics. Political-
administrative relations and agency strife, what I termed an internal component of 
bureaucratic politics, should be more systematically related to bureaucracy-interest 
group interactions, what I termed an external component of bureaucratic politics. 
The literature on bureaucratic politics seldom links these two components (but see 
Carpenter 2001; Hill 1991; Suleiman 1974). These two components, and more 
importantly, the interactions between them, are relevant to explain bureaucratic 
motives. Bureaucracy-interest group interactions may serve the position of the 
bureaucrat as opposed to his/her political superior. Or, vice versa, a civil servant’s 
position in the bureaucracy may influence his/her relations with interest groups. 
The same applies to the differences in agency types. In sum, these analyses suggest 
that studies of bureaucratic politics should more systematically include such 
variation and link internal aspects to external aspects to better explain bureaucrats’ 
motives. Systematic comparative research on bureaucratic politics that incorporates 
both an internal and external perspective could provide better insights into this 
phenomenon than the public choice driven accounts of bureaucrats’ motives and 
case studies that have been offered until now.  
5.5.1 The entrepreneurial or the captive bureaucrat?  
The results show that the resource dependence model offers a promising 
explanation for bureaucracy-interest group interactions. But what does this all say 
about the entrepreneurial bureaucrat? If you were a civil servant in the UK in need 
of expertise, for instance, you would face a somewhat less severe dependence on 
interest groups than if you were a civil servant in the Netherlands with a similar 
need. That is, the importance of expertise is higher in pluralist regimes, but a 
higher importance of resources results in more interest groups with which civil 
servants interact. This eventually results in a degree of dependence that is less 
severe. The importance of expertise, implementation and intermediation capacity 
increases when you are top civil servant involved in considerable political-strategic 
decision-making. Depending on the interest representation regime, your 
dependence will be less severe (in the UK), or somewhat more severe (the 
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Netherlands). Or, if you are working for an executive agency, you may be more 
dependent on expertise than your colleagues at advisory agencies. Given these 
general patterns, we would assess the degree of dependence characterising your 
interactions with interest groups as ‘it depends.’ For a detailed assessment of a 
bureaucracy’s entrepreneurial behaviour, an assessment of the importance and 
concentration of a resource in a specific case and how these two elements vary 
along relevant political-administrative dimensions is necessary. In general, 
however, the importance of resources seems to be much more context-driven than 
is resource concentration. And, some aspects of the political-administrative 
environment may matter more than others in allowing entrepreneurial behaviour.  
In sum, the analyses provide a first assessment of the explanatory potential of 
the resource dependence model. That is, we can to a certain extent measure 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions by modelling them in terms of degree of 
dependence. In addition, tests of the model provide an initial assessment of how 
entrepreneurial behaviour might vary under different political-administrative 
circumstances. To precisely distinguish between the entrepreneurial and the 
captive bureaucrat, we need to examine the interest group environment in more 
detail. In doing so, we should be able to gain insights into other contextual 
dynamics that may influence resource concentration, which was shown to be 
affected only to a limited extent by the contextual variables included in the model. 
This will be done in the chapter 6. 
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6  
The Interest Group Environment:           
A View from Within 
We prefer the imperial route. That is, we always negotiate with civil servants first to obtain what we 
want. If this strategy fails, we will seek to exert influence via politicians or the media. But we always 
prefer the civil servants’ route. When you’re not successful in this stage, you did something wrong.1  
6.1 Introduction  
This statement represents the opinion of several respondents in this study; such an 
‘imperial route’ is preferred by most of the interest groups included here. They also 
indicate that they aim to bring solid information, or bring in examples of best 
practices, so that they will be considered a trustworthy partner for civil servants to 
interact with. They thus try to trade high-quality expertise for influence, a resource 
explicitly shown to be useful in obtaining access to European institutions as well 
(Bouwen 2002, 2004; Beyers 2004).  
Earlier, I examined what kind of resources civil servants consider to be 
important to obtain from interest groups and the extent to which such resources 
are available in the interest group environment. The interest group environment 
has thus been studied through the eyes of the civil servant. Which kind of 
resources, however, do interest groups themselves find most important to offer to 
civil servants, and how do they perceive their immediate environment? Do they 
experience severe competition with each other, or are they more likely to join forces 
in achieving what they want? And, most importantly, do they consider civil servants 
an important partner to cooperate with? Answering these and other questions 
about the interest group environment helps to more fully interpret the degree of 
dependence that characterises bureaucracy-interest group interactions. When 
interest groups do not consider bureaucrats to be an important means for exerting 
influence, for instance, bureaucrats may be more dependent on those very interest 
groups than when those bureaucrats are considered to be an important means for 
accessing public decision making.  
To provide such a broader perspective on bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions, this chapter offers a detailed inspection of the resources and their 
availability in the interest group environment. That is, it examines the 
characteristics and availability of resources that interest groups may have to offer 
and how such availability may vary in a changing environment. To do so, I will 
examine the type of resources interest groups have to offer, how they perceive 
                                                        
11 Interview by author. 
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cooperation with and competition from fellow interest groups, and to what extent 
they consider civil servants to be an important access point through which to exert 
influence. I will also examine the impact of Europeanisation on national 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions. In other words, this chapter studies the 
interest group environment in more detail, to better assess the explanatory 
potential of the resource dependence model.  
6.2 Measuring degree of dependence 
A comprehensive empirical analysis of the comparative potential of the resource 
dependence model requires a full scale analysis from the perspectives of both the 
bureaucracy and interest groups. For the latter, we need to generate hypotheses 
about relevant contextual factors that would influence interest group behaviour. As 
the focus of this study has been and still is the bureaucracy, such a comprehensive 
analysis of resource exchange from an interest group perspective goes beyond the 
scope of this research. Nonetheless, I will consider several contextual factors, albeit 
in a more exploratory fashion, to provide some initial insights into how interest 
group dynamics may influence the dependence relationship. 
6.2.1 Concentration and importance of resources 
The importance of resources was incorporated in the survey by asking respondents 
to indicate the most important reasons for them to interact with civil servants. This 
item does not explicitly refer to ‘exercising influence.’ “Influence sounds too bad,” 
as one respondent honestly puts it,2 and interest groups generally seem to be 
keener to focus on what they bring to the negotiation table rather than the act of 
exerting influence. Therefore, to avoid socially undesirable answers, the reason ‘to 
exercise influence’ was deliberately omitted from the list of options.3 I further 
included items in the questionnaire asking respondents to indicate whether they 
cooperate with similar interest groups, whether they experience competition from 
fellow interest groups, and whether they interact with other types of organisations, 
such as advisory councils or research institutes (item 8-12, see appendix I). These 
indicators do not directly measure resource concentration, yet they gauge how 
many interest groups may offer equivalent resources and to what extent access may 
be limited as a result of competition. Cooperation with similar interest groups is 
thus assumed to be an indicator of the number of similar kinds of interest groups, 
whereas competition says something about the number of organisations civil 
servants may be familiar with. These two indicators are thereby indirect measures 
of inside resource concentration. Cooperation with other types of organisations is 
used as an indirect measurement of outside resource concentration. 
                                                        
2 Interview by author. 
3 Only a few mentioned this aspect in the ‘other, please specify’ category. So, on the whole, respondents seem 
to have been quite comfortable with the reasons that were presented to them. In addition, I phrased this item 
in terms of ‘reasons’ rather than in terms of ‘resources’, as ‘resources’ obviously is a theoretical construct and 
most likely will not fit in the respondents’ framing of why they interact with civil servants (see also section 5.1 
for a similar use of ‘reasons’). 
The Interest Group Environment: A View from Within 
129 
6.2.2 Contextual factors 
First, similar to the bureaucracy analysis, interest representation regimes are 
hypothesised to make a difference for the interest group environment. The degree 
of institutionalisation of interest group involvement and the hierarchical 
organisation of interest representation will influence whether and how interest 
groups are able to interact with civil servants and with each other, as well as the 
kind of resources that are available (see also section 5.1).  
Second, I assume that differences in kinds of interest groups, for instance 
employers’ organisations versus voluntary organisations, are relevant for the 
resources they have to offer and how they perceive the bureaucracy. For an 
operationalisation of different kinds of interest groups, I apply the classification I 
used to construct the interest group datasets (see chapter 4).  
A final contextual factor that has been defined is the extent to which interest 
groups receive government grants for their activities. In this sense, the Dutch 
government, for instance, is known for ‘organising and financing its own 
adversaries’ (see Duyvendak et al. 1992), a trend the European Commission also 
seems to follow. That is, the European Commission organises an active civil society 
by encouraging or sometimes even formally requiring member states to involve 
interest groups in policy making or the transposition of EU directives (COM 2002, 
704). Often, such organisations receive government grants in order to represent 
their members and to actively participate in public decision making. Although they 
lag behind in terms of (financial) resources, they are often invited to the 
negotiation table. In the words of one civil servant: “When people try to represent a 
certain group of people in their spare time, you have to respect such organisations 
despite their obvious disadvantage in resources and time.”4 Or, as an interest group 
representative indicates: “They [civil servants; CP] respect our formal position at the 
negotiation table, although we are inferior compared to the big boys in terms of 
resources. You see, our head office fits in the entrance hall of one of the major 
organisations representing the insurance sector.”5 Usually, civil servants gather 
both types of organisations around the negotiation table so as to formally represent 
a diverse array of societal interests.  
Two interesting questions arise. Does such active governmental outreach to 
interest groups, and the amount of public money interest groups receive, make a 
difference in how they get access to the government? And do these governmental 
initiatives affect what kind of resources the interest groups bring to the table? To 
examine whether there is such an effect from receiving government grants, I asked 
respondents to indicate which percentage of their budget consists of public grants 
(item 5, see appendix I).6 So, three contextual factors, interest representation 
regime, kind of interest organisation, and government grants will be included in 
the analyses of the interest group environment when appropriate. 
                                                        
4 Interview by author. 
5 Idem. 
6 For each country, the question was asked somewhat differently. Therefore, I recoded the Dutch data by 
adding up the percentages for each type of financial resources provided by the respondents to an overall 
percentage of government grants and assigned them the values attached to the categories of government 
grants in the UK survey (see item 5, appendix I). 
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Table 6.1 below reports the contextual factors and the elements of resource 
concentration and resource importance. In the first column, the (in)dependent 
variables are listed; the second column reports the answer categories and how they 
were coded. In the remaining columns, several descriptive statistics are reported, 
including missing data. 
Table 6.1 Operationalisation of (in)dependent variables 
(in)dependent variables Coding Mean SD Min Max Missing
NLD (1)
UK (0)
Kind of interest group Private firm (1)
(item 2) Employers’ organisation (2)
Labour union (3)
(association of) Public institution (4)
NGO voluntary (5)
NGO education (6)
NGO consumer (7)
NGO development (8)
NGO environment (9)
NGO health (10)
NGO minorities (11)
NGO religious/ idealistic (12)
NGO science (13)
NGO culture/sports/recreation (14)
Other (15)
Government Grants We receive no grants (0)
(item 5) 1-25% of our total budget (1)
26-50% of our total budget (2)
51-75% of our total budget (3)
76-100% of our total budget (4)
Importance of resources Unimportant (0) Information: 0.78 0.42
(item 17) Important (1) Expertise: 0.68 0.46
Grants: 0.30 0.42
Implementation: 0.32 0.47
Inside resource concentration (1) None (0)
1-5 similar interest groups (1)
6-10 similar interest groups (2)
(item 8) 11-15 similar interest groups (3)
> 15 similar interest groups (4)
Inside resource concentration (2) No competition not at all (1) Access to politicians: 2.27 1.17 83
Not so much (2) Access to civil servants: 2.10 1.12 86
Don’t know / not applicable (3) Access to policy process: 2.40 1.18 85
(item 10) Somewhat (4) Access to implementation: 2.35 1.15 85
Very much (5) Access to grants: 2.48 1.14 84
Outside resource concentration None (0 ) Advisory council: 0.92 0.92 84
1-5 organisations (1) Consultancy firm: 0.81 0.86 88
6-10 organisations (2) Scientific organisation: 0.97 0.87 85
(item 12) 11-15 organisations (3) Research institute: 0.73 0.77 88
> 15 organisations (4) Think tanks: 0.61 0.72 241I
Public agencies:1.01 0.93 78
2.22 1.34
4 23
0 1 127
Cooperation with other 
organisations
Competition experienced from 
other interest groups
Interactions with similar interest 
groups (IG)
42
1 5
0 4
0 4
1
0.49 0
0.66 1.21 0
Interest representation regime 0.62
6.24 4.40
1 0
15 8
 
Note: I = The large number of missing variables is a result of excluding the category ‘think tanks’ from 
the Dutch survey.  
6.2.3 Missing data 
Table 6.1 reveals, similar to the senior civil servants’ survey, a considerable amount 
of missing data. To avoid bias in the results, I used a similar technique to that 
applied to the civil servants’ survey (multiple imputation). Appendix II shows the 
diagnostics of the multiple imputation process run by Amelia. These diagnostics 
indicate whether the imputed data is too distant from the originally observed 
values, the extent to which the program is able to predict the true value of the data, 
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and whether the imputations are consistent and do not depend on the value from 
which the process started (Honaker, King and Blackwell 2007, 16). The datasets 
meet the assumptions of the three diagnostics that the program Amelia offers, 
indicating a fairly good fit for the multiple imputation process. Again, as was done 
in the previous chapter, analyses will be conducted both with the original and 
imputed datasets and results for both analyses will be depicted (see also section 
5.2.3). Model 1 represents the analyses based on the original dataset; model 1 MI 
represents the analyses based on the complete dataset.  
6.3 Examining the interest group environment 
Interest groups may try to build coalitions to be better able to exert influence or to 
better implement their goals (Gray and Lowery 1998; Hojnacki 1998; Mahoney 
2007). As a respondent notes:  
The lobby for smoke-free restaurants and pubs was very successful. Part of its 
success was the decision to build a coalition with several major health 
organisations such as The Netherlands Heart Foundation (Hartstichting) and the 
Dutch Cancer Society (Koningin Wilhelmina Fonds). We agreed with them that we 
would be the official spokesperson for this particular campaign as this issue is at 
the heart of our organisation. For other issues, such as a campaign to stop 
smoking, other organisations will have the lead. 
Interest groups not only form coalitions, they are also likely to experience 
competition from fellow interest groups when attempting to get access to public 
officials on their own. “There are two relatively large patient organisations in the 
Netherlands,” a respondent in this study observes, “and while the other one is our 
largest partner to cooperate with, at the same time, we compete with them over the 
budget and over our position as an important spokesperson for patients in the 
Netherlands.” Such patterns of cooperation and competition will shape the interest 
group environment and shed some light upon how resources are dispersed or 
concentrated within the environment. Patterns of cooperation between similar 
interest groups may reveal the number of interest groups that potentially have 
similar resources or other useful resources to offer for a particular policy problem.7 
The members of the above-mentioned coalition of various health organisations, for 
instance, had similar and additional expertise and information to offer on the 
effects of (passive) smoking on public health. Competition in getting access may 
reflect to what extent civil servants interact with a smaller subset of the existing 
population. The two major umbrella patient organisations represent somewhat 
different groups in society. By talking to only one interest group, civil servants miss 
the perspective of the other groups. Cooperation with other types of organisations 
may provide an indication of the availability of resources relevant to a specific 
policy area in a broader environment than interest groups represent.  
                                                        
7 On the other hand, cooperation may also reduce the number of organisations with which civil servants are 
able to interact. When only a few organisations act as spokespersons, for instance, the actual number of 
organisations with which civil servants interact in this case is relatively small. However, cooperation patterns 
do reveal something of the true dispersal of resources in the environment by showing what kind of relevant 
interest groups exist in respect of a specific policy issue.  
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In other words, revealing such interaction patterns within the interest group 
environment provides some additional information on the extent to which 
resources are concentrated in a bureaucracy’s environment.8 This section studies 
different aspects of interaction patterns within the interest group environment: 
cooperation with similar interest groups, various types of competition interest 
groups may face, and, finally, to what extent interest group interact with a broad 
array of other types of organisations.  
6.3.1 Cooperation with fellow interest groups 
Let me first consider cooperation with fellow interest groups. Figure 6.1 shows the 
percentage of respondents that report that they cooperate with a particular number 
of fellow interest groups. For instance, 20.8 per cent report that they cooperate with 
6-10 other fellow interest groups.  
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Figure 6.1 Cooperation with fellow interest groups 
When asked with how many fellow interest groups they interact (i.e., interest 
groups involved in a similar policy issue), it appears that interest groups either 
interact with a relatively small number of interest groups (33 percent interact with 
1-5 fellow interest groups) or with a relatively large number of other organisations 
(28.7 percent interact with over 15 fellow interest groups). These interaction 
patterns raise two questions: do these patterns vary across different interest 
representation regimes, or do they depend on the kind of interest group? To 
examine the influence of these factors on the number of fellow interest groups with 
which interest groups interact, I conducted an ordered logistic regression analysis. 
Ordered logistic regression was an appropriate choice as the dependent variable 
has been measured at an ordinal level. Both models meet the assumptions: the test 
of parallel lines and goodness-of-fit statistics are insignificant. The results are 
shown in table 6.2. Model 1 is based on the original dataset and model 1 MI is 
based on the complete datasets.  
 
                                                        
8 This is obviously only part of the story. A true measurement of how many interest groups may have to offer 
appropriate resources requires a detailed analysis of each of the interest groups included in this study. 
However, for practical reasons, I have opted to use cooperation with and competition from familiar 
organisations to approximate the extent to which resources are concentrated in the environment.  
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Table 6.2 Ordered logistic regression analysis of the effect of contextual variables on inside resource 
concentration (interactions with fellow interest groups) 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 1 MI
-0.88*** -0.68***
(0.25) (0.23)
0.25 0.19**
(0.10) (0.09)
-0.89 -0.53
(0.64) (0.57)
1.31 1.24
(0.85) (0.81)
-0.23 -0.26
(0.52) (0.48)
-1.01 -0.99
(0.70) (0.65)
0.29 0.003
(0.48) (0.42)
-0.60 -0.64*
(0.38) (0.36)
0.55 0.30
(0.55) (0.50)
0.49 0.38
(0.43) (0.40)
0.76 0.57
(0.70) (0.58)
-0.36 -0.33
(0.42) (0.39)
-0.19 -0.23
(0.51) (0.44)
-0.63 -0.50
(0.69) (0.59)
Cut-points -3.25;-0.86;         0.07; 0.59
-3.12; -0.86;         
0.06; 0.63
pseudo R2 (nagelkerke) 0.13 0.07
Model χ2 38.41(14)*** 32.96(14)***
N 299 345
Dependent Variable: Inside resource concentration 
Interest representation regime
Grants
Private firm
Labour union
(association of) Public institution
NGO voluntary 
NGO consumer 
NGO religious/idealistic
NGO culture/sports/recreation
Other
NGO development 
NGO environment
NGO health care
NGO minorities’ 
 
*** p ≤ 0.01; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10 Note: dummy variables ‘NGO science’ and ‘NGO education’ were 
omitted because the sample did not contain scientific and educational organisations. The reference 
category for different types of interest groups is ‘employers’ associations.’ All two-tailed tests. 
The original dataset reveals a stronger relationship between the variables and a 
stronger overall effect than the complete dataset (pseudo R2 of 0.13 versus 0.07, 
respectively). In the case of the original dataset, interest representation regime (-0.88; 
p ≤ 0.01) produces significant results. Model 1 MI produces significant coefficients 
for interest representation regime (-0.68; p ≤ 0.01) and receiving grants (0.19; p ≤ 
0.05), and kinds of interest groups, in this case development NGOs (-0.64; p ≤ 0.1) as 
compared to the reference category of employers’ associations. A change in interest 
representation regime from the UK to the Netherlands is likely to result in fewer 
fellow interest groups with which interest groups seem to interact. This finding 
indicates that the characteristics of interest representation regimes could influence 
cooperation patterns. The tendency to build coalitions could be less apparent in a 
highly institutionalised interest representation system. An increase in government 
grants, on the other hand, is likely to result in a larger number of fellow interest 
groups with which interest groups interact, according to model 1 MI. While the 
exact nature of such a relationship is impossible to unpack within the limitations of 
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this study, a possible reason could be that organisations receiving grants are often 
invited to collective meetings with other subsidised organisations and/or they are 
urged to work together with other interest groups. In this sense, government grants 
could stimulate cooperation. Or, as grants are most likely to overlap with the kind 
of interest organisations, certain kinds of interest organisations may be more 
inclined to cooperate. However, a change from employers’ organisations to 
development NGOs is likely to result in fewer interactions with fellow interest 
groups (model 1 MI). In general, however, the model has a small explanatory value.  
What could these cooperation patterns imply for the distribution of resources 
within the environment? More generally, we can say that interest groups are 
inclined to interact with either a relatively small or a relatively large number of 
fellow interest groups. As the number of fellow interest groups with which interest 
groups tend to cooperate is likely to decrease from the UK to the Netherlands, one 
could conclude that the concentration of resources is slightly higher in the 
Netherlands than in the UK. Yet, the effect is very small. So, due to cooperation 
with at least a few organisations, concentration of resources may always be 
somewhat mitigated. Providing government grants seems to increase cooperation 
patterns and thus decreases the concentration of resources. In that sense, providing 
grants could help civil servants to better pick and choose the resources they want. 
This finding parallels the case of subsidising immigrant organisations discussed in 
the first chapter. Grants could help agencies to keep in touch with a variety of 
organisations, which in turn could be stimulated to interact more often with each 
other. As a respondent in the Rotterdam case study notes: “The most important 
side-effect of grants is that we can keep in touch.”9 Grants have been shown to 
affect the behaviour of interest groups in the field of immigration policies. 
Examined from the perspective of the political opportunity structure literature, 
these grants create opportunities for immigrants to establish and then maintain 
their organisations. Such patterns vary across countries, depending on their 
immigrant integration regime (Koopmans and Statham 2000; Soysal 1994; de 
Zwart and Poppelaars 2004; 2007). The effect of government grants on the 
behaviour of interest groups is interesting to study further, as it may influence the 
nature of the relationship between civil servants and interest groups.10  
6.3.2 Competition from fellow interest groups 
It is not only cooperation patterns that shape the interest group environment. The 
competition interest groups experience also influences their immediate 
environment and is an indirect measure of inside resource concentration. When 
                                                        
9 Interview by author. 
10 Separate analyses of the UK and the Netherlands would help to better interpret an effect of the funding 
variable. Yet, conducting these analyses resulted in models that did not meet the necessary analytical 
assumptions. In particular, in analysis for the UK, the absence of observations for some categories of interest 
groups rendered the results unreliable. For the Netherlands, some of the separate analyses of the imputed 
datasets and the analysis based on the original dataset produce significant coefficients for the variable 
‘receiving grants’. Although neither of the models based on the Dutch data met the test for the parallel lines 
assumption, we could think of the following hypothesis: Providing grants affects patterns of cooperation, but 
this effect may be related to the type of interest representation regime. Put differently, providing grants and 
corporatism correlate highly. 
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facing severe competition, interest groups will certainly behave differently toward 
each other and also towards civil servants. In addition, access could be seriously 
restricted by severe competition. The extent to which interest groups believe that 
they experience competition from each other is shown in figure 6.2. The figure 
shows the percentages of respondents that report experiencing a particular degree 
of competition with respect to different aspects of exercising influence. The figures 
include a perception of competition regarding access to politicians, access to civil 
servants, access to the policy-making process, getting involved in implementation 
processes and, finally, in receiving government grants. 
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Figure 6.2 Interest groups’ perceptions of competition 
Not many interest groups believe that they face severe competition. Across all of 
the categories, a maximum of 4.2 per cent of the respondents indicate that they 
experience competition to a relatively large extent. In the case of getting grants, a 
relatively large percentage of the respondents indicate that competition is either not 
applicable or that they are not aware of such competition. A relatively large 
proportion of the sample consists of employers’ organisations, which usually do 
not, or only to a small extent, receive government grants. This could explain the 
large percentage of respondents who do not encounter competition in getting 
grants. In getting access to either politicians or civil servants, only 16.4 or 13.9 
percent of the respondents indicate that they face ‘somewhat’ to ‘very much’ 
competition. Yet, in both cases, roughly one-fourth to one-fifth of the respondents 
indicate that they are not aware of competition, or that competition is not 
applicable in their case. However, when they get involved in policy making, a 
relatively large percentage of respondents indicate that they experience ‘somewhat’ 
or ‘very much’ competition (24.2 percent).  
The bottom line is that, although some respondents indicate that they 
experience competition, the perception is that overall competition is not very 
severe. A perception of competition, however, should not be confused with the 
actual existence of competition. These patterns of perceived competition are similar 
to those found in a study of interest group representatives in the American states. 
Roughly 40 percent of the associations and membership groups in that study 
indicated that they sometimes face competition from other interest groups (Gray 
and Lowery 1996b, 103). These authors argue, however, based on niche theory 
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used in population biology, that a perception of competition does not automatically 
imply the absence of competition. Population biology tells us that overt conflict 
with allies, or interacting and cooperating with them, suggests that a particular 
resource is not vital to an organisation’s survival. A lack of interaction, on the other 
hand, could indicate severe competition. Existing interactions between interest 
groups can be seen as the partitioning of resources, which is a vital survival strategy 
that has been shown to result from competition. Rather than engaging in overt 
conflict when in direct competition with species that thrive on similar resources, 
partitioning occurs (Gray and Lowery 1996b). Interest groups that depend on the 
same Member of Parliament for getting access to government, for instance, are less 
likely to directly compete with one another for his/her attention than to seek 
different ways of approaching him/her. Thus, a ‘perception’ of competition 
provides only a particular perspective on this phenomenon and does not in itself 
explain actual competition. When interest groups indicate that they are not aware 
of competition processes, they may still be involved in severe competition. 
Does variation in the type of interest representation regime or in the kind of 
interest organisation explain variation in the degree to which interest groups 
perceive their experience of competition? Illustrative is the following observation by 
a respondent of one of the largest professional associations in the Netherlands: 
“The Socialist Party and our organisation? We are only natural opposites; their 
opinion is always contrary to ours.”11 Also, according to other respondents, whether 
you are an employer’s organisation or an NGO appears to make a difference in 
getting or seeking access to politicians. Could this example point to a more general 
pattern of differences in getting access? Table 6.3 reports the values of a chi-square 
test and Cramer’s V for the association between interest representation regimes 
and competition in getting access to either civil servants or politicians, and between 
different interest groups and competition in getting access to either civil servants or 
politicians.12 Model I is based on the original dataset; model I MI is based on the 
complete dataset.  
The strength of the relationship between these two variables is relatively small. 
According to model I, the differences between kinds of interest groups explain 
variation in the perception of competition in getting access to politicians (χ2 = 
73.12(48), p ≤ 0.05; Cramer’s V = 0.27, p ≤ 0.05). Overall, we can conclude that 
interest groups usually experience competition only to a small extent. 
Interestingly, the level of competition could in theory work both ways. If interest 
groups face a modest degree of competition in getting access to politicians or civil 
servants, this means that, for civil servants or politicians, the concentration of 
resources will be less severe as several interest groups compete for their attention. 
On the other hand, if interest groups face severe competition, this could mean that 
only a few have real access, and thus resources could be more concentrated for civil 
servants. Whether competition reduces or induces concentration of resources is 
likely to depend on whether these interest groups already enjoy access. When 
                                                        
11 Interview by author. 
12 I conducted other types of analyses, yet the statistical assumptions of these individual models were not met 
and the coefficients were insignificant. Therefore, I opted for these analyses for interest representation 
regime and type of organisations and excluded grants as it proved to be an insignificant variable. 
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outside interest groups face considerable competition, the organisations civil 
servants interact with may be restricted and the outside groups could remain 
unknown to civil servants. So, severe competition negatively affects access for 
interest groups that cannot cope with severe competition and are not able to secure 
access. The analyses above show that there is only a small to modest level of 
perceived competition. This would suggest that the degree of dependence is likely 
to be mitigated. If these organisations are unknown to civil servants, however, then 
such modest levels of competition could result in a higher resource concentration. 
Whether competition results in a higher or lower degree of dependence could thus 
very much hinge on familiarity of the civil servant with an interest group  
Table 6.3 The relationship between context and competition  
 Model 1
Χ2 Cramer’s V Χ2 Cramer’s V
6.98(4) 4.13(4)
N = 262 N = 260
73.12(48)** 61.68(48)
N = 259 N =257
 Model 1 MI
Χ2 Cramer’s V Χ2 Cramer’s V
Interest representation regime 8.35(4) 0.15 4.11(4) 0.10
Kinds of interest group 67.34(48) 0.24 58.24(48) 0.21
Interest representation regime 0.16 0.13
Kinds of interest group 0.27** 0.25
Access to politicians Access to civil servants
Access to politicians Access to civil servants
 
*** p ≤ 0.01; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; Model I MI: N = 345; all two-tailed tests 
6.3.3 Interactions with other organisations 
A final indirect measure of resource concentration, in this case outside resource 
concentration, is the extent to which interest groups cooperate with other types of 
organisations, such as advisory councils, consultancy firms or research institutes. 
Again, such a cooperation pattern is not a direct measure of concentration of 
resources. But it may indicate whether interest groups expand their scope of 
activity to achieve what they want, or the extent to which they share their resources 
with other types of organisations. Figure 6.3 shows such cooperation patterns. It 
reports, by organisation type, the percentage of respondents who indicated that 
they tend to interact with such organisations, and how many.  
Interest groups appear to interact with other types of organisations, but only 
with a few of them. Consultancy firms seem to be the least attractive to interest 
groups; 38.5 percent indicate that they never interact with consultancy firms. For 
each category, roughly 50 percent of the respondents indicate that they interact 
with only 1-5 organisations of that particular type. On average, 8 percent of the 
respondents indicate that they cooperate with 6-10 organisations, and only 2 and 3 
percent on average tend to work with 10-15 organisations or with more than 15, 
respectively. Interest groups apparently expand their scope of activity only to a 
limited extent.  
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Figure 6.3 Cooperation between interest groups and other organisations 
A better assessment of such interaction patterns and, eventually, a better 
understanding of its relation to bureaucracy-interest group interactions, are 
needed. As the resource dependence model is designed to be a comparative model, 
it is important to additionally examine whether such cooperation patterns may 
change across different interest regimes or vary across different types of interest 
organisations. To measure such an effect, a multiple regression analysis was 
conducted. In doing so, I followed a similar strategy as in the case of civil servants 
(see section 5.3.3).13 Examination of diagnostics concerning multicollinearity and 
heteroskedasity did not show cause for major concern. However, again similar to 
the civil servant analysis, for both the original and complete datasets, the 
dependent variable deviated from normality, even after several transformations. 
Yet, multiple regression is said to be rather robust for violations of normality (see 
de Vaus 2002), and the sample is large enough to use these analyses for 
interpretation, albeit carefully. Table 6.4 below reports the results of the regression 
analyses. Model 1 represents the analysis based on the original data; model 1 MI 
represents the analysis based on the complete dataset.  
The contextual variables only to small extent explain variance in interaction 
patterns between interest groups and other types of organisations, given the values 
of the adjusted R2 (0.13 and 0.17 respectively). Apparently, interaction patterns with 
a broader set of organisations are not to a large extent influenced by the contextual 
variables in the model. The explanatory value of this model is larger than the 
explanatory value of the model explaining cooperation with fellow interest groups. 
                                                        
13 I established a midpoint for each response category, and, to estimate a total number of other organisations 
with which interest groups interact, I added up these midpoints for each organisation. The disadvantage of 
this approach, similar to the civil servant analysis, is that information on separate types of organisations is 
lost. Moreover, it does not provide an indication of the absolute numbers of other types of organisations with 
which interest groups usually interact. Instead, it provides an indication of the size of interaction patterns 
between interest groups and other types of organisations such as advisory councils or research institutes. 
However, the recoding resulted in a variable that could be interpreted as continuous and, given the easier 
interpretability of multiple regression analysis, this approach was chosen. 
The Interest Group Environment: A View from Within 
139 
Table 6.4 Multiple regression analysis of the effect of contextual variables on outside resource 
concentration (interactions with other organisations) 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 1 MI
-6.80*** -6.62***
(1.80) (1.62)
3.90*** 5.16***
(0.75) (0.73)
-0.47 -1.06
(4.97) (4.03)
-7.60 -12.69
(6.44) (5.17)
1.60 -5.48
(4.01) (3.76)
-5.90 -6.41
(4.76) (4.68)
-5.33 -3.60
(3.40) (2.98)
-6.59** -5.65*
(2.73) (2.51)
-1.30 -1.96
(4.00) (3.53)
-0.94 -2.30
(3.27) (2.86)
-6.30 -4.01
(5.47) (4.20)
-0.05 -1.91
(3.20) (2.75)
-6.10 -4.92
(3.89) (3.16)
-7.21 -3.24
(4.83) (4.15)
18.41*** 18.20***
(1.45) (1.30)
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.17
N 267 345
NGO religious/idealistic
NGO culture/sports/recreation
Other
Constant
NGO development
NGO environment
NGO health
NGO minorities
Labour union
(assocation of) Public institutions
NGO voluntary
NGO consumer
Dependent Variable:                                   
Outside resource concentration
Interest representation regime
Grants
Private firm
 
*** p ≤ 0.01; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10. Note: dummy variables NGO science and NGO education were 
omitted because the dataset did not contain scientific and educational organisations. The reference 
category for different types of interest groups is ‘employers’ associations’; all two-tailed tests. 
Interest representation regime significantly contributes to the number of other 
organisations with which interest groups interact. Its coefficients (-6.80 and -6.62; 
p ≤ 0.01, respectively) imply that when an interest representation regime becomes 
more corporatist in nature, interest groups tend to interact with fewer other 
organisations. This finding corresponds with the results on interactions with fellow 
interest groups. It is difficult to ascertain whether a similar mechanism is at stake 
here, i.e. whether increasingly limited access reduces the tendency to cooperate 
with other organisations. Yet, it can be concluded that interest regimes do have a 
certain impact on cooperation patterns. 
Government grants also produces significant coefficients (3.90 and 5.16; p ≤ 0.01, 
respectively). When an organisation receives government grants, it tends to 
cooperate with more other organisations. This finding is also similar to the case of 
cooperation with fellow interest groups. Grants seem to induce cooperation among 
both fellow interest groups and other types of organisations. Similar to the 
interaction pattern with fellow interest groups, the effect of government grants is 
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rather complex. Inspection of correlations between types of interest groups and 
receiving grants reveals two patterns. First, organisations do not seem to receive 
large grants.14 Second, receiving grants seems to overlap with a certain kind of 
interest groups. The majority of employers’ organisations report that they do not 
receive grants at all or only small ones, whereas the organisations with a relatively 
large proportion of grants usually are different types of NGOs. It could well be the 
case that NGOs are more inclined to build bigger coalitions, perhaps to enhance 
their reputation or their visibility, or as a strategy to ensure better access.  
Finally, in the case of differences in kinds of interest groups, only the difference 
between development NGOs and employers’ organisations seems to significantly 
explain the number of other organisations with which they cooperate (-6.59; p ≤ 
0.05 and -5.65; p ≤ 0.1 respectively). Development NGOs tend to cooperate with 
fewer other organisations than employers’ associations. This finding is contrary to 
the observed effect of grants and the correlation patterns between grants and 
different kinds of interest groups. The types of organisations included in the 
sample, such as consultancy firms, advisory councils and executive agencies, are 
perhaps more natural cooperation partners for employers’ organisations than for 
development NGOs. This could explain the difference. The opposite findings of 
government grants and kinds of interest groups are still a bit puzzling, however. 
Government grants seem to be correlated with variation in kinds of interest group, 
in particular NGOs. Grants seem to increase interaction patterns, whereas 
development NGOs, compared to employers’ organisations, tend to interact with 
fewer other types of organisations. A methodological answer to such a puzzle is 
that this finding may be a result of the relatively large proportion of development 
NGOs included in the sample. The proportion of development NGOs seems to be 
constituted of middle-range to small-range organisations, which perhaps cooperate 
with fewer other types of organisations. A theoretical answer to this problem is that 
the various contextual factors are intertwined and will have a different impact on 
the behaviour of interest groups, depending on their precise configuration. A full 
analysis of the degree of dependence for interest groups should address the 
complex interplay between different contextual factors to model them accordingly.  
6.3.4 Supply of resources revisited 
What can we learn from these findings on cooperation patterns and competition 
between interest groups? In general, the interest groups in this study interact with 
either a relatively small or a relatively large number of fellow interest groups; they 
believe that they do not experience severe competition from each other; and they 
tend to interact with only a few other types of organisations, such as advisory 
councils and research institutes. The interaction patterns between interest groups, 
such as cooperation and competition, will not only influence the survival prospects 
of the interest groups themselves (Gray and Lowery 1996b), but will influence 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions as well. 
                                                        
14 However, we must take into account that this information could be biased, either because of an 
unwillingness or an inability to report a percentage of the total budget that consists of government grants. 
Annual financial reports would provide more accurate indicators, yet that goes beyond the scope of this study.  
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More generally, population dynamics within the environment will influence 
how interest groups seek access and to what extent they are able to do so 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Leech et al. 2005; Lowery and Gray 1995). For the 
dependence model developed in chapter 3, we can infer the following. Modest 
interaction patterns with fellow interest groups show the extent to which resources 
may be dispersed in the interest group environment. When fellow interest groups 
interact, they share some resources that civil servants could need. Large packs of 
organisations that interact could signal a wide dispersion of resources. Small 
collections of interest groups that interact could signal high resource concentration. 
This is also true for interaction patterns with other types of organisations, which 
may reveal variation in resource concentration as well. Levels of competition can 
also say something about the dispersal of resources necessary for civil servants. 
Severe competition may result in limited access for certain, in particular outside, 
interest groups. When newcomers try to get access, they could have difficulties in 
doing so when competition is severe. Severe competition may thus result in limited 
access, and at the same time render the resource concentration higher for civil 
servants, especially in the case of interest groups that do not yet have access. Put 
differently, when certain groups cannot get access because of severe competition, 
they remain unknown to civil servants. This phenomenon could contribute to a 
higher concentration of available resources from a civil servant’s perspective.  
These cooperation and competition patterns have been shown to vary across 
contextual dimensions, such as particular interest representation regimes, extent to 
which an interest group’s budget consists of government grants, and the different 
kinds of interest groups. Although these analyses were not based on a fully-fledged 
theoretical model, these first results show that the contextual variables affect 
population dynamics and thereby resource concentration. Interest group 
population dynamics and how they vary along different political-administrative 
dimensions is thus an important aspect to include in a model explaining resource 
exchanges between bureaucrats and interest groups. It could have a significant 
impact on resource concentration, thereby having consequences for the actual 
degree of dependence characterising interactions between civil servants and 
interest groups. However, as I have previously discussed, not only does resource 
concentration determine the degree of dependence, but resource importance is also 
an important determinant. Below, the resources interest groups have to offer will 
be examined in more detail.  
6.3.5 Resources on the negotiation table  
Obviously, interest groups want to exert influence on relevant policy proposals that 
have an impact on the people or organisations they represent. In order to be 
successful in interest representation, they bring resources to the negotiation table 
and ask for others in return. To examine the resources that interest groups bring to 
the negotiation table, and those which they would like to take away from it, I asked 
respondents to indicate the most important reasons for them to interact with civil 
servants.15 Four reasons were included in the list of reasons given to respondents: 
                                                        
15 As in the civil servants’ survey, I used ‘reasons’ to frame this question on resources, mainly because 
‘resources’ is not a familiar concept for interest organisations to frame their interactions with civil servants. It 
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information, expertise, receiving grants, and participating in implementation of 
public policy. Figure 6.4 shows to what extent respondents consider these 
resources to be important or unimportant. Many respondents (78 percent) rated as 
important the provision of information, and 68 percent so rated the provision of 
expertise. In contrast, roughly 70 and 68 percent rated as unimportant the receipt 
of grants and participation in implementation, respectively (see figure 6.4).  
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Figure 6.4 The importance of resources for interest groups 
Apparently, interest groups do not find it altogether important to take part in 
implementation of policy proposals.16 Such an interest group perspective might 
explain why, in recent studies of interest groups’ access to EU institutions (and 
indeed the access of interest groups in general), information and expertise are the 
main explanatory variables to obtain access and exercise influence (Austen-Smith 
1993; Bouwen 2002, 2004; see for an overview Baumgartner and Leech 1998;). 
Interestingly, if we compare this to the results on what bureaucrats find important, 
a difference emerges. Although both parties value information and expertise, civil 
servants clearly value the role that interest groups may play in implementation 
more than the interest groups themselves do. From the perspective of civil 
                                                                                                                                             
is a theoretical concept used to allow better comparison between bureaucracy-interest group interactions. 
Also similar to the civil servants’ survey, respondents could check as many reasons they found important and 
add one(s) they thought were missing. As discussed earlier, I left out ‘to exert influence’ and ‘to provide 
political support’ to avoid biases due to socially desirable answers. This means, however, that we cannot tell 
from this question whether interest groups perceive their role in providing political support to be important. 
Yet, the open-question option would indicate if obvious reasons were missing from the list, and the answers 
given did not contain references to ‘political support’ or a related phenomenon. 
16 Binary logistic regression analyses have been conducted to examine the importance of the individual 
resources, similar to the analysis of the reasons civil servants stated for interacting with interest groups (see 
section 5.3.3). Each analysis included an individual resource as a dependent variable and interest 
representation regimes, different types of organisation, and receiving grants were included as independent 
variables. These analyses all resulted in highly insignificant results, except for ‘grants.’ The extent to which 
interest groups receive grants also significantly explains whether they would like to obtain grants. This may 
sound like circular reasoning, and to a large degree it is circular reasoning indeed. Yet, the fact that interest 
groups receive grants does not necessarily imply that they consciously want to obtain such grants. They may, 
for instance, have been receiving grants for so many years or perhaps are so well-established that receiving 
grants is not an issue any more.  
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servants, interest groups have to offer more than just information and expertise. 
These different perspectives may have implications for the resource exchange 
relationship. If interest groups do not consider themselves partners in 
implementation, bureaucrats may have difficulties in finding interest groups 
willing to offer that resource. On the other hand, when interest groups are aware 
that they can deliver important information or expertise, they may ‘sell it for a 
higher price.’ We cannot here determine the exact effect of this difference in 
perceptions in this study, yet such diametrically opposed notions of what resources 
are important may well imply a less or more severe degree of dependence and 
should thus be taken into account.  
These different perceptions of resources and the population dynamics 
previously discussed will together determine the degree of dependence that 
characterises bureaucracy-interest group interactions. Based on the findings of 
these analyses, we cannot not exactly determine their effect, but we nonetheless 
obtain a fair impression of their relation to the degree of dependence and whether 
they should be included in a full resource dependence model. These factors will not 
be the sole determinants of such dependence, however. Equally important is how 
interest groups value the access to public policy making offered by bureaucrats. 
This will be examined in the next section. 
6.4 Access to the bureaucracy 
How interest groups value the ‘imperial route,’ as noted in the introduction to this 
chapter, is important for estimating the degree of dependence that characterises 
their relationship with civil servants. If the bureaucracy is at the bottom of their list 
of priorities, bureaucrats will be more dependent on them than if the opposite 
applies. In other words, the idea of an imperial route, suggests that bureaucrats’ 
dependence on interest groups may be mitigated. So, to better interpret the degree 
of dependence for bureaucrats examined in the previous chapters, we need to know 
how often interest groups interact with civil servants, how important they perceive 
civil servants as opposed to other decision makers, and how they assess individual 
aspects of interacting with civil servants.  
6.4.1 With how many public officials interest groups interact 
A first indication of how important the bureaucracy is for interest groups lies in 
measuring with how many (senior) civil servants interest groups usually interact. 
This is depicted in figures 6.5, including civil servants, (under-)Ministers, and 
Members of Parliament. The figure indicates the percentage of interest groups 
interacting with each category of public officials and with how many of those public 
officials they interact. A distinction is made between the Netherlands and the UK 
and between NGOs and professional organisations.  
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All four panels show a somewhat similar pattern. Interest groups in the 
Netherlands interact with fewer senior civil servants than in the UK. In the 
Netherlands, 17.2 percent of the interest groups interact with more than 6 senior 
civil servants, versus 31.2 percent in the UK. The situation is reversed for 
interactions with middle-level civil servants: 48.3 percent of the Dutch interest 
groups interact with more than 6 middle-level civil servants, versus 36.9 percent in 
the UK. And finally, for executive agency civil servants: roughly 25 percent of the 
UK interest groups interact with more than 11 civil servants working at executive 
agencies, whereas in the Netherlands, it is only 13.4 percent.  
Members of Parliament seem to be more popular with interest groups in the 
UK than interest groups in the Netherlands. Roughly 26 percent of the UK interest 
groups report that they have interacted with more than 11 Members of Parliament a 
year, whereas in the Netherlands only 13.6 percent have so interacted. This 
variation seems to reflect differences in interest representation regimes. The fact 
that interest groups in the Netherlands interact with a smaller number of senior 
civil servants than in the UK may reflect a hierarchical organisation of interest 
groups and limited access. Similarly, the fact that interest groups in the UK interact 
with a larger number of Members of Parliaments suggests a pattern of lobbyism 
that is less obvious in the Netherlands. Interest groups tend to interact with more 
agencies in the UK than in the Netherlands, however, which may have something 
to do with the process of agencification as a result of recent reforms in the UK 
(Pollit and Bouckaert 2004). So, interest groups in the UK seem to be keener to 
interact with either senior civil servants or civil servants working at executive 
agencies, whereas in the Netherlands, interest groups tend to interact more with 
middle-level civil servants. And Members of Parliament are more popular among 
UK interest groups than with their Dutch counterparts.  
Comparing the average number of public officials within each category between 
the Netherlands and the UK, we observe interesting results. When conducting t-
tests to compare whether the average numbers vary across the UK and the 
Netherlands, we find a significant result for the number of senior civil servants 
(t(209) = -2.71, p ≤ 0.01) and a significant result for the number of (under-
)Ministers (t(206) = -2.20, p ≤ 0.05).17 Overall, interest groups tend to interact with 
fewer senior civil servants and (under-)Ministers in the Netherlands than in the 
UK. The difference in number of officials with whom interest groups interact 
between these two countries thus lies in the senior officials. Perhaps contrary to the 
expectation of hierarchical interest representation, organisations in the Netherlands 
seem to interact with fewer senior public officials than their English colleagues.  
When we examine differences between various kinds of interest groups and the 
number of public officials they interact with, there are no real differences. The 
same types of public officials seem to be popular among employers’ and non-
governmental organisations. Yet, there is a difference to note in access to senior 
civil servants. That is, 15.1 percent of the employers’ organisations versus 27.5 
percent of the NGOs do not have access to senior civil servants. This may hint at a 
                                                        
17 Strictly speaking, a t-test is not appropriate here given the non-normal distribution of the data (the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was significant) and its ordinal level of measurement. Its non-parametric 
counterpart, a Mann-Witney test, produced almost similar results to the t-tests, however (see Field 2005). 
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bias in getting access in favour of the employers’ organisations. Yet, such a bias 
may have less severe consequences, as access to other types of public officials 
seems to be rather equally dispersed. So, in terms of the number of public officials 
with whom interest groups interact, there is very little difference between civil 
servants and political appointees or parliamentarians. 
When we test whether different kinds of interest group interact with more or 
less different officials, we perceive some differences. Comparing the average 
number of officials between professional organisations versus all other kinds of 
interest groups did not result in significant results. However, the average number 
of officials across the individual categories of interest groups resulted in several 
significant differences.18 The number of senior civil servants (χ2(12) =27.92, p ≤ 
0.01), the number of middle-level civil servants (χ2(12) =29.77, p ≤ 0.01), and the 
number of civil servants at executive agencies (χ2(12) =20.84, p ≤ 0.1) turned out to 
be significantly different across the different kinds of interest groups. So, there is a 
significant variation across different kinds of interest groups and the number of 
various civil servants they interact with, rather than variation in the number of 
politicians versus civil servants. In that sense, a trend to lobbying parliamentarians 
may be also related to other factors than differences among interest groups. 
6.4.2 Importance and frequency of interactions with public officials 
So, there are some differences in the sheer number of different public officials with 
whom interest groups tend to interact. But on the whole, there is only a small 
variation to be observed. Would there be a similar small variance if we examined 
how often interest groups interact with civil servants and how important they 
perceive their interactions with civil servants, compared to those with politicians? 
Figures 6.6 show the frequencies of the answer categories to these questions. What 
we observe is that most of the interest groups interact less often with politicians. 
Indeed, 64.9 percent indicate that they interact more often or much more often 
with civil servants than with politicians. In addition, most interest groups perceive 
civil servants to be an important partner for exerting influence; 87.1 percent 
indicate that civil servants are important or very important for them in this regard.  
Examining the differences in frequency between the Netherlands and the UK 
and across different kinds of interest groups, we find a significant difference (t 
(201) = 2.90, p ≤ 0.01) for interest representation regime and for kinds of interest 
groups (χ2 (12) =30.27, p ≤ 0.01). On average, interest groups in the Netherlands 
interact somewhat more often with civil servants than their UK colleagues. And, 
apparently, the frequency of interacting with civil servants also significantly varies 
across different kinds of interest groups. Additionally, when we compare the 
average value that interest groups attach to civil servants, there are significant 
differences across different interest representation regimes (t(201) = 1.77, p ≤ 0.1) 
as well. Interest groups in the Netherlands find civil servants more important in 
exerting influence than interest groups in the UK. However, the various kinds of 
interest groups do not significantly differ in how important they consider civil 
servants for exerting influence.  
                                                        
18 Given the non-normal distribution of the data, I used a non-parametric test to examine whether there are 
significant differences in number of officials to be observed. 
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Figures 6.6 The importance of civil servants to interest groups 
In short, interest groups tend to interact with roughly similar numbers of civil 
servants and politicians. The importance of civil servants for interest groups and 
the frequency with which they interact with civil servants generally varies between 
the UK and the Netherlands. Dutch interest groups tend to interact more often 
with civil servants and tend to find them more important than their UK colleagues. 
In addition, the importance of civil servants varies only across different kinds of 
interest groups. And UK interest groups interact with more senior civil servants 
and executive agencies, whereas their Dutch colleagues interact with more middle-
level civil servants.  
6.4.3 Why bureaucrats are important 
Civil servants are important, albeit not in numbers. But why are they more 
important for interest groups than politicians? In other words, are there some 
general tendencies to observe underlying the importance of bureaucrats for interest 
groups? One way to examine this is to conduct a factor analysis for various 
propositions concerning the mechanisms that explain the importance of 
bureaucrats for interest groups. Factor analysis, or principal component analysis, is 
a technique for identifying a group or a cluster of variables that are related to each 
other. Variables that correlate highly, and are together relatively independent from 
others, are considered as belonging to a single cluster and thought to reflect an 
underlying shared dimension or meaning (Tabachnik and Fidell 2007). Principal 
component analysis and factor analysis, however, are theoretically not the same. 
The difference between the two is whether variables are associated with a factor or 
with a component. Factors are thought to cause the variables; that is, the 
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underlying construct is what produces scores on the variables. Components, on the 
other hand, are aggregates of correlated variables. So, here the variables seem to 
produce the component (Tabachnik and Fidell 2007, 609-610). Practically, the two 
methods of analysis seem to result in similar findings and, accordingly, the term 
factor and component are often used interchangeably (de Vaus 2002; Field 2005).  
In this study, I will explore whether various propositions on the importance of 
bureaucrats for interest groups are the result of one or more underlying latent 
variables. The questionnaire contained two items consisting of nine sub-items 
designed to reflect different aspects concerning the importance of bureaucratic 
access (items 19 and 20, see appendix I). To reveal the underlying processes, if any, 
I used principal component analysis with oblique rotation to take into account the 
multifaceted phenomenon of exerting influence. Rotation is a technique used to 
better interpret the results of principal component analysis or factor analysis. A 
factor can be mathematically visualised as one of the axes of a graph (see Field 
2005, 634-635). Using the terminology of these methods, when there are obvious 
underlying factors, individual variables ‘load highly’ onto a factor, meaning that 
they correlate highly with an underlying variable. Returning to the imaginary 
graph, they will concentrate along one of the axes. Usually most variables load 
highly on one factor and to a smaller extent on another. This renders interpretation 
relatively difficult and that is why the technique of rotation is used. We simply 
rotate the axes so as to make sure that as many variables as possible are located on 
one of the axes representing a factor. Orthogonal rotation assumes that the factors 
are independent from each other. Visually, this means that the axes of the graph 
remain perpendicular. Oblique rotation is used when the underlying factors are 
assumed to correlate theoretically. With oblique rotation, the axes do not have to 
remain perpendicular, but may be given any angle (Fidell and Tabachnik 2007).  
I used oblique rotation (direct oblimin) because the underlying factors are likely 
to correlate. Exerting influence is a multifaceted phenomenon, which will be 
constituted of different but related aspects in a causal process. That is, exerting 
influence is only possible if one knows the right person to talk to. And, for getting 
access, one needs to bring valuable resources to the negotiation table. The 
underlying factors that render a bureaucracy important for interest groups are thus 
hypothesised to be multifaceted phenomena with aspects that correlate.  
Table 6.5 reports the results of the principal component analysis. It displays the 
individual variables (or sub-items) and the extent to which they correlate with an 
underlying factor.19 Two factors or components seem to emerge from these nine 
sub-items, as we can observe two clusters of variables. Model 1 is based on the 
original data and model 1 MI is based on the complete dataset generated by 
multiple imputation.  
                                                        
19 The values for the complete dataset are based on two of the imputed files; factor analysis on the third 
dataset revealed three factors, rendering it difficult to average the values. 
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Table 6.5 Principal component analysis of the importance of civil servants to interest groups 
Individual aspects concerning the importance of civil servants C I C II C I C II
Without civil servants we miss important access 0.82 0.76
Without civil servants we would not be involved in the implementation of public policies 0.78 0.81
Without civil servants we do not have as much influence 0.71 0.55
Without civil servants we are not included in a set of familiar organisations 0.68 0.81
Without civil servants we do not get grants as easily 0.58 0.55
Civil servants ask us to give input -0.87 0.85
Civil servants use our input to adapt policy -0.83 0.83
Civil servants find legitimacy important -0.77 0.77
Civil servants see us as partner in implementing policy -0.75 0.61
Model 1 Model 1 MI
 
Note: C = component; Model I: KMO-test: 0.79; Bartlett's test of sphericity χ2 = 323.86(36)***; N = 
110; Model I MI: KMO-test: 0.80; Bartlett's test of sphericity χ2 = 1014.45(36)***; N = 345 
Closer examinations of the individual items that load on the same factor suggest a 
distinction between what we could term ‘participation in public decision making’ 
and ‘limited access.’ Participation in public decision making refers to the ability to 
genuinely provide input and a sense of whether civil servants actually use the input 
of interest groups to change or improve policy proposals. Individual items that 
belong to this factor include, for instance, (dis)agreement with the statement that 
‘civil servants use the input of interest groups to adapt policy proposals,’ or 
(dis)agreement with the statement that ‘civil servants ask interest groups to provide 
input.’ Such activities or observations relate to interest groups’ actual participation 
or contribution to policy making. The second factor relates to an interest group’s 
ability to get access as such, even before it is able to provide input or to exert 
influence. Items that load on this factor include, for instance, (dis)agreement with 
the statement that ‘without civil servants, interest groups could not contribute to 
implementation;’ or (dis)agreement with the statement that ‘without civil servants, 
interest groups would not be included in the set of organisations that get access to 
the (under-)Minister.’ These items all relate to whether the door is open for interest 
groups and do not include a sense of actual participation in the policy-making 
process. An open door is a necessary condition for the possibility to actually 
participate in decision making. However, access does not automatically guarantee 
that input will be taken seriously or will actually be used, as is illustrated by a 
respondent. “It is not about getting access per se; these days it is not so difficult to 
find a civil servant to talk to. It is about getting to the right person and that you 
really are able to exert influence.”20  
So, from the perspective of interest groups, interacting with civil servants is 
important, first, to secure access and, second, to be actually taken seriously. 
Apparently, civil servants are a more important partner for achieving this than 
politicians are, given that we see differences in importance as well as a similarity in 
the sheer numbers of public officials that interest groups interact with.21 This 
                                                        
20 Interview by author. 
21 Although the samples are too small to justify separate factor analyses for both the UK and the Netherlands, 
I conducted separate analyses to see whether there are differences to observe. Interestingly, the factors that 
emerge in both countries are quite similar. For the UK case, a third factor emerges: the fact that civil servants 
involve interest groups in implementation. This may be a distinctive underlying mechanism for the UK, 
which is an interesting hypothesis to examine further.  
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finding suggests the need to examine how important each of the public actors is for 
interest groups in exerting influence. Only focusing on the resources interest 
groups have to offer may explain access, but not necessarily influence. It is 
therefore important to consider additional factors, for instance, political-
administrative relations or agency type, to unravel the interdependent mechanisms 
of getting access and exerting influence. Such a meso-level analysis is not only 
important in determining the nature of bureaucracy-interest group interactions, 
but also in more systematically explaining access and influence of interest groups.  
Now that resource concentration and resource importance in the interest group 
environment have been examined, as well as how interest groups value the 
bureaucratic entrance, one final environmental factor has to be studied. That is the 
extent to which bureaucracy-interest group interactions, and the underlying 
resource exchanges, will vary as a result of Europeanisation.  
6.5 How far away is Europe? 
Europeanisation, as has been discussed previously, can mean a variety of things, as 
we have seen earlier. An important question for this study is to what extent 
relations between national civil servants and national interest groups are 
influenced by the process of Europeanisation. Consider figure 6.7 depicting the 
relevance of two EU-related activities for civil servants.22 It shows the percentage of 
the respondents indicating how relevant for their job they consider the 
transposition of EU directives and how relevant for their job they consider the 
involvement of interest groups in EU-level decision making.  
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Figure 6.7 Civil servants' opinions about the relevance of EU transposition and involving interest 
groups in EU policy 
Roughly 54 percent of the civil servants indicate that transposition of EU directives 
is not relevant at all, not so relevant, or neither relevant nor irrelevant. The 
involvement of national interest groups in EU-level policy making and decision 
                                                        
22 Based on the original bureaucracy-interest group dataset. 
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making is for 75 percent of the civil servants not relevant at all, not so relevant, or 
neither relevant nor irrelevant. Only 25 percent of the civil servants indicate that it 
is somewhat relevant to very relevant for their job to include national interest 
groups in policy making and decision making related to EU issues or with an EU- 
related component. 
What these figures seem to suggest is that the involvement of interest groups in 
EU-related policy activities is relatively small. To unravel how Europeanisation 
relates to national bureaucracy-interest group interactions, I will examine whether 
both sets of actors notice an impact of Europe on their interactions or whether they 
are otherwise involved in European affairs. I first examine whether and how 
various aspects of EU involvement relate to national bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions from a bureaucratic perspective. This includes whether interest groups 
often refer to European regulations, and whether national civil servants interact 
with EU level interest groups (item 28 and 29, see appendix I). Figures 6.8 show to 
what extent civil servants how often interest groups refer to EU regulations and 
with how many EU level interest groups national civil servants interact.23  
Panel 6.8.1 depicts the percentage of respondents indicating how often interest 
groups refer to EU regulations when they interact with them. We notice that 47.2 
percent report that interest groups only occasionally mention EU regulations (the 
category 1-25 percent of the time). Only 11.6 percent of the respondents indicate 
that interest groups refer to EU regulations more than half of the time they interact 
with each other (categories 51-75 and 76-100 percent of the time). When asked with 
how many EU level interest groups they interact, 66.0 percent of the civil servants 
report that they do not interact with EU-level interest groups at all, and 31.7 percent 
say that they interact with 1-5 EU-level interest groups. Only 2.3 percent interact 
with 6 or more EU-level interest groups. Interactions with EU-level interest groups 
thus seem to be a relatively rare phenomenon (see panel 6.8.2).24  
                                                        
23 There was no significant effect to be observed from the contextual variables included in earlier analyses. To 
estimate the effect of EU regulations on interactions between national bureaucrats and interest groups, I ran 
ordered logistic regression analyses. I conducted logistic regression analyses of how often interest groups 
refer to EU regulations; and with how many EU-level interest groups the civil servants interacted. The 
contextual variables included in the models were the same as in the analyses of the resource dependence 
model of chapter 5, i.e. interest representation regime, political-administrative relations, agency type and 
policy area. These models resulted in non-significant overall results and non-significant results for the 
individual parameters. Apparently, how often national interest groups refer to EU regulations, and with how 
many EU-level interest groups national civil servants interact, does not vary significantly across the set of 
contextual variables included in the analyses. 
24 Source: original dataset, interest group survey. 
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Figure 6.8.1
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Figures 6.8 EU aspects concerning national bureaucracy-interest group interactions 
These figures indicate that the overall relevance of EU level governance to national 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions is quite small. It is important to note that 
what has been measured is the perceived impact of EU regulations, rather than a 
direct, more objective effect. We do not know from these questions to what extent 
existing or upcoming EU regulations and directives truly influence the behaviour 
or strategic opportunities of interest groups. Rather, we know the extent to which 
they are aware of EU regulations, and that interest groups apparently do not seize 
the opportunity to strategically use EU regulations at the national level. The EU 
seems to be only to a limited extent important for bureaucrats in their interactions 
with interest groups. True multi-level governance, entailing interactions with EU-
level interest groups, seems to be a rare phenomenon as well.  
But how do national interest groups cope with Brussels at home? The figures 
below show whether the interest groups included in this study lobby EU 
institutions, whether such EU lobbying affects their national lobbying, and how 
they perceive the importance of Europe more generally. A further set of items 
probed the strategic use of EU regulations by interest groups in their national 
lobbying (items 31-37, see appendix I). Figures 6.9 show the percentage of the 
respondents indicating the extent to which the various EU-related activities or EU 
aspects are important for their organisations.  
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Roughly two-thirds of the organisations in the sample note that they never interact 
with EU institutions (see figure 6.8.2). And 65 percent of those interest groups that 
do interact with EU institutions say that their interactions do not have any impact 
on their interactions with national government. None of them report that EU 
interactions affect their national interactions very much, and only 8 percent 
indicate that their EU interactions somewhat influence their national interactions. 
Panel 6.9.2 shows several aspects related to the strategic use of EU regulations at 
the national level. All three lines converge to a very small proportion of the 
respondents, indicating that these aspects are not so relevant for the major part of 
their interactions. Relatively more interest groups either never (36.5 percent) or 
only occasionally (37 percent, 1-25 percent of the time) refer to EU regulations 
during their interactions with national civil servants. And 17.6 percent of the 
respondents indicate that they do so more than 50 percent of the time (51-75 plus 
76-100 percent of the time).  
When asked how often EU regulations influence their opportunities at the 
national level, most respondents indicate that this is never the case. Restrictions on 
national opportunities never occur, according to 53.5 percent of the respondents. 
Enhancement of national-level opportunities also never occurs, according to 44.4 
percent. Occasionally, interest groups perceive an impact of EU; 22.5 percent 
indicate restriction, and 37 percent indicate enhancement up to 1-25 percent of the 
time. Only 3.5 percent of the organisations indicate that EU regulations usually (76-
100 percent of the time) restrict opportunities at the national level. This is true for 
1.5 percent of the respondents in the case of enhancing national opportunities. 
More generally, 30 percent say that the EU is either somewhat more important or 
much more important than the national level today (see panel 6.9.3).  
So, most interest groups indicate that the EU level is less important or that they 
cannot draw a conclusion about the importance of the EU level compared to the 
national level today. These figures seem to indicate that although on average they 
consider Europe to be somewhat important, most interest groups have only to a 
small extent changed their focus toward Brussels. Moreover, they are either not 
able or not aware of the opportunities or challenges that EU regulations or 
directives may have to offer for their strategic position at the national level. This 
general picture is confirmed by interviews with Dutch interest groups:  
The air-quality directive was a little disaster I would say. We should have lobbied 
the EU much more proactively to influence European decision making on this 
topic. We did not notice and so we were too late to change anything.  
The air quality directive, and some others, was a signal to us that we should be 
involved in EU decision making to a much larger extent. 
Europe is important and I would like to have more than one person working in 
Brussels, but it is always difficult to make sure our member organisations 
understand the added value of lobbying Brussels. 
Yes, Brussels is important and I certainly would like to have more employees 
working on it, yet I do not have enough money to do so.25 
                                                        
25 All quotes are from interviews by author. 
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Adapting their behaviour to reflect a changing governmental environment or, put 
differently, transitioning to a situation of multi-level governance, thus seems 
laborious for interest groups. Only a small part of the interest groups included in 
the survey indicate that the EU is really important for them. Yet, most of the 
interview partners argue that Europe is indeed important, but remains difficult for 
them to ‘get a grip on.’ It is not always a question of enough (financial) resources at 
one’s disposal. Even in the case of one of the professional associations in the 
Netherlands, usually one amongst those that are quite active in Brussels, Europe is 
not always top priority. As a civil servant comments:  
Europe is really underexposed. The other day, there was a meeting of the advisory 
committee of social partners and national governments. Representatives of one of 
our national peak organisations could not make it to Brussels and asked me to 
present their point of view. Isn’t that a bit odd? The first ten minutes, I was 
presenting the national government’s point of view, and five minutes later I had 
to ensure that everyone knew that I was representing the interest groups’ view 
rather than that of my own government. It was like performing a play. But 
apparently they did not consider it important enough.26  
In some cases, even large national interest groups do not seem to consider Europe 
to be one of their top priorities and leave the responsibility for representing their 
members to a national civil servant. Neglect of the EU may not be only a result of a 
lack of financial resources, but may be also part of framing. What organisations 
consider important or not does not necessarily reflect an objective situation (see 
Weick’s (1969) concept of the ‘enacted environment,’ discussed in chapter 3). The 
EU seems much less popular in the Netherlands nowadays than it was before.27 
This may not be helpful in directing influence strategies towards Brussels. 
Dominant national ideas on the importance and relevance of Europe could be a 
determining factor explaining why interest groups are slow in turning their gaze 
towards Brussels in addition to more traditional arguments of missing resources.  
In sum, although the EU is seen as an important factor, national civil servants 
and interest groups only to a small extent have broadened their view to Brussels. 
These findings indicate that the national governance level is apparently the most 
important locus for interest groups to exert influence, despite a growing 
importance of the EU. A full appreciation of the effect of the EU on national 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions, however, goes beyond the scope of this 
study. Nonetheless, these results indicate that EU interest representation and 
national interest representation are two relatively separate worlds. Multi-level 
governance, in the sense of a true interplay of different levels of governance, is, in 
the case of bureaucracy-interest group interactions, a rare event. For now, we could 
cautiously conclude that Europeanisation so far does not have major consequences 
for interactions between national bureaucrats and national interest groups. 
Europeanisation, so far, thus has fewer consequences for the degree of dependence 
characterising national bureaucracy-interest group interactions than the objective 
importance of the phenomenon itself suggests.  
                                                        
26 Idem. 
27 NRC (2008), 17-18 May, p. 3-4; The Economist (2008), May 3rd, p36. 
Chapter 6 
156 
6.6 The resource dependence model revisited 
This chapter shed light on several aspects of the interest group environment, 
including interaction patterns among interest groups, the perceived importance of 
bureaucracies to interest groups, and Europeanisation. Interaction patterns among 
fellow interest groups are characterised by either a relatively large or a relatively 
small number of fellow interest groups. UK interest groups tend to interact with a 
larger number of fellow interest groups than their Dutch colleagues do. 
Interactions with other types of organisations, such as advisory councils, 
consultancy firms or research institutes, are usually limited to a small number of 
these organisations. Apart from interacting with each other and other types of 
organisations, interest groups do not experience severe competition from fellow 
interest groups. Such a perception of competition is not related to differences in 
interest representation or kinds of interest groups for the respondents in this study. 
In the case of access to politicians, however, there is a difference to be observed 
between different kinds of interest groups in the level of competition they face.  
What do interest groups consider important to bring to the negotiation table? 
Expertise and information are much more important than contributing to 
implementation or getting grants, according to interest groups. Their perception 
differs from that of the civil servants, who consider the contribution interest groups 
can have in implementation important as well.  
Interest groups find the bureaucracy an important source of access to public 
policy making and exerting influence. This is not, however, reflected in the number 
of public officials, including civil servants and elected officials such as Ministers 
and Members of Parliament, with whom they interact. In general, namely, there is 
not much difference between the numbers of different public officials with whom 
interest groups interact. But we see some variation across different interest 
representation regimes. UK interest groups seem to interact with more senior civil 
servants and (under-)Ministers than their Dutch counterparts. Dutch interest 
groups interact with a larger number of middle-level civil servants than their UK 
colleagues. In sheer numbers, however, there is not much difference between civil 
servants and elected officials. Yet, in terms of frequency and perception, there is. 
Interest groups tend to find civil servants more important than politicians and 
interact more often with them in trying to exert influence. In this case, Dutch 
interest groups interact more often with civil servants than UK interest groups do. 
Various kinds of interest groups also vary in how often they interact with civil 
servants. And, on the whole, interest groups in the Netherlands consider civil 
servants to be more important for exerting influence than their UK colleagues.  
What is it that makes civil servants so important for interest groups? Interest 
groups consider civil servants to be important in ensuring access to public policy 
making. And second, civil servants are important for interest groups to actually 
provide input for policy proposals, indicating that their input is actually used to 
adapt policy proposals. Civil servants are thus considered to be more important in 
securing access and actually contributing in some way to the decision-making 
process compared to politicians, given the similarity in numbers and yet the 
different value interest groups attach to civil servants as opposed to politicians as a 
source for access and exerting influence.  
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Finally, a major change in the environment of interest groups in the 
Netherlands and the UK, namely Europeanisation, does not seem to have a large 
impact on national bureaucracy-interest group interactions. The national 
governance level is still the most important level for interest groups in exerting 
influence. Both civil servants and interest groups rarely engage in true multi-level 
governance or consciously anticipate strategic benefits or disadvantages coming 
from EU regulations.  
6.6.1 The interest group environment and the dependence model 
These environmental dynamics, being cooperation and competition patterns, 
interest group perceptions of the importance of the bureaucracy, and the small 
impact of Europeanisation, all have implications for the degree of dependence 
model. First, cooperation and competition patterns have consequences for resource 
concentration in the interest group environment. When we observe cooperation 
patterns among fellow interest groups, this could imply that there are several 
organisations controlling a similar resource. Such cooperation patterns may thus 
create a resource concentration that is less severe than otherwise could be the case. 
That is, cooperation patterns could imply that civil servants have alternative 
organisations to interact with. Competition, on the other hand, could result in a 
degree of dependence that is more severe. Severe competition could hamper some 
interest groups in gaining access to civil servants. In this way, a civil servant may be 
unaware of several relevant interest groups, which would thus render the number 
of interest groups with whom he/she interacts smaller than it could be. So, 
competition and cooperation patterns influence resource concentration in the 
environment. For the resource dependence model to fully explain bureaucracy-
interest group interactions, such population dynamics need to be considered.  
Resource concentration is not the only determinant of resource dependence. 
How interest groups value the resources they can bring to the negotiation table is 
also important. It appears that, particularly in the case of implementation capacity, 
their perception of important resources varies from civil servants’ perceptions. This 
difference in perception could have implications for the degree of dependence. 
When interest groups are not directly aware of the value of what they offer to civil 
servants, this may be beneficial to civil servants. However, such unawareness could 
also result in a higher degree of dependence, because civil servants are not able to 
find interest groups that can offer or are willing to offer the resource they want. 
When interest groups are aware of the importance of the resources they can offer, 
this may enhance their bargaining position. They could, as it were, try to ‘sell their 
resources at a higher price.’ The resource dependence model thus needs to take 
into account different perceptions of the importance of resources. 
To what extent population dynamics and the importance of resources determine 
the eventual degree of dependence also depends on how interest groups value the 
bureaucracy or civil servants in getting access. Access to public policy making is an 
important resource for interest groups. Although interest groups do not interact 
with a larger number of civil servants, they find civil servants more important for 
gaining access and exerting influence. They also interact more often with civil 
servants than with politicians. The importance of this particular resource for 
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interest groups may balance, or in some cases even mitigate, the degree of 
dependence for civil servants. In other words, the value interest groups attach to 
civil servants may enhance the bargaining position of civil servants.  
A final implication of the environmental dynamics examined in this chapter is 
the impact of Europeanisation. The analyses suggest that while both sets of actors 
perceive Europe to be a relatively important factor, they seem unable to actually 
incorporating it in their daily business. This implies that, so far, EU-related 
changes in the environment do not affect national bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions or the degree of dependence. Theoretically, however, Europeanisation 
could have implications for the degree of dependence, as it may affect both 
resource concentration and resource importance. Offering expertise, for instance, 
could become less important for national civil servants when most of the 
regulations are designed at the European level. Europeanisation could imply that 
the environment becomes larger, including more interest groups, but at the same 
time entailing a gradual shift of attention towards Brussels. In other words, while 
there are more interest groups, the value they attach to national bureaucracies for 
gaining access may change. This implies that resource concentration may become 
more severe for national bureaucrats. Not so much because of population dynamics 
within the national interest group populations, but as a result of a changing 
broader environment in which these national populations exist.  
What these environmental and population dynamics suggest is that a full 
resource dependence model should not only include contextual variables that are 
particularly important for civil servants’ behaviour. A full resource dependence 
model would thus measure the degree of dependence from a civil servant’s 
perspective, while taking into account the impact of contextual variables related to 
interest group population dynamics, the value of resources, and broader 
environmental changes as well. The challenge in doing so is to theorise how exactly 
these contextual variables relate to each other. Including contextual variables that 
mostly relate to civil servants’ immediate environment does not take into account 
how interest group population dynamics may render the eventual degree of 
dependence less or more severe.  
6.6.2 The dependence model and interest group politics 
The analysis of environmental dynamics not only has implications for the model of 
resource dependence developed in this study. It also has several implications for 
the literature on interest group politics more generally. First, interest 
representation in Europe is not only an issue of lobbying Brussels. It is also an 
issue of how national interest groups are coping with Brussels back home. In other 
words, we need to better understand the consequences for interest group behaviour 
at the national level arising from the multi-level governance system of the EU. 
Currently, most attention is, quite understandably, focused at the European level 
(Berkhout and Lowery 2008; Beyers and Trondal 2004; Coen 2007; Eising 2007; 
Wilts 2001). Europe, at least in an objective sense, is becoming more important. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that most attention is paid to EU interest 
representation. Yet, it is also not unlikely that, for the foreseeable future, the 
national governance level will remain important. And thus interest groups will 
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mostly focus on national governments. From that perspective, we need to better 
understand how national interest groups and national bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions are influenced by the process of Europeanisation. Are interest groups 
really too much tied to their immediate environment to turn their gaze more 
swiftly to Brussels (Beyers, Kerremans 2007; Visser and Wilts 2006)? Also, how do 
institutional and public interest groups cope with Europeanisation? Such 
phenomena are now to a lesser extent the subject of interest representation studies. 
But to understand European integration better, a true understanding of what multi-
level governance really means for national interest representation and national civil 
society seems prerequisite.  
Second, focusing on what interest groups have to offer to explain access is not 
enough. Civil servants’ preferences and how they vary across different political-
administrative dimensions are also important in explaining interest groups’ access, 
as we have seen in the previous chapter. In addition, not only what interest groups 
have to offer, but what they perceive to be important to offer also explains access to 
the bureaucracy. Access and real influence are important resources for interest 
groups, but they do not mean the same thing. A more detailed examination of the 
payoff of different access options in exerting influence is therefore important in 
understanding the role of interest groups in decision making.  
This brings me to a third implication of the analyses in this chapter. The 
necessity to include interest group population dynamics draws attention to a gap in 
the literature on interest representation regimes in corporatist countries. The 
attention in the literature on corporatism has been mostly directed to macro-
economic issues, the involvement of the social partners therein, and how to 
improve coordination mechanisms of such tripartite bargaining (Meer van der et al. 
2003; Molina and Rhodes 2002; Visser and Hemerijck 1997). Yet, very often, 
issues relevant in social-economic policy or macro-economic policy do not only 
touch upon classic labour and financial system related issues. Issues such as 
corporate responsibility, environmental issues, and ethnically diverse societies all 
very much relate to a nation’s economic life as well. Illustrative are the findings 
from the interviews in this study. As several respondents from the established 
interest groups and NGOs noted, the Social Economic Council (SER) often reaches 
out to NGOs in order to consult them on several policy issues. On the other hand, 
respondents also indicate that it is sometimes difficult for NGOs to get access to 
these institutional platforms of interest representation. Other respondents say that 
the role of NGOs has been changing and that they are becoming increasingly 
important for both civil servants and parliamentarians. The major parties currently 
involved in macro-economic policy making may be less well-equipped to address 
additionally relevant issues. They often lack the knowledge and access to specific 
issues or groups within society.  
Understanding why such bargaining systems remain relatively closed to other 
types of interest groups, or why the role of such interest groups is different from 
the traditional social partners, requires a broader study of interest representation 
than only the traditional coordination mechanisms apparent in the corporatism 
literature. This implies that studying influence in decision making or evaluating 
policy outcomes may not be enough. Studying the characteristics of the entire 
population of interest groups may help to provide additional insights about who 
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gets access and who does not. And, such a broader, more population-based view 
may help to explain from whom and when the traditional interest groups 
experience competition. Such population studies have become popular only 
relatively recently in the US (Aldrich et al. 1994; Lowery and Gray 2004). And 
while interaction patterns among interest groups have been studied, the literature 
is relatively silent on these issues in traditionally corporatist countries. It may be 
time to focus on population dynamics in traditionally corporatist countries as well.  
This chapter added a more detailed perspective on the bureaucrats’ 
environment, and in particular, the interest group environment. It shows the 
relevance of adding interest group population dynamics to better explain the degree 
of dependence characterising bureaucracy-interest group interactions. Chapters 5 
and 6, however, have not addressed important rival explanations for the nature of 
the resource exchange determining bureaucracy-interest group interactions. That 
is, the possibility of anticipatory and habitual rationality has not yet been included 
in the analyses. These two behavioural logics will be examined in chapter 7. 
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Degree of Dependence:           
Multiple rationalities at work? 
Twee theorieën over een verschijnsel zijn geen legitimatie voor intellectuele non-interventie,                  
maar een uitdaging voor een overkoepelende theorie1  
7.1 Introduction 
A pendulum will never change direction but will slow down and ultimately stop 
swinging as a result of the air’s friction. When such a friction is counterbalanced, 
however, the pendulum will infinitely swing back and forth between the two 
ultimate points that determine its movement.2 Interactions between the Dutch 
government and the country’s major social partners and NGOs seem to be 
determined by a similar swinging back and forth. The government may take 
opposite directions, either in favour of interactions with such interest organisations 
or against them, but the end result always seems to be a government characterised 
by a steady pattern of interactions with its well-known national interest groups. 
Such interactions may vary in intensity, however, as a result of variation in the 
political affiliation of the reigning coalition and the economic life cycle (see Meer 
van der et. al 2003). Nonetheless, the big picture of bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions in the Netherlands seems to be that of a punctuated equilibrium (cf. 
Baumgartner and Jones 1993), where the punctuations are neither complete nor 
very severe. The notion of “we need each other,” indicated by many respondents 
with regard to initiating reforms and anticipating future developments, seems too 
strong to allow for complete interruptions to these interactions. Apparently, the 
bureaucracy-interest group interaction pendulum is dictated by other than 
exclusively strategic choices.  
Would deliberately interrupting these relations be possible? The possibility of 
strategic decision making, which is central to resource dependence theory (Pfeffer 
and Salancik 2003[1978]) and which has been incorporated in the model tested in 
the previous chapters, implies the option of ‘exiting’ such interactions whenever 
necessary. Indeed, when one aims for full independence or when the resources one 
has to offer are no longer needed, why continue such interactions? From the 
perspective of resource dependence theory, long-term interactions exist because 
they are strategically chosen to last, but can be ended any time.  
                                                        
1 Prof. dr. C. Teulings (2008), ‘Markt en Moraal gaan hand in hand, alleen aan jezelf denken loont niet in de 
evolutie’, NRC Handelsblad, zaterdag 2 februari, Opinie en Debat, p. 11. 
2 The air’s friction can be counterbalanced by an electro-magnetic field. As a result, a pendulum will swing 
endlessly. This is called a mathematical pendulum, and Foucault used it to demonstrate the earth’s 
movement (‘de historie van de slinger’, www.rug.nl/fwn/nieuws/pr/jaar-natuurkunde/slinger/historie/index) 
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When considering such long-term interactions in more detail, however, we 
encounter two other, even rival, explanations. First, long-term interactions can be 
the result of habitual rationality. That is, they may either unconsciously serve a 
strategic or rational purpose decided upon some time ago, or they may constitute a 
situation where routine has taken over and the interaction no longer serves its 
initial strategic purpose (Simon 1997[1947]). Second, these long-term interactions 
can be dictated by anticipatory rationality. If you anticipate that you will need a 
particular interest group in the near future, you may opt to continue working 
together today, although you might prefer not to do so (see chapter 3 for a more 
detailed discussion). So, bureaucracy-interest group interactions can also be 
determined by anticipatory or habitual rationality in addition to, or instead of, the 
strategic rationality implicit in resource dependence theory.  
This final empirical chapter tests the existence of these different types of 
rationality and examines their explanatory potential. As I discussed in chapter 3, 
multiple rationalities are only to be revealed when studied over time. A true 
longitudinal research design was not possible in this research, and therefore I 
followed the following strategy to unravel the potential existence of both 
anticipatory and habitual rationality. First, I included several items in the 
questionnaire designed to reveal behaviour related to either habitual rationality or 
anticipatory rationality. Section 7.1 discusses the results of these analyses.  
To study the (joint) contribution of the three types of rationality in explaining 
dependence relations between civil servants and interest groups, I tested whether 
they are necessary conditions for long-term relationship by conducting a 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). The reasoning behind this necessity 
analysis is that, rather than conducting true longitudinal research, I assume, based 
on interview results, that interactions are stable. I further assume that anticipatory 
and habitual rationality are necessary conditions for such stable interactions. This 
strategy tests, following the reasoning of logics, whether long-term interactions 
imply either habitual rationality, anticipatory rationality, or both. Such a strategy 
does not require research over time, yet could provide initial insights into the 
existence of multiple rationalities that may motivate bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions. Section 7.2 presents the results of these analyses and, in section 7.3, 
various mechanisms behind each type of rationality are examined in detail.  
7.2  Interactions with interest groups: multiple rationalities? 
Bureaucrats and interest groups choose to interact for apparently sound reasons. 
They engage in a conscious exchange of goods that they want to acquire or with the 
goal of obtaining access and exerting influence. But this may be only part of the 
story. To examine whether choices other than those resulting from strategic 
rationality determine bureaucracy-interest group interactions, other types of 
rationality need to be examined as well. Below, the potential existence of both 
habitual and anticipatory rationality will be examined based on the surveys.  
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7.2.1 Bureaucrats routinely interact with interest groups 
A first indication of whether such other types of choices play a role in explaining 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions is whether bureaucrats tend to interact with 
familiar interest groups. If a large proportion of the groups with which they interact 
appear to be already familiar to them, this will indicate that other types of 
rationality may be at work. That is, diversifying the set of interest groups with 
which one interacts reveals conscious thinking about which groups would be 
(strategically) relevant. Interacting with familiar groups, on the other hand, does 
not immediately reveal such a choice. Those interactions could be the result of 
habitual, anticipatory, or strategic rationality. It may well be the case that a familiar 
set of groups perfectly meets a strategic purpose, yet it may equally be that such 
interactions are rational but constrained by future consequences or result from a 
habitual choice. The persistence of a relationship does not reveal whether strategic 
choice is operating, whereas an obvious diversification of the collection of interest 
groups with which one interacts reflects at face value a strategic choice. So, a high 
percentage of familiar groups can indicate the existence of other types of 
rationality, which would point to a more detailed analysis of such interactions.  
Figure 7.1 shows whether civil servants interact with familiar interest groups 
(see items 3 and 7, appendix I). That is, it depicts the percentages of civil servants 
interacting with particular numbers of interest groups and how many of these 
interest groups were already familiar to them. Pairing these two should reveal 
whether civil servants tend to interact with familiar groups.  
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Figure 7.1 Interactions with familiar interest groups 
A first thing to notice is that the percentage of interest groups with which civil 
servants say they interact and the number of interest groups that were already 
familiar to them are relatively similar. What we also observe is that the set of 
interest groups with which they are familiar is usually larger than the total number 
of interest groups they report to have interacted with recently. When civil servants 
report that they interact with more than 15 interest groups, then we observe that the 
number of familiar groups is smaller than the number of groups with which they 
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interact. This could indicate that when civil servants interact with a relatively large 
number of interest groups, some of these interest groups may be not familiar to 
them. In general, however, the relatively large proportion of familiar groups 
suggests that different types of rationality, and not simply strategic rationality, 
determines these interactions.3 
To examine whether this pattern of interactions with a relatively large 
proportion of familiar groups points toward different types of rationality, the 
existence of habitual or anticipatory rationality is assessed based on the survey 
dataset. Consider habitual rationality. Habitual rationality can be operationalised as 
a set of indicators that point to a common way of interacting with interest groups. 
Questionnaire items, however, cannot probe in detail whether such habitual 
rationality really results from strategic rationality in the past. They can, however, 
provide a first measure of potentially habitual behaviour. These items asked 
respondents about routine behaviour in interacting with interest groups, whether 
they have always interacted with such groups, or whether their predecessor had 
passed the relationships with particular interest groups on to them (item 4, see 
appendix I). These items were thus designed to serve as indicators for a common 
way of interacting with interest groups. Yet, such interactions may not only evolve 
from habitual behaviour; they may also be the result of a formalised or legally 
required pattern of behaviour. Such a legal requirement to interact with interest 
groups has therefore been included in the analysis as well. Figure 7.2 shows the 
percentage of civil servants who indicated that reasons related to habitual 
rationality are important, next to the resource-related reasons (see chapter 5).  
Although the resources included in the resource exchange analysis in the 
previous chapters are important, other reasons seem to be important as well. 
Roughly half of the civil servants indicate that an important reason for them to 
interact with such interest groups is that they usually do so (50.3 percent). Also, 
24.5 percent indicate that such interactions result from a formal requirement. The 
fact that a predecessor passes on his or her contacts does not really seem to explain 
why interactions between bureaucrats and interest groups occur (1.7 percent). So, 
apart from reasons that are related to a strategic exchange of resources, civil 
servants indicate that reasons related to habitual rationality are important as well. 
                                                        
3 One possible flaw in this reasoning is related to the way respondents may have answered these questions. 
As the items were not consecutive, some of the answers may be not entirely reliable. It may be difficult to 
recollect the total number of interest groups you interacted with and figure out how many of these were 
already familiar to you. This difficulty could result in an incorrect absolute number of familiar interest 
groups, yet would still provide a fairly good indication of familiarity. Or, respondents may have indicated the 
total number of interest groups that they were familiar with. In this way, the number of interest groups with 
which they interacted last year and the number of familiar interest groups could be seen as two different sets. 
When the number of interest groups interacted with is a subset of the total number of familiar interest 
groups, we could infer that all of the interest groups were already familiar. If the number of familiar interest 
groups is a subset of the total number of interest groups they interacted with, we could infer that they did 
indeed interact with a few unfamiliar interest groups. One way to examine the reliability of the combination 
of these items is to measure the value of Cronbach’s alpha. As the value of Cronbach’s alpha for these two 
items on the questionnaire is 0.90, their correlation is high. This does not provide a clear-cut answer to the 
measurement issue discussed above. But a relatively high value for Cronbach’s alpha could imply that the 
number of interest groups with which civil servants interact is similar to those they were already familiar 
with. Put differently, civil servants tend to interact with few unfamiliar interest groups.  
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Figure 7.2 Reasons for civil servants to interact with interest groups 
Similar to the reasons related to strategic resource exchange, the reasons related 
to habitual rationality are likely to vary under different circumstances. To measure 
such a variance, binary logistic regression analyses were conducted. To match these 
analyses to those of the resources related to strategic rationality (see chapter 5), they 
resemble the analyses of those resources in every respect. A similar recoding was 
applied, and the same independent variables were included in the model (see also 
sections 5.1 and 5.3.3). The reasons ‘usually interactions occur’ and ‘formal 
requirements’ are included in the model as the dependent variable.4 To maximise 
the explanatory value of the model with a binary logistic regression analysis, one 
aims to explain the odds that the outcome constituting the largest part of the initial 
sample occurs. In the case of formal requirements, the majority of the civil servants 
indicated this to be an unimportant reason. In the case of usual interactions, the 
majority of the civil servants indicated this to be an important reason. So, the two 
binary logistic regression models explain two different outcomes. Model I (usual 
interactions) explains the odds of civil servants considering this reason to be 
important. Model II (formal requirements) explains the odds that civil servants 
consider this an unimportant reason. Table 7.1 reports the results of the analyses.5  
Overall, the contextual model of usual interactions has a better explanatory 
potential than the model explaining formal requirements, given the differences in 
values for the pseudo R2 (0.29 for usual interactions and 0.15 for formal 
requirements). Interest representation regime produces in both models a 
significant coefficient. In model I (usual interactions), interest representation regime 
is related to the odds that civil servants in the UK are likely to consider this reason 
more important than their Dutch colleagues (1.77, p ≤ 0.01). In addition to interest 
representation regime, the policy area of public safety is related to the reason of 
‘interactions usually occur.’ In public safety, this reason is likely to be less 
                                                        
4 In this chapter, the analyses have only been conducted based on the original dataset, as the survey data is 
not the only data source that will be used to analyse the different choices underlying resource exchanges 
between bureaucrats and interest groups. Therefore, the EU variable has been omitted, as this variable 
resulted in non-random patterns of missing data and was not found in the earlier analyses to be especially 
important (see chapter 3, 5 and 6, sections on missing data).  
5 A similar cautionary tale applies to the interpretation of the results of the analyses as was mentioned earlier 
in this study. These analyses do not fully reveal the interaction effects between the contextual factors (see also 
footnote 22, chapter 5) 
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important (-0.76, p ≤ 0.1) than in environmental policy, the reference category. In 
model II (formal requirements), interest representation regime is related to the odds 
that formal requirements are considered to be unimportant. The UK interest 
representation regime contributes to the odds that formal requirements are more 
unimportant (1.34, p ≤ 0.01). In this model, the policy area of public transport is, in 
addition to interest representation regime, related to the unimportance of formal 
requirements (1.14, p ≤ 0.05). As opposed to environmental policy, involvement in 
public transport policy is likely to contribute to higher odds that formal 
requirements to interact are considered to be an unimportant reason.  
Table 7.1 Binary logistic regression analysis of the effect of contextual variables on the importance of 
resources (reasons to interact with interest groups) 
Independent Variables I Usual interactions II Formal requirement
1.77*** 1.34***
(0.22) (0.25)
0.03 0.44
(0.2) (0.23)
(0.83) 0.07
(0.56) (0.63)
0.62 0.14
(0.58) (0.65)
-0.22 -0.67
(0.49) (0.56)
-0.18 -0.43
(0.42) (0.50)
-0.08 -0.35
(0.51) (0.58)
-0.13 0.06
(0.48) (0.53)
-0.37 1.01
(0.67) (0.69)
-0.76* -0.24
(0.43) (0.49)
-0.06 -0.14
(0.47) (0.53)
-0.74 -0.22
(0.47) (0.50)
0.16 1.14**
(0.42) (0.45)
-0.30 -0.45
(0.64) (0.76)
-1.30* -3.10***
(0.78) (0.92)
Model χ2 86,44(14)*** 48.94(14)***
Pseudo R2 (Nagelkerke) 0.29 0.15
N 462 462
Education,science, culture policy
Public transport and water management policy
Public housing policy
Constant
Internal affairs
Immigration, integration policy
Public safety policy
Public health policy
Executive agency
International affairs 
Macro-economic affairs
Employment, social affairs
Dependent Variables
Interest representation regime (UK)
Political-strategic insight
Advisory agency
 
* p ≤ 0.1; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01. Note: The reference category for policy area is ‘environmental 
policy;’ the reference category for agency type is 'other agencies' All two-tailed tests. 
The variation between policy areas is difficult to explain, as the model only included 
substantive differences at a relatively high level of abstraction. A fuller explanation 
of such differences would require more in-depth knowledge of specific policy 
fields. What we can conclude, however, is that these reasons most likely vary from 
policy area to policy area. In the area of youth welfare work in the Netherlands, to 
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give an example, there is no extensive pattern of regular interactions because of the 
simple reason that very few organisations relevant to the target group exist.6  
The difference between interest representation regimes, however, results in an 
interesting finding. It appears that the reason of ‘usual interactions’ is likely to be 
more important in the UK than in the Netherlands. In addition, formal 
requirements are more unimportant in the UK than in the Netherlands. At first 
sight, one may expect such routines (‘we usually interact’) to occur in a corporatist 
country like the Netherlands in which interest representation is more 
institutionalised. On the other hand, formal requirements seem to be more 
important (that is, less unimportant) in the Netherlands than in the UK. So, when 
not legally required to interact, civil servants in the Netherlands may act less upon a 
habitual rationality than their UK colleagues. 
So far, this analysis has shown that there is reason to suggest that habitual 
rationality plays a role in explaining interactions between civil servants and interest 
groups. The number of familiar organisations with which civil servants are likely to 
interact is relatively high. In addition, patterns that refer to routine behaviour (‘we 
usually interact, so today we will do so as well’) and formal requirements to interact 
were also shown to be important for civil servants. These findings may thus be an 
initial indication that the strategic choice implicit in resource dependence theory 
may not fully explain bureaucracy-interest group interactions. Habitual rationality 
may be important as well. 
7.2.2 Bureaucrats anticipate future consequences 
Most likely, habits matter when it comes to interactions with interest groups 
alongside or instead of strategically picking and choosing interest groups to interact 
with. But what about strategic choices limited by consequences in the near future? 
Put differently, could anticipatory rationality also determine bureaucracy-interest 
group interactions? The existence of anticipatory rationality is explored by means of 
counterfactual analysis. The generic form of counterfactuals usually takes the 
following structure: ‘if event X had not occurred, event Y would not have 
happened.’ Counterfactuals have often been used by historians and international 
relations scholars, among others, to explain the occurrence of events or sequences 
in history as they actually occurred (Lebow 2000). Examples abound, and an 
interesting popular example is in the novel Fatherland, by Robert Harris (1992). 
Harris sketches a scenario to the following counterfactual: what would have 
happened if Hitler had won World War II? To be sure, we would not have known 
about the Jewish mass killings if a Kriminalpolizei investigator and an American 
journalist had not discovered the Endlösung after investigating systematic murders 
of senior Nazi officials in Nazi Germany in April 1964. Although extremely 
intriguing, scholarly application of counterfactuals is often questioned on 
methodological grounds, both in quantitative and qualitative traditions. Whereas in 
qualitative traditions the logical inference of causal relationships and the legitimacy 
of the counterfactual model have been discussed, in quantitative traditions, the 
critique is focused on its strong model dependence and lack of empirical data (see 
Fearon 1991 and King and Zeng 2007, respectively).  
                                                        
6 Example based on interviews with respondents. 
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I do not use counterfactual analysis to make any causal inferences (see 
Carpenter 2001, for a somewhat similar application of counterfactuals); I rather 
use it to explore the possibility of anticipatory rationality underlying bureaucracy-
interest group interactions. The counterfactual I employed was twofold. First, I 
asked respondents to what extent it would have been possible to sidestep the 
interest groups with which they interacted last year, if they had wanted to. This 
would provide a first indication of anticipatory rationality. 
Second, if respondents indicated that circumvention would have been difficult, 
they were asked why this would have been so difficult. This, in turn, would provide 
an indication of the underlying factors related to anticipatory rationality, if any (see 
items 8 and 9, appendix I). Phrasing the question in terms of a counterfactual 
condition, which uses the logic of counterfactual reasoning, allows respondents to 
explore a wider range of contingencies (as has been proven by experimental 
research), or to make more explicit their latent uncertainties about historical 
junctures (Lebow 2000). By requiring respondents to contemplate the possibility of 
sidestepping interest groups or not interacting with interest groups in the first 
place, they are stimulated to consider the nature of their interactions in more detail. 
Then, asking what would be the most important reason for not being able to 
circumvent these interest groups would reveal potential mechanisms behind 
anticipatory rationality.7  
Figures 7.3 show to what extent civil servants consider it possible to circumvent 
interest groups and for what reasons it might be difficult to do so. They represent 
the extent to which respondents indicated that circumvention of interest groups is 
possible (in percentages) and the reasons for which such a possibility would be 
difficult (again, in percentages). The figures apply to the entire dataset, including 
Dutch and UK civil servants.  
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7 Using items based on counterfactual logic has both a drawback and an advantage. As for the drawback, 
asking a ‘what if’ question runs the risk of being incomprehensible to respondents. To address this issue, I 
included an open-answer category to allow respondents to indicate whether they had not understood the 
question. The advantage of adding such an item to a survey is that both the anonymity and the ‘what if’ 
structure allow a respondent to explore these options more freely. Otherwise, if respondents had been asked 
about a real-life situation, this question could have been a politically incorrect question resulting in biased 
answers.  
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Figures 7.3 The possibility of circumventing interest groups 
Roughly 50 percent indicate that it is not often or never possible for them to 
circumvent interest groups if they would have wanted to. But almost 31 percent 
indicate that it may often be possible to do so. And, roughly 20 percent indicate 
that this is very often or always possible. So, roughly half of the civil servants argue 
that is rather difficult to circumvent interest groups, whereas the other half 
indicates that it is not so difficult at all. But what causes the difficulties? 
Respondents argue that difficulties mostly arise from interest groups’ role as an 
important spokesperson for a target group. To a somewhat lesser extent, civil 
servants argue that interest groups are difficult to circumvent because they are 
formally required to interact, because of the role such interest groups play in the 
nation’s economy, or because other interest groups are not as useful to them as 
those they have already interacted with.  
To evaluate these reasons in more detail, I analysed the extent to which the 
possibility of circumventing interest groups varies under different circumstances. 
Table 7.2 reports the results of a logistic regression analysis with the possibility of 
circumventing as the dependent variable. The model includes interest 
representation, the functional differences between agency types, political strategic 
insight and the differences between policy areas as independent variables, so as to 
be consistent with the analysis of contextual variables in chapter 5.8 
We see that the explanatory value of the overall model is very small (pseudo R2 = 
0.10).9 A few independent variables are related to the possibility of circumventing 
interest groups. First, interest representation regime produces a significant coefficient 
(0.57, p ≤ 0.01). A more corporatist interest regime is likely to contribute to the 
odds that circumvention is possible more often. The functional difference in agency 
types also produces a significant coefficient (-0.21, p ≤ 0.1). As opposed to the 
                                                        
8 The independent variable ‘EU involvement’ is again omitted from the analysis, because of the non-random 
pattern of missing variables (see also footnote 4).  
9 The test of parallel lines was significant, indicating that we need to reject the hypothesis that the 
independent variables vary in a similar way on each of the logits of the dependent variable. Therefore, a 
multinominal logistic regression analysis would have been more appropriate here, as it does not assume such 
a similar variance. Yet, for ease of interpretation, given the relatively large number of categorical variables, I 
opted for reporting the ordered logistic regression analysis instead.  
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reference category of other types of agencies, working at an executive agency is 
likely to result in the odds that circumvention is possible less often. Apart from a 
difference in interest representation regime and agency types, differences in policy 
area also seem to be related to the possibility of circumventing interest groups. The 
policy areas of international affairs (1.21, p ≤ 0.01), public safety (1.20, p ≤ 0.01), 
education (1.08, p ≤ 0.01), and public housing (0.93, p ≤ 0.1) are all related to the 
odds of how often circumvention is possible. As opposed to environmental policy, 
involvement in these policy areas is likely to contribute to the odds that 
circumvention is more often possible.  
Table 7.2 Ordered logistic regression analysis of the effect of contextual variables on the possibility to 
circumvent interest groups 
Independent Variables
0.57***
(0.19)
0.11
(0.17)
-0.79
(0.44)
-0.21*
(0.47)
1.21***
(0.49)
0.91
(0.36)
0.16
(0.44)
0.16
(0.42)
-0.55
(0.59)
1.20***
(0.37)
0.54
(0.40)
1.08***
(0.39)
0.45
(0.36)
0.93*
(0.54)
Cut-points -2.09; 0.66; 2.18; 3.14
Model’s χ2 45.43(14)***
Pseudo R2 0.10
N 451
Internal affairs 
Interest representation regime
Political-strategic insight
Advisory agency
Executive agency
Dependent Variable: Possibility of 
circumventing interest groups
Public transport policy 
Public housing policy
Immigration, integration policy
Public safety policy
Public health policy
Education, science, culture policy
International affairs 
Macro-economics affairs
Employment, social affairs
 
* p ≤ 0.1; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01 Note: The reference category for policy area is 'environmental 
policy;' the reference category for agency type is 'other agencies' All two-tailed tests. 
It seems to be somewhat easier to circumvent interest groups in the Netherlands, 
whereas it is somewhat more difficult for executive agencies. And, in the case of 
international affairs, public safety, education policy and public housing, it is easier 
to sidestep interest groups than in the case of environmental policy, which is the 
reference category. What do these results tell us? First of all, the model with these 
contextual variables has a small explanatory value. This means that the effect of the 
contextual variables on the possibility of circumventing interest groups is very 
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small. Nevertheless, the possibility to circumvent interest groups seems to occur 
more often in the Netherlands than in the UK. This is an interesting finding, as 
one would expect that in a relatively institutionalised and hierarchical interest 
representation system, it would be less often possible to circumvent than in those 
interest representation systems that are not so institutionalised. For agency types 
and policy areas, the difference is also hard to explain, although it suggests the 
importance of meso-level variables in explaining bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions once again. Indeed, several policy areas are related to the possibility of 
circumvention. Such an option may well be dependent on the substantive issues 
and, related, variation in interest groups involved in those issues. This may also 
explain the surprising finding on interest representation regimes. It could be that 
the possibility of circumventing interest groups is more related to meso-level 
variables, such as agency type and policy area, than to a macro-level variable, such 
as national interest representation regimes. However, the general message is that 
the possibility of circumvention does not seem to be very dependent on the 
contextual factors included in the model.  
7.2.3 First signs of multiple rationalities 
In general, the existence of anticipatory rationality has been indicated by the 
findings of the survey analyses, revealing a difficulty in circumventing interest 
groups. When we examine the reasons provided by civil servants in more detail, we 
see a mix of different types of choices. The position of interest groups in the 
nation’s economy, their important role as a voice for a target group, and the fact 
that other interest groups might be less useful all indicate anticipatory rationality. 
For a certain policy proposal, a civil servant might want to do the initial 
development without interest groups, but their position as a major spokesperson 
forces him or her to involve such interest groups nevertheless. Formal consultation 
procedures, routines that are hard to change, and the fact that there has always 
been close cooperation, reflect habitual rationality. What we can infer from the 
reasons civil servants report for having difficulties in circumventing interest groups 
is that a complex mix of choices underlies bureaucracy-interest group interactions, 
related to either anticipatory or habitual rationality. What we can conclude from 
this survey analysis more generally is that resource exchanges between bureaucrats 
and interest groups are not only determined by strategic choices, but that other 
types of rationality are important as well. What is missing so far is some indication 
of whether these different types of mechanisms jointly explain long-term 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions. Below, the interplay between different 
types of choices will be examined.  
7.3 Unravelling habitual and anticipatory rationality 
The analysis of the survey provides initial evidence to suggest that both habitual 
and anticipatory rationality could be important in explaining dependence relations 
between bureaucrats and interest groups. A next step is to adopt a longitudinal 
research design to unravel to what extent resource exchanges are based on either of 
these types of rationalities or on a combination of them. A way to do this, without 
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the option of a true longitudinal design is to assume durability of bureaucracy-
interest group relations. That is, rather than studying whether these interactions 
are durable by examining them over time, respondents were asked to reflect on the 
stability and durability of their relations with interest groups and vice versa. A next 
step, then, is to assume that both anticipatory and habitual rationality are necessary 
conditions for long-term relationships.  
In the terminology of logics, a necessary condition means that when such a 
condition is absent, the outcome would not occur. If we assume that P is a 
condition and Q is the outcome, we can also say that Q implies P. A sufficient 
condition is a condition that in itself is all that is needed for the outcome to occur. 
In other words, P implies Q (Forbes 1994; Ragin 1987; 2000). For instance, 
breathing is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the existence of a human 
being. Without breathing there is no human life. Yet breathing is not the only 
condition that allows human beings to exist; a pumping heart is required as well. 
In this case we could say that several conditions are jointly necessary for human 
life. Returning to bureaucracy-interest group interactions, necessity and sufficiency 
tests can help to explain the complex interplay between the different choices 
underlying resource exchanges. When we know which conditions are necessary 
and/or sufficient for interactions to thrive, we can obtain insights into how they 
operate together and how they together may explain such interactions. In this way, 
we can, without conducting research over time, cautiously assess whether habitual 
and anticipatory rationality could explain bureaucracy-interest group interactions. 
Qualtitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is an analysis technique that explicitly 
incorporates necessity and sufficiency to explain why certain conditions contribute 
to a given outcome. In the sections below I briefly describe the method of QCA and 
analyse two cases of long- term bureaucracy-interest group interactions to examine 
whether habitual and anticipatory rationality explain long-term interactions. 
7.3.1 Exploring stability via QCA  
QCA, initially developed by Charles Ragin (1987; 2000) was designed to bridge the 
gap between variable-oriented quantitative methods and case-oriented qualitative 
methods, and it does so by considering cases to be configurations of variables. As 
such, it is argued that QCA allows for causal complexity by examining the co-
existence of conditions, their mutual relations, and if and how they jointly explain 
the outcome in question. In other words, qualitative comparative analysis is well 
suited for situations in which outcomes may result from different combinations of 
independent variables and are related to different explanations of a single 
phenomenon. As this may be true for bureaucracy-interest group interactions, 
QCA is useful in exploring the different rationalities underlying these interactions. 
The independent variables, or conditions in QCA terms, are coded according to 
the terminology of logics as QCA is grounded in Boolean algebra. This requires the 
researcher to assign either a 0 or 1 membership to the variables in question. This 
means that the researcher has to determine whether the variable or impact of the 
variable is apparent in a particular case. In QCA, 0 indicates non-membership and 
1 indicates full membership. However, only a few social science concepts allow for 
such a clear demarcation between full and non-membership. An extension of the 
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QCA method with fuzzy-set logic allows for a more flexible assignment of 
membership. Apart from ‘fully in’ and ‘fully out’, the two options available in 
binary QCA, the researcher may opt for ‘almost fully out,’ ‘more out than in,’ ‘not 
in, not out,’ ‘more in than out’ and ‘almost fully in,’ in addition to ‘fully out’ and 
‘fully in’ in a single model (this is a seven-scale fuzzy-set membership).10 The 
added value of using QCA/fuzzy-set analysis is that it relies on the algebra of logic, 
thereby enabling the examination of how a set or combination of independent 
variables may jointly explain the outcome for an intermediate number of cases, and 
tolerate the inclusion of rival explanations.11 
The data for QCA is provided by 57 semi-structured interviews. These interviews 
included civil servants and representatives of interest groups involved in the areas 
of (social)economics and public health (see chapter 4). The QCA accordingly 
included 57 cases of bureaucracy-interest group interactions. Each case represents a 
set of interactions between one civil servant and various interest groups, or one 
interest group and various civil servants. This analysis thus involves an individual 
level application of QCA (see Rihoux and Ragin 2004). 
The individual cases have been restricted to the issues of (social-)economics and 
public health.12 These policy areas have been chosen for two particular reasons. 
First, they are characterised by long-term interactions with many interest groups 
and thus allow for a thorough analysis of underlying behavioural logics. A 
drawback is that this selection only allows for a limited assessment of the different 
logics, as it does not include ‘negative’ cases. Both policy areas exhibit a high value 
for interactions, whereas a full assessment of the different behavioural logics 
requires a selection that also includes cases with no or only a few interactions.  
Second, these policy areas have been chosen because they are interesting in 
substantive terms to include in the analysis. Macro-economics and labour-market 
politics have been the predominant area in studies of corporatism and are closely 
related to the field of political economy. This field has been dominated by studies 
restricted to the national level. Furthermore, evidence about the decline and 
effectiveness of the major tripartite bargaining method in the Netherlands remains 
inconclusive. In A Dutch Miracle, for instance, Visser and Hemerijck (1997) argue 
that the Dutch corporatist structures enabled the necessary adaptation and reform 
of the welfare state. Some, however, question this finding (Becker 2001; 
Woldendorp and Keman 2007). Adding a meso-level analysis of interest 
                                                        
10 Such a ranking of membership could be interpreted as a ratio-interval scale with both a fixed minimum 
and maximum (1 = full membership; 0 = non membership; Ragin 2000).  
11 Interestingly, multiple regression analysis and other statistical techniques that allow for multiple 
independent variables do roughly the same thing. Yet, they focus on the unique contribution of each of the 
independent variables, whereas in QCA the focus is on the combination of the independent variables and 
their joint contribution to a given outcome. A fundamental methodological question would be to what extent 
these methods really differ, apart from terminology and a sheer difference in number of cases or 
observations. I use the terminology of indicators / independent variables rather than causal conditions. 
Causality cannot be assumed here, as this is not a controlled comparison of cases, but rather a first 
exploration into the potentially explanatory value of habitual and anticipatory rationality in explaining long-
term relationships between bureaucrats and interest groups. 
12 By selecting two policy areas in a single country, I control for national characteristics and thereby avoid the 
interplay between macro-level and meso-level characteristics. 
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representation from a different perspective to this field can contribute to the 
existing literature by generating different insights into the same phenomenon.  
Public health policy is characterised by a diverse array of interest groups, 
ranging from large insurance companies and their professional associations to 
voluntary organisations representing the interests of individual patients. Given the 
assumed bias in interest representation, the expectation is that there are at least 
differences among these various kinds of groups regarding their options to secure 
access or exert influence. Individual patient organisations could be less powerful 
than the large societies of professionals in health care. Yet, they have been 
encouraged to professionalise to become a countervailing power to the influential 
interest groups in public health care in the Netherlands (Trappenburg 2005).  
Additionally, public health is a good example of a policy area where private 
partners are responsible for the implementation of public health care. A strong 
reliance on private partners for implementation could render bureaucrats in this 
field more dependent on such interest groups. If this is true, anticipatory rationality 
would certainly be revealed.13 Both the diverse interest population and the role of 
private partners in policy implementation render public health an interesting policy 
field for studying bureaucracy-interest group interactions. The selection of these 
two policy areas provides a good locus for examining the various types of rationality 
that may determine bureaucracy-interest group interactions.14  
Measuring anticipatory and habitual rationality 
To examine anticipatory and habitual rationality, four indicators have been 
developed. Participation in or the organisation of consultation meetings is used as 
indicator for habitual rationality. The extent to which civil servants and interest 
groups consider trust to be an important aspect of their interactions is used as 
indicator for institutional reproduction. This reflects the possibility that habitual 
rationality may not only be the unconscious proliferation of a strategic choice but 
could also reflect a suboptimal situation. Finally, to measure anticipatory 
rationality, the importance of legitimacy, and the perceived influential position of 
interest groups, and the importance of civil servants for obtaining access, 
respectively, have been developed as indicators.  
To start with the first, participation in or organising consultation meetings 
refers to the regular meetings organised to consult relevant interest groups. They 
usually take place as a regular part of the process of drafting bills, policy proposals 
or programmes and serve to probe the approval or disapproval and further 
comments of major societal groups. As it is a routine part of most policy 
trajectories, this is a good indicator of habitual behaviour.  
                                                        
13 In this sense, although it is not mentioned as such, it could be argued that public health is an extreme case 
for measuring anticipatory rationality. The extreme case method selects cases because of the extreme values 
of either the dependent or independent variables. The logic behind this method is to try to maximise variance 
so as to gauge the entire spectrum of values a variable can have. However, it is only when the researcher 
knows the entire population that these cases can be used to generalise. In other instances, one is able to draw 
conclusions about the range of values an (in)dependent variable can exhibit (See Gerring 2006, 98-103). 
14 The selection of these two policy areas was not meant to result in a fully controlled comparison. Rather, 
limiting the analysis to two interesting, yet contrasting, policy areas minimised variation in respondents 
which could hamper sound interpretation of the results. The selection of these two areas provides an initial 
assessment of how these sets of different behavioural logics may vary across different policy fields, if at all.  
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The importance of trust will be used as an indicator for institutionalisation. 
When actors trust each other, this is likely to benefit their relationships (Hardin 
2002). In other words, trust facilitates cooperative behaviour. When trust becomes 
more important than the initial reason to interact, we might observe institutional 
reproduction. Put differently, bureaucrats might interact with certain interest 
groups because they are really trustworthy, even if there are other interest groups 
that could deliver better expertise, for instance. In this sense, when either civil 
servants or interest groups consider trust to be very important, this would point to 
institutional reproduction.15 
Anticipatory rationality will be measured by two indicators: first, to what extent 
legitimacy is considered to be important, and, second, to what extent both sets of 
actors perceive each other to be important or influential. In the case of legitimacy, 
however, it is not so much a question of obtaining legitimacy as such, but much 
more what kind of legitimacy is vital for deciding upon and implementing policy 
proposals. Political support from the major business organisations may contribute 
to swift decision making and implementation. Public support, however, may be 
vital for parliamentary consent. Which one is more important will vary among 
other things, according to the circumstances and policy issue at hand. In any case, 
the importance of legitimacy to a civil servant gives an indication of anticipatory 
rationality, as legitimacy is a fundamental resource for democratic governments.  
Finally, to what extent civil servants consider interest groups to be influential 
(and, vice versa, to what extent interest groups consider civil servants to be 
important for getting access) is another indicator for anticipatory rationality. Civil 
servants may sometimes want to avoid interest groups, but simply decide not to do 
so as they are too influential to sidestep.16 When a civil servant perceives that an 
interest group is highly influential (or, vice versa, an interest group perceives that a 
civil servant is highly important), and they interact on this basis, then this is a good 
indication of anticipatory rationality. Table 7.3 summarises the four indicators.  
                                                        
15, Regular consultation could also indicate institutional reproduction when it does not serve the purpose for 
which it was originally intended: to address a variety of societal interests. Perhaps the question is whether 
civil servants really use the information and perspectives they collect during such meetings. In any case, 
taking part in such meetings is often ‘part of the job,’ yet at the same time benefits democratic decision 
making. Therefore, I include it as an indicator for habitual rationality, although I acknowledge that for it to be 
a full measure of habitual rationality, the outcome of such meetings should be examined as well.  
16 Those familiar with James Mahoney’s (2000) article ‘path dependence in historical sociology’ may wonder 
whether legitimacy and an influential position are not two explanations for path dependence rather than 
anticipatory rationality. Indeed, he includes these two explanations, together with a functional and utilitarian 
explanation, in a typology of different types of path dependence. I would argue that the major difference 
between how I operationalised these behavioural logics, or types of rationalities, and Mahoney’s typology of 
path dependence lies in a different focus. First, path dependence focuses on deviant outcomes rather than 
inter-organisational processes. Second, the emphasis in studying path dependence is on the contingency that 
triggered a deterministic sequence of events, resulting in a particular institutional arrangement. In this study, 
the focus is not on contingencies but rather on a strategic choice that was perfectly logical in the beginning, 
but where routine behaviour has taken over so that the resulting institutional arrangement may no longer fit 
the current situation. Most importantly, anticipatory rationality is a concept that captures anticipated 
consequences, whereas historical institutionalism often explains consequences from the past. Anticipatory 
and habitual rationality, or put differently, the heritage of the past and the shadow of the future, result in 
similar ‘locked-in’ mechanisms that explain the stability of institutional arrangements. An interesting 
theoretical challenge is to precisely explain the nature of these locked-in effects (see section 7.4). 
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Table 7.3 Indicators of different types of rationality 
Behavioural logic Indicator
Habitual rationality Participation in or organisation of consultation meetings
Institutional reproduction The extent to which trust is perceived to be important for interactions
?    The extent to which legitimacy is considered indispensable
?    The extent to which an actor is perceived to have an influential position
Anticipatory rationality
 
Consultation and influence outweigh trust 
The indicators listed above have been used to code the transcripts of the interviews, 
based on a seven-scale fuzzy-set membership coding. The results of the coding can 
be found in appendix II, and include cases seen from the perspectives of civil 
servants and interest groups.17 Table 7.4 reports how often (in percentages) each 
fuzzy-set membership value occurs for each of the indicators.  
Table 7.4 The importance of individual types of rationality  
Indicators types of rationality 0 0.17 0.33 0.50 0.67 0.83 1.0
Civil servants
Consultation 0.0 7.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 92.3
Trust 0.0 0.0 5.1 35.9 28.2 5.1 25.6
Legitimacy 2.6 2.6 0.0 2.6 12.8 25.6 53.9
Influential position of interest groups 0.0 0.0 2.6 7.7 38.5 25.6 25.6
Interest groups
Consultation 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 94.4
Trust 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.2 11.1 44.4 22.2
Legitimacy 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.1 11.1 5.6 72.2
Importance of civil servants 0.0 0.0 5.6 0.0 16.7 77.8 1.0
Fuzzy set values (7-scale)
 
Note: the table displays how often each of the fuzzy-set values occurs for a given type of choice or 
rationality (in %) 
We can derive from the table the extent to which trust, consultation, legitimacy and 
an influential position (for interest groups, the importance of civil servants) are 
important for bureaucracy-interest group interactions. Consider the results for the 
cases based on the interviews with civil servants. In roughly 90 percent of the 
cases, they indicated that consultation is a very important factor (indicated by a 
membership value of 1). When it comes to trust, we observe a more nuanced result. 
In almost 36 percent of the instances of bureaucracy-interest group interactions, 
trust is neither important nor unimportant (indicated by a value of 0.5), and, in 
roughly 26 percent of the cases, trust is considered to be very important (a value of 
1). Roughly 80 percent of the civil servants considered legitimacy to be very 
important (indicated by the values 0.83 and 1). And, finally, the influential position 
of interest groups provides a mixed picture. In 38.5 percent of the cases, the 
                                                        
17 Assigning fuzzy membership values is based on transcripts of the recorded interviews. Such a direct 
assignment has obvious disadvantages in terms of reliability (see Verkuilen 2005), and a solution to this 
would be the equivalent of inter-coder reliability in content analysis. To enhance the reliability of the 
membership assignment, I coded part of the interviews twice and compared the first and second coding, 
which revealed a relatively high consistency.  
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influential position of interest groups is considered to be somewhat important 
(indicated by a value of 0.67); in 25.6 percent of the cases as really important (a 
value of 0.83), and 25.6 percent of the cases very important (a value of 1). 
What about the interest groups’ perspective? Consultation seems to be as 
important in explaining bureaucracy-interest group interactions to interest groups 
as it is to civil servants. In 94.4 percent of the cases, it is considered to be very 
important (a value of 1). Interest groups consider trust to be more relevant than 
civil servants; 66.6 percent of the interest groups consider it to be important (a 
value of 0.83 and 1). In the case of legitimacy, a full membership value of 1 is 
assigned to 72.2 percent of the cases. Both civil servants and interest groups 
consider legitimacy to be important. Finally, in almost 80 percent of the cases 
(values 0.83 and 1), civil servants are considered to be an important source for 
securing access. Apparently, the influential position of civil servants is more 
important for interest groups than vice versa. A general conclusion is that from 
both perspectives, civil servants and interest groups, these four indicators seem to 
be important, yet to varying degrees.  
7.3.2 Multiple rationalities: mutually exclusive or mutually reinforcing? 
We can assess the explanatory potential of habitual and anticipatory rationality by 
testing whether the four indicators that measure these types of rationality are 
necessary conditions for long-term interactions to occur.18 By revealing the 
necessary conditions for long-term interactions, we can infer whether habitual 
rationality and/or anticipatory rationality determine bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions in addition to the strategic rationality implicit in resource dependence 
theory. Testing necessity with QCA is done by comparing the values of the 
indicators and the values of the outcome. An indicator is seen as a necessary 
condition in fuzzy-set QCA when the value of the indicator is larger than or equal 
to the value of the outcome. This reflects the necessity rule that without the 
indicator there is no outcome. Or, vice versa, that a certain outcome implies the 
occurrence of a certain condition. Testing necessity in fuzzy-set QCA thus means 
testing whether the outcome is a subset of the indicator(s).  
The tables below show the results of the necessity tests based on probabilistic 
criteria for both the civil servants’ and the interest groups’ perspectives. They test 
whether the proportion of cases is significantly larger than a set benchmark of 
0.80. Setting a benchmark of 0.80 implies that it is almost always the case that 
                                                        
18 Two issues are important. First, as a result of a selection criterion emphasising the existence of long-term 
interactions between bureaucrats and interest groups, the set of cases for the analysis does not contain cases 
in which the outcome is absent. Therefore, only an analysis of necessity will be conducted. Second, Coding 
the outcome, i.e. ‘thriving relationships,’ was somewhat more complex than coding the indicators. The 
question was not so much whether these relationships did thrive, as I selected two policy areas where survey 
respondents indicated many interactions existed and that are known for extensive and long lasting 
relationships. The issue was rather whether assigning full membership (coded 1) was legitimate. Full 
membership would mean that these relations absolutely thrive no matter what happens. And although most 
relationships were usually remarkably stable, there have been some upsurges and interruptions. Therefore, 
when respondents indicated that the collection of organisations had been rather stable for a long time, I 
assigned it 0.83; when they more explicitly mentioned interruptions, I assigned 0.67.  
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durable interactions result from a particular behavioural logic.19 In addition, it also 
tests whether the absence of the individual types of choices contribute significantly 
to the outcome (absence is indicated by the ‘~’ sign). Finally, the necessity analyses 
have been conducted twice, once without and once with an adjustment factor of 
one fuzzy-set membership level. This basically means that, if the outcome is but 
one fuzzy-set level higher, then the cause will not be seen as a violation of 
necessity. The cause will then be included in the proportion of cases for which it 
follows that the values of the outcomes are smaller than or equal to the value of the 
cause. To illustrate, suppose that a certain outcome is coded with a fuzzy-set level 
of 0.83 and the indicator is coded with a value of 0.67. When no adjustment factor 
is applied, the indicator is not seen as a necessary condition. When we apply an 
adjustment factor of one level of fuzzy-set membership to the indicator, this 
combination is no longer a violation of the assumption that the outcome is a subset 
of a (set of) indicator(s) (see Ragin 1987; 2000). Applying an adjustment factor is 
legitimate, as a seven-scale fuzzy-set membership is a rather rough measurement. 
Combined with interview data, the coding may be open to different interpretations 
and thus imprecise measurement (see Ragin 2000, 272-273). Conducting the 
analyses twice takes into account potentially imprecise measurement.  
Several of the conditions produce significant results. First, when we examine 
the bureaucratic perspective, we find that consultation procedures are related to 
stable, long-term interactions (0.92, p ≤ 0.05). After applying an adjustment factor 
of one fuzzy-set level, i.e. including the cases for which the outcome is one fuzzy-
set level higher than the cause, we find that several conditions are related to 
durable interactions. Not only consultation procedures (0.95, p ≤ 0.05), but also the 
powerful position of interest groups (0.90, p ≤ 0.1) and legitimacy (0.92, p ≤ 0.05) 
seem to be necessary conditions for durable interactions to occur. Significant 
results are also observed for the interest groups’ perspective. In this case, 
consultation procedures are a necessary condition for durable interactions to occur 
(0.94, p ≤ 0.1). Applying the adjustment factor in this case (again including cases 
for which the outcome is only one fuzzy-set level higher than the cause) reveals two 
necessary conditions. Consultation procedures are again a necessary condition (0.94, 
p ≤ 0.1), as well as the importance of civil servants in securing access (0.94, p ≤ 0.1).  
Several necessary conditions for interactions to endure are revealed by these 
tests. From both perspectives, consultation procedures appear to be a necessary 
condition for durable interactions. This suggests the existence of habitual 
rationality. In the case of civil servants, legitimacy and the powerful position of 
interest groups can be considered necessary conditions as well. These two 
indicators reveal anticipatory rationality. In the case of interest groups, we see that 
the importance of civil servants is also a necessary condition, again revealing 
anticipatory rationality. Both habitual and anticipatory rationality play a role in 
durable interactions between interest groups and civil servants.  
                                                        
19 This test is based on a z-test that assesses the degree to which the observed proportion exceeds the 
benchmark proportion relative to the standard error of the benchmark proportion. When the number of the 
cases is less than 30, a binominal probability test should be used (in this case, for the interest group 
perspective). This test assesses the probability of observing a specific range of ‘successful’ outcomes, given an 
expected probability of success which is provided by a set benchmark, in this case 0.80 (Ragin 2000, 111; 112).  
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Table 7.5 Individual necessary indicators for durable bureaucracy-interest group interactions 
Indicators
Proportion of cases:             
Cause ≥  Outcome
Adjusted proportion of Cases: 
Cause ≥  Outcome
Trust 0.26 0.67
Legitimacy 0.85 0.92**
Powerful position of interest groups 0.59 0.90*
Consultation 0.92** 0.95**
~Trust 0.10 0.13
~Legitimacy 0.00 0.03
~Powerful position of interest groups 0.03 0.03
~Consultation 0.08 0.08
Indicators
Proportion of cases:             
Cause ≥  Outcome
Adjusted proportion of Cases: 
Cause ≥  Outcome
Trust 0.67 0.83
Legitimacy 0.78 0.89
Consultation 0.94* 0.94*
Importance civil servants 0.78 0.94*
~Trust 0.00 0.06
~Legitimacy 0.00 0.00
~Consultation 0.06 0.06
~Importance civil servants for getting access 0.06 0.06
The Bureaucrats’ Perspective
The Interest groups’ Perspective
 
* p ≤ 0,1; ** p ≤ 0,05; *** p ≤ 0,01; Note: the sign (~) indicates the absence of a particular condition 
What we do not know yet is the extent to which they could jointly explain durable 
interactions between civil servants and interest groups. We want to know, in the 
case of the civil servants’ perspective for instance, whether consultation together 
with legitimacy together with an influential position jointly explain long-term 
interactions. With fuzzy sets, the operation of ‘and’ tests the possibility of jointly 
necessary conditions. It requires taking the minimum of the individual values; that 
is, the value the individual conditions share. Logical ‘and’ is represented by the 
sign: ‘·.’ Using this terminology, we want to know whether,  
 
(1) consultation · legitimacy · influential position         long-term interactions, and 
(2) consultation · importance of civil servants          long-term interactions  
 
To test these two hypotheses, I used a similar technique as was used in the 
necessity analysis above. This requires testing whether the proportion of cases that 
exhibits a value of these variables is significantly larger than a benchmark criterion 
of 0.80. Testing the hypotheses against this criterion means testing whether it is 
almost always the case that, for instance, ‘consultation together with legitimacy 
together with an influential position of interest groups’ is a jointly necessary 
condition for long-term interactions. Again, the test has been conducted twice, 
including one with and one without an adjustment factor of one fuzzy-set 
membership level. That is, values of the outcome one fuzzy-set level higher than 
the joint conditions were not considered a violation of the necessity test. The tables 
below show the results of these tests.  
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Table 7.6 Jointly necessary indicators for durable bureaucracy-interest group interactions  
Combination of indicators
Proportion of cases:          
Cause ≥  Outcome
Adjusted proportion of Cases: 
Cause ≥  Outcome
Interest groups
Consultation · importance CV 0.83 1.00**
Civil Servants
Consultation · legitimacy · powerful position 0.56 0.87 
 
* p ≤ 0.1; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01. the sign ‘·’ indicates logical 'and' 
Significant results can be observed only when an adjustment factor has been 
applied. For interest groups, the combination seems to be jointly necessary. 
Consultation procedures together with the importance of civil servants (1.00, p ≤ 
0.01) relate to durable interactions after applying the adjustment factor of one 
fuzzy-set level. For the civil servants’ perspective, the conditions do not seem to be 
jointly necessary. However, when the test was repeated with a benchmark of 0.67 
rather than 0.80 (usually the case rather than almost always the case), a significant 
result (0.87 p ≤ 0.01) was found for the combination of ‘consultation procedures · 
legitimacy · influential position of interest groups.’20 Therefore, in the case of 
bureaucrats, it is fair to suggest that a combination of habitual and anticipatory 
rationality may explain their interactions with interest groups.  
Multiple rationalities along political-administrative dimensions 
While QCA compares the cases along their values of the indicators for habitual 
rationality, institutional reproduction and anticipatory rationality, we have not yet 
included comparison between contextual variables included in earlier analyses. 
Could these different types of choices, and thus the nature of bureaucracy-interest 
group interactions, differ between civil servants and interest groups involved in 
macro-economics or public health? To measure such variance, I compared whether 
the values of the indicators, on average, varied across agency type and policy area. 
No significant results were found. Apparently, the types of choices that result in 
long-term bureaucracy-interest group interactions do not vary for the respondents 
involved in either macro-economics or public health. Interestingly, the role of 
interest groups in implementation of public health policy is not reflected in a more 
influential position vis-à-vis civil servants, with a corresponding impact of 
anticipatory rationality.  
For the variance in agency type, however, a significant difference was found for 
the influential position of interest groups (t(37) = -1.81, p ≤ 0.1).21 This indicated 
that, on average, civil servants in advisory agencies found the influential position of 
interest groups more important than their colleagues at regulatory agencies. This is 
an interesting finding, as the literature on capture usually finds that interest groups 
in the environment of regulatory agencies are relatively powerful (Yackee 2005; 
Yackee and Yackee 2006). Similar t-tests for the interest group data do not reveal a 
significant variance across macro-economics and public health. When the average 
                                                        
20 A z-value of 3.23, indicating 0.01 significance. 
21 Strictly speaking, a t-test is not appropriate here, given the non-normal distribution of the data. The values 
for its non-parametric counterpart, the Mann-Withney test (see Field 2005), however, are similar.  
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values are compared across different kinds of interest groups - professional 
associations versus NGOs - there is a significant difference to be observed between 
the kind of interest group and the importance of civil servants (t(16) = 1.78, p ≤ 0.1). 
Professional associations find civil servants slightly more important than NGOs do.  
The variation in policy area apparently did not make a difference for the 
respondents in this study. So, the underlying logics do not significantly differ 
across these two areas. Given the different position of interest groups in macro- 
economics and public health, however, an influential position could have multiple 
meanings. An influential position may indicate implementation influence in one 
policy area, whereas it may mean an influential advisory position in another. This 
means that we cannot draw a conclusion about the nature of the influential 
position as such. Yet, variables such as agency type and kinds of interest groups 
seem to matter in explaining the role of either an influential position of interest 
groups or the importance of civil servants, respectively. These findings cannot 
readily be generalised, as the respondents in this study are not a representative 
sample of the civil servants and interest groups involved in both policy areas, 
although respondents from different kinds of interest groups and different topics 
within these broad areas were included. But for these cases of bureaucracy-interest 
group interactions, we can assume that a sheer difference in policy area did not 
matter. Yet, variations in agency type and kinds of interest groups did.  
All in all, we can cautiously infer that a combination of different types of 
rationality explains interactions between bureaucrats and interest groups. Based on 
the indicators that have been used in this qualitative comparative analysis, we can 
conclude that habitual and anticipatory rationality together explain why interactions 
last, rather than institutional reproduction. The indicators for both habitual 
rationality (consultation procedures) and anticipatory rationality (influential 
position of either civil servants or interest groups, and legitimacy) were found to be 
necessary conditions for durable interactions between interest groups and civil 
servants. In contrast, trust, as an indicator for institutional reproduction, was not 
found to be a necessary condition for durable interactions. The combination of 
habitual and anticipatory rationality makes sense, as both serve a purpose that has 
been strategically decided upon. These different types of choices were shown not to 
vary across the different policy areas. Significant relationships were observed only 
in the cases of agency type (for the influential role of interest groups) and kinds of 
interest groups (for the importance of civil servants in gaining access). Civil 
servants working at advisory agencies find interest groups more influential than 
their colleagues at regulatory agencies. And professional associations consider civil 
servants to be a more important means for getting access than NGOs do. In sum, 
interactions between interest groups and bureaucrats are not only a result of 
strategic choices to obtain the best resources, but are also dictated by habitual and 
anticipatory rationality.  
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7.4 Multiple rationalities in reality  
Not only strategic choices appear to determine interactions between bureaucrats 
and interest groups. Habits and anticipating behaviour also matter. This section 
serves to describe several concrete instances in which we observe some of the 
mechanisms underlying the multiple rationalities shown to influence the relation 
between bureaucrats and interest groups.  
7.4.1 The weakest link 
The major peak or umbrella interest groups face a particular challenge both in 
representing the interests of their constituency and in keeping up with latest 
developments. They usually represent a wide array of membership organisations 
that vary in their organisational capacity and innovative potential. As a result, peak 
interest organisations tend to be rather conservative. They have to keep on board 
the weakest or most disruptive link of their constituency as well as their most 
innovative or successful members (Smith 2000; Truman 1951). Indeed, the chain 
is as strong as the weakest link and that makes them, despite their favourable 
position, less attractive for civil servants to cooperate with. Legitimacy is important, 
as we will see below. But civil servants need more than legitimacy to design policy 
proposals. Expertise, particularly in the form of innovative approaches and best 
practices, is an important tool for civil servants as well in drafting policy proposals. 
In the terminology of Rogers’ (2003[1962]) innovation diffusion model, civil 
servants highly value expertise from ‘early adaptors;’ that is, those who adopt new 
technologies or reforms soon after their introduction to the market. In contrast to 
laggards and the late majority who implement new technologies only when they 
have become common knowledge, the early adaptors deliver the best practices civil 
servants look for, thereby rendering the peak organisations less attractive.  
Consequently, civil servants reach out to individual member organisations or 
individual corporations to get a feeling for the latest developments and 
opportunities to incorporate them in policy proposals or to set a standard. As a 
respondent illustrates: “When we invite the major umbrella organisations, they 
always ask for money first. More often than not, we cannot provide extra money 
and just want to know what really works ‘in the field.’ To deal with this situation, 
we often invite individual organisations and individual experts to discuss whether 
new medicines or policy reforms really would work.” Or, as another respondent 
suggests: “Those major umbrella organisations often scream blue murder, but 
when you ask individual general practitioners, for instance, there doesn’t seem to 
be a problem at all.” Several civil servants at the Ministry of Social affairs and 
Employment indicate a similar mechanism. According to one: “The national 
organisation representing various minorities in the Netherlands interprets its 
representative task as one that only involves talking about draft bills. But we have 
already adopted most of the laws involving minority rights and minority 
participation in the Netherlands. When it comes to successful implementation, 
however, they tend to be rather passive, and it is hard to figure out who they 
represent. Therefore, we do talk with them, but we are increasingly reaching out to 
smaller minority organisations, which design and implement many projects that 
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really benefit the individual citizens.” A similar reasoning applies to interactions 
with both the social partners and their individual member organisations. As a 
respondent observed: “We consult the major peak organisations for major reforms 
and yearly budgetary discussions. For concrete projects and implementation, we 
tend to consult the individual member organisations.” And, according to a civil 
servant at the Labour Inspectorate: “Although the social partners often want to talk, 
it is in real life where changes really take place.” Individual member organisations 
become increasingly important and may erode the position of peak organisations. 
When individual member organisations are substantively big enough, it is even 
more attractive for civil servants to cooperate with those individual organisations 
separately. “When we want to get something done,” says a civil servant at the 
Ministry of Public Health, Welfare and Sports, “we sometimes approach the 
individual health insurance companies rather than their representative 
organisations. If several of the big players agree with our plans and their 
representative organisation does not, it will be quite possible that we can still 
implement our plans.” These strategies of reaching out to individual member 
organisations are, naturally, not warmly welcomed by the peak organisations 
themselves. By reaching out to individual organisations or individual persons, their 
role and position in policy making, as well as their representativeness, is 
questioned. So, they try to establish a secure position for themselves by insisting on 
consultation in cases of reforms or new developments. Usually, civil servants opt 
for the strategy of allowing them their say in consultation procedures, but 
nevertheless involve individual organisations at other stages in the policy process.  
The problem of the weakest link obviously creates a challenging management 
dilemma for large representative organisations. Differences in positions and 
opinions among the individual member organisations are as much as possible 
addressed behind closed doors. A public awareness of different opinions 
immediately decreases their bargaining position and, at the same time, increases 
the strategic position of civil servants by providing them with the possibility of a 
‘divide and rule’ tactic. However, when individual interests are at stake, it is 
difficult to speak with one voice, as an example of sustainable development 
indicates. Several CEOs of large national and international corporations sent an 
open, personally signed letter to the person charged with forming the new Dutch 
government (the formateur) in late 2006. They asked the government in this letter 
to formulate stricter rules on corporate social responsibility.22 That letter, according 
to one of the respondents, was not coordinated with the major peak employer 
organisation, the confederation of Dutch Industry and Employers (VNO-NCW). 
They “were not exactly amused, as VNO-NCW’s strategy was to lobby for realistic 
goals that would not harm the level playing field of Dutch corporations too much.” 
The letter of several of their prominent and biggest members rendered VNO-
NCW’s bargaining position much more difficult than it would have been without 
such a public willingness to take care of the environment.  
While consultation with the major peak and umbrella organisations is deeply 
embedded in the decision-making processes, the strategy of reaching out to 
individual organisations to either obtain expertise on new developments or 
                                                        
22 NRC Handelsblad (2006), 12 December. 
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legitimacy for policy proposals is frequent. In that sense, interactions with major 
interest organisations are subject to change. Although contacts with members or 
individuals are relatively small in scope, they undeniably take place. They seem to 
be a result of strategic choices to somehow cope with an institutional arrangement 
of interest representation and concomitant vested interests that do not always meet 
the demands of policy making to address current social problems. The problem of 
the weakest link thus creates more manoeuvrability for civil servants within a 
system of vested interests. That is, when individual members of associations 
present themselves as early adaptors, they are very attractive for civil servants to 
interact with. Such organisations can provide the best practices they are looking 
for, which are usually not provided to them by the major umbrella interest 
organisations. Presenting such best practices would mean that part of their 
constituency would not be able to keep up. Because they have to represent their 
entire constituency, the early adaptors usually profit less from a peak association 
than laggards do. The risk, if the individual members are large enough, is that they 
will lobby on their own. Such internal conflict is useful, in turn, for civil servants, 
as it creates the option for a divide and rule tactic. So, the problem of the weakest 
link not only poses a management and legitimacy dilemma for major umbrella 
interest organisations. It also tends to mitigate a potential degree of dependence for 
civil servants, as there are more alternatives to pick and choose from.  
7.4.2 It’s all about legitimacy 
One resource in particular unravels the complex interplay between 
institutionalisation and anticipatory rationality, and that is legitimacy. Although 
information and expertise are important, most respondents indicate that legitimacy 
is a particularly important resource to obtain. As one civil servant noted: “When 
there is no political support for a bill or proposed plans, forget it. Of course, 
ultimately we can impose our plans on the sector, but that is a rare event.” This 
point of view is shared by many respondents. A well-known mechanism is the 
inevitable necessity for civil servants to prepare their political superiors for and 
support them in parliamentary debates. To do so, civil servants seek to obtain 
support from the interest groups for proposed plans or drafted bills, or they 
informally check to what extent such interest groups would agree on certain initial 
ideas. And, in instances when the major interest groups oppose a Minister’s plans, 
they check their opinions to anticipate debates in parliament, as interest groups 
will lobby parliamentarians to change intended plans.  
This characteristic of political-administrative relations is well-known and is not 
a surprising finding. What it means in the context of this study is that the 
legitimacy issue induces anticipatory rationality, especially in the case of civil 
servants. As a representative of an interest group aptly comments: “The worst 
nightmare for a civil servant is to read our opposing opinion in the next morning’s 
newspaper without having informed his political superior.” Lobbying parliament 
has always been and continues to be an important strategy, even in a corporatist 
country like the Netherlands (Torenvlied 2005). All interest group representatives 
who participated in this study indicate that they “take the parliamentary road to 
influence.” Yet, they vary in the extent to which they do so. Almost all indicate that 
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they prefer to come to an agreement with civil servants. If that does not work out, 
however, they certainly do not hesitate to lobby parliamentarians. Overall, the 
larger, more economically-oriented interest groups tend to shy away from the 
political route as much as is possible. They prefer silent diplomacy to public noise.  
The image of the interest group or sector also plays an important role in 
deciding to lobby parliament. A respondent from one of the professional 
associations indicates that his organisation benefits from a relatively positive 
image: “We can count on sympathy from parliamentarians, as medium-sized 
enterprises are not only the engine of our economy but they are also relatively 
harmless.” He added: “Besides, another important reason to lobby 
parliamentarians is that we don’t have to discuss every excruciating detail of a 
policy proposal. It is more than enough to bring across a general feeling of 
injustice, which is important for individual parliamentarians to show to their 
constituency that that is what they stand for.” And a civil servant aptly summarised 
the benefits of the parliamentary road: “Everything that has an aura of something 
pitiful can count on the unconditional support of any parliamentarian.” Image is 
not only important in getting access. It helps in obtaining legitimacy as well. 
The image of interest groups or the sector is indeed important for civil servants 
in their strategies to obtain public support for policy plans and to prepare their 
ministers or secretaries of state for parliamentary debates. But it is not only the 
players with the big financial resources and the best expertise who matter; those 
who can count on a broad display in the media matter as well, perhaps even more 
so. Civil servants working for diverse supervisory bodies or inspectorates observe 
that the industrial players they supervise are not necessarily the most influential 
ones. To an increasing extent, consumer organisations and other NGOs gain 
influence via the media. As a civil servant working at one of the regulatory agencies 
comments on this tendency: “I am not at all happy when I read in the newspapers 
that the Association for Consumers is dissatisfied with our procedures.” Public and 
political support are important for regulatory agencies as well (Berry 1997; Wilson 
2000[1989]), and may be helpful in balancing economic power. 
The examples above show that there are two sides to the same coin when it 
comes to a hypothesis about how legitimacy enables interactions to endure. On the 
one side, we clearly observe that legitimacy reveals an institutionalised pattern, as it 
is crucial for civil servants to provide the necessary support for their Minister when 
defending draft bills in parliament. “You may call it political support”, comments 
one of the civil servants, “but actually it is something essential to our jobs.” This 
quote, however, may also reflect a situation that induces anticipatory rationality. 
Legitimacy is prerequisite, so there is no free choice to obtain it or not. It is much 
more a question of what kind of legitimacy and from which organisation to obtain it. 
So, on the other side, diversification of legitimacy is important and refers to 
anticipatory rationality rather than, or in addition to an institutionalised pattern of 
interactions. And in this subtle game, the big industrial players are no longer the 
natural winning party. This variation in sources of legitimacy reflects a well-known 
tendency that a wider array of interest groups than only business associations is 
needed for securing political support for policy proposals. This means that civil 
servants have some room to strategically manoeuvre among the various interest 
groups they inevitably have to interact with to ensure political support. 
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7.4.3 Fair play  
‘Fair play’ refers to the collection of formal and informal rules in sports with which 
individual competitors have to comply in order to guarantee an honest and an even 
match. They include both the formal rules of the game as well as the informal rules 
of showing respect for one another and acting upon this respect. Fair play is an 
important unwritten rule guiding bureaucracy-interest group interactions in both 
policy areas as well. Fair play, in this case, reveals the importance of trust. When 
one does not obey the ‘informal rules of fair play,’ both civil servants and interest 
groups will consider each other as less trustworthy parties to cooperate with.  
To reveal what such informal rules and trustworthiness mean for bureaucracy-
interest group interactions, how interest groups use the media serves as a concrete 
example. Questions included the use of the media, whether interest groups inform 
civil servants when they are about to ‘go public,’ and whether a failure to inform in 
advance would harm their relations with civil servants. The table below shows the 
results analyses of the answers respondents gave. It reports the percentages of the 
fuzzy-set membership levels attributed to the answers of the interest groups. A 
high value means strong membership in that category; a low value indicates the 
opposite. For instance, 0.83 means ‘we almost always use the media,’ or ‘we almost 
always inform civil servants before we use the media as a lobby tactic,’ and ‘not 
informing civil servants almost always harms our relationships.’  
Table 7.7 Indicators of going public 
Indicators for going public 0 0.17 0.33 0.5 0.67 0.83 1.0
Use the media 0.0 0.0 16.7 5.6 22.2 5.6 50.0
Inform civil servants in advance 11.1 0.0 0.0 22.2 11.1 16.7 38.9
Not informing is harmful for relationship 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 44.4 22.2 0.0
                    Fuzzy set values (7-scale)
 
Note: The numbers represent the frequency of the individual fuzzy-set membership values (in %). 
The majority of the respondents indicate that they always or at least regularly use 
the media for strategic purposes. That is, 50 percent (value 1) of the respondents 
say that they always use the media, and 27.8 percent indicate that they use the 
media almost always, or more often than not (value 0.83 and 0.67, respectively). A 
majority, 55.6 percent, indicate that they always or often inform civil servants in 
advance of going public to achieve what they want (values 0.83 and 1). Finally, 66.6 
percent indicate that it often can be harmful when they do not inform civil servants 
in advance (values 0.67 and 0.83). Yet, none of the interest groups indicate that 
they always inform civil servants (value 1). No significant differences were found 
for variance in kinds of interest groups or policy areas. These mechanisms are 
apparently not affected by the kinds of interest groups or the substance of the 
policies involved in this analysis. 
The logic behind this habit of informing civil servants in advance is that interest 
groups do not want to surprise civil servants, a mechanism closely related to their 
need of public support for policy plans. It is not only a simple ‘gentleman’s 
agreement.’ Interest groups do not want their relationships with civil servants to be 
harmed by untrustworthy behaviour. Some interest groups indeed report that civil 
servants were not amused when they informed the media about certain negotiation 
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processes. Their behaviour, in turn, influenced their subsequent chances of getting 
access. One respondent noted that: “A particular top civil servant has been grumpy 
for years and does not really trust us anymore, so we have more difficulties in 
getting access than before.” The damage may be not always so severe (and 
sometimes does not even exist). As another respondent indicates: “Indeed, some of 
my colleagues fear such a consequence when we go the media. I immediately 
admit that this could happen. On the other hand, when a civil servant is so 
personally tied to a specific problem, he is not likely to be the person with the most 
influence. The really important civil servants are responsible for a wide variety of 
topics.” In general, however, not informing seems an unwise option. Yet, in some 
cases, negatively influencing the relations with civil servants is less harmful if the 
civil servant in question is not the most important source of access.  
The agreement to inform in advance is sometimes violated, however, either 
deliberately or by sheer unprofessional behaviour. As for the latter, several of the 
representatives of interest groups indicate that, over recent years, they have started 
to professionalise their public affairs functions, or that they simply do not have 
sufficient financial means for a professional public affairs manager. A deliberate 
choice to violate the agreement is somewhat more complex. Representative 
organisations are often caught between what Olson (1965) called the logic of 
membership and the logic of access. Weighing their different functions of interest 
representation and public visibility for their individual member organisations 
sometimes leads interest groups to decide to go public, even when it is not 
beneficial for their relations with civil servants. As one noted: “We have to show 
our members that we really take action. We do this by being visible in the media. 
Being visible is sometimes better than protecting the relationship with civil 
servants. We carefully weigh those different functions.”  
Although interest groups indicate that relations sometimes can be harmed by a 
careless media strategy, civil servants, on the other hand, note that going public or 
lobbying parliamentarians is part of the game. They accept interest groups’ choices 
to go to parliament or to the media to arrange their affairs, as long as they are 
honest about their strategies. Lying can seriously erode civil servants’ trust in an 
organisation. As one civil servant illustrates: “We accept their role and that 
lobbying parliament and going to the media is part of the game. However, lying 
can seriously undermine trust. We once had a situation in which we came to an 
agreement with an organisation after long negotiations. But right after the 
negotiations ended, they declared in the media that they wanted a totally different 
solution. That was not exactly beneficial to our relationship. Just say you disagree, 
and then go to the media or parliament.” Fair play is an important strategy for both 
parties to remain a trustworthy partner. The qualitative comparative analysis did 
not reveal trust as a necessary condition for durable interactions. Yet, these 
examples suggest that the delicate balance of trustworthiness can be an important 
aspect underlying bureaucracy-interest group interactions.  
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7.4.4 The influence is in the adjectives 
A final and quite particular instance of bureaucracy-interest group interactions is 
provided by interactions between regulatory agencies and interest groups. It is for 
these interactions that the literature on interest group politics often claims an 
influential position for interest groups (see, among others, Carpenter 2004; Yackee 
2005; Stigler 1971; Woll and Artigas 2007). Regulators in the Netherlands face a 
relatively high level of policy discretion.23 Almost all interest group respondents 
indicated that regulators are relatively hard to influence, and respondents from the 
regulators indicate that they are to a large extent able to maintain their autonomy. 
Obviously, capture is relatively difficult to measure, and even more so when there 
is no database allowing a comparison of the initial input of interest groups on the 
major standards and norms and their final version (Yackee 2005). Also, due to its 
politically sensitive nature for both interest groups and civil servants alike, capture 
is a complex phenomenon to study. Respondents from the business associations 
were especially keen to report that they have established trustworthy relationships 
with civil servants. This very same keenness, combined with a strong preference 
for so-called ‘silent diplomacy,’ may indicate a relatively strong bargaining position. 
Two important mechanisms stand out, namely, civil servants prefer informal 
negotiation, and the strategic use of language in reporting.24  
Regulation in the Netherlands is guided by the principle of ‘high-trust 
regulation,’ combined with active participation of market parties. High-trust 
regulation can be interpreted as a sort of policy paradigm that guides the actions of 
regulatory bodies. The underlying principle is to trust the market to comply with 
regulations and to assume that companies regulate their own behaviour. Only 
when cases of non-compliance become apparent must the regulator in question 
interfere.25 Trust is not only an important guiding principle for regulators, it is also 
a mechanism that regulators seem to use to avoid ‘judicialisation,’ as they call it. 
When faced with major corporations that violate policies and laws on competition, 
they are keen on solving such issues informally. That is, they try to convince these 
parties in informal settings that they indeed should pay a fine to compensate for 
their violations of the law, or otherwise adapt their behaviour.  
Such a strategy fits not only the current policy paradigm of high trust, it also 
seems to be in the interest of the regulators themselves. If the parties were to bring 
their cases before a court, the legal burden of proof would be on the side of the 
regulator, in turn requiring professionally trained and highly experienced lawyers. 
Such attempts to avoid judicialisation, reveals the Achilles heel of many regulators. 
They usually lack the financial resources to hire the best lawyers. “You know,” says 
a civil servant at a regulatory agency, “the best and brightest do not work here. They 
go to the private sector as that is simply better value for money. The average age 
                                                        
23 Parliamentary Papers 2003-2004, 29279, no. 9. 
24 Respondents from regulators were careful in answering questions about the position of those they were 
supposed to regulate. Some respondents, however, elaborated on examples of individual corporations or 
interest organisations, revealing potentially strong influence. These examples, unfortunately, were always 
provided ‘off the record.’ Therefore, I can only address the two mechanisms in abstract terms. 
25 Parliamentary Papers, 2007-2008, 31200 XXI, no. 2, p. 23. 
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here is around 30. When we go to court, young, recently graduated lawyers face the 
most experienced and most expensive lawyers of the country, as the individual 
corporations have plenty of money to hire the best.” More generally, regulators in 
the fields of both public health and macro-economics indicate a lack of capacity to 
properly regulate and enforce norms and standards. As another respondent 
indicates: “We have the capacity to visit each company once every thirty years. 
Sometimes we visit a company twice a year, but the majority of the organisations 
we never check.” Such a capacity problem potentially renders regulatory agencies 
more vulnerable to being captured and causes them to rely much more on informal 
mechanisms of trust and authority.  
A second mechanism that shows a subtle influence of interest groups and 
individual corporations is when regulatory agencies publish results of so-called 
‘sector-wide investigations.’ As such investigations do not involve a procedure to 
formally correct the behaviour of a single corporation; they have to avoid 
addressing the blameworthy organisations by name. Instead, regulators have to 
publish their results in general terms. When a regulator is about to publish such a 
report, they provide organisations in question with the opportunity to comment on 
the facts and figures in the report. Only naturally, those organisations try to 
influence the conclusions as well. And that is where the subtle use of adjectives 
becomes visible. It is in the interest of the regulator to publish the results as 
objectively as possible so that self-regulation within the sector will solve the 
problem. Vice versa, it is in the interest of the sector to minimise the damage to 
their reputation. Consensus is often sought via adding adjectives that provide a 
more nuanced and positive image of the ‘remainder’ of the sector. As a 
representative of an interest group recalls:  
Several years ago, the inspectorate published a report that the quality of care in 
our sector was really poor. I was not happy with this publication and called the 
Inspector-General immediately. I told him that the report suggested that the 
entire sector was performing badly, whereas the conclusion only applied to a few 
institutions. We made careful agreements that this would not happen again.  
In the words of a civil servant working at one of the regulatory agencies: “Yes, they 
undeniably have some influence, but it is alright to give them something by 
modifying our findings, as long as the essence of our message remains the same.” 
The subtle nuances of adding adjectives thus help both interest groups in exerting 
influence and regulatory agencies in getting their main message across.  
So, a formal policy paradigm of high-trust regulation ensures that trust is an 
important mechanism in interactions between regulators and the regulated. Yet, 
investing in trustworthy relations is also necessary for regulatory agencies to avoid 
judicialisation and too much emphasis on enforcement and monitoring. They 
simply have too few resources to cope with the consequences of judicialisation and 
extensive regulatory demand. Informal negotiations and subtle adaptations of 
conclusions of sector-wide reports ensure that regulatory agencies are still able to 
maintain their autonomous position and get their most important messages across. 
Yet, the very same informal trajectories that seem necessary to build trust and 
authority as a solid regulator simultaneously render them more open to the 
influence of interest groups.  
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7.4.5 Multiple rationalities and degree of dependence 
These four mechanisms illustrate the complex interplay between different types of 
rationalities that determine relations between bureaucrats and interest groups. 
First, the problem of the weakest link shows that the organisational structure of 
representative organisations provides civil servants with more room to manoeuvre. 
As representative organisations tend to be rather conservative and have difficulties 
in speaking with one voice, civil servants deliberately reach out to individual 
organisations - and have the opportunity to do so by this very phenomenon. This 
mechanism may mitigate relatively high resource concentration in cases of limited 
access, as there are more alternatives for civil servants to choose from. 
Second, it’s all about legitimacy shows that the importance of this resource could 
contribute to situations of capture, although civil servants have room to manoeuvre 
within the boundaries that legitimacy sets. Legitimacy is a vital resource for civil 
servants to obtain. They have little choice whether or not to obtain it, which severely 
increases their dependence on interest groups. There is, however, some room to 
manoeuvre offered by different sources of legitimacy various types of interest 
groups have to offer. Public endorsement thus may outrun economic power play. 
Increasing variation in types of legitimacy thus broadens the set of organisations to 
choose from. This, in turn, results in a smaller degree of dependence.  
Third, fair play shows that bureaucracy-interest group interactions may be a 
delicate balance of trust and distrust. Carelessly dealing with such interactions may 
well result in a negative reputation and decrease the trustworthiness of interest 
groups (see also Bernhagen and Brauniger 2005; Bernhagen 2007). Civil servants 
seem to benefit from this balance, as interest groups are keen on maintaining a 
good relationship. In this sense, trust may reveal institutionalised but suboptimal 
situations. Put differently, ensuring trust at a particular moment in time may be 
more important than the exchange of certain types of resources.  
Finally, the influence is in the adjectives reveals that, although the current practice 
of high-trust regulation and the lack of sufficient resources may render regulatory 
agencies relatively vulnerable, there are some subtle ways of ensuring that they 
maintain their autonomy and are able to get their main message across. Yet, it also 
shows that the resources regulatory agencies control cannot always match those 
that interest groups control. Informal regulation and a subtle use of language could 
be seen as a means of regulators for manoeuvring in interactions with those whom 
they regulate. A high-trust paradigm seems to facilitate informal negotiation. This 
emphasises individual administrative leadership in regulation more than the actual 
practice of monitoring. 
These four concrete mechanisms illustrate that both habitual and anticipatory 
rationality are also important in explaining bureaucracy-interest group interactions. 
These types of choices seem to intermingle with – rather than cancel out – the 
strategic choices that are inherent in a resource dependence reconceptualisation of 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions. 
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7.5 Multiple rationalities at work  
Bureaucracy-interest group interactions are not only a matter of resource exchanges 
based on strategic rationality. Other types of behavioural logics, such as habitual 
and anticipatory rationality, also seem to explain these interactions. This chapter 
has revealed that, generally speaking, civil servants tend to interact with a familiar 
set of interest groups, a finding that points in the direction of habitual or 
anticipatory rationality. Indeed, diversifying the set of interest groups reveals a 
conscious strategic choice, whereas interacting with a set of familiar groups may 
well be the result of habitual or anticipatory rationality. Formal requirements to 
interact and the fact that bureaucrats usually interact with interest groups are two 
important reasons shown to explain these interactions.  
Comparing habitual rationality along different political-administrative 
dimensions revealed variation across interest representation regimes and policy 
areas. Formal requirements to interact are more important in the Netherlands, 
whereas ‘usual interactions’ with interest groups prevail in the UK. Such reasons 
also vary across policy areas, again indicating the relevance of meso-level analyses.  
Next to habitual rationality, anticipatory rationality may also determine resource 
exchanges. The existence of anticipatory rationality has been examined by 
counterfactual analysis. This analysis revealed that half of the civil servants find 
that it is not often possible to sidestep interest groups, even if they want to do so. 
This possibility to circumvent varies only to a very small extent between different 
interest representation regimes and different types of agencies. In the Netherlands, 
it is somewhat easier to circumvent interest groups than in the UK. And for 
executive agencies, it is more difficult to circumvent than for other types of 
agencies. Civil servants report that difficulties in circumvention are mainly because 
of the position of interest groups as important spokespersons, their role in the 
national economy, their usefulness, and formal requirements to consult them. 
These reasons again reveal a mixture of different types of rationality. The survey 
analysis more generally suggested that multiple rationalities are at stake in 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions.  
The findings of multiple types of choices are confirmed by a qualitative 
comparative analysis. Seen from the perspective of civil servants, consultation 
procedures, legitimacy and a powerful position of interest groups were necessary 
conditions for durable bureaucracy-interest group interactions. From an interest 
group perspective, both the importance of civil servants to obtain access and 
consultation procedures appeared to be necessary conditions. Tests of joint 
necessity of these conditions suggested that different types of rationalities together 
explain long-term interactions. Comparison across the two policy areas did not 
reveal significant variation. The difference between advisory agency and regulatory 
agency revealed a significant difference in the influential position of interest 
groups. Interest groups appeared to be regarded as less powerful by civil servants 
working at regulatory agencies than by those working at advisory agencies. And 
civil servants turned out to be more important for professional associations than 
for NGOs. In sum, QCA showed that resource exchanges between bureaucrats and 
interest groups are based on a set of multiple rationalities 
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An in-depth examination of concrete instances in which these mechanisms 
related to the various types of rationality are at work reveals an important interplay 
between strategic, anticipatory, and habitual rationality. The need to secure political 
support for their Minister or the policy proposals they draft, for instance, ensures 
that civil servants to a large extent depend on interest groups to obtain these 
resources. This induces anticipatory rationality. On the other hand, the need for 
various types of legitimacy allows civil servants to pick and choose among 
alternatives, revealing the possibility for strategic choices as well. A management 
dilemma for major umbrella organisations to represent every member of their 
constituencies also induces the possibility for civil servants to strategically pick and 
choose individual organisations in addition to routine interactions with peak 
organisations. The emphasis on informal negotiation and subtle use of language 
reveals both strong dependence on interest groups and a subtle room to manoeuvre 
within a framework of dependence relations.  
In conclusion, the resource dependence model applied to bureaucracy-interest 
group interactions revealed a mixture of various types of choices or behavioural 
logics. Resource exchange not only results from strategic choices based on the 
resources one needs. These resource exchanges also result from habitual and 
anticipatory rationality. When we consider the discussion of the literature in 
chapter 2 again, each of the strands of literature is shown to reveal one particular 
aspect of government-interest group interactions, or bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions in particular. Bureaucratic politics suggest that civil servants can act as 
entrepreneurs in their interactions with interest groups. This implies a strategic 
choice for civil servants. The literature on interest group politics suggests a similar 
strategic choice for interest groups. Both strands of literature implicitly assume that 
the behaviour of the opposite set of actors, interest groups in the case of 
bureaucratic politics and civil servants in the case of interest group politics is 
governed by anticipatory rationality. A resource dependence approach to 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions incorporates both points of view. By 
measuring the degree of dependence, we can infer which set of actors is able to 
choose purely strategically and which set of actors faces strategic decision making 
that is mainly constrained by future consequences. By incorporating relevant 
contextual factors in the model, we can explain how and why such a possibility 
varies across different circumstances.  
Yet, resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003[1978]) and its 
applications to explain interest groups’ access (Bouwen 2000; 2004) usually focus 
on the possibility of strategic choice. The kind of resources that are needed 
determines the choice among organisations to interact with. This implicitly 
assumes that once such a resource is no longer valuable to the organisation, the 
relation between the two (or more) organisations ends, since the interactions no 
longer serve the strategically decided-upon purpose. Yet, when we take into account 
the availability of resources in the environment (resource concentration) more 
explicitly, as well as the environment itself (by incorporating relevant contextual 
variables), we see that quitting such relationships may be far from optional. The 
underlying factors that cause such relationships to last are revealed in this study by 
explicitly addressing bureaucracy-interest group interactions over time. A long-term 
perspective reveals mechanisms related to institutionalisation and to evolutionary 
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perspectives on rational choice. Both types of mechanisms restrict a civil servant’s 
or interest group’s room to manoeuvre. The room for strategic choices in 
interacting with interest groups or civil servants, respectively, is thus very much 
determined by the context in which those interactions take place. Demarcating and 
understanding context is therefore necessary to understand the extent to which 
these actors may strategically decide upon their interactions, or how actors adapt to 
their environment to optimise their choices. 
Examining bureaucracy-interest group interactions over time, albeit in an 
indirect manner, allowed us to observe aspects of habitual rationality, 
institutionalisation, and anticipatory rationality. Whereas the literature on historical 
institutionalism explains the consequences of choices or occurrences in the past 
(Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Thelen 2003), evolutionary perspectives on 
rational decision making explain today’s options given future or anticipated 
consequences (Axelrod 1984; Hardin 2002; Ostrom and Walker 2003). They may, 
however, both result in similar locked-in effects today. That is, when bureaucrats 
anticipate that they will need certain interest groups in the foreseeable future, they 
will consciously choose to continue to interact in the present. Reducing uncertainty 
or avoiding the unintended consequences of ending relationships becomes more 
important reasons to maintain a relationship than the actual exchange of resources. 
The same is true for a heritage of the past. When interactions persist due to 
unconscious or routine behaviour, they result in interactions in the present as well, 
which cannot be escaped from. Past choices and anticipated (dis)advantages may 
thus result in similar mechanisms underlying interactions today. These analyses 
point to current interaction effects between the consequences of previous choices 
and anticipated future consequences. Historical institutionalism and rational 
choice may be more related than has been shown until today. Disentangling the 
precise nature of each of the individual types of choices underlying bureaucracy-
interest group interactions may also help in unravelling the interaction effects 
between the shadow of the future and the heritage of the past regarding 
institutional arrangements. 
The resource dependence model developed in this study integrates the various 
logics that implicitly underlie the three strands of literature discussed in chapter 2. 
The strategic element of resource exchange has been revealed to be a significant 
explanatory component. But anticipatory and habitual rationality are two likely 
determinants of a resource dependence relationship as well. As such, the model is 
a first step to a comprehensive assessment of bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions, incorporating elements over and across time. And, it may be helpful 
in addressing the complex interplay of strategic, anticipatory, and habitual 
rationality that may jointly determine the nature of these interactions. Most 
importantly, the model developed in this study draws attention to a theoretical 
challenge: how to disentangle interaction effects of mechanisms that are tied to 
different theories of institutional stability or behavioural continuity. 
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8  
Bureaucracy-Interest Group Interactions 
Unravelled 
8.1 Building bridges, dependent on support, or just a habit? 
The bureaucrats in New York City and Rotterdam chose to cooperate for similar 
reasons with immigrant organisations, as we saw in the introduction. A capacity to 
intermediate between the local government and diverse citizen groups turned out 
to be a vital resource, both in maintaining contact over time and getting in touch 
quickly in times of contingencies. This capacity to intermediate appeared to travel 
the oceans well. In two entirely different interest representation systems, a similar 
resource proved to be vital for solid policy making as well as effective crisis 
management. The differences in the political-administrative systems of each city 
were apparently not the most important explanatory factor determining these civil 
servants’ similar needs and reactions. Other contextual factors apparently matter 
for bureaucrats’ interactions with interest groups. 
A case study into such relations (Poppelaars 2007) highlighted this similarity 
and pointed to a more general question about this political-administrative 
phenomenon. Why is it that bureaucrats interact with certain interest groups but 
not, or to a lesser extent, with others? And why do we see variation in the extent of 
their interaction, as well as in their motives? Some of these motives could be 
remarkably similar across different political-administrative dimensions, but others 
would perhaps vary to a considerable degree along the very same dimensions. In a 
nutshell, and at a relatively abstract level, the answer to these questions is that 
bureaucrats’ motives to interact with interest groups are grounded in a mix of 
strategic, anticipatory, and habitual rationality. This mixture of choices varies under 
different political-administrative circumstances and explains why interactions 
between bureaucrats and interest groups can vary. In what follows, I will discuss 
the overall conclusion in more detail. I first briefly summarise the explanatory 
model developed in this study and the empirical findings generated by testing the 
model. I then briefly reflect on the research project and the explanatory potential of 
the model. Finally, I address how the model relates to other strands of literature 
and sketch possible avenues for further research.  
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8.2 The explanatory value of the resource dependence model  
The added value of the resource dependence model to explain bureaucracy-interest 
group interactions is that it integrates several existing explanations for this 
phenomenon. And, by doing so, it allows systematic comparison of these 
interactions across cases and over time. The underlying logic of the model is to 
focus on a central underlying commonality found in the different sets of literature 
explaining bureaucracy-interest group interactions. That is, in all three sets of 
literature examined here, we see different types of resource exchanges. The 
literature on bureaucratic politics reveals that, for bureaucrats to establish 
autonomy or to push through their policy plans, they need political support. They 
are able to obtain this political support from networks of interest groups. According 
to the interest group literature, interest groups try to exert influence by offering 
certain expertise and information to ensure their access to the decision-making 
process. In some cases, interest groups may have to offer resources that 
bureaucrats fully rely on, rendering them very influential. According to policy 
network studies, bureaucracy-interest group interactions serve a mutual benefit. 
That is, in such interactions, ‘give’ and ‘take’ are perfectly in balance. Requiring 
political support, providing expertise, and a mutual benefit: these three 
explanations all suggest an exchange. This is why classic resource dependence 
theory, in which resource exchanges are the key explanatory variable for 
interactions between organisations, is ideally suited as a starting point to develop 
an explanatory model of bureaucracy-interest group interactions. 
Classic resource dependence theory, developed by Pfeffer and Salancik 
(2003[1978]), assumes that organisations are not self-sufficient. As a result, they 
must interact with other organisations to obtain the resources they need to survive. 
The nature of such resource exchanges is, first, determined by the necessity of 
these resources for survival (the relative importance of resources), and, second, by 
the availability of these resources (the concentration of resources in the 
environment). Resource dependence theory additionally assumes that 
organisations try to minimise their dependence on other organisations by 
strategically picking and choosing the organisations with which to interact, based 
on what they perceive to be important resources. This option of strategic decision 
making distinguishes resource dependence theory from its fellow contextual 
approaches, such as neo-institutionalism and evolutionary organisational 
population theory, which are more deterministic in nature. Resource dependence 
theory emphasises strategic choice rather than adaptation to environment in an 
almost mechanical way (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003[1978]; Scott 2001).  
Applying the basic assumptions of classic resource dependence theory to 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions generated my explanatory model. Under 
resource dependence theory, bureaucrats need to interact with interest groups to 
obtain the resources they need. Bureaucracy-interest group interactions are then 
determined by the elements that govern resource exchange relationships. That is, 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions can be explained by the importance of the 
resources to either the bureaucracy or interest groups (the relative importance of 
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the resources) and by the extent to which these resources are available in the 
environment (resource concentration). By measuring both elements – resource 
importance and resource concentration – it should be possible to determine the 
nature of bureaucracy-interest group interactions (see chapter 3 for a detailed 
discussion and the full model). That is, when the resulting degree of dependence is 
more severe for bureaucrats, the traditional interpretation of the interest group 
literature is likely to hold. Vice versa, when the degree of dependence is less severe 
for bureaucrats, the interpretation of bureaucratic politics is likely to hold.  
I further hypothesised that the individual elements that constitute the degree of 
dependence, resource importance and resource concentration, are likely to vary 
across different political-administrative dimensions. National interest 
representation regimes characterising a country; differences in political-
administrative relations; functional and cultural differences among public 
agencies; the salience, complexity and political sensitivity of different policy areas; 
the influence of framing; and finally, Europeanisation, were hypothesised to either 
influence resource concentration or resource importance, or both (see also chapter 
3). Incorporating these contextual dimensions in the model allowed for cross-
sectional comparisons to determine under which circumstances the degree of 
dependence would be more severe for either bureaucrats or interest groups.  
This comparative model, however, did not incorporate a rival explanation to the 
assumption of strategic choice. Classic resource dependence theory argues that 
organisations strategically pick and choose to minimise their dependence. It 
assumes, implicitly, the possibility of ending interactions at any given time. Such 
an exit option, however, may not always be evident, which implies that resource 
exchanges may not solely be determined by strategic rationality. The possibilities 
for strategic decision making will be most likely absent or severely limited when 
the degree of dependence is severe. The organisation in question is forced to 
interact, as it were, but may still be doing so based on a conscious choice. In other 
words, an organisation may anticipate benefits of future interactions or 
disadvantages from future non-interactions and, therefore, continues to interact 
today. This is a situation characterised by, what I term, anticipatory rationality. A 
third option, however, arises when these interactions do not result from a 
conscious rational choice. That is, a given resource exchange could be a purely 
routine activity, which was originally based on a rational choice but has 
unconsciously continued over time. Such a situation reflects what Simon has called 
habitual rationality (1997[1947]) or, put differently, institutional reproduction. This 
routine behaviour could reflect an optimal or a suboptimal situation.  
In short, the resource dependence model states that bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions can be conceptualised as a resource exchange characterised by a degree 
of dependence. The degree of dependence is determined by the importance of a 
resource to the organisation in question and the extent to which this particular 
resource is available in the environment (resource concentration). As both 
elements will vary under different political-administrative circumstances, so will 
the degree of dependence that is constituted by these two elements. Such resource 
exchanges are, however, not only a result of strategic rationality, as is implicit in 
classic resource dependence theory, but they are also likely to result from 
anticipatory and habitual rationality.  
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So, by measuring both resource importance and resource concentration, we can 
measure bureaucracy-interest group interactions over time and across cases. A 
reconceptualisation of bureaucracy-interest group interactions at a more abstract 
level allows for systematic comparison of these interactions. And, in addition, it 
allows us to incorporate the different types choices that are apparent in the three 
strands of literature explaining bureaucracy-interest group interactions discussed 
here. As such, the resource dependence model is an attempt to integrate various 
theoretical explanations of bureaucracy-interest group interactions.  
8.3 Variations in bureaucracy-interest group interactions 
The findings on bureaucracy-interest group interactions generated by this study 
can be summarised by three subheadings. First, bureaucracy-interest groups can be 
explained by a resource dependence conceptualisation and have been shown to vary 
systematically across different circumstances (chapter 5). Second, interest group 
population dynamics, such as cooperation and competition, appear to influence 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions and need to be incorporated in a full model 
of resource dependence (chapter 6). Third, apart from the strategic choices implicit 
in a resource dependence reconceptualisation, bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions can sometimes be explained by anticipatory and habitual rationality as 
well (chapter 7). In this sense, the three empirical chapters provide complementary 
findings on bureaucracy-interest group interactions, which will be discussed below. 
8.3.1 Why bureaucrats interact with interest groups  
The first part of the empirical analysis (chapter 5) was primarily aimed at testing 
the explanatory model. With an overall R2 of roughly 0.48, the model offers a 
satisfying explanation for observed variations in bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions. Bureaucracy-interest group interactions can thus be unpacked by 
measuring resource importance and resource concentration and by taking into 
account the influence of contextual dimensions on each of these elements. This 
finding justifies further development of the explanatory model.  
In general, the contextual variables have a larger impact on the importance of 
the individual resources than that they have on the concentration of resources. 
Apparently, context influences the value civil servants attach to resources more 
than it influences the extent to which resources are available in their environment. 
Of these contextual variables, interest representation regime is an important 
explanatory variable. In corporatist regimes, the number of other types of 
organisations with which civil servants interact is somewhat smaller and the 
number of familiar interest groups is somewhat higher. Civil servants in pluralist 
interest representation regimes, like the UK, consider expertise, implementation 
capacity, and intermediation capacity to be more important than their colleagues in 
corporatist regimes. Although the importance of legitimacy significantly differs 
between the two types of interest representation regimes, the analyses could not 
reveal a direction in which the variance occurs.  
A second contextual variable, political-strategic insight, is particularly significant 
in explaining the importance of different resources. When political-strategic insight 
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becomes more important, civil servants will consider implementation capacity, 
expertise, and intermediation capacity to be more important. Variation in agency 
type also influences the importance civil servants attribute to the different resources 
interest groups have to offer. Civil servants working at advisory agencies consider 
expertise to be less important than their colleagues in executive agencies. Civil 
servants working at these two different types of agencies also differ in the 
importance they attach to legitimacy. Yet, it is hard to tell from the analyses 
whether the UK or the Dutch civil servants consider it to be more important. The 
capacity to intermediate is less important for those working at advisory as opposed 
to those working for executive agencies.  
The number of other types of organisations that civil servants cooperate with, as 
well as the number of interest groups that civil servants are familiar with, varies 
according to policy area. Variation in policy area is also related to the perceived 
importance of implementation capacity and legitimacy. Civil servants responsible 
for different policy areas value the importance of particular resources in different 
ways. They work together with varying numbers of other types of organisations 
such as advisory councils or research institutes and are familiar with varying 
numbers of interest groups. Variation in policy area is thus related to both resource 
concentration and resource importance.  
Finally, EU involvement does not seem to be related to either the importance or 
the concentration of resources in the environment. Only in the case of legitimacy 
and intermediation capacity does EU involvement seem to be related to the value 
civil servants attach to this resource, but only to a very small extent.  
An analysis of the interaction effects between the resource elements and 
contextual variables confirms the small yet significant impact of context in 
explaining variation in degree of dependence. What we can conclude is that the 
degree of dependence varies across these political dimensions and that some of the 
political-administrative dimensions matter more in determining this variation than 
others. What these analyses have shown is that bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions can be conceptualised as resource exchanges and that, via a systematic 
variation of contextual variables, the different nature - the degree of dependence - of 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions can be explained.  
8.3.2 Interest group population dynamics matter 
The empirical findings described above show that resource concentration is less 
influenced by the contextual dimensions specified in the analyses of chapter 5 than 
resource importance. It could very well be the case that resource concentration is 
influenced by contextual dimensions other than those included in the model. To 
provide insights into such potential effects, chapter 6 examined population 
dynamics that could influence bureaucracy-interest group interactions. This 
chapter examined several kinds of interaction patterns among interest groups, the 
resources they consider to be important, and how they value bureaucratic access as 
a means for exerting influence. In summary, the findings show that cooperation 
between interest groups involves either a relatively small or a relatively large set of 
interest groups. Interest groups in the UK tend to interact with a larger number of 
fellow interest groups than their Dutch colleagues. Interest groups also tend to 
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interact with a small number of other types of organisations, such as advisory 
councils, research institutes, or consultancy firms. In addition, interest groups 
experience relatively low levels of competition from each other. Such a perception of 
competition seems to vary according to the kinds of interest groups involved. 
Overall, however, perceptions of competition are not influenced by the independent 
variables included in the model, such as interest representation regime, receiving 
government grants, and variation in kinds of interest groups.  
Interest groups argue that expertise and information are important resources they 
can bring to the negotiation table. Implementation capacity, on the other hand, is 
considered to be a less important resource. This is an interesting finding, given 
that civil servants tend to consider implementation capacity a relatively important 
reason to cooperate with interest groups. Interest groups naturally seek to obtain 
something in return for the resources they bring. What is particularly important to 
them, first of all, is to get access to public policy making. When we compare the 
number of various political officials with which interest groups interacted, we find 
relatively small differences. UK interest groups seem to interact with more senior 
civil servants and (under-)Ministers than their Dutch counterparts. The latter tend 
to interact with more middle-level civil servants. In terms of frequency and 
perception, interest groups tend to find civil servants more important and interact 
more often with them in trying to exert influence. The frequency of interactions 
with civil servants also varies across the different kinds of interest groups. And, on 
the whole, interest groups in the Netherlands consider civil servants to be more 
important in exerting influence and interact more often with them than their UK 
colleagues do. Generally, interest groups consider civil servants to be important in 
assuring access to public policy making and, thereby, in being able to actually 
provide input for policy proposals. In addition, bureaucratic access is important to 
gain a sense that their input is actually used to adapt policy proposals. Exerting 
influence is a two-stage process of getting access and actually delivering input for 
policy proposals that is taken seriously. And, civil servants are apparently more 
important to interest groups in this process than politicians are.  
Finally, a major change in the environment of interest groups in the 
Netherlands and the UK, namely Europeanisation, does not seem to have had a big 
impact on national bureaucracy-interest group interactions to date. Civil servants 
report that they only to a limited extent include interest groups in their EU-related 
activities. Interest groups correspondingly indicate that they only to a limited extent 
experience either advantages or disadvantages from European regulations. 
Strategically using European regulations and directives at the national level is still a 
rare activity. Apparently, interest groups are not entirely aware of the strategic 
potential or impact of European regulations, directives and best practices. More 
generally, they seem to have difficulties adapting to the EU environment. 
How do these findings relate to the resource dependence model developed in 
this study? The cooperation and competition patterns among interest groups are 
assumed to influence bureaucracy-interest group interactions by influencing 
resource concentration. This will eventually influence the degree of dependence 
that characterises bureaucracy-interest group interactions. Cooperation patterns 
reveal that civil servants may have alternative sources to reach out to when they 
seek resources, and they thus imply that resource concentration may be less severe 
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when interest groups cooperate. Competition, on the other hand, may result in 
fewer organisations having access to civil servants, and thus fewer organisations 
may be known by civil servants. This results in higher resource concentration.  
A different interpretation of the importance of individual resources may also 
have consequences for the eventual degree of dependence. When interest groups 
are unaware of the importance of a particular resource, this may result in a higher 
degree of dependence, as the resource in question is not readily available to civil 
servants. It could thus enhance the bargaining position of interest groups when 
they are aware of the value of the resources they have to offer to civil servants. They 
could, as it were, try to ‘sell their resources at a higher price,’ and thereby heighten 
the degree of dependence. The apparent importance of bureaucratic access as a 
resource for interest groups, however, may mitigate the degree of dependence for 
civil servants. When civil servants are considered to be important, their bargaining 
position is stronger vis-à-vis interest groups. These findings thus reveal important 
contextual dimensions that are related to bureaucracy-interest group interactions. 
Particularly, this analysis draws attention to several population dynamics within the 
interest group environment that are important to consider in a full model of 
resource dependence explaining bureaucracy-interest group interactions. 
8.3.3 Multiple rationalities at work 
The foregoing findings are based on the assumption that interactions between civil 
servants and interest groups are based on strategic rationality to interact with an 
interest group capable of providing the resources the civil servant in question 
needs. Implicitly, this assumes an exit option. When an interest group cannot offer 
the resources a civil servant needs, why then continue to interact? Contemplating 
resource dependence over time, however, reveals that ending such relationships is 
not always a realistic option. The final set of analyses (chapter 7) therefore 
examined the possibility that resource dependence could be the result of 
anticipatory and habitual rationality. Anticipatory rationality indicates that civil 
servants, or interest groups, may not really want to interact. But, given the 
relevance of a particular organisation in the foreseeable future, or the willingness to 
reduce uncertainty, they are more or less ‘forced’ to interact. This is a strategic 
choice to interact despite a current unwillingness to do so. Second, bureaucracy-
interest group interactions could also be a result of a choice made in the past that 
has turned into a routine, indicating habitual rationality. These interactions could 
still meet a previous, rationally decided-upon purpose, yet could also reflect a 
situation that is suboptimal.  
The following findings indicate the existence of a mixture of different types of 
rationalities. First, civil servants tend to interact with a relatively familiar set of 
organisations. And, when asked why they interact, the reasons of ‘we usually have 
interactions, so today as well’ and ‘consultation procedures’ are important, in 
addition to the resources highlighted in the main resource dependence model. 
Contextual variables seem to affect these reasons as well. Consultation procedures 
prove to be more important in corporatist regimes than in more pluralist regimes, 
whereas ‘usual interactions with interest groups’ are more important to senior civil 
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servants in more pluralist regimes. In addition, civil servants involved in different 
policy areas value these reasons differently. 
These reasons to interact, and the interaction patterns with familiar 
organisations, point in the direction of habitual rationality. Civil servants, however, 
also indicate that, should they want to circumvent certain interest groups, they 
would face difficulties in doing so. Interest groups may hold an important position 
in the nation’s economy or may be too important as a spokesperson to ignore; there 
may be (in)formal requirements to interact, or there may always have been close 
cooperation. These reasons suggest a mixture of both habitual and anticipatory 
rationality. The (in)formal requirements and the existence of close cooperation 
suggest habitual rationality, whereas an interest group’s role as spokesperson and 
in a nation's economy suggest anticipatory rationality. By conducting a qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA) with interview data, we observe that several indicators 
of habitual and anticipatory rationality are necessary conditions for durable 
interactions. Further analysis reveals that, for interest groups, some of these are 
jointly necessary, such as consultation procedures and the importance of civil 
servants as an entrance point to policy-making processes. In the case of civil 
servants, there is reason to suggest that consultation procedures, the need for 
legitimacy, and the influential position of interest groups may jointly explain their 
interactions with interest groups. In addition, an in-depth analysis illustrates the 
underlying mechanisms of the different types of rationality in concrete instances. 
These three sets of analyses (testing the model, exploring interest group 
population dynamics and examining different types of rationalities) suggest that 
the combination of strategic, anticipatory, and habitual rationality determines the 
dependence relation between civil servants and interest groups. It is likely, then, 
that bureaucracy-interest group interactions result from a mixture of choices rather 
than a single type of rationality.  
8.4 Going forward by looking back 
The model developed in this study unravels how variation in the determining 
elements of an exchange relation – resource importance and resource 
concentration – explains variation in the degree of dependence that characterises 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions. The model and its analyses thus follow 
Mill’s method of concomitant variation (Mill 1970[1843], see also chapter 4). The 
empirical analyses, however, do not yet enable us to predict the degree of 
dependence in a given situation, because they do not fully capture the impact of 
context and the interaction between the resource elements. In addition, the precise 
causal direction of the resource variables and the contextual variables needs to be 
developed further. And, we also require a more detailed analysis of the different 
types of rationality as it is yet unclear whether strategic, anticipatory, and habitual 
rationality are mutually exclusive or mutually reinforcing mechanisms to explain 
resource dependence.  
So, the empirical analyses in this study offer promising findings but also 
suggest several ways to go forward, both in theoretical and methodological terms. A 
twofold theoretical issue that stands out after the analyses is how we could refine 
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the individual resource elements to better capture their meaning. And second, we 
need to better theorise and analyse the impact of context and interaction effects, 
both between context and resources and between the individual contextual 
variables. In methodological terms, the research design needs a better match with 
the model’s explanatory potential. Below, I will briefly discuss these two issues.  
8.4.1 Refining the model 
What becomes clear when casting resource dependence theory in a rudimentary 
formula is that there are several gaps and missing links to properly develop a 
dependence model of bureaucracy-interest group interactions. Consider the 
formula that summarised the argument in chapter 3 once again:  
D = ( )∑
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where,  
D = degree of dependence of a given bureaucracy-interest group resource exchange relation 
I = the importance of a particular resource (the value attributed to a particular resource) 
Ci = inside concentration of a particular resource (the number of interest groups that control 
a particular resource) 
Co = outside concentration of a particular resource (the number of other organisations that 
control a particular resource) 
 
A first obvious refinement is explicitly incorporating a ranking of the importance of 
resources (Ir) in the model. What is now included in the model is a dichotomous 
concept of importance (0 = unimportant; 1 = important), which incorporates a 
ranking at a more aggregate level. Usually, reference is made to the critical 
dependency of resources by ranking them in order of importance (Jacobs 1974; 
Bouwen 2004). What is thus necessary to capture the importance of resources 
better is either adding weights to the individual resources or measuring them by 
using a scale or index. In addition, we need to incorporate the variation of 
importance as a consequence of the impact of particular contextual factors.  
Second, measuring the number of organisations, be they interest groups or 
other types of organisations, is not enough to capture the idea of concentration of 
resources. Concentration of, in this case, resources implies a relative measurement. 
That is, we cannot properly determine concentration when we do not know the 
boundaries of a total population. What should be included in the model is a ratio 
measurement rather than an absolute number of organisations. This means that 
the number of interest groups that are familiar to civil servants and capable of 
providing a particular resource should be divided by the total number of interest 
groups capable of delivering such a resource. This also applies to the number of 
other organisations with which civil servants may interact.  
A possible complicating factor of incorporating such ratio terms is that usually 
there is no satisfying census of the interest group population. Furthermore, by 
simply adding up inside and outside concentration, we cannot properly isolate the 
concentration of resources within the interest group environment from the 
concentration in the total environment including other types of organisations. To 
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do this, a ratio of the concentration of resources within the interest group 
environment as opposed to the total environment (other organisations and interest 
groups) should be included in the model as well.  
How these different ratio measurements (inside resource concentration as the 
proportion of familiar interest groups of the total population, and the proportion of 
the interest groups of the total environment) precisely relate to each other to 
constitute an overall measurement of resource concentration remains a subject for 
further study. In addition, the number of familiar interest groups will be 
influenced by the contextual factors specified in the model. But, as we have seen, 
they will also be influenced by competition and cooperation among interest groups. 
So, refining resource concentration by ratio terms is only a first step.  
Third, according to the original resource dependence theory, a given 
dependence relation is characterised by resource importance and resource 
concentration. The theory, however, does not properly specify the linking term of 
‘and’ between the individual resource elements. In the model developed in chapter 
3, this linking term has been interpreted by an additive term. So, importance plus 
concentration are said to determine degree of dependence. Arguably, however, 
addition does not fully capture how the two elements relate to each other. An 
important aspect that is missing by interpreting the missing link in additive terms 
is a proper recognition of the interdependence, or interaction effects, between 
resource importance and resource concentration. To illustrate, when the 
importance of a resource is high, but concentration is low, the degree of 
dependence will be mitigated. Vice versa, when importance is low, yet 
concentration is high, the degree of dependence will be more severe. Or, when 
importance is low, concentration may not matter that much any more. A 
straightforward way of capturing this effect in the model is to include with the 
additive term a multiplicative term. A multiplicative term better reflects the 
interaction effects just mentioned and offers a starting point to capture the 
interaction effects between resource importance and resource concentration.  
Finally, and I only touched upon this briefly so far, the interaction effects 
between context and the resource elements need to be included in the core 
dependence model. The interaction model in chapter 5 and the individual analyses 
of how importance and concentration vary under different circumstances suggest 
the importance of contextual factors to explain bureaucracy-interest group 
dependence relations. Further work needs to be done, however, to precisely unravel 
under what specific values of the contextual variables importance and 
concentration of resources vary and in which direction. The empirical analyses, in 
addition, suggest the importance of both macro- and meso-level contextual 
variables. The theoretical challenge here is to better distil the systemic effects of the 
contextual variables on the individual resource elements, the interaction among 
contextual variables, and their joint effect on the resource elements.  
8.4.2 Matching analysis techniques with the model’s needs 
Essentially, a large part of the model is about explaining motives and how they vary 
across different circumstances. Using questionnaires and interviews is an 
appropriate way of revealing the individual considerations and reasons behind 
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bureaucracy-interest group interactions. The contextual variables, however, were 
measured by questionnaire items as well. For instance, functional differences 
between agency types were measured by asking respondents what type of agency 
they work for. Their answers were coded based on the classification derived from 
the literature. This way of measuring agency type draws heavily upon the 
perception of respondents, rather than being a careful coding based on the 
classification used in the literature of the agency types that were included in the 
sample. For the purpose and within the time frame set for this study, 
measurements like these can be justified. But they may be not as detailed as one 
would wish. The same applies to the most of the contextual variables. In general, 
we could conclude that context was measured in a somewhat simplified manner. 
An improvement would include measures based on careful classifications of 
institutional variables and content analysis to capture the impact of variation across 
policy areas better. Measuring the political salience of a policy area would require, 
for instance, extensive coding based on a wide array of documents (Baumgartner 
and Jones 1993; Breeman et al 2008).  
Although interaction effects have been included in the model, a more precise 
analysis of how contextual variables relate to each other and to the resource 
elements would be an improvement. Multi-level modelling or nested analysis, for 
instance, could be potentially useful in doing so. For example, civil servants all 
work within a ministry, executive agency or other type of organisation that is in 
turn nested within a particular interest representation regime. Such techniques 
would allow us to better capture the effects of the contextual variables on the degree 
of dependence.  
In sum, empirical analysis of the contextual variables could thus be improved by 
other types of data collection and measurement techniques. In addition, resource 
concentration would also require supplementary analysis techniques as what is 
measured in this study is a perception of resource concentration rather than actual 
resource concentration. Network analyses should be helpful in doing this.  
Second, unravelling a set of different types of choices underlying bureaucracy-
interest group interactions requires a research design that measures such 
interactions over time. The mix of survey analysis, counterfactual analysis, and 
QCA was designed to capture the different types of behavioural logics that 
underpin bureaucracy-interest group interactions. But this mix of analysis 
techniques serves only as an approximation of a long-term pattern of bureaucracy-
interest group interactions. An important issue to note is that these analyses, 
particularly QCA, are likely to reveal only a subset of the entire set of mechanisms 
underlying bureaucracy-interest group behaviour. For a full analysis of such 
mechanisms, the selection of cases should also include those that reveal no or only 
a few interactions. Without such ‘negative’ cases, analysis of sufficiency is not 
possible, and thus cannot provide a complete analysis of the different types of 
choices underlying bureaucracy-interest group interactions.  
Although the QCA indeed points to the existence of different types of choices 
and the possibility that they jointly determine bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions, for a true measurement of such behavioural logics, a long-term 
research design is needed. When relying on QCA, one way to incorporate the 
element of time is to include in the analysis a potential sequence of indicators as 
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separate variables (Caren and Panofsky 2005). For instance, and purely 
hypothetically, one could assume that consultation procedures result in trust. 
According to Caren and Panofsky (2005), this option should be included as a 
separate condition in the analysis: if there are consultation procedures, trust will 
follow. Interestingly, this sounds similar to incorporating interaction terms in 
multiple regression language, provided that the interaction term only includes one-
way effects. But rather than including the effect of time by assuming certain 
sequences in events, it is better to adopt a true longitudinal design, measuring 
these interactions over a certain period in time. The crucial challenge, then, is how 
to capture the differences between the mechanisms underlying the triad of 
strategic, anticipatory, and habitual rationality. Whereas fluctuation in degree of 
dependence at face value indicates strategic rationality, stability could conceal all 
three types of rationality. Further in-depth investigation of how resource 
concentration and resource importance evolve over time would reveal which of the 
individual rationalities, or a combination of, is involved in the resource exchange.  
Finally, the use of counterfactual analysis points to the usefulness of a quasi-
experimental design. Bureaucracy-interest group interactions based on anticipatory 
rationality (or capture) are difficult to measure due to their politically sensitive 
nature. Capture basically implies that certain interest groups have a disproportional 
amount of influence over civil servants. What is more, this disproportional amount 
of influence is usually undemocratically obtained; neither set of actors, i.e. 
bureaucrats and interest groups, is democratically elected. So, respondents are 
most likely to be somewhat reluctant to provide information on the occurrence of 
such a phenomenon. In this research, questions posed according to the logic of 
counterfactuals have been used to probe the existence of anticipatory rationality. 
Such counterfactual analysis points in the direction of quasi-experimental designs. 
These designs use scenarios or hypothetical examples to ask respondents what they 
usually would do when they encounter such situations. The interactive mode of 
many online surveys, as well as the possibility to control the order of the questions, 
allows more easy use of survey experiments. While such designs have their own 
problems (Gaines and Kuklinski 2006; Sniderman et al. 1996), they can be, with 
careful attention those problems, used to better distinguish the different types of 
choices underlying bureaucracy-interest group interactions and to generate reliable 
findings on sensitive issues such a capture.  
Although surveys and interviews are well suited to explore and examine 
individual motives and considerations to interact, they are less well suited to 
measure contextual variables. When used in comparative perspective, the model 
requires additional data collection and analysis techniques so as to provide a better 
explanation of bureaucracy-interest group interactions. In addition, to better 
measure how the resource elements vary along different political-administrative 
dimensions, techniques should be used that specifically address the interaction 
between variables measured at different levels of analysis and that can include 
multiple dependent variables. Finally, research designs focused on the individual 
types of choices underlying bureaucracy-interest group interactions, in particular 
longitudinal designs and quasi-experimental designs, will be a valuable supplement 
to those that were applied in this study.  
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8.4.3 The model and its theoretical roots 
The conceptual model based on resource dependence used here to explain 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions, as well as the empirical findings, results in 
interesting observations for the classic resource dependence model as well as for 
the literatures on interest group politics, bureaucratic politics, and longitudinal 
perspectives on decision-making.  
The dependence model and classic resource dependence theory 
The reconceptualisation of bureaucracy-interest group interactions in terms of 
resource exchange draws attention to several types of choices potentially underlying 
these interactions. They can individually explain the resource exchanges upon 
which bureaucracy-interest group interactions are based, or they could operate 
jointly. One interesting observation from this application of resource dependence 
theory is that it draws more attention to the deterministic element of context than 
the original version does. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003[1978]) emphasise the 
possibility of strategic choice and argue that this feature distinguishes their theory 
from fellow contextual theories. Recent applications of resource exchange to 
explain access of interest groups to government institutions, in particular those 
related to EU interest representation, also emphasise this strategic decision-making 
aspect. By identifying what civil servants need most, the access of the interest 
groups capable of delivering these resources is explained. In other words, “the 
organisations involved in the exchange [of resources, CP] make an implicit or 
explicit cost-benefit analysis on the basis of which they decide with whom to 
interact” (Bouwen 2002, 368). But too much attention to strategic choice denies 
the impact of context, the other determinant of resource exchange relations. Beyers 
and Kerremans (2007) show, for instance, that dependence on resources in their 
immediate environment creates difficulties for interest groups when they try to 
lobby EU institutions.  
While the focus is still on resources, context seems to be a decisive element in 
explaining the available options of how to strategically exploit such resources. The 
resource dependence model developed in this study points precisely to the 
importance of context. This is true not only in determining strategic rationality, but 
also for the two rival types of behavioural logics: anticipatory and habitual 
rationality. Context may set the boundaries for strategic choice as well as induce 
habitual or anticipatory rational choices. The scope to strategically choose to 
interact with interest groups or civil servants (depending on the perspective taken) 
seems to be very much determined by the context in which these interactions 
occur. Demarcating and understanding context is thus required to understand the 
extent to which these actors may strategically decide upon their interactions. In the 
end, resource dependence theory may be more deterministic than it is argued to be 
by its founders (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003[1978]).  
So, resource dependence theory could be defined as the inter-organisational 
version of Herbert Simon’s (1997[1947]) intra-organisational concept of bounded 
rationality. Just as an organisation enhances or restricts an individual’s rationality, 
so may the political-administrative environment restrict or alter the strategic 
choices of bureaucrats or interest groups to obtain the resources they need.  
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The dependence model and bureaucratic politics 
Designed to integrate various explanations to systematically compare bureaucracy-
interest group interactions, the model also raises interesting questions about each 
of its theoretical foundations. Consider the literature on bureaucratic politics. An 
important implication of these analyses is that bureaucracy-interest group 
interactions are a key aspect of bureaucratic politics. Often, bureaucratic politics 
has studied political-administrative relations or inter-agency strife. They have 
studied how individual motives of bureaucrats relate to growing budgets or 
growing agencies (Downs 1967; Mueller 2003, 359-384; Niskanen 1971; Tullock 
1995), or incorporated inter-agency strife as a factor to explain decision making 
(Allison and Zelikow 1999; Huntington 1961). Only very few studies (Aberbach, 
Putnam, and Rockman 1981; Carpenter 2001; Suleiman 1974, for instance) have 
included relations between interest groups and bureaucrats in models of 
bureaucratic behaviour. These relations, which I have termed the external part of 
bureaucratic politics, are important in understanding the internal part and vice 
versa. Interactions with interest groups could serve agency autonomy and are thus 
important in understanding inter-agency competition. In addition, such 
interactions could very well enhance a bureaucracy’s position towards a political 
superior (Carpenter 2001). On the other hand, the kind of political leadership 
which civil servants experience, and the resulting political-administrative 
relationship, is likely to influence bureaucracy-interest group interactions as well, 
since they determine, among other things, a civil servant’s room to manoeuvre. But 
not many studies explicitly incorporate interactions with interest groups in 
understanding the phenomenon of bureaucratic politics. The findings generated by 
this study suggest the relevance of various political-administrative dimensions in 
explaining variation in bureaucracy-interest group interactions. And, these 
contextual factors are equally important in explaining the larger phenomenon of 
bureaucratic politics. The resource dependence model thus draws attention to the 
importance of interactions with interest groups in studies of bureaucratic politics, 
as well as the necessity for systematic comparative analyses of bureaucratic politics 
as a broader research area.  
The dependence model and interest group politics 
The analyses of the interest group environment have important implications for the 
literature on interest group politics. First, interest representation in Europe is not 
only an issue of lobbying Brussels. It is also an issue of how national interest 
groups are coping with Brussels back home. In other words, we need to better 
understand what the consequences are for interest group behaviour at the national 
level arising from the multi-level governance system of the EU. Currently, most 
attention in the literature on interest representation in the EU is concerned with 
the EU governance level (see, for instance, Broscheid and Coen 2007; Bouwen and 
McCown 2007; Eising 2007). Europe, at least in an objective sense, is becoming 
more important; therefore, it is not surprising that most attention is paid to EU 
interest representation. However, national member states will remain important in 
the EU in the near future, if not indefinitely. The national governance level thus 
remains important for exerting influence, and the focus of interest groups will 
accordingly remain to a great extent on the national level. From that perspective, we 
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need to better understand how national interest groups and national bureaucracy-
interest group interactions are influenced by the process of Europeanisation. Are 
interest groups really too tied to their immediate environment to turn their gaze to 
Brussels (Beyers and Kerremans 2007). Or, more generally, what difficulties do 
interest groups face when incorporating the additional level of governance into 
their strategies in the national capitals? In other words, why do interest groups 
cope with the multi-level governance systems as they do today? For a true 
understanding of interest representation in a multi-level context, the influence of 
the EU on national interest representation is a vital additional element in studying 
EU interest representation. 
This brings me to another implication of the analyses on interest group 
population dynamics. These analyses reveal a gap in the literature on interest 
representation regimes in corporatist countries. The literature on corporatism 
mostly concerns the bargaining mechanisms which should result in effective 
macro- and social-economic policy making (Molina and Rhodes 2002; Siaroff 
1999; Schmitter 1989; Visser and Hemerijck 1997) rather than a systematic 
analysis of interest representation in a broader sense (but see, for instance, the 
social movement literature). Yet, very often, issues relevant to social-economic 
policy or macro-economic policy touch on more than only classic labour and public-
finance issues. Corporate responsibility, environmental issues, ethnically diverse 
societies, to name a few, also very much relate to the economic life of a national 
economy. The major parties currently involved in social-economic policy making 
are not always fully equipped to address such issues, as they lack the knowledge 
about and access to specific issues or groups within society. Understanding why 
such systems remain relatively closed to other types of interest groups, or why the 
role of such interest groups is different from the traditional social partners, 
requires a broader focus than decision making in the institutions of tripartite 
bargaining. Studying influence in decision making or evaluating policy outcomes 
to explain interest group involvement in corporatist regimes is not enough to 
understand all aspects of interest representation.  
Studying interest representation from a group perspective may help to provide 
additional insights about who gets access and who does not (Baumgartner and 
Leech 1998; Lowery and Gray 2004; Aldrich et al 1994). Government-induced 
restrictions for access may not only determine which interest groups gather around 
the negotiation table, but will have consequences for interest group communities 
and mobilisation as well (Lowery, Poppelaars, and Berkhout 2008). In addition, 
such a broader view on interest representation may help to explain from whom 
traditional interest groups experience competition, and, if so, in what way. Studies 
on decision making in corporatist regimes would clearly benefit from such a 
broader perspective to explain the involvement of interest groups. In other words, 
changing one’s perspective in explaining a similar phenomenon may reveal 
additional insights about how interest representation in corporatist regimes works. 
The dependence model and decision making over time 
The conclusion from the final analyses in chapter 7 – resource exchanges 
determining bureaucracy-interest group interactions are based on multiple 
rationalities - reveals an interesting finding related to the literature on longitudinal 
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perspectives on decision making. Resource exchanges based on anticipatory 
rationality could result from anticipated consequences in the near future. Resource 
exchanges based on habitual choices may be a consequence of decisions in the 
past. Both past choices and anticipated (dis)advantages, however, result in similar 
interactions today. That is, both the heritage of the past and the shadow of the 
future have similar locked-in effects on contemporary interactions. This 
observation points to the difficulty in defining the theoretical heritage of the 
underlying mechanisms of locked-in effects. The main problem in doing so seems 
to lie in the focus of each strand of literature. Whereas historical institutionalism 
tends to focus much more on how context and past choices may restrict or 
stimulate institutional development in a certain direction, evolutionary rational 
choice perspectives focus on individual motives. So, we need a better 
understanding of how motives and context relate to each other to unravel the 
multiple rationalities determining individual’s motives. What the model and the 
empirical findings of this study suggest is the need for better incorporating the 
delicate balance between motives and context in studying decision making. 
8.5 A joint venture of motives and context  
In order to truly understand bureaucracy-interest group interactions, the resource 
dependence model highlights the importance of both individual motives and 
context to explain individual’s motives. In particular, the delicate balance between 
the two, or put differently, their interaction, is crucially important. Such interaction 
effects are not only relevant for a better understanding of bureaucracy-interest 
group interactions. The dual importance of motives and context also results in 
several avenues for further research, which are related to the implications for the 
broader strands of literature discussed in the previous section. When one argues, 
however, that the interaction between individual motives and context is important, 
the question that immediately comes to mind is why actor-centred institutionalism 
is not a sufficient theoretical framework to advance research in these areas, 
compared to the model developed in this study. I will address the relationship 
between actor-centred institutionalism and the resource dependence model in 
more detail, and then I will elaborate on future research questions in the fields of 
interest groups politics, bureaucratic politics and institutionalism. 
Actor-centred institutionalism (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995) proceeds from the 
assumption that interactions between purposeful actors are shaped by the 
institutional settings in which they occur. Such an interaction-oriented focus helps 
to explain past policy choices and contributes to formulating recommendations to 
design institutions so as to develop effective and efficient policies in the future 
(Scharpf 1997, 36-43). Or, in Scharpf’s words, actor-centred institutionalism is 
“about the capacity of different types of institutional structures to deal effectively 
with different types of policy problems” (Scharpf 1997, 49). Thus, in actor-centred 
institutionalism, the focus is on explaining institutions’ existence and effect by 
reference to the initial strategic choices of actors. For instance, corporatist 
arrangements in newly-created policy areas might be the result of conscious choice. 
Politicians could create these corporatist patterns, for instance, to protect their 
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newly-created policy programs from radical changes that their successors may 
make once in office (Blom-Hansen 2001). Here, a corporatist arrangement results 
from conscious choice rather than from an embedded organising principle, 
reflecting a functionalist perspective (Pierson 2000; Thelen 2003). In this sense, 
actor-centred institutionalism parallels the discussion on a long-term perspective of 
resource exchange. All exchanges are assumed to be the result of a deliberate cost-
benefit analysis of which resources to obtain. This may even be the case in routines 
that started their life as a rational choice of the individuals who developed them. 
The resource dependence model developed in this study resembles actor-
centred institutionalism in its point of departure. The underlying assumption of 
the model is that interactions between bureaucrats and interest groups will vary 
under different circumstances. Thus, context determines the importance of 
resources as well as the concentration of resources, which together determine the 
degree of dependence. In this respect, the resource dependence model shares the 
assumption with actor-centred institutionalism that interactions between purposive 
actors are shaped by the context in which they take place (see also Scott 2001, 176). 
A major difference between the two, however, is their focus. Whereas actor-centred 
institutionalism focuses on explaining past policy choices so as to design better 
institutions, the resource dependence model focuses on how interactions between 
actors vary under different circumstances. Implicitly, the assumption is that by 
understanding context, we can adapt our behaviour. The focus is not on 
institutions, as it is in actor-centred institutionalism, but is rather on the 
interactions between organisations, which may be either ad hoc or long-term.1  
8.5.1 Multiple avenues for future research 
The main purpose of the resource dependence model is to explain individual or 
repetitive interactions between bureaucracies and interest groups systematically but 
not yet to link them to policy outcomes. In addition, it reveals how individual’s 
choices are either restricted or enhanced by contextual dimensions. In that sense, 
although not explicitly relying on game-theoretic principles, we could define 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions in terms of a specific game, as the interests 
of the purposive actors are determined by the resources he/she needs and to what 
extent they are available in the environment. Yet, context may not solely influence 
these interactions; actors may strategically adapt to the context as well. In other 
words, the dependence model steers a middle course between (historical) 
institutionalism and actor-centred institutionalism. It does not explain the 
effectiveness of certain institutional arrangements by reference to either individual 
choices or restrictions resulting from the past. It explains how individual motives 
will be influenced by the context in which they occur, by either restricting options 
or providing opportunities for strategic decision making. It is precisely this delicate 
balance between context and motives that generates interesting new research 
questions. I will briefly discuss several of them below.  
                                                        
1 One could argue, however, about whether or not such interactions should be interpreted as institutions. I do 
not define them as institutions, as these interactions reflect individual decision making. But in the case of 
formalised interactions, such as consultation procedures, I concur that defining these interactions as 
institutions could be appropriate. 
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Capture: an imbalance between resources 
Let me first consider the phenomenon of capture lying on the fine line between 
bureaucratic politics and interest group politics. So far, scholars have argued that 
there is indeed reason to conclude that some interest groups are so powerful that 
bureaucrats may become too dependent on them in formulating regulations and 
monitoring behaviour. Interestingly, as we have already seen, scholars also point to 
the difficulty in distinguishing capture from routine behaviour (Carpenter 2001; 
Yackee 2005). As Wilson (2000[1989]) pointed out, a large proportion of approvals 
for pricing in the shipping industry could simply constitute a routine designed by 
bureaucrats to cope with enormous workload, rather than being a true case of 
capture. What may seem to be regulation solely in favour of a particular industry 
may turn out to be an effective routine to cope with the daily overload of work or a 
learning strategy. Regulations or decisions that mostly reflect the position of the 
monopolist or semi-monopolists in the industry may thus also represent a strategic 
choice that is limited by future consequences (anticipatory rationality), when seen 
from a bureaucratic perspective. Or, has we have seen in chapter 7, civil servants 
may quite deliberately allow organisations a certain extent of influence so as to 
better design future regulations.  
The main difficulty lies both in distinguishing and theorising the differences in 
motives. As Wilson suggested, capture may result from a situation in which 
bureaucrats at regulatory agencies do not have enough resources at their disposal to 
effectively resist the influence of certain interest groups (Wilson 2000[1989]). One 
could also describe this situation as a severe degree of dependence. Carefully 
studying the resources and their availability in the agency’s environment and 
subsequently determining the nature of the interaction may help to address the 
interplay between context and motives. Adopting such an approach should result in 
a more precise assessment of interactions between regulatory agencies and interest 
groups and how the political context may influence these interactions across cases 
and over time. Once we understand the nature of these interactions more precisely, 
we can address a potential asymmetry in dependence better as well.  
Interest group populations in corporatist regimes  
The model also suggests that meso-level contextual factors in both the bureaucrats’ 
and interest groups’ environments are important in explaining variance of 
bureaucracy-interest group interactions. For the interest group environment, this 
means that population level variables are important. This study has explored the 
impact of patterns of cooperation and competition on the nature of bureaucracy-
interest group interactions. More generally, patterns of competition and 
characteristics of interest group communities have been shown not only to affect 
the sheer existence or survival chances of organisations but also how they try to 
exert influence (Hojnacki 1998, Gray and Lowery 1996). Not much research has 
been done into such population dynamics in the Netherlands (but see van Waarden 
1992; Wilts 2001). Yet, such mechanisms may help to explain limited access or the 
characteristics of the interest group population, alongside the traditional focus on 
institutional arrangements and on interest group strategies. Such an approach to 
studying interest representation in the Netherlands requires, however, a dataset 
which at minimum provides a satisfactory overview of the interest group 
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population. There are several databases that include interest groups (such as the 
Pietersen Almanak or the Chamber of Commerce database used in this study), but 
they do not provide a valid overview of the population as a whole. They tend to be 
incomplete and outdated. And, as they are not designed to serve research on 
interest groups, they do not include relevant information other than contact details. 
Such a comprehensive database is necessary to conduct population-related research 
and to be able to compare different national interest group populations. To 
genuinely compare, we indeed need databases of interest group populations that 
are equivalent. And this deficit is the major obstacle to comparative research in 
interest group politics in most European countries. A first attempt has been made 
to construct such a database in this study, yet much more work needs to be done to 
construct a sustainable database that is accessible for scientists, policy makers and 
the public. Such databases would allow for studying interest representation in 
corporatist countries from a different and novel perspective. For instance, by 
studying the process of ‘influence production’, we could be able to determine 
which contextual factors are important and how, for instance, community 
dynamics may influence the exercise of influence (Lowery and Gray 2004), or how 
policy outcomes or policy plans influence interest groups’ strategies (Baumgartner 
and Leech 1998; Leech et al 2001) In addition, such a perspective may enable 
comparative research, as equivalent mechanisms in the individual stages of interest 
representation can be better compared (Lowery, Poppelaars and Berkhout 2008).  
In sum, the model developed here points to the relevance of the development of 
databases of interest group populations in corporatist regimes, which allow better 
comparative research. This, in turn, would enable the study of context and 
population dynamics to supplement the decision-making studies that prevail in the 
corporatist literature on interest representation.  
Past choices versus anticipated consequences 
The set of different types of choices that the model reveals, and in particular, 
anticipatory and habitual rationality, poses challenging research questions both in 
theoretical and methodological terms. To be precise, the challenge concerns the 
extent to which we can, both theoretically and methodologically, really distinguish 
between these different types of choices. It goes beyond the scope of this study to 
elaborately discuss these issues. Yet, a first exploration will suffice to point in the 
direction of new research questions. Habitual behaviour, strictly speaking, reflects 
an unconscious set of actions designed to meet a rationally decided-upon goal 
(Simon 1997[1947]). But it may reflect a suboptimal situation as well. Path 
dependency usually refers to a suboptimal situation where current constellations of 
institutional arrangements are too costly to change. So, there will be no incentives 
for either of the actors involved to change, as this will negatively influence their 
interests (Pierson 2004). This reasoning results from an efficiency perspective. Yet, 
there are more situations in which such high costs create locked-in effects. That is, 
when the parties involved in an institutional arrangement are too useful, too 
powerful or too legitimate, there are also no incentives to change (Mahoney 2000). 
Seen in retrospect, we can indeed argue that a particular institutional arrangement 
reflects a suboptimal situation in which the interests of a few stakeholders are 
decisive in maintaining the status quo, rather than a broader set of stakeholders, as 
Chapter 8 
214 
economic equilibria usually suggest. But what happens when we examine such an 
arrangement only at a single point in time? How can we distinguish an optimal 
situation from a suboptimal one? The literature on historical institutionalism 
suggests that such suboptimal situations are rather irreversible and only open to 
change by major outside forces (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Pierson 2004; 
Kuipers 2004). But a suboptimal situation may be open to change by a series of 
smaller incremental changes. Capture, for instance, may be a suboptimal situation 
for bureaucrats, but does not necessarily have to be heavily institutionalised. It 
could well reflect a pattern of cooperative behaviour in which a consciously 
calculated asymmetry is allowed by those who are most dependent. The calculated 
risk involves a situation that may not be entirely efficient, fair or democratic, but 
given the circumstances is still the most strategic option. This does not mean, 
however, that such a suboptimal pattern of cooperation cannot be changed without 
major external pressure. In the example mentioned in this study, when regulatory 
agencies lack certain resources to face large corporations before court, hiring one 
or two top quality lawyers would make a difference. Thus, suboptimality may not 
be as resistant as the path dependence literature suggests.  
This example reveals the difficulty in precisely assessing the nature of a given 
institutional arrangement. A suboptimal equilibrium could result from a variety of 
equilibria at a given point in time in the past. Contingency is thus an important 
factor in explaining how and why a suboptimal equilibrium may arise. Once set, 
similar negative feedback mechanisms, as in the case of optimal equilibria, result 
in inertia. One option in distinguishing the difference between optimal and 
suboptimal equilibria could be to determine the nature of the behavioural logics 
underlying the institutional arrangement. A suboptimal equilibrium is likely to 
meet the interests of a relatively small set of influential stakeholders, whereas an 
optimal equilibrium meets the interests of a broader set of stakeholders. 
Depending on the constellation of stakeholders, a suboptimal situation may be 
sensitive to small changes or only respond to major external disturbances.  
The focus thus should be on the set of stakeholders and the nature of their 
interactions to explain the nature of a given institutional arrangement. 
Understanding the nature of such situations, in this case bureaucracy-interest 
group interactions, may help in explaining the possibility of change. That is, an 
understanding of whether strategic, anticipatory, habitual rationality, or a 
combination of these three types of choices, is operating could help in determining 
the nature of such interactions. Negative feedback to retain a current situation may 
result from sunk costs, stimuli generated by the activity or the institution itself, or 
too high costs in changing routines (Simon 1997[1947], Pierson 2004). But they 
also may be grounded in anticipated costs as well. This involves asking, what kind 
of behaviour will my decision invoke from the organisations with which I interact 
today and need in the foreseeable future? That is, when a civil servant anticipates 
that he/she needs a particular organisation in the near future, he/she is likely to 
decide to cooperate today, although he/she would not have done so had there only 
been a one-off interaction. So, anticipated choices may result in suboptimal 
situations today, which may be the result of a perfectly rational decision rather than 
an institutionalised choice from the past, as historical institutionalism would argue. 
Although anticipated costs and consequences from the past may result in similar 
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locked-in effects, understanding their different natures is important to understand 
how to bring about changes and improvements to a given situation. The balance of 
context (the domain of historical institutionalism) and motives (the domain of 
(evolutionary) rational choice) could help in determining the differences between 
strategic, anticipatory, and habitual rationality underlying bureaucracy-interest 
group interactions, or institutions more generally. Such an assessment could help 
to understand how a legacy of the past interacts with the shadow of the future to 
explain the nature of today’s interactions and the potential for institutional change.  
8.6 Steering a course between friends and foes  
This research systematically unravelled the motives of bureaucrats and interests 
groups to interact with each other and showed that these motives are grounded in 
multiple rationalities by examining resource exchanges between these two sets of 
actors. These resource exchanges have been shown to vary systematically along 
different political-administrative dimensions. This study has brought a new model 
and empirical findings to bear on a phenomenon that has often been part of 
broader areas of research, but has been rarely systematically studied on its own. 
Understanding why bureaucrats interact with certain types of interest groups and, 
eventually, how these interactions contribute to policy outcomes, is important. This 
is the case not only in fully developed western democracies, but even more so in 
regimes that are shifting towards democracy. Systematic knowledge of this 
phenomenon thus adds transparency to interactions between two unelected yet 
influential sets of actors in public policy making and public governance.  
So, in the end, why do bureaucrats interact with certain interest groups, but do 
not or only do so to a lesser extent with others? Their choices to interact are 
determined by what they need from particular interest groups to fulfil their role in 
public policy or, to paint a bleaker picture, to meet their own interests. The 
importance of these needs and the availability of resources in the interest groups’ 
environment will determine the set of interest groups with which civil servants 
interact and the nature of their interactions. Steering a course between friends and 
foes is thus a matter of deliberately picking and choosing what one needs, 
strategically anticipating what future consequences of interactions will entail, or 
(un)consciously following a path carved out by past experiences and choices. All of 
this may be either restricted or enhanced by the political-administrative dimensions 
along which the course will be or has been set. 
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Appendix I Questionnaires 
 
 
Drop down menu includes the following answer options: foreign affairs (excluding EU affairs); 
EU affairs; Development aid; Defence; Foreign trade; Domestic commerce; Macroeconomics;  
Taxes; Labour market; Social welfare; Wales, Scotland, N. Ireland affairs; Sub-national public administration; 
Urban development; Public housing; Minority affairs; Immigration; Civil rights; Public safety; 
Crime; Law, judiciary; Public Health; General Welfare; Sports; Education; Science and Technology;  
Culture; Transport; Water management;Spatial planning; Public works; Environment; Agriculture; Fishery. 
1
1
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Drop down menu includes the following answer options: Advisory councils; Consultancy firms;  
University Research institutes; Other Research institutes; Ideologically oriented think tanks;  
Technically oriented think tanks;  Executive public agencies; None of these. 
Note: answer options in grey do not belong to this study.
2
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Note: answer options in grey do not belong to this study.
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Note: questions 17, 18, 22-26 were omitted, because they do not belong to this study nor do the answer 
options in grey. 
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Drop down menu includes the following answer options:  
Grade 0 (Cabinet Secretary); Grade 1 (Permanent Secretary); Grade 1A (Second Permanent 
Secretary); Grade 2 (Director-General, Deputy Secretary,or equivalent); Grade 3 (Director, Under Secreatry or 
equivalent); Grade 4; Grade 5 (Assistant Secretary, Divisional Manager, Deputy Director or equivalent) 
Grade 6; Grade 7. 
Note: question 34 is omitted, because it does not belong to this study. 
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Note: questions 42 and 43 were omitted, because they do not belong to this study.
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Drop down menu includes the following answer options: Private firm; Employers’ sectoral 
organisation; Employers’ peak organisation; Professional association; Labour union; Public 
Institution; Association of Public Institution; Research Institute;  
Think tank; Advisory body; Non governmental organisation; Voluntary organisation; Other. 
1
1
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Appendix II Coding Schemes, 
Diagnostics, and Respondents 
Appendix II.1 NCC codes and recoding for NLD interest group database 
 
Table A.1 contains:  
• the list of codes used from the National Chamber of Commerce Coding 
system (De Kamer van Koophandel, BIK-boekje 2005; available at 
www.kvk.nl/handelsregister);  
• total N of organisations selected from the NCC database (second column);  
• the recoding used for the construction of the survey database and data 
analysis (final column).  
 
Table A.1 Coding Scheme database Dutch national interest groups 
total N 
(NCC database)
Public administration 74 Private firm 
Semi-public organisations 7 Employers’ organisation
Umbrella organisations health 472 Labour union
Various social service organisations 549 (association of) Public institutions
Umbrella organisations social welfare 10466 NGO voluntary
Employers' associations 1598 NGO education
Farmers' interest groups 394 NGO consumer
Professional organisations 1966 NGO development
Labour unions 274 NGO environment
Religious organisations 5643 NGO health
Other 'philosophy of life' organisations 1158 NGO minorities
Umbrella organisations culture 986 NGO religious/ idealistic
Umbrella organisations religion 231 NGO science
Umbrella organisations education 1257 NGO culture/sports/recreation
Other umbrella organisations 702 Other
Animal protection organisations 2618
Environmental organisations 2034
Idealistic organisations 3006
Parents primary school organisations 1937
Parents secondary school organisations 230
Parents specific groups of children organisations 141
Tenant organisations 4439
Appartment / house owners organisations 2703
Other housing organisations 62
Interest groups of other specific groups 8991
Other interest groups 4746
Sport organisations 415
Umbrella organisations sport 958
Umbrella organisations tourism 163
Total 58220
NCC Coding Recoding
Coding Schemes, Diagnostics, and Respondents 
 233 
Appendix II.2 Diagnostics multiple imputation (Amelia) 
Tables A.2 and A.3 show the diagnostics that the program Amelia offers to assess 
the fit of the multiple imputation process. In the case of the SCS survey, the mean 
imputations usually fall within the range of observed values, and when they are 
outside that range they seem to be fairly reasonable. Although, for instance, an 
imputed value of -20 for the EU variable may be not easy to interpret intuitively, 
the imputed data nevertheless reflect the tendency that time spent at EU activities 
tends to concentrate around small percentages. In case of over-imputation, most of 
the x-y line representing a perfect agreement between predictions of the imputation 
model and the observed value cross the 95% confidence intervals. Over-imputation 
is a process of sequentially treating each of the observed values as if they actually 
had been missing. The confidence intervals the program produces allow for a 
visual inspection of how often the imputation model can predict the true value 
(Honaker, King and Blackwell 2007, 16). In some cases, not all confidence 
intervals cover the x-y line, yet only a small proportion for each variable fail to do 
so. A final diagnostic offered by Amelia enables the inspection of whether the 
imputations are dependent on starting values as a result of poorly-behaved 
likelihoods of the original data (see for a discussion, Honaker, King and Blackwell 
2007, 18-19). This diagnostic provides positive results for the SCS database. 
In the case of the interest group survey, the diagnostics offer a promising 
picture of the imputed data. Only in the case of government grants, the means of 
the imputed data fall somewhat outside the range of the observed data, but this is 
no reason for concern (see Honaker, King and Blackwell 2007). In general, for 
both datasets, the diagnostics show a good fit for the imputed data. 
 
Table A.2 Diagnostics of the Senior Civil Service dataset (see Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2007) 
Variables Compare Overimpute Overdisperse
Interest representation regime No missing values No missing values -
Political-strategic insight
A bit outside range original 
observation, at numbers higher than 
3 (= very relevant);ranging to 
somewhat over 3.5
95% CI of category 1 is above x-y 
line of perfect match Convergence
Agency type Within range, flat line Not overimputed (nominal variable) Convergence
Policy area Within range, flat line Not overimputed (nominal variable) Convergence
EU involvement Somewhat outside range concerning low values; below 0 (ranging to -20).
95% CI of above values 60 do not 
cross x-y line of perfect match Convergence
Number of interest groups with 
which civil servants interact Within range 95% CI cross x-y line Convergence
Number of interest groups with 
which civil servants are familiar Within range 95% CI cross x-y line Convergence
Number of other organisations 
with which civil servants interact Within range
95% CI of values above 70 do not 
cross x-y line Convergence
Expertise Within range 95% CI cross x-y line Convergence
Implementation capacity Within range 95% CI cross x-y line Convergence
Legitimacy Within range 95% CI cross x-y line Convergence
Intermediation capacity Within range 95% CI cross x-y line Convergence
Amelia Diagnostics
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Appendix II.3 Policy issue coding 
Table A.4 lists several issue codings used in this study. The original issue coding, 
in the first and second columns, is derived from the code book used by the agenda 
setting team in the Netherlands (Breeman et al. 2008; Breeman and Timmermans 
2007). In the case of the UK, the topic ‘Wales, Scotland and N. Ireland affairs’ has 
been added to the list to account for particular regional affairs. The recoding (third 
column), which resulted in the summary coding (final column), includes several 
subtopics under a single heading. The main reason for the recoding was to ensure 
enough observations to enable solid analysis. The final summary coding has 
therefore been used in the analyses to obtain a first indication whether variation in 
policy issues would influence variation in degree of dependence.  
Table A.4 Issue coding 
Issue coding questionnaires in Dutch and English Original coding Recoding Summary recoding
Buitenlandse zaken (exclusief Europese zaken) / Foreign Affairs 1 1 1 = International Affairs
Europese zaken / European Affairs 2 1 2 = Macro-economic Affairs
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking / Development Aid 3 1 3 = Employment, social affairs
Internationale handel / International trade 4 1 4 = Internal Affairs
Defensie / Defence 32 1 5 = Immigration, integration, civil rights
Binnenlandse handel / Domestic trade 5 2 6 = Public Safety
Openbare financiën / Macro economics 6 2 7 = Public Health
Belastingen / Taxes 7 2 8 = Education,Science, Culture
Arbeidsmarktbeleid / Labour market 8 3 9 = Transport and Water management
Sociale zaken / Social affairs 9 3 10 = Public Housing and spatial planning
Binnenlands bestuur / Subnational public administration 10 4 11 = Environment, Agriculture and Fishery
Grote stedenbeleid / Urban development 11 4
Wales, Scotland, N. Ireland affairs 34 4
Integratiebeleid / Minority affairs 13 5
Immigratiebeleid / Immigration 14 5
Burgerrechten / Civil rights 15 5
Openbare orde en veiligheid / Public safety 16 6
Criminaliteit / Crime 17 6
Rechtspraak / Judiciary, Law 18 6
Volksgezondheid / Public Health 19 7
Welzijn / General Welfare 20 7
Sport / Sports 21 7
Onderwijs / Education 22 8
Wetenschap / Science and Technology 23 8
Cultuur / Culture 24 8
Openbaar vervoer 25 9
Verkeer / Transport 26 9
Waterstaat / Watermanagement 27 9
Huisvestingsbeleid / Public housing 12 10
Ruimtelijke ordening / Spatial planning 28 10
Public works 33 10
Milieu / Environment 29 11
Landbouw / Agriculture 30 11
Visserij / Fishery 31 11
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Appendix II.4 Fuzzy-set coding interview dataset 
Table A.5 Fuzzy-set coding civil servant dataset 
Cases macro economics public health ministry inspectorate trust legitimacy powerful position interest groups consultation
1 0 1 1 0 0.67 0.83 1 1
2 0 1 1 0 1 1 0.67 1
3 0 1 1 0 0.5 0.17 0.33 0.17
4 0 1 1 0 0.33 1 1 1
5 0 1 1 0 0.67 0.83 1 1
6 0 1 1 0 0.33 1 1 1
7 0 1 0 1 0.5 1 0.67 1
8 0 1 1 0 0.5 0.83 1 1
9 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.83 1
10 1 0 1 0 1 0.83 0.67 1
11 1 0 0 1 0.5 0.83 0.67 0.17
12 1 0 1 0 0.67 0.83 0.67 1
13 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
14 1 0 1 0 0.67 1 0.83 1
15 1 0 1 0 0.5 0.83 0.67 1
16 1 0 1 0 0.5 1 0.83 1
17 1 0 0 1 0.67 1 1 1
18 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.83 1
19 1 0 0 1 0.67 0.67 0.67 1
20 1 0 1 0 0.67 1 0.67 1
21 1 0 1 0 0.5 0 1 1
22 1 0 1 0 0.67 0.83 0.83 1
23 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.67 1
24 1 0 1 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.17
25 1 0 0 1 0.5 0.67 0.67 1
26 1 0 1 0 0.67 0.83 0.83 1
27 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.67 1
28 1 0 1 0 0.5 1 1 1
29 1 0 1 0 0.5 1 0.83 1
30 0 1 1 0 0.67 1 0.67 1
31 1 0 1 0 0.5 0.83 0.83 1
32 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.83 1
33 0 1 0 1 1 0.67 0.5 1
34 1 0 0 1 0.83 0.67 0.67 1
35 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
36 1 0 0 1 0.67 0.67 0.83 1
37 0 1 0 1 0.5 1 0.67 1
38 0 1 0 1 0.83 1 0.5 1
39 1 0 0 1 0.5 1 0.67 1
QCA/Fuzzy-set indicators
 
Table A.6 Fuzzy-set coding interest group dataset 
Cases macro economics public health trust legitimacy importance      civil servants consultation long existing relationship
1 1 0 0.5 1 0.83 1 0.83
2 1 0 0.83 1 0.83 1 0.83
3 1 0 0.83 1 0.83 1 0.83
4 1 0 0.83 1 0.83 1 0.83
5 0 1 1 1 0.67 1 0.83
6 1 0 1 1 0.83 1 0.83
7 0 1 1 1 0.83 1 0.83
8 1 0 0.5 0.67 0.83 1 0.83
9 0 1 0.5 1 0.83 1 0.67
10 1 0 0.83 1 0.67 1 0.83
11 1 0 1 1 0.83 1 0.83
12 1 0 0.5 0.5 0.67 1 0.83
13 0 1 0.67 0.67 0.83 1 0.83
14 0 1 0.83 1 0.83 1 0.83
15 0 1 0.83 1 0.83 1 0.83
16 1 0 0.67 0.83 0.83 1 0.83
17 1 0 0.83 0.5 0.83 1 0.83
18 0 1 0.83 1 0.33 0 0.67
QCA/Fuzzy-set indicators 
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Appendix II.5 Interview respondents  
Table A.7 List of interview respondents (interest groups) 
Interest groups
1 representative professional association accountancy (VLP)
2 representative labour union (CNV)
3 representative professional association agriculture (LTO)
4 representative professional association (VNO-NCW)
5 representative patient organisation (de gehandicaptenraad)
6 representative professional association agriculture (LTO)
7 representative professional association hospitals (NVZ)
8 representative banking association (VVB)
9 representative patient organisation (NPCF)
10 representative association small and medium sized cooperations (MKB)
11 representative association of insurances (Verbond van  Verzekeraars)
12 representative labour union (MLP)
13 representative patient organisation (MO groep)
14 representative professional organisation health care (actiz)
15 representative consumer organisation (CSO)
16 representative association construction sector (Bouwend Nederland)
17 representative professional association accountancy (Novaa)
18 representative patient organisation (astmafonds)  
Table A..8 List of respondents (civil servants) 
Civil servants
1 civil servant 1 Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Sports
2 civil servant 2 Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Sports
3 civil servant 3 Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Sports
4 civil servant 4 Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Sports
5 civil servant 5 Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Sports
6 civil servant 6 Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Sports
7 civil servant 7 Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Sports
8 civil servant 8 Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Sports
9 civil servant 9 Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Sports
10 civil servant 10 Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Sports
11 civil servant 1 Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
12 civil servant 2 Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
13 civil servant 3 Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
14 civil servant 4 Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
15 civil servant 5 Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
16 civil servant 6 Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
17 civil servant 1 Ministry of Economic Affairs
18 civil servant 2 Ministry of Economic Affairs
19 civil servant 3 Ministry of Economic Affairs
20 civil servant 4 Ministry of Economic Affairs
21 civil servant 5 Ministry of Economic Affairs
22 civil servant 6 Ministry of Economic Affairs
23 civil servant 1 Ministry of Finance
24 civil servant 2 Ministry of Finance
25 civil servant 1 The Netherlands Health Care Inspectorate
26 civil servant 2 The Netherlands Health Care Inspectorate
27 civil servant 1 The Dutch Inspectorate for Youth Care
28 civil servant 1 Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority
29 civil servant 1 Labour Inspectorate
30 civil servant 2 Labour Inspectorate
31 civil servant 3 Labour Inspectorate
32 civil servant 1 The Netherlands Competition Authority
33 civil servant 2 The Netherlands Competition Authority
34 civil servant 1 The Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority 
35 civil servant 2 The Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority 
36 civil servant 1 The Netherlands Authority Financial Markets
37 civil servant 2 The Netherlands Authority Financial Markets
38 civil servant 1 Office of Energy Regulation
39 civil servant 1 Consumer Authority
 238 
Appendix III References 
Aberbach, J. D., and B.A. Rockman. 2002. Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews. Political Science and 
Politics 35 (4):673-676. 
Aberbach, J. D., R. D. Putnam, and B. A. Rockman. 1981. Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western 
Democracies. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Agresti, A. 2007. An Introduction to Categorical Data Analysis. Hoboken (NJ): John Wiley and Sons. 
Akkerman, A. 2005. Verhoudingen tussen de Sociale Partners in Nederland anno 2005: Corporatisme of 
Lobbyisme? Beleid en Maatschappij 32 (4):187-198. 
Albrow, M. 1970. Bureaucracy. London: Macmillan press. 
Aldrich, H.E., and J. Pfeffer. 1976. Environments of Organizations. Annual Review of Sociology 2:79-105. 
Aldrich, H.E., C. Zimmer, U. Staber, and J.J. Beggs. 1994. Minimalisation and Organizational Mortality: 
Patterns of Disbanding Among U.S. Associations, 1990-1983. In Organizational Evolution: New 
Directions, edited by J. V. Singh. Newbury Park (CA): Sage. 
Allison, G., and P. Zelikow. 1999. Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Second 
edition. New York: Longman. 
Austen-Smith, D. (1993). Information and Influence: Lobbying Agendas and Votes. American Journal of 
Political Science 37(3): 799-833. 
Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books. 
Barkey, K. 1994. Bandits and Bureaucrats. The Ottoman Route to State Centralization. Ithaca 
Baumgartner, F. R. 1996. Public Interest Groups in France and the United States. Governance: an 
International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 9 (1):1-22. 
Baumgartner, F.R., and B.D. Jones. 1993. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Baumgartner, F.R., and B.L. Leech. 1998. Basic Interests. The Importance of Groups in Politics in Political 
Scientists. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press. 
Becker, G. 1985. Public Policies, Pressure Groups and Dead Weight Costs. Journal of Public Economics 
28:329-347. 
Becker, U. 2001. 'Miracle' by Consensus? Consensualism and Dominance in Dutch Employment 
Development. Economic and Industrial Democracy 22 (4):453-483. 
Becker, U. 2005. An Example of Competitive Corporatism? The Dutch Political Economy 1983-2004 in 
Critical Examination. Journal of European Public Policy 12 (6):1078-1102. 
Bekke, H.A.G.M., and F.M. Meer van der. 2000. West-European Civil Service Systems: Variations and 
Similarities. In Civil Service Systems in Western Europe, edited by H. A. G. M. Bekke and F. M. Meer 
van der. Chettenham: Edward Elgar. 
Bekke, H.A.G.M., J. L. Perry, and Th. A. J. Toonen. 1996. Civil Service Systems in Comparative 
Perspective. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Bennet, A., and B. Braumoeller. 2005. Where the Model Frequently Meets the Road: Combining Statistical, 
Formal and Case Study Methods. Working Paper, IQRM January 2005 Arizona State University 
Benson, J.K. 1975. The Interorganizational Network as a Political Economy. Administrative Science 
Quarterly 20 (2):229-249. 
Berg, J. Th. J., and H.A.A. Molleman. 1977. Crisis in de Nederlandse Politiek. Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Samsom. 
Berkhout, J., and D. Lowery. 2008. Counting Organized Interests in the EU. A Comparison of Data 
Sources. Journal of European Public Policy 15(4):489-513 
Bernhagen, P. (2007). The Political Power of Business: Structure and Information in Public Policymaking. 
London, Routledge. 
Bernhagen, P. and T. Brauniger (2005). Structural Power and Public Policy: A Signaling Model of Business 
Lobbying in Democratic Capitalism. Political Studies 53(1): 43-64. 
Berry, J.M. 1997. The Interest Group Society. 3rd edition. Boston: Little, Brown. 
Berry, J.M. 2002. Validity and Reliability Issues in Elite Interviewing. PS-Political Science and Politics 35 
(4):679-682. 
Beyers, J. 2002. Gaining and Seeking Access. The European Adaptation of Domestic Interest Associations. 
European Journal of Political Research 41 (5):585-612. 
Beyers, J. 2004. Voice and Access. Political Practices of European Interest Associations. European Union 
Politics 5 (2):211-240. 
Beyers, J., and B. Kerremans. 2004. Bureaucrats, Politicians, and Societal Interests. How is European 
Policy Making Politicized? Comparative Political Studies 37 (10):1119-1150. 
References 
 239 
Beyers, J., and B. Kerremans. 2007. Critical Resource Dependencies and the Europeanization of Domestic 
Interest Groups. Journal of European Public Policy 14 (3):460-481. 
Beyers, J., and J. Trondal. 2004. How Nation-States 'Hit' Europe. Ambiguity and Representation in the 
European Union. West European Politics 27 (5):1057-1078. 
Blom-Hansen, J. 2001. Organized Interests and the State: A Disintegrating Relationship? Evidence from 
Denmark. European Journal of Political Research 39 (3):391-416. 
Börzel, T. A. 1998. Organizing Babylon - On The Different Conceptions of Policy Networks. Public 
Administration 76:253-273. 
Bouwen, P. 2002. Corporate Lobbying in the European Union: The Logic of Access. Journal of European 
Public Policy 9 (3):365-390. 
Bouwen, P. 2004. Exchanging Access Goods for Access: A Comparative Study of Business Lobbying in the 
European Union Institutions. European Journal of Political Research 43 (3). 
Bouwen, P., and M. McCown. 2007. Lobbying versus Litigation: Political and Legal Strategies of Interest 
Representation in the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy 14 (3):422-443. 
Brady, H.E., and D. Collier, eds. 2004. Rethinking Social Inquiry. Diverse Tools, Shared Standards. Oxford: 
Roman and Littlefield Publishers. 
Brambor, T., W. R. Clark, et al. (2006). Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses. 
Political Analysis 14: 63-82. 
Breeman, G., and A. Timmermans. 2007. Responsieve Overheid. Politieke en Maatschappelijke 
agendavorming. Nederlands Codeboek:  Wageningen University / Leiden University. 
Breeman, G., D. Lowery, C. Poppelaars, S. Resodihardjo, A. Timmermans, and J. Vries de. 2008. Political 
Attention in a Coalition System: Analyzing Queen's Speeches in the Netherlands 1954-2007. Acta 
Politica:forthcoming. 
Broscheid, A., and D. Coen. 2007. Lobbying Activity and Fora Creation in the EU: Empirically Exploring 
the Nature of the Policy Good. Journal of European Public Policy 14 (3):346-365. 
Brown, M. 1999. Reconceptualizing Public and Private in Urban Regime Theory: Governance in AIDS 
Politics. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 23 (1):70-87. 
Bueren van, E.M., E-H. Klijn, and J.F.M. Koppenjan. 2003. Dealing with Wicked Problems in Networks: 
Analyzing an Evironmental Debate from a Network Perspective. Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory 13 (2):193-212. 
Burke, John P. 1986. Bureaucratic Responsibility. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. 
Caren, N., and A. Panofsky. 2005. QTCA. A Technique for Adding Temporality to Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis. Sociological Methods & Research 34 (2):147-172. 
Carpenter, D.P. 2001. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy 
Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press. 
Carpenter, D.P. 2004. Protection without Capture: Product Approval by a Politically Responsive, Learning 
Regulator. American Political Science Review 98 (4):613-631. 
Chubb, J. E. 1983. Interest Groups and the Bureaucracy. Stanford: Stanford university press. 
Coen, D. 2007. Empirical and Theoretical Studies in EU Lobbying. Journal of European Public Policy 14 
(3). 
Collier, D., and J.E. Jr. Mahon. 1993. Conceptual 'Stretching' Revisited: Adapting Categories in 
Comparative Analysis. American Political Science Review 87 (4):845-855. 
COM. 2002. General Principles and Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by the 
Commission: European Committee. 
Cook, T.D., and D.T. Campbell. 1979. Quasi-experimentation. Design and Analysis Issues for Field 
Settings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 
Czaja, R., and J. Blair. 1996. Desiging Surveys. A Guide to Decisions and Procedures. California: Thousand 
Oaks. 
Dahl, R.A. 2005[1961]. Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Dijkstra, G.S.A., and F.M. Meer van der. 2003. Disentangling Blurring Boundaries: The Public/Private 
Dichotomy from an Organizational Perspective. Retracing Public Administration 7:89-106. 
Downs, A. 1967. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little, Brown & Company. 
Dunleavy, P. 1991. Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice. Economic Explanations in Political 
Science. Herfordshire: Harrester and Wheatsheaf. 
Duyvendak, J.W., H.A. van der Heijden, R. Koopmans, and L. Wijmans, eds. 1992. Tussen Verbeelding en 
Macht. 25 jaar Nieuwe Sociale Bewegingen in Nederland. Amsterdam: sua. 
Eising, R. 2007. The Access of Business Interests to EU institutions: Towards Elite Pluralism. Journal of 
European Public Policy 14 (3):384-403. 
Favell, A. 2001. Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and 
Britain. 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Fearon, J.D. 1991. Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science. World Politics 43:169-195. 
Appendix III 
 240 
Field, A. 2005. Discovering Statistics Using SPSS. London: Sage Publications. 
Forbes, G. 1994. Modern Logic. A Text in Elementary Symbolic Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Fowler, F. J. jr. 2002. Survey Research Methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Frederickson, H.G., and K.B. Smith. 2003. The Public Administration Theory Primer. Boulder: Westview 
Press. 
Gaines, B.J., and J.H. Kuklinski. 2006. The Logic of the Survey Experiment Reexamined. Political Analysis 
15:1-20. 
Gelman, A., G. King, and L. Chuanhai. 1998. Not Asked and Not Answered: Multiple Imputation for 
Multiple Surveys. Journal of the American Statistical Association 93 (443):846-857. 
George, A.L., and A. Bennet. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 
Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. 
Gerring, J. 2006. Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gerring, J., and P.A. Barresi. 2003. Putting Ordinary Language to Work. A Min-Max Strategy of Concept 
Formation in the Social Sciences. Journal of Theoretical Politics 15 (2):201-232. 
Goertz, G. 2006. Social Science Concepts. A User's Guide, Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Goggin, M.L, A. Bowman, P.J. Lester, and L.J. O'Toole Jr. 1990. Implementation Theory and Practice. 
Toward a Third Generation. Glenview 
Gormley, W. T., and S. J. Balla. 2004. Bureaucracy and Democracy: Accountability and Performance. 
Washington D.C.: CQ Press. 
Gormley, W.T. 1983. Policy, Politics, and Public Utility Regulation. American Journal of Political Science 
27 (1):86-105. 
Gray, V., and D. Lowery. 1996a. The Population Ecology of Interest Representation: Lobbying 
Communities in the American States. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Gray, V., and D. Lowery. 1996b. A Niche Theory of Interest Representation. Journal of Politics 58 (1):91-111. 
Gray, V., and D. Lowery. 1998. To Lobby Alone or in a Flock - Foraging Behavior among Organized 
Interests. American Politics Quarterly 26 (1):5-34. 
Grindle, M.S. 1980. Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World. Princeton (NJ): Princeton 
University Press. 
Groves, R.M., F. J. jr. Fowler, M.P. Couper, J.M. Lepkowski, E. Singer, and R. Tourangean. 2004. Survey 
Methodology. Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons. 
Hall, P.A. 1993. Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State. Comparative Politics 25:275-296. 
Hannan, M.T., and J. Freeman. 1977. The Population Ecology of Organizations. The American Journal of 
Sociology 82 (5):929-964. 
Hardin, R. 2002. Trust and Trustworthiness. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Hargrove, E.C., and J.C. Glidewell. 1990. Impossible Jobs in Public Management. Kansas: Kansas 
University Press. 
Hart de, J. 2005. Landelijk Verenigd. Grote Ledenorganisaties over Ontwikkelingen op het Maatschappelijk 
Middenveld, Civil Society en Vrijwilligerswerk IV. Den Haag: SCP. 
Hill, L.B. 1991. Who Governs the American Administrative State? A Bureaucratic-Centered Image of 
Governance. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 1 (3):261-294. 
Hofstede, G. 1998. Attitudes, Values and Organizational Culture. Disentangling the Concepts. 
Organization Studies 19 (3):477-492. 
Hojnacki, M. 1998. Organized Interests and the Decision to Join Alliances or Work Alone. American 
Journal of Political Science 41 (1):61-87. 
Honaker, J., G. King, and M. Blackwell. 2007. Amelia II: A Program for Missing Data. Harvard: Harvard 
University. 
Hood, Ch. 1995. The 'New Public Management' in the 1980s. Variations on a Theme. Accounting, 
Organisations and Society 20 (2/3):93-109. 
Huitema, D. 2005. In een Groen, Groen Polderland: De Mix tussen Corporatisme en Lobbyisme in het 
Nederlandse Milieubeleid. Beleid en Maatschappij 324 (4):199-210. 
Huntington, S.P. 1961. Interservice Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services. American 
Political Science Review 55 (1):40-52. 
Hupe, P.L. 2000. Interdepartementaal Onderhandelen: Het Werkgelegenheidsplan van Minister Den Uyl 
(1981-1982). In Publiek Onderhandelen. Een Vorm van Eigentijds Besturen, edited by P. L. Hupe, M. 
A. Beukenholdt- ter Mors and H. L. Klaassen. Alpen aan den Rijn: Samsom. 
Jacobs, D. 1974. Dependency and Vulnerability: An Exchange Approach to the Control of Organizations. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 19 (1):45-59. 
Jordan, G. 2006. More than a 'Cacophony of Discordant Sounds'? Orchestrating Comparative Research: 
University of Aberdeen; Department of Politics and International relations. 
Judge, W. Q., and R. Dooley. 2006. Strategic Alliance Outcomes: A Transaction-Cost Economics 
Perspective. British Journal of Management 17:23-37. 
References 
 241 
Kahane, L.H. 2001. Regression Basics. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Katzenstein, Peter J. 2003. Small States and Small States Revisited. New Political Economy 8 (1):2003. 
Kennedy, P. 2003. A Guide to Econometrics. 5th edition. Cambridge: the MIT Press. 
King, G., and L Zeng. 2007. When Can History Be Our Guide? The Pitfalls of Counterfactual Inference. 
International Studies Quarterly 51 (183-210). 
King, G., C.J.L. Murray, J.A. Salomon, and A. Tandon. 2004. Enhancing the Validity and Cross-Cultural 
Comparability of Measurement in Survey Research. American Political Science Review 98 (1):191-207. 
King, G., J. Honaker, A. Joseph, and K. Scheve. 2001. Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data: An 
Alternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation. American Political Science Review 95 (1):49-69. 
King, G., R.O. Keohane, and S. Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press. 
Kjaer, A.M. 2004. Governance. Cambridge (UK), Malden (USA): Polity press. 
Kohler-Koch. 1997. Organized Interests in the EC and the European Parliament. European online papers 
1:1-17. 
Kollman, K. 1998. Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies. Princetion (NJ): 
Princeton University Press. 
Koopmans, R. 1999. Political. Opportunity. Structure. Some Splitting to Balance the Lumping. Sociological 
Forum 14 (1):93-105. 
Koopmans, R., and P. Statham, eds. 2000. Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relation Politics: 
Comparative European Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Koopmans, Ruud. 2002. Zachte Heelmeesters. Een Vergelijking van de Resultaten van het Nederlandse en 
Duitse Integratiebeleid en wat de WRR Daaruit niet Concludeert. Migrantenstudies 18 (2):87-92. 
Kuipers, S.L. 2004. Cast in Concrete? The Institutional Dynamics of Belgian and Dutch Social Policy 
Reform. Delft: Eburon. 
Lebow, R.N. 2000. What's So Different About A Counterfactual? World Politics 52:550-585. 
Leech, B.L. 2002. Asking Questions: Techniques for Semistructured Interviews. Political Science and 
Politics 35 (4):665-668. 
Leech, B.L., F.R. Baumgartner, T.M. La Pira, and N. A. Semanko. 2005. Drawing Lobbyists to Washington: 
Government Activity and the Demand for Advocacy. Political Research Quarterly 58 (1):19-30. 
Levine, S., and P.E. White. 1961. Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Interorganizational 
Relationships. Administrative Science Quarterly 5 (4):583-601. 
Lieberman, E.S. 2005. Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research. American 
Political Science Review 99 (3):435452. 
Lijphart, A. 1971. Comparitive Politics and the Comparative Method. American Political Science Review 65 
(3):682-693. 
Lijphart, A. 1999. Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Lijphart, A., and M.M. Crepaz. 1991. Corporatism and Consensus Democracy in Eighteen Countries: 
Conceptual and Empirical Linkages. British Journal of Political Science 21:235-246. 
Lindblom, Ch.E., and E. Woodhouse, J. 1993. The Policy-Making Process. Third Edition. New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall. 
Lindvall, J., and J. Sebring. 2005. Policy Reform and the Decline of Corporatism in Sweden. West 
European Politics 28 (5):1057-1074. 
Lipsky, M. 1980. Street-Level Bureaucracy. Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services. New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation. 
Litwin, M. 1995. How to Measure Survey Reliability and Validity. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Long, J.S. 1997. Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables. Thousand Oaks: 
Sage Publications. 
Lowery, D. 1998. Consumer Sovereignty and Quasi-Market Failure. Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory 8 (2):137-172. 
Lowery, D., and H. Brasher. 2004. Organized Interests and American Government. New York: McGraw 
HIll. 
Lowery, D., and V. Gray. 2004. A Neopluralist Perspective on Research on Organized Interests. Political 
Research Quarterly 57 (1):163-175. 
Lowery, D., C. Poppelaars, and J. Berkhout. 2008. The European Interest System in Comparative 
Perspective: A Bridge too Far? West European Politics forthcoming. 
Lowi, Th. J. 1964. American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and political Theory. World Politics 
16:677-715. 
Lowi, Th., J. 1972. Four Systems of Policy, Politics and Choice. Public Administration Review 32 (4):298-
310. 
Lynn, L. E. Jr., C.J. Heinrich, and C.J. Hill. 2001. Improving Governance: A New Logic for Empirical 
Research. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
Appendix III 
 242 
Mahoney, C. 2004. The Power of Institutions. State and Interest Group Activity in the European Union. 
European Union Politics 5 (4):441-466. 
Mahoney, C. 2007. Networking vs Allying: The Decision of Interest Groups to Join Coalitions in the US 
and the EU. Journal of European Public Policy 14 (3):366-383. 
Mahoney, J. 2000. Path Dependence in Historical Sociology. Theory and Society 29 (4):507-548. 
Mahoney, J., and D. Rueschemeyer, eds. 2003. Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mair, Peter. 2005. Introduction to Sartori's 1967 Manuscript on ' Party Types, Organisation and Function'. 
West European Politics 28 (1):1-5. 
Marks, G., L. Hooghe, and K. Blank. 1996. European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric versus 
Multilevel Governance. Journal of Common Market Studies 34 (3):341-378. 
Mayntz, R., and F. Scharpf. 1995. Gesellschaftliche Selbstregelung und Politische Steuerung. 
Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag. 
McAdam, D. 1996. Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions. In Comparative 
Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural 
Framings, edited by D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy and M. N. Zald. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
McClelland, J.S. 1998. A History of Western Political Thought. London: Routledge. 
Meer van der, M., J. Visser, T. Wilthagen, and P.F. Heijden van der. 2003. Weg van het Overleg? 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
Meier, Kenneth, J. 1997. Bureaucracy and Democracy. The Case for More Bureaucracy and Less 
Democracy. Public Administration Review 57 (3):193-1999. 
Migdal, J.S. 1988. Strong Societies and Weak States. State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the 
Third World. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press. 
Mill, J.S. 1970[1843]. A system of Logic. Ratiocinative and Inductive. Being a Connected View of the 
Principles of Evidence and the Methodology of Scientific Investigation. London: Longmans, Green and 
Co. 
Miller, G.E., and I. Iscoe. 1990. The Case of State Health Care Commissioners. In Impossible Jobs in 
Public Management, edited by E. C. Hargrove and J. C. Glidewell. Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas. 
Milward, H. B., and K. Provan, G. 2000. Governing the Hollow State. Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory 10 (2):359-379. 
Moe, T.M. 1985. Control and Regulation in Economic Regulation: the Case of the NLRB. American 
Political Science Review 79 (4):1094-1116. 
Molina, O., and M. Rhodes. 2005. Corporatism: The Past, Present and Future of a Concept. Annual Review 
of Political Science 5:305-331. 
Moore, Mark H. 1990. Leadership in the Houston Police Department. In Impossible Jobs in Public 
Management, edited by E. C. Hargrove and J. C. Glidewell. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. 
Mueller, D.C. 2003. Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
National_Statistics. 2006. Civil Service Statistics 2006. Amendment. London: National Statistics. 
Niskanen, W.A. 1971. Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton. 
Noort van, W., L. Huberts, and L. Rademakers. 1987. Protest en Pressie. Een Systematische Analyse van 
Collectieve Actie. Assen 
Nurosis, M.J. 2007. SPSS Advanced Statistical Procedures Companion. New Yersey: Prentice Hall. 
Odendahl, T, and A. Shaw, M. 2002. Interviewing Elites. In Handbook of Interview Research, edited by J. 
F. Gubrium and J. A. Holstein. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
OECD. 1997. Employment Outlook 1997: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). 
OECD. 2003. Managing Senior Management. Senior Civil Service Reform in OECD Member Countries: 
Organisation for Economic Co-peration and Development. 
Oldersma, J., W. Portegijs, and M. Janzen-Marquard. 1999. The Iron Ring in Dutch Politics Revisited. 
Public Administration 77 (2):335-360. 
Olsen, J.P. 2002. The Many Faces of Europeanization. Online Papers: Arena. 
Olson, M. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
ORC_International. 2006. Senior Civil Service Overall Highlights Report. London: ORC Internationa. 
Orr, Sh. K. 2005. New Technology and Research: An Analysis of Internet Survey Methodology in Political 
Science. PSOnline:263-267. 
Ostrom, E. 1998. A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action. Presidential 
Address, American Political Science Association, 1997. American Political Science Review 92 (1):1-22. 
Ostrom, E., and J. Walker, eds. 2003. Trust and Reciprocity. Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental 
Research. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
References 
 243 
O'Toole Jr., L.J. 2000. Research on Policy Implementation: Assessment and Prospects. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 10 (2):263-288. 
O'Toole Jr., L.J., K.I. Hanf, and P.L. Hupe. 1997. Managing Implementation Processes in Nnetworks. In 
Managing Complex Networks: Strategies for the Public Sector, edited by W. J. M. Kickert, E.-H. Klijn 
and J. F. M. Koppenjan. London: Sage. 
Page, E.C., and V. Wright. 2001. Conclusion: Senior Officials in Western Europe. In Bureaucratic Elites in 
Western European states, edited by E. C. Page and V. Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Palombara La, Joseph. 1964. Interest Groups in Italian Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Pelassy, D., and M. Dogan. 1990. How to Compare Nations. Strategies in Comparative Politics. 2nd ed. 
Chatham: Chatham House Publishers Inc. 
Pesch, U. 2005. The Predicaments of Publicness. An Inquiry into the Conceptual Ambiguity of Public 
Administration. Delft: Eburon. 
Peters, B. G. 1988. Comparing Public Bureaucracies. Problems of Theory and Method. Tuscaloosa: The 
University of Alabama Press. 
Peters, B. G., and J. Pierre. 2001. Civil Servants and Politicians. The Changing Balance. In Politicians, 
Bureaucrats and Administrative Reform, edited by B. G. Peters and J. Pierre. London: Routledge. 
Peters, B. G., and J. Pierre. 2004. Politicization of the Civil Service. Concepts, Causes and Consequences. 
In Politicization of the Civil Service in Comparative Perspective. The Quest for Control, edited by B. G. 
Peters and J. Pierre. London: Routledge. 
Peters, B.G. 1990. The Necessity and Difficulty of Comparison in Public Administration. Asian Journal of 
Public Administration 12 (1):3-28. 
Peters, B.G. 1998. Comparative Politics. Theory and Method. Houndsmill: Palgrave Publishers ltd. 
Peters, B.G. 2001. The Politics of Bureaucracy. 5 ed. New York: Routlege. 
Pfeffer, J., and G. R. Salancik. 2003[1978]. The External Control of Organizations. A Resource Dependence 
Perspective. California: Stanford Business Books. 
Pierre, J., and B.G. Peters. 2000. Governance, Politics and the State. London: McMillan Press Ltd. 
Pierson, P. 2004. Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Pollitt, Ch., and G. Bouckaert. 2004. Public Management Reform. A Comparative Analysis. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Poppelaars, C. 2007. Resource exchange in Urban Governance. On the Means that Matter. Urban Affairs 
Review 43 (1):3-27. 
Poppelaars, C., and P. Scholten. 2008. Two Worlds Apart. The Divergence of National and Local 
Immigrant Integration Policies in the Netherlands. Administration and Society 40 (4):335-357. 
Posner, Richard A. 1974. Theories of Economic Regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science 5 (2). 
Pressman, J. L., and A. Wildavsky. 1984[1973]. Implementation. How Great Expectations in Washington 
Are Dashed In Oakland. Third ed. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Prezworski, A., and H. Teune. 1970. The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New York: John Wiley and 
Sons. 
Provan, K, G., and H.B. Milward. 2001. Do Networks Really Work? A Framework for Evaluating Public-
Sector Organizational Networks. Public Administration Review 61 (4):414-423. 
Provan, K, G., M.A. Veazie, L.K. Staten, and N.L. Teufel-Shone. 2005. The Use of Network Analysis to 
Strengthen Community Partnerships. Public Administration Review 65 (5):603-613. 
Ragin, Ch.C. 1987. The Comparative Method. Moving beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Ragin, Ch.C. 2000. Fuzzy-Set Social Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Rhodes, R.A.W. 1990. Policy Networks. A British Perspective. Journal of Theoretical Politics 2 (3):293-317. 
Rhodes, R.A.W. 2000. The Governance Narrative: Key Findings and Lessons from the ESRC's Whitehall 
Programme. Public Administration 78 (2):345-363. 
Rihoux, B., and C. Ragin. 2004. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA): State of the Art and Prospects. In 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Chicago. 
Ripley, R.B., and G.A. Franklin. 1986. Policy Implementation and Bureaucracy. Chicago: The Dorsey 
Press. 
Rogers, E.M. 2003[1962]. Diffusion of Innovations. New York: Free Press. 
Rokkan, S. 1969. Cross-National Survey Research: Historical, Analytical and Substantive Contexts. In 
Comparative Survey Analysis, edited by S. Rokkan, S. Verba and E. Almasy. 
Rommetvedt, H. 2005. Norway: Resources Count, But Votes Decide? From Neo-Corporatist 
Representation to Neo-Pluralist Parliamentarism. West European Politics 28 (4):740-763. 
Rosenthal, U. 1988. Bureaupolitiek en Bureaupolitisme. Om het Behoud van een Competitief 
Overheidsbestel. Alpen aan den Rijn: Samsom H.D. Tjeenk Willink. 
Rosenthal, U., H.G. Geveke, and P. Hart 't. 1994. Beslissen in een Competitief Overheidsbestel: 
Appendix III 
 244 
Bureaupolitiek en Bureaupolitisme nader Beschouwd. Acta Politica 29 (3):309-334. 
Roy le, Crince. 1969. De Vierde Macht. 's-Gravenhage. 
Rutgers, M. 2004. Grondslagen van de Bestuurskunde. Historie, Begripsvorm en Kennisintegratie. 
Bussum: Coutinho. 
Rutgers, M.R. 2001. Traditional Flavors? The Different Sentiments in European and American 
Administrative Thought. Administration and Society 33 (2):220-244. 
Salisbury, R.H. 1984. Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions. American Political Science 
Review 78 (1):64-76. 
Salisbury, R.H., J.P. Heinz, R.L. Nelson, and E.O. Laumann. 1992. Triangles, Networks, and Hollow Cores: 
The Complex Geometry of Washington Interest Representation. In The Politics of Interests. Interest 
Groups Transformed, edited by M. P. Petracca. Boulder: Westview. 
Sartori, G. 1970. Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics. American Political Science Review 64 
(4):1033-1053. 
Sartori, G. 1984. Guidelines for Concept Analysis. In Social Science Concepts, edited by G. Sartori. Beverly 
Hills: Sage publications. 
Sartori, G. 1991. Comparing and Miscomparing. Journal of Theoretical Politics 3 (3):243-257. 
Sartori, G. 2005[1967]. Party Types, Organisation and Functions. West European Politics 28 (1):5-32. 
Scharpf, F. 1997. Games Real Actors Play. Actor-centred Institutionalism in Policy Research. Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press. 
Scharpf, F. 1999. Governing in Europe. Effective and Democratic? Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Schattschneider, E.E. 1970[1960]. The Semi-Sovereign People. Hinsdale (Illinois): The Dryden Press. 
Schendelen van, M.P.C.M. 1992. Het nut van Haagse Politieke Netwerken. Bestuurskunde 1(8): 395-401 
Schmitter, Ph.C. 1985. Neo-Corporatism and the State. In The Political Economy of Corporatism, edited by 
W. Grant. London: McMillan Publisher Ltd. 
Schmitter, Ph.C. 1989. Corporatism is Dead! Long Live Corporatism! The Andrew Shonfield Lectures (IV). 
Government and Opposition 24:54-73. 
Scholz, J.T., and F.H. Wei. 1986. Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist System. American Political 
Science Review 80 (4):1249-1270. 
Scott, W.R. 2001. Institutions and Organizations. 2nd edition. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Selznick, Ph. 1953. TVA and the Grassroots. A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organizations. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Siaroff, A. 1999. Corporatism in 24 Industrial Democracies: Meaning and Measurement. European 
Journal of Political Research 36 (2):175-205. 
Simon, H. A. 1997[1947]. Administrative Behavior. A Study of Decision-Making Processes in 
Administrative Organizations. 4th ed. New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc. 
Sinharray, S., H.S. Stern, and D. Russel. 2001. The Use of Multiple Imputation for the Analysis of Missing 
Data. Psychological Methods 6 (4):317-329. 
Smith, M.A. 2000. American Business and Political Power. Chicago: University of Chicago. 
Smith, Th.B. 1973. The Policy Implementation Process. Policy Sciences 4 (2):197-209. 
Sniderman, P.M., E.G. Carmines, G.C. Layman, and M. Carter. 1996. Beyond Race: Social Justice as a Race 
Neutral Idea. American Journal of Political Science 40 (1):33-55. 
Soysal, Y.N. 1994. Limits of Citizenship. Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe. Chicago 
Stern, J. 2003. Terror in the Name of God. Why Religious Militants Kill. New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers. 
Stigler, G.J. 1971. The Theory of Economic Regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science 2 (1):3-21. 
Stone, D. 1997. Policy Paradox. The Art of Political Decision-Making. New York: Norton. 
Suleiman, E.Z. 1974. Politics, Power and Bureaucracy in France. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University 
Press. 
Svara, J. H. 2001. The Myth of the Dichotomy: Complementarity of Politics and Administration in the Past 
and the Future of Public Administration. Public Administration Review 61 (2):176-183. 
Tabachnik, B.G., and L.S. Fidell. 2007. Using Multivariate Statistics. Boston: Pearson. 
Thelen, K. 2003. How Institutions Evolve. Insights from Comparative Analysis. In Comparative Historical 
Analysis in the Social Sciences, edited by J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer. Cambridge: Cambridge 
university press. 
Thijn van, E., ed. 1998. De SORRY-Democratie. Recente Politieke Afaires en de Ministeriële 
Verantwoordelijkheid. Amsterdam: Van Gennip. 
Thompson. 2005. Seeking Effective Power: Why Mayors Need Community Organizations. Perspectives on 
Politics 3 (2):301-308. 
Toke, D., and D. Marsh. 2003. Policy Networks and the GM Crops Issue: Assessing the Utility of a 
Dialectical Model of Policy Networks. Public Administration 81 (2):229-251. 
References 
 245 
Torenvlied, R. 2005. Van Poldermodel naar Lobbymodel. Beleid en Maatschappij 32 (4):167-172. 
Trappenburg, M. 2005. Gezondheidszorg en Democratie. Inaugurele rede. Leiderdorp: Demmenie 
Grafimedia. 
Truman, D. B. 1951. The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion. New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf. 
Tsebelis, G. 2002. Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Tullock, G. 1965. The Politics of Bureaucracy. Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press. 
Vaus de, D. 2002. Analyzing Social Science Data. 50 Key Problems in Data Analysis. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Verba, S. 1969. The Uses of Survey Research in the Study of Comparative Politics: Issues and Strategies. 
In Comparative Survey Analysis, edited by S. Rokkan, S. Verba and E. Almasy.Paris and The Hague: 
Mouton. 
Verkuilen, J. 2005. Assigning Membership in a Fuzzy Set Analysis. Sociological Methods & Research 33 
(4):462-496. 
Visser, J. 2005. Beneath the Surface of Stability: New and Old Modes of Governance in European 
Industrial Relations. European journal of industrial relations 11 (3):287-306. 
Visser, J., and A. Hemerijck. 1997. 'A Dutch Miracle' Job Growth, Welfare Reform and Corporatism in the 
Netherlands. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
Visser, J., and A. Wilts. 2006. 'Reaching out and Fitting in. Dutch Business Associations at Home (and) in 
Europe'. In Governing Interests. Business Associations Facing Internationalization, edited by W. 
Streeck, J. R. Grote, V. Schneider and J. Visser. London: Routledge. 
Waarden van, F. 1992. Emergence and Development of Business Interest Associations. An Example from 
the Netherlands. Organization Studies 13 (4):521-562. 
Webb, E.J., D.T. Campbell, R.D. Sechrest, and L. Schwartz. 1967. Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive 
Research in Social Sciences. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution. 
Weber, M. 2006[1922]. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Paderborn: Voltmedia. 
Weick, K.E. 1969. The Social Psychology of Organizing. Reading (MA): Addison-Wesley. 
Wildavsky, A. 1964. The Politics of the Budgetary Process. Little: Brown. 
Wilson, James Q. 2000[1989]. Bureaucracy. What Government Agencies Do and Why they Do it. USA: 
Basic Books. 
Wilts, A. 2001. Europeanization and the Means of Interest Representation by National Business 
Associations. European Journal of Industrial Relations 7 (3):269-286. 
Winne de, S., E. Plevoets, and L. Sels. 2003. Panel Survey of Organisations in Flanders. Leuven: Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven. 
Witteloostuijn van, A. 2000. Organizational Ecology has a Bright Future. Organization Studies march:v-
xiv. 
Woldendorp, J., and H. Keman. 2007. The Polder Model Reviewed: Dutch Corporatism 1965-2000. 
Economic and Industrial Democracy 28 (3):317-347. 
Woll, C. and A. Artigas (2007). When Trade Liberalization turns into Regulatory Reform: The Impact on 
Business-Government Relations in International Trade Politics. Regulation and Governance 1(2): 121-
138. 
Yackee, J. W., and S. W Yackee. 2006. A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on 
the U.S. Bureaucracy. The Journal of Politics 68 (1):128-139. 
Yackee, S. W. 2005. Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of Interest Group Comments on 
Federal Agency Rulemaking. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 16 (1):103-124. 
Zwart de, F., and C. Poppelaars. 2004. Ontwijkende Administratieve Categorieën en Etnische 
Fragmentatie. Een Internationaal Perspectief. Beleid en Maatschappij 31 (1):3-14. 
Zwart de, F., and C. Poppelaars. 2007. Redistribution and Ethnic Diversity in the Netherlands: 
Accommmodation, Denial and Replacement. Acta Sociologica 50 (4):387-399. 
 
 246 
Dutch Summary 
Navigeren tussen vriend en vijand 
Waarom ambtenaren samenwerken met belangenorganisaties  
 
Inleiding 
In 2004 presenteert de Tijdelijke Commissie Integratie Beleid (TCOI, Commissie-
Blok) haar bevindingen aan de Tweede Kamer. De titel van het rapport, Bruggen 
Bouwen, is een onbedoelde maar treffende samenvatting van het nut van 
immigrantenorganisaties voor de (lokale) overheid. Deze organisaties vervullen 
namelijk een belangrijke functie als aanspreekpunt voor de overheid namens hun 
achterban en vormen hiermee een brug naar diverse, moeilijk bereikbare 
doelgroepen in de samenleving. Deze functie blijkt noodzakelijk in het besturen 
van een cultureel diverse samenleving en onmisbaar om in tijden van crises en 
calamiteiten snel contact te kunnen opnemen met de betreffende doelgroepen. 
Niet alleen in Nederland blijkt deze functie van groot belang te zijn. In New York 
blijken communication channels, oftewel organisaties die contacten hebben met 
verschillende doelgroepen, ook een noodzakelijk middel om grootschalige 
rassenrellen eerder en zonder geweld te beëindigen.  
 Deze casus laat zien dat de capaciteit om als intermediair te fungeren een 
nuttig en noodzakelijk middel is voor ambtenaren en bestuurders om een 
samenleving te besturen. Dit gegeven roept een aantal interessante vragen op. 
Geldt deze capaciteit om als intermediar te fungeren voor meerdere 
beleidsterreinen? Wat zijn andere belangrijke redenen voor ambtenaren om met 
maatschappelijke organisaties samen te werken? En, zijn bepaalde redenen onder 
specifieke omstandigheden belangrijker dan andere en wat zegt dit over de toegang 
van belangenorganisaties tot publieke besluitvorming? Om deze en andere vragen 
te kunnen beantwoorden staat de volgende onderzoeksvraag centraal in deze 
studie: Waarom werken ambtenaren samen met bepaalde belangenorganisaties en 
niet, of in veel mindere mate, met andere?  
Deze vraag wordt in een aantal stappen beantwoord. Ten eerste worden 
bestaande verklaringen voor samenwerking tussen ambtenaren en 
belangenorganisaties in de literatuur vergeleken en besproken. Deze verklaringen 
overlappen en zijn soms zelfs tegenstrijdig. Een belangrijke conclusie is dan ook 
dat mede daardoor geen systematisch antwoord op de vraag kan worden gegeven 
hoe samenwerking tussen ambtenaren en belangenorganisaties varieert onder 
verschillende omstandigheden. Met andere woorden, we kunnen niet systematisch 
afleiden welke omstandigheden leiden tot een beslissende rol voor ambtenaren of 
voor belangenorganisaties in hun samenwerking. Daarom is in deze studie een 
afhankelijkheidsmodel geformuleerd, waarmee de verschillende verklaringen 
geïntegreerd kunnen worden. Vervolgens zijn met behulp van dit model 
verschillende empirische analyses gemaakt van samenwerking tussen ambtenaren 
en belangenorganisaties. Onderstaand worden deze stappen beschreven.  
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1. Drie verklaringen voor samenwerking 
Drie stromingen binnen de literatuur geven antwoord op de vraag waarom 
ambtenaren met bepaalde belangenorganisaties samenwerken en niet, of in 
mindere mate, met andere. De literatuur over beleidsnetwerken gaat ervan uit dat 
de overheid in toenemende mate moet samenwerken met private en/of (semi-) 
publieke partners uit de samenleving. Deze noodzaak is het resultaat van een 
afnemende overheidscapaciteit, zowel vanuit objectief als normatief oogpunt. 
Vanuit deze gedachte zijn vervullen samenwerkingsrelaties tussen ambtenaren en 
belangenorganisaties een evenwichtig wederzijds belang. Een impliciet kernmerk 
van dit wederzijds belang zijn duurzame, langdurige relaties, waarbij routine de 
overhand kan krijgen. Volgens de literatuur over belangenvertegenwoordiging 
kunnen belangenorganisaties zo invloedrijk zijn dat ambtenaren voor een groot 
deel, of zelfs volledig, afhankelijk zijn van de inbreng van deze organisaties bij het 
formuleren en uitvoeren van beleid. De literatuur over bureaupolitiek 
beargumenteert precies het tegenovergestelde. Volgens deze literatuur gedraagt de 
ambtenaar zich als entrepeneur die handelt uit eigen belang of vanuit het belang 
van het organisatie-onderdeel waar hij/zij werkzaam is. Relaties of netwerken met 
belangenorganisaties worden daarmee strategisch ingezet ten behoeve van dit 
eigen belang of dat van de organisatie. Deze notie veronderstelt een ambtenaar die 
in staat is significante invloed uit te oefenen op het netwerk van 
belangenorganisaties waar hij/zij mee samenwerkt. Samengevat leveren deze drie 
stromingen de volgende hypothesen op over samenwerkingsrelaties tussen 
ambtenaren en belangenorganisaties: 
1. Samenwerkingsrelaties tussen ambtenaren en belangenorganisaties zijn 
duurzaam en dienen een evenwichtig wederzijds belang; 
2. Belangenorganisaties domineren samenwerking met ambtenaren vanwege 
hun grote invloed; 
3. Ambtenaren domineren de samenwerking met ambtenaren omdat zij deze 
relaties en netwerken inzetten voor eigen belang of dat van de organisatie.  
Het belangrijkste probleem dat in de bestaande literatuur schuilt is niet zozeer dat 
er geen voldoende verklaringen of inzichten zijn. Het probleem is veel eerder dat 
het haast onmogelijk is om te bepalen wanneer welke verklaring geldig is. We 
weten dus niet  onder welke omstandigheden de ambtenaar een entrepeneur van of 
gevangen is in een netwerk van belangenorganisaties, of wanneer deze relaties een 
evenwichtig wederzijds belang dienen Om antwoord op deze vraag te kunnen 
geven is een theoretisch model nodig waarmee deze verklaringen geïntegreerd 
kunnen worden en relaties tussen belangenorganisaties en ambtenaren 
systematisch kunnen worden vergeleken.  
 
2. Afhankelijkheid tussen ambtenaren en belangenorganisaties 
Wat de bovenstaande theoretische verklaringen gemeen hebben is een impliciet 
idee over een uitruil van goederen. De literatuur over bureaupolitiek stelt dat 
ambtenaren politieke steun ruilen voor toegang tot het besluitvormingsproces. De 
literatuur over belangenvertegenwoordiging stelt dat belangenorganisaties over 
belangrijke goederen beschikken en dat ambtenaren grotendeels of volledig 
afhankelijk zijn van deze organisaties. De literatuur over beleidsnetwerken stelt dat 
belangenorganisaties en ambtenaren beiden over goederen beschikken die nuttig 
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voor elkaar zijn en dat daarom een evenwichtige uitruil van goederen ontstaat. Dit 
uitwisselingsconcept kan daarom als uitgangspunt gebruikt worden voor een 
verklarend model voor samenwerking tussen ambtenaren en belangenorganisatie.  
In de klassieke resource dependence theory, geformuleerd door Pfeffer en Salancik 
(2003[1978]), is deze uitwisseling van goederen de belangrijkste verklarende 
variabele voor samenwerking tussen organisaties. Volgens deze resource dependence 
theory werken organisaties samen omdat ze goederen die ze niet zelf kunnen 
produceren van andere organisaties moeten betrekken. Deze uitwisseling van 
goederen, ook wel afhankelijkheidsrelatie genoemd (degree of dependence), wordt 
door twee factoren bepaald: 1) de aanwezigheid van deze goederen in de omgeving 
van de organisatie en 2) de waarde van deze goederen voor de organisatie in 
kwestie. De aanwezigheid van deze goederen in de omgeving wordt bepaald door 
het aantal organisaties die over deze goederen kunnen beschikken. Dit laatste 
wordt door Pfeffer en Salancik (2003[1978]) de concentratie van goederen 
genoemd. De waarde van de goederen wordt bepaald door het belang van een goed 
voor de organisatie om te overleven. Wanneer beide componenten bekend zijn, kan 
de afhankelijkheidsgraad tussen organisaties bepaald worden.  
Aan deze theorie liggen een aantal assumpties ten grondslag. Ten eerste 
veronderstellen de auteurs dat uitwisseling van goederen niet deterministisch 
bepaald is. Dat wil zeggen dat organisaties de ruimte hebben om strategische 
keuzes te maken met wie ze samenwerken om bepaalde goederen te verkrijgen. 
Daarnaast ligt aan de waarde die aan bepaalde goederen gehecht wordt een 
subjectief oordeel ten grondslag. Datgene wat van belang geacht wordt is subjectief 
bepaald en niet een objectief gegeven (dit is wat Weick (1969) enactment  noemt). 
Een derde assumptie die ten gronslag ligt aan deze resource dependence theory is dat 
deze strategische keuzes betrekking hebben op manipulatie van de omgeving en 
van de afhankelijkheidsrelaties die zijn ontstaan. Dit betekent dat organisaties altijd 
naar volledige autonomie streven en hun samenwerkingsrelaties zodanig inrichten 
of de omgeving zodanig proberen te beïnvloeden dat ze in minimale mate 
afhankelijk zijn van andere organisaties. Kortom, organisatie x werkt samen met 
organisatie y omdat organisatie y de meest strategische keuze is die voorvloeit uit 
een kosten-baten analyse met wie samen te werken om de benodigde goederen te 
bemachtigen. De afhankelijkheidsrelatie, die als gevolg hiervan ontstaat, wordt 
bepaald door de aanwezigheid van deze goederen in de omgeving van de 
organisatie x en de waarde van deze goederen voor organisatie x.  
Als we dit toepassen op samenwerking tussen ambtenaren en 
belangenorganisties, kunnen we het volgende afleiden. Ambtenaren en 
belangenorganisaties werken met elkaar samen omdat ze van elkaar afhankelijk 
zijn voor het verkrijgen van goederen die ze nodig hebben om hun taak goed te 
vervullen. Deze uitwisselingsrelaties worden bepaald door de waarde van deze 
goederen en de aanwezigheid van deze goederen in de omgeving.  
Om de vergelijkende component aan het model toe te voegen, zijn in deze 
studie omgevingsfactoren gedefinieerd die van invloed zijn op deze relaties, in het 
bijzonder op óf de aanwezigheid van goederen in de omgeving óf de waarde van 
deze goederen of op beide elementen. De volgende omgevingsfactoren zijn in deze 
studie gedefinieerd: het regime van belangenvertegenwoordiging, politiek-
ambtelijke verhoudingen, de specifieke functies van een overheidsorganisatie, de 
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cultuur van overheidsorganisaties, de complexiteit van, politieke gevoeligheid van 
en publieke aandacht voor beleidsonderwerpen, framing en Europeanisering. Een 
systematische vergelijking van de invloed van deze omgevingsfactoren op elk van 
de samenstellende elementen van een afhankelijkheidsrelatie, kan de aard van 
relaties tussen ambtenaren en belangenorganisaties bepalen. Met behulp van dit 
model kan dus worden bepaald wanneer een ambtenaar een makelaar van of 
gevangen is in een netwerk van belangenorganisaties.  
Alleen het langetermijn perspectief ontbreekt nu nog in het model. Eerder 
zagen we dat een lange termijn perspectief aan het licht brengt dat dergelijke 
uitwisselingsrelaties een hoge mate van stabiliteit kennen. Om deze stabiliteit 
verder te bestuderen kunnen we inzichten vanuit het historisch institutionalisme 
en evolutionaire rationele keuze theorie gebruiken. De laatste theorie stelt dat 
wanneer een verzameling van actoren gedurende langere tijd met elkaar 
samenwerkt, deze actoren zich meestal rekenschap geven van deze lange termijn. 
Dit betekent dat actoren niet alleen hun eigen belang of nut maximaliseren bij 
samenwerking, zoals in een eenmalige relatie vaak wel het geval is, maar zich 
eerder cooperatief opstellen. Bij lange termijn relaties worden zaken als het 
reduceren van onzekerheid of het vertrouwen dat men heeft in de 
samenwerkingspartner belangrijker dan het maximaliseren van het eigen nut. 
Mogelijke gevolgen in de nabije toekomst, die aan het afbreken van de relatie 
vastzitten, worden dus belangrijker dan de nutsmaximalisatie. Vanuit deze theorie 
redenerend kan een relatie worden voortgezet op basis van een anticiperende 
rationele keuze. Het is een strategische keuze om de relatie voort te zetten, maar 
niet per sé omdat deze relatie in het huidige tijdsgewricht de meest optimale keuze 
is. In de nabije toekomst kan de samenwerkingspartner te belangrijk kan zijn om 
de samenwerking te beëindigen, of het verminderen van onzekerheid wordt van 
groter belang geacht dan nutsmaximalisatie op dit moment.  
Vanuit het historisch instituitionalisme wordt stabiliteit verklaard door te wijzen 
op routinematig gedrag of padafhankelijkheid. Padafhankelijkheid wordt vaak 
gebruikt om de weerbarstigheid van niet-optimale situaties te verklaren. Een 
verandering van de situatie benadeelt snel de belangen van diegenen die het 
meeste baat hebben bij een dergelijk suboptimale situatie. Op basis van de wet van 
actie-reactie, veroorzaakt een voorgestelde verandering een reactie van de 
belangrijkste stakeholders die er belang bij hebben om de status quo te handhaven. 
Hierdoor kunnen suboptimale situaties lange tijd voortduren. Alhoewel het 
historisch institutionalisme vaak gericht is op het verklaren van suboptimale 
situaties, hoeft suboptimaliteit niet de norm te zijn van stabiele instituties. Stabiele 
instituties kunnen nog volledig beantwoorden aan de eisen die destijds gesteld zijn 
vanuit rationeel oogpunt. Dit wordt ook wel rationaliteit uit gewoonte genoemd 
(Simon 1997[1947]). Deze rationaliteit uit gewoonte kan de instandhouding 
verklaren van optimale situaties, maar ook van suboptimale situaties, die in de 
literatuur vaak worden aangeduid als padafhankelijk.  
Deze beide fenomenen geven een andere verklaring voor de uitwisselings-
relaties tussen ambtenaren en belangenorganisaties. Aan de klassieke resource 
dependence theory ligt een strategische keuze ten grondslag. Impliciet is de volgende 
assumptie aan de orde: als de organisatie waarmee wordt samengewerkt niet meer 
beschikt over de goederen die de organisatie in kwestie nodig heeft, dan wordt de 
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relatie beëindigd. De samenwerking voldoet immers niet meer aan de eerder 
gemaakte kosten-baten analyse over de benodigde goederen. Vanuit het historisch 
institutionalisme en de evolutionare rationele keuze theorie wordt duidelijk dat het 
beëindigen van relaties vaak niet mogelijk is. Dergelijke afhankelijkheidsrelaties 
zijn dan niet gebaseerd op een onbeperkte, strategische keuze zoals resource 
dependence theory stelt. Deze afhankelijkheidsrelaties kunnen dan dus ook 
gebaseerd zijn op een anticiperend rationeel gedrag of rationaliteit uit gewoonte.  
Met het hierboven beschreven model is het mogelijk om de aard van 
samenwerkingsrelaties tussen ambtenaren en belangenorganisaties te definieren 
onder verschillende omstandigheden en gedurende een langere tijdsperiode. 
Hiermee biedt dit model een systematische vergelijking van deze 
samenwerkingsrelaties en integreert ze de verschillende verklaringen uit de drie 
theoretische stromingen die beschreven zijn in deze studie. Met de systematische 
vergelijking onder verschillende omstandigheden kan onderscheid gemaakt 
worden tussen de verklaringen van de literatuur over bureaupolitiek en 
belangenvertegenwoordiging. Het lange termijn perspectief kan de verschillende 
soorten rationeel gedrag die ten grondslag kunnen liggen aan 
afhankelijkheidsrelaties verklaren. 
 
3. Samenwerking in de praktijk 
Met het bovenstaande model is het dus mogelijk om op conceptueel niveau 
samenwerking tussen ambtenaren en belangenorganisaties systematisch te 
vergelijken. Om de verklarende kracht van dit model in de praktijk te toetsen, is in 
dit onderzoek data verzameld over deze samenwerkingsrelaties. De benodigde data 
heb ik verzameld met behulp van surveys onder topambtenaren en landelijke 
belangenorganisaties. Voor de topambtenaren heb ik aselecte steekproeven 
genomen op basis van database van de Algemene Bestuursdienst en diens 
internationale equivalenten. Voor de belangenorganisaties heb ik dit gedaan op 
bestaande databases van de populatie van landelijke belangenorganisaties. Het 
ontbreken van een dergelijke database in Nederland vormde een probleem voor de 
dataverzameling en vergelijkbaarheid van deze data met andere landelijke data. 
Daarom heb ik voor de Nederlandse casus een database ontwikkeld van de 
landelijke populatie van belangenorganisaties. Op basis van het register van 
verenigingen en stichtingen van de Kamer van Koophandel heb ik een database van 
landelijke belangenorganisaties geconstrueerd.  
Naast de verzamelde surveydata, die met name geschikt is voor cross-sectionele 
vergelijkingen, zijn semi-gestructureerde interviews gehouden. Deze interviews 
betroffen zowel ambtenaren als vertegenwoordigers van belangenorganisaties 
werkzaam binnen twee beleidsterreinen in Nederland: (sociaal)economisch beleid 
en de gezondheidszorg. Met deze interview-data werd het mogelijk om een lange 
termijn perspectief te benaderen door respondenten te laten reflecteren op hun 
relaties met ofwel belangenorganisaties ofwel ambtenaren over een langere 
periode. Deze data zijn gebruikt om de verklaringskracht van het model te toetsen, 
aanvullende omgevingsfactoren te onderzoeken en het bestaan van alternatieve 
keuzelogica die aan afhankelijkheidsrelaties ten grondslag kunnen liggen te 
onderzoeken. Onderstaand worden de resultaten van ieder van deze empirische 
analyses kort samengevat.  
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3.1 Het afhankelijkheidsmodel heeft verklaringskracht 
Op basis van verschillende analyses is aangetoond dat het afhankelijkheidsmodel 
voldoende verklaring biedt voor samenwerking tussen ambtenaren en 
belangenorganisaties. Zowel de aanwezigheid van goederen in de omgeving van 
belangenorganisaties als de aanwezigheid van deze goederen bij andere 
organisaties zijn gerelateerd aan de afhankelijkheidsgraad. Ook de waarde van 
expertise, implementatiecapaciteit en de capaciteit om als intermediair te fungeren 
zijn hieraan gerelateerd.  
De eerder genoemde omgevingsfactoren blijken beide elementen te 
beïnvloeden. Het regime van belangenvertegenwoordiging en verschil in 
beleidsterreinen hebben invloed op de beschikbaarheid van goederen in de 
omgeving van ambtenaren. De waarde van expertise, implementatiecapaciteit en de 
capaciteit om als intermediair te fungeren is belangrijker in pluralistische regimes, 
dan in corporatistische regimes. De waarde van expertise en implementatie-
capaciteit neemt toe wanneer politiek-strategisch inzicht belangrijker wordt. Dit 
geldt ook voor de capaciteit om als intermediair te fungeren. Expertise neemt af in 
belang voor uitvoerende organisaties, maar de capaciteit om als intermediair te 
voldoen neemt af voor adviserende organisaties. De waarde van legitimiteit varieert 
langs bovengenoemde drie dimensies. Daarnaast varieert de waarde van 
implementatie capaciteit en legitimiteit tussen verschillende beleidsterreinen. 
Wanneer de mate van Europeanisering toeneemt, tot slot, wordt de capaciteit om 
als intermediair te fungeren belangrijker geacht en varieert de waarde van 
legitimiteit voor de ambtenaren in kwestie.  
In het algemeen blijkt dat de beschikbaarheid van goederen in de omgeving 
minder door de omgevingsfactoren zoals opgenomen in het model beïnvloed wordt 
dan de waarde die door ambtenaren aan deze specifieke goederen wordt gehecht.  
 
3.2 Populatiekenmerken bepalen mede de afhankelijkheidsgraad 
De beschikbaarheid van goederen lijken dus minder contextafhankelijk te zijn dan 
de waarde van individuele goederen. Dit kan het gevolg zijn van andere 
omgevingsfactoren dan die in het model zijn opgenomen. Aanvullende factoren die 
onderzocht zijn, omvatten samenwerking en concurrentie tussen 
belangenorganisaties, het belang dat zij hechten aan ambtelijke toegang en het 
effect van Europeanisering. Belangenorganisaties blijken gemiddeld met een klein 
aantal of juist een groot aantal andere belangenorganisaties samen te werken. 
Daarnaast ervaren ze gemiddeld genomen weinig concurrentie van elkaar. 
Belangenorganisaties hechten waarde aan informatie en expertise als goederen om 
aan te bieden, maar veel minder aan de rol die ze kunnen spelen in de 
implementatie van beleid. De ambtelijke organisatie is van belang voor 
belangenorganisaties. Alhoewel ze met nagenoeg evenveel politici als bestuurders 
samenwerken, werken ze wel vaker samen met ambtenaren en worden ambtenaren 
belangrijker geacht voor beleidsbeïnvloeding. Het belang van ambtenaren voor 
belangenorganisaties blijkt tweeledig. Ten eerste zijn ambtenaren van belang om 
zichzelf van toegang te verzekeren tot het beleidsproces. Ten tweede zijn 
ambtenaren van belang om daadwerkelijk invloed uit te oefenen.  
Een grote verandering in de omgeving van belangenorganisaties en 
ambtenaren, Europeanisering, lijkt tot op heden nog relatief weinig invloed te 
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hebben op ambtenaren en belangenorganisaties op landelijk niveau. Ambtenaren 
geven aan dat omzetting van EU richtlijnen of aan de EU gerelateerde 
beleidsaspecten weinig tot niet van belang zijn voor hun taakuitoefening. Ze geven 
aan dat landelijke belangenorganisaties nauwelijks verwijzen naar EU beleid of 
regelgeving. Belangenorganisaties geven aan dat EU beleid en richtlijnen niet of 
nauwelijks hun kansen op het nationaal niveau beïnvloeden. En alhoewel Europa 
over het algemeen wel wordt gezien als een factor van betekenis, lijken 
belangenorganisaties niet goed in staat daar tijdig en effectief op in te spelen.  
Samenwerking en concurrentie tussen belangenorganisaties hebben invloed op 
de afhankelijksheidsgraad die de relaties tussen hen en ambtenaren kenmerkt. 
Samenwerking geeft aan dat er wellicht meer organisaties zijn voor ambtenaren 
om mee samen te werken. Gematigde concurrentie doet dit ook. Sterke 
concurrentie, zeker voor relatief onbekende organisaties, resulteert in een lagere 
beschikbaarheid van goederen omdat minder organisaties toegang hebben tot 
ambtenaren. De waarde die belangenorganisaties toekennen aan goederen kan ook 
invloed hebben op de afhankelijksgraad. Als ambtenaren bepaalde goederen erg 
belangrijk vinden, maar belangenorganisaties vinden dit veel minder, of zijn zich 
hier niet van bewust, kan dit de afhankelijksgraad beïnvloeden. Het belang dat 
belangenorganisaties hebben bij toegang tot de ambtelijke organisaties vermindert 
de afhankelijkheid van ambtenaren. Europeanisering lijkt nauwelijks een effect te 
hebben. In het algemeen suggereren deze bevindingen het belang van contextuele 
factoren gerelateerd aan de omgeving van belangen-organisaties voor het verklaren 
van de afhankelijkheidsrelaties tussen ambtenaren en belangenorganisaties.  
 
3.3 Afhankelijkheid is gebaseerd op verschillende soorten rationeel gedrag 
Naar alle waarschijnlijkheid bepalen niet alleen onbeperkte strategisch keuzes, 
maar ook anticiperend rationeel gedrag en rationaliteit uit gewoonte de 
afhankelijkheid tussen ambtenaren en belagnenorganisaties. Uit de survey blijkt 
dat ambtenaren over het algemeen met bekende organisaties samenwerken. Dit is 
een aanwijzing voor rationaliteit uit gewoonte of anticiperend rationeel gedrag. Een 
bewuste diversificatie is, op het eerste gezicht, een aanwijziging voor onbeperkte 
strategische keuze, terwijl samenwerking met bekende organisaties alle drie de 
keuzelogica’s kan behelzen. Uit de redenen die ambtenaren noemen om met 
belangenorganisaties samen te werken, blijkt dat zowel consultatieprocedures als 
het feit dat samenwerking gebruikelijk is, ook goede verklaringen zijn voor deze 
relaties. Daarnaast blijkt dat ambtenaren vaak samenwerken omdat 
belangenorganisaties een te belangrijk aanspreekpunt zijn om ze te negeren of een 
grote rol spelen in de nationale economie. Deze verschillende redenen verwijzen 
zowel naar rationaliteit uit gewoonte (het is gebruikelijk om samen te werken, 
consultatieprocedures) en anticiperend rationeel gedrag (belangrijke rol als 
aanspreekpunt of in de economie). Wanneer we indicatoren voor deze 
verschillende logica’s toetsen, blijken de indicatoren voor zowel rationaliteit uit 
gewoonte als anticiperend rationeel gedrag beide noodzakelijke voorwaarden te zijn 
voor langdurige relaties. Ze zijn daarnaast gecombineerd noodzakelijk. Een analyse 
van concrete cases van samenwerkingsrelaties geeft blijk van een complexe mix van 
keuzelogica’s die ten grondslag ligt aan de afhankelijkheidsgraad die 
samenwerking tussen ambtenaren en belangenorganisaties kenmerkt.  
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3.4 Het afhankelijkheidsmodel biedt perspectief  
Het model en de empirische resultaten laten zien dat de balans tussen context en 
individuele motieven van belang zijn om samenwerking tussen ambtenaren en 
belangenorganisaties in het bijzonder en institutionele arrangementen in het 
algemeen te verklaren. Het model in deze studie richt de aandacht op het 
deterministische karakter van de klassieke resource dependence theory¸ door te 
wijzen op de invloed van context op zowel de waarde van goederen en de 
beschikbaarheid in de omgeving hiervan. Voor de literatuur over bureaupolitiek 
wijst het model op de noodzaak om de verbinding te leggen tussen politiek-
ambtelijke verhoudingen en organisatorische kwesties met de netwerken van 
belangenorganisaties waarmee ambtenaren in contact zijn. Daarnaast kan een 
gedegen analyse van de aard van de relaties tussen ambtenaren en 
belangenorganisaties met behulp van het afhankelijkheidsmodel meer inzicht 
bieden in de aard van wat door economen en politicologen als capture wordt 
aangeduid. Het systematisch in kaart brengen van de aard van de 
afhankelijkheidsrelatie op basis van de waarde en beschikbaarheid van 
noodzakelijke goederen in de omgeving kan de mate van asymmetrie in een relatie 
goed blootleggen. Het afhankelijkheidsmodel wijst daarnaast op het belang van een 
bredere kijk op belangenvertegenwoordiging in corporatische landen. Vaak gaat 
daar de aandacht uit naar de tripartite onderhandeling tussen werkgevers, 
werknemers en de overheid om zo het succes van (sociaal-) economisch beleid te 
verklaren. Een bredere kijk op belangenvertegenwoordiging vanuit een ander 
pespectief kan meer licht werpen op de beperkte toegang van belangenorganisaties 
en of, en zo ja van wie, de traditionele overlegpartners concurrentie ondervinden. 
Als laatste wijst het model op andere dan alleen strategische overwegingen die aan 
besluitvoring ten grondslag kunnen liggen en die zowel vanuit het historische 
institutionalisme als evolutionaire perspectieven op rationele keuze verklaard 
worden. Op het oog lijken beide theorieën dezelfde mechanismen te verklaren. 
Zicht op de exacte balans tussen context en motieven kan de aard van duurzame 
instituties dus beter ontrafelen.  
 
Tot slot 
Deze studie heeft aangetoond dat samenwerking tussen ambtenaren en 
belangenorganisaties systematisch onderzocht kan worden met behulp van het 
afhankelijkheidsmodel. De afhankelijkheidsgraad, die de relatie tussen ambtenaren 
en belangenorganisaties typeert, kan worden verklaard door de waarde van de 
goederen en de beschikbaarheid van deze goederen in de omgeving te bepalen. 
Beide determinanten varieren langs verschillende politiek-bestuurlijke dimensies. 
Daarnaast toont het model aan dat de afhankelijkheidsrelatie tussen ambtenaren 
en belangenorganisaties niet alleen gebaseerd is op een onbeperkte strategische 
keuze. Samenwerking tussen ambtenaren en belangenorganisaties wordt evenzeer 
bepaald door anticiperend rationeel gedrag en rationaliteit uit gewoonte. Navigeren 
tussen vriend en vijand is dus een kwestie van strategisch kiezen welke goederen 
nodig zijn en met wie samen te werken om deze goederen te verkrijgen, 
anticiperen op de toekomst, en/of het al dan niet onbewust volgen van een pad dat 
in het verleden is ingeslagen. 
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